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In 1958, J.O. Urmson’s landmark article “Saints and Heroes” resulted 
in a renewed interest in supererogation in moral philosophy. However, 
religious engagement with supererogation has remained relatively low. Further 
complicating matters is the fact that dating back to the writings of Martin Luther, 
Philip Melanchthon, and John Calvin, supererogatory deeds in the form of 
“counsels” were rejected due to the soteriological role they played in Aquinas’ 
thought (and other Scholastics) which was used to justify the selling of 
indulgences by the Roman Catholic church. It is no wonder that the Reformers 
rejected supererogation in their aim to refute a view of justification that was not 
sola gratia, sola fide (at least from their perspective).  
However, philosopher Gregory Mellema suggests that there is no 
contradiction in affirming a sola gratia, sola fide doctrine of justification while 
also affirming that a person can perform acts of supererogation. Employing the 
Protestant doctrine of vocation, he suggests that it might be possible in 
Protestant Christian ethics to perform an act of supererogation though the act 
in no way contributes to a person being justified before God (i.e., forgiven of 
sin and declared righteous in God’s sight). This key insight opened the door to 
the possibility of supererogation in Protestant Christian ethics. Though 
Mellema’s proposal is valuable, no specific act is named. In chapter three, I 
argue that there is one clear act of supererogation in the New Testament. 
Working with the two divorce passages in Matthew (5:31-32 and 19:1-9), I 
argue that the following act is supererogatory from a Protestant Christian 
perspective: choosing to remain married to a spouse that has committed 
adultery in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce. This is not to say that this 
is the only one, but it serves as a great example and can be use to justify 
further inquiry into additional supererogatory deeds and the overall value of 
the concept in Protestant thought and practice.  
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In chapter four, I argue that proper motive should be considered an 
official criterion of supererogatory acts in Protestant Christian ethics. This view 
is contrary to David Heyd’s and Alfred Archer’s intent-based theories which, in 
line with John Stuart Mill, dismiss the deontic relevance of motives to acts. I 
argue against their view in an attempt to demonstrate that proper motive is 
necessary, along with the other three basic criteria (1. Not obligatory, 2. Not 
forbidden, 3. Possesses moral value), for an act to be classified as 
supererogatory in Protestant Christian ethics. My overall aim is to build upon 
Mellema’s insight and offer a systematic account of supererogation in 





 “Supererogation” is an awkward term but a useful concept. Essentially, 
it is an act that goes above and beyond the call of duty. If an act is 
supererogatory, then this means that though possessing moral worth, it is fully 
optional. If you do not do it, then no one can assign blame, yet the performance 
of such acts is considered praiseworthy. In this thesis, I argue that Protestants 
have rejected the possibility and role of such acts for far too long. From the 
time of the Reformation and the writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin, 
Protestants have rejected supererogation because this type of act was viewed 
as providing support for the selling of indulgences, which was closely 
connected with a faith+works view of justification that the Reformers 
wholeheartedly rejected in favor of a doctrine of justification is by faith alone.  
 However, Gregory Mellema argued in 1991 that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with affirming the following two propositions: (1) acts of 
supererogation are possible in Protestant ethics, and (2) these same acts can 
in no way justify a person. This key insight opened the door for Protestants to 
reengage with supererogation and ask the question: “Are supererogatory acts 
possible now that they have been decoupled from the doctrine of justification?” 
Building on this insight, I argue in chapter three that there is one clear example 
(this is not to say that there are not others) of supererogation in the New 
Testament: an innocent spouse’s act of remaining and reconciling a marriage 
with a spouse who has committed adultery (Matt. 5:31–32, 19:1–9). Based on 
Jesus’ teaching, the act is not obligatory, it is not forbidden, and it possesses 
moral worth. This act satisfies the three standard criteria for an act to be 
considered supererogatory.  
 I then conclude the thesis in chapter four by arguing that proper motive 
should be a fourth criterion for supererogation in Protestant ethics. This claim 
is somewhat unique because both David Heyd and Alfred Archer—two of the 
most well-known and established moral philosophers in the field—argue that 
proper intent, not motive, is required for an act to be supererogatory. Yet, the 
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emphasis in the New Testament is upon motive (e.g., fasting, praying, giving, 
preaching, etc.), so I argue for this while drawing on German theologian 
Helmut Thielicke’s motive-centric account. 
 It is my hope that as a result of this thesis, Protestants will engage 
supererogation and embrace the concept as a useful tool in counseling 
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The term “supererogation” is not a word that you come across on an 
everyday basis. In its simplest form, it is an act that possesses moral worth but 
is neither obligatory nor forbidden. Thus, it is completely optional. The concept 
remained largely unexamined until J.O. Urmson’s essay, “Saints and Heroes,” 
which was published in 1958. Though he only used the term “supererogatory” 
once in the entire essay,1 his main purpose was to argue that an additional 
category of acts is necessary to classify the full range of acts that human 
beings perform. Urmson’s article generated a great deal of interest in 
supererogation and has in the words of David Heyd: “singlehandedly revived 
the idea of supererogation from its astonishingly long post-Reformation 
slumber.”2 This led to the first systematic treatment of the idea of 
supererogation in the history of moral philosophy. Since then, a significant 
body of literature has emerged in an effort to not only debate the possibility of 
such acts within deontologically-oriented normative theories, but also to treat 
the more nuanced issues related to supererogation such as the relevance of 
character, the role of intentions and motives, whether an act can really possess 
moral worth but not be obligatory, whether “smaller” acts are candidates of 
supererogation, and several other important issues. 
The main purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate the possibility, internal 
structure, and role of supererogatory acts in Protestant Christian ethics. The 
concept has been wrongly rejected for far too long by Protestant thinkers, 
which is unfortunate because for so many Christians, the concept may prove 
helpful in trying to make sense of their moral obligations in a morally complex 
 
1 James Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden 
(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1958), 214. This is worth noting because 
Deborah Barnbaum writes that Urmson did not use the term “supererogation” in his article. 
She is mistaken, unless she is being overparticular and not counting the term 
“supererogatory” as an instance of “supererogation.” It is more likely that this is a simple 
oversight on her part. See Deborah R. Barnbaum, “Supererogation in Clinical Research,” 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (2008): 344. 
2 David Heyd, "Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?" Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 25. 
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world. I first became interested in supererogation while completing my 
undergraduate studies. As for most American students taking courses in 
philosophy, Peter Singer’s 1972 article, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” was 
required reading. Having been raised in a middle-class family in a small rural 
town in Northeast Texas, I had never been exposed to philosophy, much less 
the ideas of Singer. As a result of his writings and additional research, I learned 
that 15,000–20,000 children under the age of five die every day from causes 
that are largely preventable by small donations from relatively affluent people 
in the West.3 As Singer notes, these causes have not always been easily 
preventable. It was not until the latter half of the 20th century and the rapid rise 
of “instant communication and swift transportation”4 that it became just as easy 
(if not easier) to help someone on the other side of the world as the neighbor 
next door. Because reputable humanitarian organizations are in a position to 
help, a person can in as little as five minutes save a person’s life by donating 
via a smartphone. I became convinced that technological advances can alter 
the classification of an act in some circumstances. This is essentially the point 
that Singer makes when he writes: “the development of the world into a ‘global 
village’ has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our 
moral situation.”5 Singer’s piece was unsettling because I was forced—
especially considering my personal faith in Jesus Christ and his command to 
love of neighbor—to rethink my understanding of “neighbor” and to consider 
adopting an “imaginative redefinition of neighbor” that included “more 
expansive, if not nonexistent, neighbor boundaries.”6 Granted, I am not a 
utilitarian which obviously undergirds his more general approach to the issue 
 
3 This number depends upon the source. In a relatively recent update, UNICEF reports 
the following: “In 2018 alone, roughly 15,000 under-five deaths occurred every day, an 
intolerably high number of largely preventable child deaths.” See UNICEF, “Under-five 
mortality,” accessed February 5th, 2020, https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-
five-mortality/.  
4 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 
(1972): 232. 
5 Ibid., 232. 
6 Thomas W. Walker, “Who is My Neighbor? An Invitation to See the World with Different 
Eyes,” in Global Neighbors: Christian Faith and Moral Obligation in Today’s Economy, ed. 
Douglas A. Hicks and Mark Valeri (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008), 12.  
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as well as his conclusion that one should give until they reach the “level of 
marginal utility.”7 But this aside, I became convinced that there may be an 
obligation of which I had previously remained ignorant.  
In addition to reading Singer, another article by philosopher James 
Rachels was impactful. Though he writes on the distinction between active and 
passive euthanisia, he provides an example that I connected with Singer’s 
argument. Rachels writes: 
Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should 
happen to his six-year-old cousin. One evening while the child is taking 
his bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and 
then arranges things so that it will look like an accident. 
 . . . Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his 
six-year-old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the 
child in his bath. However, just as enters the bathroom Jones sees the 
child slip and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is 
delighted; he stands by, ready to push the child’s head back under if it 
is necessary, but it is not necessary. With only a little thrashing about, 
the child drowns all by himself, “accidentally,” as Jones watches and 
does nothing.”8 
 
After reading these two cases, I began to ask myself the question in relation 
to Singer’s article: “By not giving to charitable organizations that are in a 
position to save lives, am I morally responsible for at least some of the deaths 
that are occuring overseas from easily preventable causes?” In other words, 
is my “letting die” the same as killing them with my own two hands,9 and does 
God approve of my current life choices?  
 I later sat down with one of my professors while working on my Master’s 
and he introduced me to the term “supererogation.” Until that moment, I had 
never heard of the term nor was I familiar with the concept. I was intrigued to 
hear that there could be an act that while possessing moral worth, remains 
completely optional. Was giving aid to charitable organizations a duty? Was it 
an imperfect duty? Or was it an act of supererogation? Considering the number 
 
7 Singer, “Famine,” 241. 
8 James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine 292, no. 2 (1975): 79. 
9 Singer elsewhere argues that there is not an intrinsic difference between “allowing 
someone to die” and “killing someone.” See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 162. 
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of lives lost every day, I became convinced that charitable giving is part of my 
obedience to God and that the concept of supererogation might be extremely 
important for helping people—including myself—sort through at least some of 
the moral issues that we face in our global village.  
 Having become interested in supererogation, I discovered that the 
concept has a rich history in Christian thought and, as will be explained in 
chapter one, has been embraced by Roman Catholics but rejected by most 
Protestants. The Protestant rejection of such acts can be traced back to the 
writings of the Reformers. Key figures such as Martin Luther, Philip 
Melanchthon, and John Calvin adamantly opposed supererogatory deeds in 
the form of counsels because they were used by the Roman Catholic church 
to justify the selling of indulgences,10 which were based on the notion of a 
spiritual treasury from which merit could be added and subtracted, and a 
doctrine of justification that required deeds in addition to faith in Jesus Christ. 
Michael Horton writes that the Reformer’s view of justification was that the 
righteousness of Christ is something that God “credits . . . through faith alone 
(sola fide), apart from works.”11 Because the Reformers recognized that 
counsels (i.e., supererogatory deeds) were closely connected with a doctrine 
of justification that is not sola gratia and sola fide, the Reformers rejected the 
possibility of such acts. As a result, there has been a low level of Protestant 
engagement with supererogation since the concept assumed a more 
prominent role in moral philosophy in the late 1950s. However, it would be 
inaccurate to claim there has not been religious engagement on other fronts.  
Several philosophers in the late 1980s and early 1990s addressed the 
question of whether it is possible for God to supererogate. While interesting 
and valuable in its own right, this is not the focus of this thesis. Besides this 
group of philosophers, Mark Wynn has also written about supererogation. Like 
myself, he is interested in acts of supererogation performed by human beings 
rather than by God. However, he writes from a Roman Catholic perspective, 
 
10 Joachim Hruschka, “Supererogation and Meritorious Duties,” Annual Review of Law 
and Ethics 6 (1998): 96. 
11 Michael Horton, Pilgrim Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 282. 
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and for this reason, the relevance of his work to what I am doing is indirect. 
The concept and history of supererogation is discussed in more detail in 
chapter one. Another figure who has engaged supererogation from a religious 
perspective is Gregory Mellema. Mellema’s contributions are pivotal to my 
thesis, and in some sense, my entire thesis hinges upon one particular insight 
that he offers in his book, Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, 
and Offence. As will be discussed in detail in chapter one, he argues that there 
is nothing contradictory about asserting that acts of supererogation are 
possible while still holding to the belief that such acts can in no way justify a 
person (i.e., result in God forgiving them and imputing his righteousness to 
them).12 This is key, because it opens the door for acts of supererogation in 
Protestant ethics without challenging the Protestant doctrine of justification. 
Mellema then proceeds to argue that there may be a way to satisfy both 
Protestants who accept the possibility of supererogation (i.e., “theistic 
supererogationists”) and Protestants who do not (i.e., “theistic anti-
supererogationists”) by invoking the concept of vocation. This will be discussed 
in the second half of chapter two. Lastly, John and Paul Feinberg assume acts 
of supererogation are possible in Protestant ethics (which is quite an 
assumption) and mention three that they believe are supererogatory. However, 
supererogation is not their main focus and their remarks are brief and do not 
occur within a larger, more systematic treatment of supererogation in 
Protestant thought. So while Mellema’s vocation-based theory of 
supererogation in Protestant thought is extremely valuable and the Feinbergs’ 
examples are worth considering, it is my goal to demonstrate that there is at 
least one act of supererogation in the New Testament in an effort to provide a 
systematic account of supererogation. If this can be shown, then it will open 
the door to further reflection concerning the possibility of additional acts and 
the importance of supererogation in both theory and practice.  
In chapter one, I provide an extensive (though obviously not 
comprehensive) survey of the history of supererogation in Roman Catholic 
 
12 Gregory Mellema, Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offense 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 52. 
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thought, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. Attention is given to 
explaining Urmson’s view of supererogation and the examples he used. 
Chapter one concludes with a survey of some of the more central ideas and 
arguments found throughout the literature for and against supererogation. 
Considering the focus of this thesis, the final subsection in chapter one, titled 
“Supererogation and Christianity,” is of particular relevance for laying the 
groundwork for what follows.  
In chapter two, I argue that the theological context must be considered 
when attempting to classify an act from a religious perspective. This point may 
seem obvious, but Urmson’s treatment of Francis’ preaching to the birds 
suggests otherwise. In the first half of the chapter, I argue that Urmson 
misclassified Francis’ preaching to the birds. It would have been better if 
Urmson had not included this example. Unlike the two other examples of 
supererogation that he uses in his argument, the Francis example is more 
complicated because it is religious. Ultimately, Urmson fails to consider the 
background theological beliefs which inform Francis’ act. This oversight results 
in Urmson not having the necessary conceptual tools to properly classify 
Francis’ act. This is an important point because it shows that while there are 
some similarities between discussions of supererogation in secular and 
religious ethics, there are also differences. Mark Wynn makes this point 
abundantly clear, using the concept of supererogation to “map the relationship 
between religious and secular thought.”13 He argues that the “introduction of a 
theological context” can change the classification of an act in some 
situations.14 In doing so, another point is implicitly reinforced: supererogation 
in secular ethics and in Christian ethics shares at least some similarities. There 
is shared “territory” around the concept of supererogation, and this is valuable 
because it fosters communication, the sharing of ideas, and the possibility that 
 
13 Mark Wynn, “Supererogation and the Relationship Between Religious and Secular 
Ethics: Some Perspectives Drawn from Thomas Aquinas and John of the Cross,” Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 163.  
14 Ibid., 166. 
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supererogation can help the two sides better understand one another as well 
as benefit from the exchange.  
Chapter two concludes with a discussion of Mellema’s suggestion that 
acts of supererogation might be possible in Protestant ethics if we consider the 
doctrine of vocation. By referring to the Protestant doctrine of vocation, 
Mellema—unlike Urmson—rightfully takes the theological context into 
consideration when attempting to answer the question: “Are acts of 
supererogation possible in Protestant ethics?”15 After presenting Mellema’s 
view, the Feinbergs’ three examples of supererogatory acts are discussed 
next. As valuable as these contributions are, my account in chapter three is 
unique because the act that I argue is supererogatory in Protestant ethics is 
located in the Gospel of Matthew; it is taken directly from the Bible, and for this 
reason is presumed to be authoritative to some degree. The focus on one act 
should not be interpreted as an argument that there is only one act of 
supererogation in the New Testament. Rather, it is meant to serve as a catalyst 
for further inquiry into whether other acts of supererogation exist in Protestant 
Christian ethics and ultimately, why this is important.  
In chapter three, I argue that the act of an innocent spouse of remaining 
and reconciling with their spouse who has committed adultery is an act of 
supererogation. My argument is based on the words of Jesus concerning 
divorce in Matthew’s Gospel.16 Of course, several theological commitments 
are required in order to begin the argument, so these are briefly enumerated 
and explained. Before presenting the argument, I discuss Philip Melanchthon’s 
view on celibacy because he, unlike the other reformers, affirms that celibacy 
is a counsel. However, I argue that his understanding of a counsel and 
Aquinas’ understanding of a counsel are very different. Considering 
Melanchthon’s doctrine of justification, it is clear that he did not think that the 
counsel of celibacy could earn extra merit that could then help a person secure 
eternal blessing in a more efficient manner. This alone clearly separates 
 
15 To clarify, Urmson is not concerned with whether acts of supererogation are possible in 
Protestant ethics. This is the specific question that concerns Mellema.  
16 Matt. 5:31–32 and 19:1–9. 
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Aquinas’ and Melanchthon’s view of a counsel. Yet, Melanchthon is interesting 
because his view of the counsel of celibacy is similar to how an act of 
supererogation is viewed in moral philosophy. Thus, I argue that in an indirect 
fashion, Melanchthon—like Mellema—is an example of a Protestant thinker 
who affirms the possibility of supererogatory acts. However, I go on to suggest 
that there is good reason for Protestants to reject the idea that celibacy is 
supererogatory. While this is at odds with Melanchthon’s view in Loci 
Communes 1521, the more important point remains: Melanchthon affirms—
albeit indirectly—a type of act that closely resembles supererogation. This 
provides precedent for my overall project.  
The second part of chapter three is where I argue that the act of an 
innocent spouse of remaining and reconciling with their spouse who has 
committed adultery is an act of supererogation. Needless to say, the guilty 
spouse must repent and also desire marital reconciliation or else the 
opportunity for the innocent spouse to reconcile the marriage does not present. 
First, I argue that the innocent spouse’s act is not obligatory, which is the first 
criterion of supererogation. Prima facie, this seems clear: however, David 
Instone-Brewer argues that Jesus not only commands the innocent spouse to 
forgive the adulterous spouse, but also to reconcile if the guilty spouse is 
willing.17 Drawing on biblical scholars, I argue that there are good reasons for 
rejecting this view, not least of which is the fact that marital reconciliation can 
be extremely oppressive for the victimized spouse. Considering Jesus’ 
emphasis upon compassion and his eagerness to help those who have been 
victimized and marginalized in one way or another, Instone-Brewer’s 
interpretation of this passage seems out-of-character with the larger ethos of 
Jesus’ life, teaching, and ministry. In arguing against Instone-Brewer’s thesis, 
I attempt to show that the social act of “marital reconciliation” is not implicit in 
the psychological act of “forgiving” in Jesus’ teaching. Thus, the innocent 
spouse has the compassionate, divine permission to not reconcile the 
marriage if they do not feel that they are able. 
 
17 David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary 
Context (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 146. 
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The next step in showing that the act of remaining and reconciling is 
supererogatory is to show that it is not forbidden, which is the second criterion 
of supererogation. As one scholar notes, both Jewish and Roman law required 
a man to divorce a spouse that had committed adultery in Jesus’ day.18 From 
a Jewish perspective, this was due in part to the Pharisee’s interpretation of 
Moses’ remarks on divorce in Deuteronomy 24:1–4. As evidenced by the 
Pharisees’ words, “Why then did Moses command us to give a certificate of 
dismissal and to divorce her?”,19 there was a prevalent belief that adultery 
necessitated divorce. Drawing out the implications of Jesus’ response that 
Moses “allowed” rather than “commanded” divorce, I argue that there are 
strong reasons for believing that Jesus does not require the innocent spouse 
to divorce, which means that the act in question is not forbidden.  
The last step in showing that the act in question is supererogatory is to 
show that it possesses moral worth. Though this is obvious and requires little 
defense, attention is given to four distinct ways that the act possesses moral 
value from a Christian perspective. They are as follows: (a) an instance of 
God’s forgiveness, (b) holiness-producing, (c) evangelistic, and (d) beneficial 
for children. Following this discussion, two distinct but related questions are 
addressed in relation to supererogation: (1) In the case that the innocent 
spouse wants to remain and reconcile, is the guilty spouse’s act to reconcile 
the marriage also supererogatory? and (2) In the case of double-adultery, does 
the classificatory status of the act of reconciling the marriage change? The 
distinctive feature of the latter situation is that both spouses―as opposed to 
one―are guilty of adultery.  
Having argued that there is at least one clear act of supererogation in 
the New Testament, I focus on motives in chapter four. Though Urmson did 
not give any attention to intentions and motives, this is one of the most 
important topics in the literature. For Urmson, an act is supererogatory if it 
satisfies the following criteria: (1) not obligatory, (2) not forbidden, and (3) 
 
18 Craig S. Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 467. 
19 Matt. 19:7. 
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possesses moral worth. However, several moral philosophers have argued 
that this account is incomplete and needs to be adapted to make room for a 
fourth criterion which is rooted in the psychology of the agent. According to 
David Heyd and more recently Alfred Archer, for the act of a moral agent to be 
supererogatory he or she must act with proper intent in addition to satisfying 
the three basic criteria. Granted, they disagree over the nature of the intent, 
and this is discussed in detail in chapter four. Yet, they concur at a general 
level. However, others like Phillip Montague argue that proper motive is 
essential to an act being classified as supererogatory. The basic idea is that 
intuitively, there seems to be something wrong with the proposition: “A selfish 
act can be supererogatory.” Though Heyd and Archer do not have an issue 
with selfish motives since they believe that proper intention, not proper motive, 
is a criterion of supererogation, I argue otherwise. Motive occupies an 
important place in the New Testament and can be shown to affect the deontic 
status of an act. Ultimately, this entails that in Protestant ethics, a behavior that 
is performed chiefly for selfish reasons cannot not be considered a candidate 
for supererogation.  
In arguing for the role of motive in a Protestant account of 
supererogation, I rely heavily on Helmut Thielicke’s motive-based account of 
assessing the moral worth of acts in conjunction with Steven Sverdlik’s 
discussion of how motives can have deontic relevance.20 Considering that this 
places me at odds with David Heyd and Alfred Archer—two of the more 
prominent thinkers in the field of supererogation—it is incumbent on me that I 
defend my account against their views. Since both of their views can ultimately 
be traced back to John Stuart Mill’s view of motives and intentions in chapter 
two of Utilitarianism, I spend considerable time addressing Mill’s view as it 
relates to the topic. I then discuss the act of supererogation in chapter three in 
view of my argument in chapter four that proper motive is also necessary for 
an act to be classified as supererogatory in Protestant ethics. Chapter four 
 
20 Steven Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4, 15. 
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concludes with a few final remarks concerning the indirect—as opposed to 
direct—relevance of character to acts of supererogation.  
There is another way in which my thesis makes a significant contribution 
in relation to the debate over intentions and motives. I offer a thorough 
discussion of the distinction between intention and motive which is often 
absent in the literature about supererogation. As will be discussed in chapter 
one, some thinkers conflate the terms, using them synonymously. Other 
thinkers seem to assume that the definition for each must be self-evident and 
therefore needs no attention. Due to this widespread neglect, ample space is 
given to defining the terms so that my argument for motive is presented as 
clearly as possible. This section might also prove useful for anyone reading or 
writing in the field of supererogation because few tasks are more important—
no matter the discipline —than defining the key terms. In the social sciences, 
such definitions are called “operational definitions,” and provide an objective, 
measurable definition so that different researchers at different places and at 
different times can replicate the studies.21  
The concept of supererogation can be helpful in counseling, homiletics, 
and even biblical interpretation. Concerning the latter, this will be evident in 
chapter three and will be further discussed in the conclusion. Not only this, but 
space for supererogation in any moral theory has an aesthetic-moral value 
because it prevents human beings from being “slaves” to every opportunity 
where the possibility of performing a good act presents. Unlike what is implicit 
in the views of both John Wesley22 and Joseph Allen,23 supererogation is an 
implicit endorsement of limited responsibility. In other words, there are times 
when a person does not have to perform a good deed even though the 
opportunity presents. According to Gilbert Meilander, this frees a person from 
 
21 The American Psychological Association (APA) defines an “operational definition” as a 
“description of something in terms of the operations (procedures, actions, or processes) by 
which it could be observed and measured.” See APA Dictionary of Psychology, s.v. 
“operational definition,” American Psychological Association, accessed February 6, 2020, 
https://dictionary.apa.org/operational-definition. 
22 John Wesley, Plain Account of Christian Perfection, in Entire Sanctification Attainable 
in This Life (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1898), 112–113. 
23 Joseph Allen, Love & Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, Inc., 1995), 79, 82, 97, 126–127. 
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the “tyranny which requires that we be something more than finite beings,”24 
an accusation he directs toward consequentialist moral theories. At the root of 
such “tyrannical” normative theories that do not permit a person to forego the 
performance of a good deed when it is in their power to do so is: (1) a failure 
to recognize that we are “created by God to inhabit a particular location in 
nature and history,”25 and (2) a failure to “trust in God’s providential care” in 
“every circumstance of life.”26 Ultimately, Protestant Christian ethics is made 
more beautiful and lives of Christian disciples are immensely enriched by the 
inclusion of supererogation. Though reference to beauty is not an argument 
for supererogation in-and-of itself per se, it speaks volumes as to the value of 
the argument set forth in this thesis. 
 
24 Gilbert Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness: Basic Themes in Christian Ethics (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 108. 
25 Ibid., 100. 
26 Ibid., 99, 108. 
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§ 1. Supererogation – A Review of the Literature 
  
My goal in this chapter is to introduce the concept of supererogation in 
moral philosophy and Christian thought. The chapter is divided into the 
following three sections, which are then followed by a brief summary: (I) A brief 
summary of the nature of supererogation; (II) James Urmson’s original 
argument; and (III) a survey of the central ideas and arguments found in the 
literature for and against supererogation. The third section is the longest, being 
divided into four subsections that allow for a detailed and systematic treatment 
of some of the most important ideas and arguments associated with both the 
supererogatonist and anti-supererogationist positions. The four subsections 
are as follows: (1) Elizabeth Pybus’ Anti-Supererogation Argument and the 
Paradox of Supererogation; (2) The Broader View of Supererogation; (3) Acts, 
Dispositions, Motives, and Intentions; and (4) Supererogation and Christianity. 
The treatment of these topics will lay the groundwork for the discussion that 
follows in chapters two, three, and four. Before the first major section, I want 
to mention how the concept of supererogation has once again become a topic 
of interest among moral philosophers and a few Christian philosophers and 
ethicists. 
In 1958, J.O. Urmson wrote that that the threefold classificatory scheme 
for assessing the moral status of human acts was “totally inadequate to the 
facts of morality.”1 He claimed that throughout the history of philosophy, moral 
philosophers had, either explicitly or implicitly, assumed only three types of 
acts from the perspective of moral worth: duties, permissible acts, and wrong 
acts: 
i) Duties are typically viewed as acts which we ought to perform, the 
omission of which is considered morally wrong. For Urmson, two 
quintessential examples of “rock-bottom duties” are telling the truth and 
keeping one’s promises.2 Essentially, if an act is classified as a duty, 
 
1 Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," 198–199. 
2 Ibid., 204. 
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the moral agent is required to act in such a manner that the 
corresponding obligation is discharged. 
ii) Permissible acts are acts that are indifferent from a moral 
perspective. While rushing into a burning building to save a stranger’s 
child is no doubt of significant moral value, the color socks that you wear 
while doing so does not matter from a moral standpoint.3  
iii) Wrong acts stand in symmetrical relation with duties in that they 
possess the exact opposite properties as duties. Whereas one ought to 
perform a duty and is wrong for not doing so, one is required not to 
perform a morally wrong act and is wrong for doing so. For Immanuel 
Kant, lying is an example of a moral wrong because it can never be 
justified.4  
For Urmson, this tripartite deontic classificatory scheme was deficient and 
needed immediate revision. Though he only used the term “supererogatory” 
once in his essay,5 he clearly advocated for the fourth category of 
supererogation that could accommodate those acts that “are certainly of moral 
worth but that fall all outside the notion of a duty and seem to go beyond it . . 
.”6 Supererogation in its most colloquial sense refers to “doing more than you 
had to.”7  
It is safe to say that though there is significant disagreement regarding 
the possibility of supererogation within moral philosophy as well as different 
branches of the Christian church, “common discourse in most cultures allows 
for such acts and often attaches special value to them.”8 Implicit in such 
utterances as “You didn’t have to do that,” or “That is more than generous,” is 
an underlying belief in the ability to supererogate. Michael Zimmerman writes 
 
3 Paul McNamara, "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call," Mind 105 (1996): 420. 
4 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:402–4:403, trans. Mary 
Gregor and Jens Timmermann (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17–18. 
5 Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," 214. 
6 Ibid., 205. 
7 McNamara, "Making Room," 417; A.C. McKay mentions a similar phrase: “doing more 
than is required by duty.” See A.C. McKay, “Supererogation and the Profession of Medicine,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2002): 70. 
8 Heyd, “Supererogation.” 
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that when inquiring into the nature of supererogation, there are four questions 
that must be kept in mind. They are as follows: “What is the nature of 
supererogation? Are supererogatory acts possible? Do they actually occur? 
Are those acts that we commonly call supererogatory in fact supererogatory?”9 
Generally speaking, these four questions have been the major concern of 
moral philosophers. The order with which Zimmerman lists the questions is not 
accidental. Rather, it is inherently logical. Although the second question, “Are 
supererogatory acts possible?” tends to get the most attention, you cannot 
effectively deal with this question until you have at least a working definition of 
supererogation itself (Zimmerman’s first question). The adjective “working” is 
here employed to acknowledge the fact that “there is no ordinary use of this 
term [supererogation] to guide us, and its use among philosophers is hardly 
uniform.”10 However, Gregory Mellema is not so skeptical and rightly affirms 
that there does “appear to be reasonable agreement” about what constitutes 
a supererogatory act.11 Returning to Zimmerman’s questions, even if you 
answer the second question in the affirmative, this does not necessarily entail 
that such an act has ever been or could be executed (Zimmerman’s third 
question). What is true in theory might not be realizable in practice. This might 
suggest that the concept itself—although interesting—is in the end, useless. I 
do not deal with this issue in this thesis, but rather, assume from the outset 
that if it can be shown that there are supererogatory deeds in Protestant 
Christian thought, then they are realizable in practice as well.  
 
A Brief Summary of the Nature of Supererogation 
 
As stated above, Urmson argues that the threefold classificatory 
scheme embraced by moral philosophers to categorize acts is inadequate. In 
Patricia McGoldrick’s words, “Urmson tells us [of] the need for a new 
 
9 Michael Zimmerman, "Supererogation and Doing the Best One Can," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 373. 
10 McNamara, "Making Room," 416. 
11 Gregory Mellema, “Quasi-Supererogation,” Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 141. 
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taxonomy, a four-fold classification of the moral realm, which recognizes the 
existence of acts which attract more praise but do not require emulation.”12 In 
addition to duties (morally required), permissible acts, and acts that are wrong 
(morally forbidden), the fourth category of supererogation was introduced in 
an effort to better account for the full range of act types. Simply stated, the 
threefold deontic categorization of acts was not conceptually rich enough to 
capture the complexity of our moral experience. In an interesting and bold 
intellectual move, David Heyd takes things one step farther. As a proponent of 
supererogation, he writes, “Indeed, the way a theory treats the problem of 
supererogation and whether it can be adjusted to contain it serve as a criteria 
for its adequacy.”13 Rather than subjecting supererogation to the test of 
whether it can be accommodated by one of the major ethical theories in the 
past,14 he suggests that it is the validity of the ethical theory itself that should 
be tested depending upon the degree to which the theory can accommodate 
(or be adjusted to accommodate) supererogation.  
Before providing a working definition of supererogation, it is important 
to mention for clarity’s sake that “judgments of supererogation are act 
assessments.”15 An individual or a particular virtue is not labeled 
supererogatory. For this reason, the question of supererogation has 
traditionally been analyzed from a deontic perspective, as deontological 
theories are act-centered rather than agent-centered. That being said, one of 
the more interesting developments in the literature is whether the “motive” or 
“intent” of the agent should serve as an additional criterion of supererogation. 
This topic will be discussed in great detail in the third section of this chapter 
and addressed extensively from a Protestant viewpoint in chapter four. 
 
12 Patricia McGoldrick, “Saints and Heroes: A Plea for the Supererogatory,” Philosophy 
59 (1984): 523. 
13 Heyd, Supererogation, 10. 
14 The theories that he mentions are Christianity, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, 
utilitarianism, and contract theory. 
15 Phillip Montague, “Acts, Agents, and Supererogation,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 26 (1989): 102.  
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Philip Montague provides a succinct summary of supererogation. He 
writes, “actions are supererogatory if and only if they are neither morally 
required (obligatory, and so on) nor morally prohibited (wrong, and so on), but 
nevertheless have moral value (are morally good, and so on).”16 The last 
distinction is important because it serves to delineate two types of permissible 
acts: a permissible act of moral value (i.e. supererogation) and an act that is 
“permissible in the neutral sense.” As expressed by Paul McNamara, “Morality 
shrugs at what is indifferent. But as supererogation makes clear, morality 
needn’t shrug at what is optional.”17 It is vitally important to elaborate upon the 
optional feature of an act of supererogation just mentioned. It is not enough to 
say that a particular act is “optional.” Zimmerman writes: "supererogatory acts 
are not just optional, but fully optional. An act is fully optional only if it is not 
just not obligatory but also such that its performance does not constitute a way 
to fulfill some obligation; it is, as it were, wholly beyond the reaches of 
obligation.”18 Of course, his claim that performing an act of supererogation 
“does not constitute a way to fulfill some obligation” is at best contentious and 
at worst, wrong. 
Regarding the distinction between “optional” and “fully optional,” one 
only has to think of Kant’s conception of an imperfect duty as it is traditionally 
understood to see the value of such a point. According to Kant, our ability to 
reason is fundamental to the moral life. Because rationality is shared by all 
human beings, that which reason reveals in the moral sphere is thought to be 
universal and thus binding upon all agents. He concludes that reason 
ultimately leads to the categorical imperative—“the ultimate moral norm”19—
from which we can deduce all other particular duties in the form of maxims. 
The first and most important formulation of the categorical imperative is, “Act 
only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
 
16 Ibid., 102. 
17 McNamara, "Making Room," 420. 
18 Zimmerman, "Supererogation," 373. 
19 Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994): 29. 
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it become a universal law.”20 After stating this foundational moral principle that 
reason provides, Kant provides four detailed examples. Using these, he draws 
the all-important distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. According 
to Kant, a perfect duty “allows of no exception to the advantage of inclination”21 
while an imperfect duty does not “specify precisely in what way one is to act 
and how much one is to do by the action.”22 Whereas one is bound by a perfect 
duty to never lie, one has a significant amount of “playroom (latitudo)”23 in 
deciding for oneself how to go about fulfilling an imperfect duty such as 
beneficence. Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton write: “In Kant’s framework, 
duties of right are narrow and perfect because they require or forbid particular 
acts, while duties of ethics and virtue are wide and imperfect because they 
allow significant latitude in how we may decide to fulfill them.”24 Though there 
is a significant level of indeterminacy inherent in how to fulfill an imperfect duty, 
it must still be fulfilled. How and when one fulfills an imperfect duty is optional, 
but one must in the end fulfill the imperfect duty in one way or another. On the 
other hand, a person can forever refrain from performing an act of 
supererogation without ever committing a moral wrong. In other words, a 
supererogatory act is fully optional. Due to this property of supererogation, 
moral agents are often praised for performing such deeds. Needless to say, 
the distinction between optional and fully optional is significant in drawing 
classificatory lines in the sand.  
Before transitioning to James Urmson’s influential argument for 
supererogation, one caveat is in order regarding Kant’s imperfect duty. Unlike 
John Stuart Mill’s clear characterization of an imperfect duty, there is a level of 
ambiguity in Kant’s depiction that has not gone unnoticed. In what I am 
referring to as the alternative view of Kant’s imperfect duty, Michael Clark 
 
20 Kant, Groundwork, 34. 
21 Ibid., 34. 
22 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 521. 
23 Ibid., 521. 
24 Heyd, “Supererogation.” 
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writes, “Sometimes Kant seems to write of imperfect duties as if they were 
supererogatory.”25 He then paraphrases the following passage from Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals in support of the claim: “Imperfect duties alone are, 
accordingly, duties of virtue. Fulfillment of them is merit (meritum) = a+; but 
failure to fulfill them is not in itself culpability (demeritum) = -a) but rather mere 
deficiency in moral worth = 0, unless the subject should make it his principle 
not to comply with such duties.”26 The interesting part of this statement is 
where Kant states that a person does not necessarily deserve blame for failing 
to fulfill an imperfect duty. Regarding the phrase, “deficiency in moral worth,” 
Kant explains that a person’s failure to perform an imperfect duty may stem 
from a “want of virtue, lack of moral strength” as opposed to vice. In these type 
cases, the agent appears to have lacked the specific virtue that would have 
provided the impetus to perform the particular act that would have discharged 
the imperfect duty. So for Kant, although the individual lacks moral strength 
and has committed a “transgression,” so long as the person did not do so 
intentionally (i.e., out of principle), the failure is not attributable to any vice. It 
might just be the case that the individual needs to mature, grow in their resolve 
to do the right thing, and develop the appropriate virtue that would propel them 
to fulfill the imperfect duty the next time a similar opportunity presents itself.  
Although the alternative view of Kant’s imperfect duty has merit, it does 
not represent the mainstream view within the body of literature on 
supererogation. For example, as recently as 2015, Marcia Baron has argued 
that although “Kant does have a place for what we often classify as 
supererogatory acts . . . [he] does not have a place for the classification.”27 
She argues that the category of imperfect duties in Kant’s theory can do a 
more than adequate job accounting for acts that are typically thought to require 
supererogation. It is clear that Baron endorses the mainstream view of Kant’s 
 
25 Michael Clark, “The Meritorious and the Mandatory,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 79 (1978–1979): 25.  
26 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 521. 
27 Marcia Baron, “A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 
33 (2016): 347. 
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imperfect duty. This is best showcased in her statement, “Lending a helping 
hand may not be morally required here and now, but there is no moral option 
of never lending a helping hand.”28 The point is that she endorses the 
mainstream view of Kant’s imperfect duty. From this mainstream perspective, 
the optional nature of an imperfect duty versus the fully optional nature of 
supererogation is key to distinguishing the two. Although exact definitions may 
vary, most agree that an act of supererogation is an act that possesses moral 
worth (i.e., is not merely permissible) and is neither obligatory nor forbidden.  
 
James Urmson’s Original Argument 
 
Urmson begins his argument for supererogation with the observation 
that we sometimes use the words “saint/hero” as a favorable moral evaluation 
of an agent and the words “saintly/heroic” as a favorable moral evaluation of 
acts. He then proceeds to articulate three types of situations in which we 
employ these terms. For the sake of brevity, I will focus on the “saintly/heroic” 
assessment of acts because it is clearly his main focus throughout the essay.  
In the first type of situation, an act is “saintly” if an individual does his 
duty “by virtue of self-control” when most would not, due to “inclination or self-
interest.”29 In similar fashion, an act is “heroic” if an individual does his duty “by 
virtue of self-control” when most would not due to “fear or a drive for self-
preservation.”30 In this first type of situation, what both have in common is that 
the agent performs his duty when most others would not due to a high level of 
self-control. The individual may experience the same level of temptation to 
forego their duty as the next person, yet they exercise a good deal of restraint 
to do what morality requires in that moment no matter what they might be 
feeling. In some sense, there is a marked incongruity between the internal 
state of the agent and the external act itself. Although the moral agent 
deserves praise, it is important to note that in the end, the individual did not do 
 
28 Ibid., 353. 
29 Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” 200. 
30 Ibid., 200. 
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more than was required. Therefore, this first type of situation in which an act is 
labeled “saintly” or “heroic” can still be accommodated within the threefold 
classificatory scheme that Urmson is attacking.  
The second type of situation in which an act can be labeled as “saintly” 
or “heroic” is similar to the first except for the ease with which the act is 
performed. In the first type of situation, the moral agent had to grit their teeth, 
wage an internal war against all that they felt, and perform the right act even 
though they were experiencing the same inner struggle as the next person. 
You might say that they did their duty in spite of what they felt. However, in this 
second type of situation, an act is called “saintly” or “heroic” because an 
individual performs their duty “without effort.” Whereas in the first type of 
situation a person does their duty in the face of contrary impulses, emotions, 
and tendencies, in this second case the deed flows from the heart. Self-control 
is not needed. The agent is of such moral excellence that there is no internal 
antagonist standing in the way of the dutiful course of action. Urmson writes, 
“Here we have the conspicuously virtuous deed, in the Aristotelian sense.”31 
Though the performance of a “saintly” or “heroic” deed in Urmson’s second 
sense is quite extraordinary, the act still falls under the concept of duty. 
Urmson wrote of these first two types of situations, “Roughly, we are calling a 
person saintly or heroic because he does his duty in such difficult contexts that 
most men would fail in them.”32 However, it is in the third type of situation that 
the terms “saintly” and “heroic” are used to describe an act that cannot be 
subsumed under the threefold classification. For obvious reasons, this third 
type of situation is of the greatest relevance for Urmson. In this third type of 
situation, an act is called “saintly” or “heroic” because it is “far beyond the limits 
of [a person’s] duty.”33 In support of this claim, Urmson provided several 
examples, two of which I will discuss now. 
His first example of a “saintly” or “heroic” act that goes far beyond the 
limits of duty is the case of the doctor. Urmson writes: 
 
31 Ibid., 201. 
32 Ibid., 201. 
33 Ibid., 201. 
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We have considered the, certainly, heroic action of the doctor who does 
his duty by sticking to his patients in a plague-stricken city; we have now 
to consider the case of the doctor who, no differently situated from 
countless other doctors in other places, volunteers to join the depleted 
medical forces in that city.”34  
 
According to Urmson, this “self-effacing life in the service of others would not 
even be contemplated by the majority of upright, kind, and honest men, let 
alone expected of them.”35 In supererogatory language, the act can be 
characterized as possessing moral worth while being neither morally required 
nor morally prohibited.  
Urmson’s second example of supererogatory behavior is famous. He 
writes: “We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing of 
live hand grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on 
the ground near the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself 
on the grenade and protecting his comrades with his own body.”36 In order to 
further distinguish this act, Urmson asks the reader to pretend that the soldier 
has just recently joined the squad and for this reason cannot be said to have 
been motivated by any emotion that might have arisen from that of friendship.37 
Urmson argues that this is a clear case of supererogation for the following 
reasons: (1) the act clearly possesses moral worth; (2) if the soldier had not 
thrown himself on the grenade, no one would dare say that he had failed to 
perform his moral duty; (3) if the soldier had not thrown himself on the grenade, 
no one would dare say that he ought to have done so; and last, (4) no one 
thinks that his fellow comrades were morally wrong for not attempting to throw 
themselves on the grenade.38 For these reasons, the soldier’s act cannot be 
classified as a duty. However, under a threefold classificatory scheme, all that 
remains is to classify the soldier’s act as either a permissible deed having no 
 
34 Ibid., 201–202. 
35 Ibid., 202. 
36 Ibid., 202. 
37 Interestingly, this qualification suggests that Urmson might not have been so fast to 
classify this self-sacrificing deed as supererogatory if in fact the soldier had a best friend in 
the squad. 
38 Ibid., 202–203. 
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moral value or a morally wrong act. For Urmson, both options are clearly 
wrong. Therefore, a fourth category is needed in order to capture this act and 
others like it.  
Following this point, Urmson proceeds to defend his claim against the 
argument, “If the act of the soldier presented itself to the soldier as a duty, then 
he was obligated to perform the deed. Therefore, it would have been morally 
wrong to omit the act.” But there is a difference between subjective perception 
and what is objectively the case. Urmson writes, “Subjectively, we may say, at 
the time of the act, the deed presented itself as a duty, but it was not a duty.”39 
Although the soldier may have believed that this act was in fact a duty, that 
does not mean that it was necessarily so. In other words, it is possible for even 
the best of moral agents to get it wrong sometimes. The willingness to behave 
in a morally exemplary manner and the philosophical ability to rightly classify 
an act are not one and the same. A moral philosopher who exhibits a keen 
ability to classify acts might be cowardly while an ordinary citizen who knows 
nothing of deontic classifications may possess great courage. The point is that 
while a saint or hero might believe their act to be supererogatory, it does not 
mean that they are correct. After all, the willingness to perform such a deed 
does not necessarily translate into having an acute, philosophical skill in 
classifying deeds. The opposite is true as well: a person trained in analytic 
moral philosophy might be concerned only with classifying, not performing, 
acts of supererogation. Most of us would prefer to have the former, not the 
latter, in our circle of friends, but this is another matter altogether. The simple 
point that needs emphasizing is that subjective reports regarding the status of 
a performed act must be treated with care because in most cases, self-reports 
are coming from those who have performed the deed.  
In an effort to present a succinct summary of Urmson’s view of 
supererogation, much as been omitted. However, there is one additional 
component of his view that needs mentioning. Urmson did not believe that the 
supererogatory classification was exclusively reserved for only those deeds 
 
39 Ibid., 203. 
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which could rightly be labeled “saintly/heroic” in the third sense. While he 
believed that acts of this sort represented the most conspicuous examples of 
supererogation, he also writes, “It is possible to go just beyond one’s duty by 
being a little more generous, forbearing, helpful, or forgiving than fair dealing 
demands.”40 Quite often, these “minor” cases of supererogation are thought to 
be just that (i.e. minor) because they typically are too modest in terms of 
sacrifice to deserve the saintly or heroic label.41 These could be “small favors 
and acts of courtesy that ordinary men [and women] go out of their way to 
perform.”42 Joel Feinberg writes, “It may be nice to do favors for people; but a 
favor, by definition, is nothing that we are legally or morally required to do.”43 
These “smaller” acts of supererogation will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter. The bottom line is that for Urmson, there is a wide range of acts 
that cannot be accounted for within the traditional tripartite classificatory 
scheme. Therefore, a fourth category is needed. Since his time, many more 
philosophers have turned their attention to supererogation. In the following 
section, I will provide a brief summary of the principal arguments for and 
against supererogation.  
 
Arguments For and Against Supererogation 
 
I will present several arguments and counterarguments for and against 
supererogation in this section. I have restricted the scope of this section to 
arguments that satisfy the following criteria: (1) they are prominent in the 
literature; (2) they raise and/or address important concepts and issues that are 
central in the supererogatory debate; (3) they are not excessively technical; 
and (4) they are relevant to the thesis. With this in mind, I will discuss the 
 
40 Ibid., 205; Barry Curtis provides a nice summary of this aspect of Urmson’s thought. 
See Barry Curtis, “The Supererogatory, the Foolish and the Morally Required,” The Journal 
of Value Inquiry 15 (1981): 315. 
41 Clark, “The Meritorious,” 30. 
42 Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, “Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of 
Supererogation,” Synthese 16 (1966): 326. 
43 Joel Feinberg, “Supererogation and Rules,” Ethics 71 (1961): 277. 
 25 
following in the remainder of this chapter: (1) Elizabeth Pybus’ Anti-
Supererogation Argument and the Paradox of Supererogation; (2) The 
Broader View of Supererogation; (3) Acts, Dispositions, Motives, and 
Intentions; and (4) Supererogation and Christianity. 
 
Elizabeth Pybus’ Anti-Supererogation Argument and the Paradox of 
Supererogation  
 
The notion that acts of supererogation are possible gives rise to an 
interesting moral dilemma. Michael Clark clearly expresses this moral dilemma 
when he writes, “How is it possible that there should be acts which are 
meritorious from a moral point of view but which are nevertheless not morally 
required of us?”44 In other words, if the performance of an act is thought to be 
praiseworthy from a moral perspective, then what gives an agent the moral 
permission to not perform such an act? This “conceptual tension regarding 
supererogation”45 is known as the paradox of supererogation and “arises out 
of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to 
another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose 
this.”46 The connection between what is morally good and obligation is what 
Horgan and Timmons label the “good-ought tie-up,” which refers to the idea 
that the “moral goodness of [an] action allegedly entails obligation.”47 
Normative theories that are characterized by the “good-ought tie-up” are what 
Claire Benn refers to as “maximizing theories.”48 The idea that an act can be 
morally good but not obligatory is what leads James Dreier to write of 
 
44 Clark, “The Meritorious,” 23.  
45 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on 
the ‘Paradox’ of Supererogation,” Social Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 2 (2010): 29. 
46 Alfred Archer and Michael Ridge, “The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of 
Supererogation,” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1576. 
47 Horgan and Timmons, “Untying the Knot,” 37. Joseph Raz offers a good explanation of 
this “good-ought tie-up” approximately 35 years prior to Horgan and Timmons. However, he 
does not attempt to assign a label to the concept. See Joseph Raz, “Permissions and 
Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975): 164, 166.  
48 Claire Benn, “The Enemy of the Good: Supererogation and Requiring Perfection,” 
Utilitas 30 (2018): 334. 
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supererogation that although it is “easy to understand,” it is also “puzzling”49 
and even “impossible” from a moral point of view.”50 Thus, defending the 
category of supererogation requires a “conceptual disconnect between moral 
goodness and obligation.”51 If moral goodness and obligation cannot be 
divorced, then the threefold deontic classificatory scheme remains and 
Urmson’s thesis is disproved. In one way or another, every argument for or 
against supererogation is a response to this paradox.  
In the early 1980s, Elizabeth Pybus put forward an interesting argument 
against supererogation. She began by agreeing with Urmson that there are 
occasions when we commend saints and heroes in a moral fashion (as 
opposed to non-moral or amoral). However, this is where she parts ways with 
Urmson. She writes: “I would suggest that if my commendation is genuinely 
moral, then my genuine act of commendation does commit me to saying that 
this really is how man ought to be. But if I do have a genuine moral view that 
this is how people ought to be, then I must think that I, and others, ought to 
live up to this, and regard those who do not as falling short of the moral 
standard.”52 According to Pybus, I cannot morally commend the soldier for 
throwing himself on the grenade to save his fellow comrades unless I too am 
willing to be the sort of person who is willing to perform similar acts of courage. 
Prima facie, it appears that Pybus is suggesting that if I deem the performance 
of an act morally praiseworthy, then I am obligated to perform the act. Of 
course, this would do away with the paradox of supererogation, for if this were 
her view, there would be no such thing as an act that is morally commendable 
 
49 Elizabeth Young also refers to this as a “puzzle” (i.e., “traditional puzzle”). See 
Elizabeth D. Young, “Is Supererogation More Than Just Costly Sacrifice?” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 125. 
50 James Dreier, “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t,” 
in Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, ed. Michael Byron 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 147–148. Interestingly, this does not result 
in Dreier necessarily rejecting the classification. He simply asserts that there might be more 
than one moral point of view—one being more ambitious and the other more relaxed—that 
allows for such acts.  
51 Horgan and Timmons, “Untying the Knot,” 37. 
52 Elizabeth Pybus, “Saints and Heroes,” Philosophy 57 (1992): 194; Christopher New 
seems to also share this view. See Christopher New, “Saints, Heroes and Utilitarians,” 
Philosophy 49, no. 188 (1974): 183. 
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and at the same time non-obligatory. Susan Hale expresses this viewpoint 
when she writes, “All actions which are morally good are morally required.”53 
However, this is not Pybus’ view. 
Pybus argues that rejecting the classification of supererogation does 
not necessarily force us to accept the extreme conclusion that in praising an 
act, I now am obligated to perform that act. In her view, this is where Urmson 
went wrong. To use Pybus’ words, Urmson seemed to think that if we deny 
that there are acts of supererogation, we will be forced into saying that “if we 
morally admire and emulate the heroic doctor . . . we commit ourselves to the 
view that we all should seek out plague-ridden cities.”54 Pybus dubbed this 
view an “absurdity.” Pybus suggests that a moral commendation of an act does 
not necessarily entail an obligation to perform that same act. She writes:  
To say, therefore, that someone is a saint or hero, and thereby to 
express a moral judgment, is to say that that person has succeeded in 
being what we all ought to be … By this I do not mean that we should 
do what the saints and heroes do, but that we must recognize that if we 
consider such actions susceptible of moral praise, we commit ourselves 
to saying that what leads to the performance of those actions is part of 
the equipment of the morally good person which we should all try to be. 
What I am getting at, therefore, is that in praising the actions we are 
praising what lies behind the actions, i.e. dispositions, or, more 
specifically, particular virtues. 
But if we morally praise a particular virtue, and do so because 
we think highly of an action which issues from the possession of that 
virtue, then although we are not committing ourselves to the 
performance of those specific actions, we do recognize the necessity of 
performance of actions which spring from the possession of a high 
degree of the virtue in question.55 
 
In what Patricia McGoldrick calls an “ingenious observation,”56 Pybus 
relocates the moral commendation of an act to the virtue that lies behind it 
rather than the specific act itself. She draws an important distinction between 
“ought to do” and “ought to be” and develops her argument accordingly. This 
 
53 Susan Hale, “Against Supererogation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 
274. 
54 Pybus, “Saints and Heroes,” 196. 
55 Ibid., 197. 
56 McGoldrick, “Saints and Heroes: A Plea,” 524. 
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allows her to praise an act while simultaneously denying that every moral 
agent is now obligated to run out of the door and perform that specific act. 
Because Urmson viewed the moral commendation as applying strictly to the 
act itself, the only way he could praise the act without requiring every agent to 
perform it was to introduce the supererogatory classification. Pybus believes 
she has avoided the same conclusion that Urmson wanted to avoid but without 
having to modify the threefold system of act classification that Urmson set out 
to defeat.  
In support of her argument, Pybus first discusses what it is about the 
acts of the doctor and soldier that we morally commend. In Urmson’s account, 
the doctor and the soldier are both willing to make great sacrifices for other 
people which require great courage. According to Pybus, if we think that the 
act of the doctor and soldier are morally good, then we too “should be 
sufficiently courageous to perform sacrificial actions.”57 However, because 
people live different lives and find themselves in varying circumstances, it is 
not the particular act of the soldier or doctor that morality requires we emulate, 
but rather, the development of the virtue of courage that gives rise to the 
sacrificial behavior in the first place. It was the disposition toward courage that 
predisposed the soldier and the doctor to behave rightly when the opportunity 
presented itself. To state this differently, when we commend an act as morally 
meritorious, we commit ourselves to performing token acts of that same type 
but not necessarily the particular act that originally prompted our praise. With 
this groundwork laid, Pybus asks the reader to consider three different priests. 
Priests, she states, are mostly admired for their willingness to be celibate. 
However, for some priests, this might not be the most challenging part. One 
man may love privacy but have to sacrifice this “love” in order to live in a 
community with others who might be disagreeable in nature. Another may 
have a weak stomach but have to visit the sick (one of a priest’s many duties). 
The last example she gives is that of a priest who is abnormally self-conscious 
but who still must stand and deliver a message on a weekly basis as part of 
 
57 Pybus, “Saints and Heroes,” 197. 
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his duties. What all three of these cases have in common with the doctor and 
soldier is that they all “have enough courage to accept what is morally required 
of them.”58 True to her theory, Pybus praises not the specific act, but the virtue 
of courage that lies behind the act. She goes on to write, “we should all be 
willing to be brave enough to do what is morally required of us. But this does 
not suggest that we should all do the same things, only that we should, morally 
should, commit ourselves to a way of life in which we are willing to use all our 
courage to meet the moral demands which arise for us.”59  
I would agree with McGoldrick that Pybus’ move is quite ingenious. 
However, it is McGoldrick herself that responds to Pybus in an effort to salvage 
supererogation. McGoldrick suggests that Pybus “leaves unargued the 
question of whether developing the habitual dispositions and virtues from 
which such actions spring . . . is required of us as a duty.”60 Pybus simply 
assumes that if an ideal is morally praiseworthy, then we are bound by duty to 
both inculcate and express through particular acts the corresponding virtue in 
every situation that calls for the type of act that is reflective of that ideal. But 
according to McGoldrick, this assumption is “precisely the issue at stake” and 
“beg[s] the question in favour of the trichotomous taxonomy.”61 Although 
Pybus is relocating the obligation to the virtue that lies behind the act, she still 
embraces the notion that if a virtue possesses moral worth, then one is 
obligated to cultivate it within oneself. To borrow Horgan and Timmons’ 
language, Pybus assumes the position that the good is tied up with obligation. 
In other words, a moral agent is obligated to develop a moral virtue for the 
simple fact that it is considered good from a moral perspective. However, as 
McGoldrick is arguing, this is the exact issue at stake and cannot therefore be 
assumed. The question of supererogation must be assessed from a neutral 
vantage point that does not take for granted the threefold or fourfold 
classificatory schema.  
 
58 Ibid., 197. 
59 Ibid., 198. 
60 McGoldrick, “Saints and Heroes: A Plea,” 524. 
61 Ibid., 524. 
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McGoldrick’s next move is characteristic of moral philosophers who 
endorse the supererogatory classification. In an attempt to argue for acts of 
supererogation from neutral ground, she states that what distinguishes acts of 
supererogation from acts that are classified as duties is that they are 
“performed at extreme risk to one’s own life and well being.” Her claim is rooted 
in Kant’s moral philosophy. In Kant’s view, we have duties to ourselves as well 
as to others. Therefore, the individual has a moral duty to consider themselves 
as well as others in all moral deliberations. Because I too possess intrinsic 
worth as a rational human being, my “own aspirations, goals, and interests” 
count in those moments when I am trying to figure out what duty requires of 
me. To say otherwise—that I must always, as a matter of duty, make the 
greatest sacrifice for others at my own expense—is to fail to recognize my own 
inherent worth and to treat myself only as a means and not as an end. This, of 
course, would violate Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: 
“So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”62 
Because “rational nature exists as an end in itself”63 and I possess a rational 
nature, I am to treat all people, including myself, as an end and never as a 
mere means. For McGoldrick, we cannot eliminate the supererogatory 
classification without also requiring that the moral agent “abrogate his own self 
worth.”64 There must exist some degree of latitude for the moral agent if their 
own aspirations and pursuits matter. Now, if a person out of love chooses to 
make extreme sacrifices for the sake of others on a continual basis, that is fine 
according to McGoldrick and would serve as a great example of 
supererogatory behavior.65 What is offensive is the idea that a person must do 
so out of a sense of duty. 
 
62 Kant, Groundwork, 41. 
63 Ibid., 41. 
64 McGoldrick, “Saints and Heroes: A Plea,” 524. 
65 Ibid., 526. 
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The perspective that “extreme cost is … an essential feature of 
supererogatory actions” is labeled the Extreme Cost View by Claire Benn.66 In 
his very well-known book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls takes this position 
even though he does not use the same language. Concerning supererogatory 
acts, he writes: “[they] are not required, though normally they would be were it 
not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself.”67 From this perspective, 
if the act in question does not require much of the agent, then whatever else 
can be said, it is not a viable candidate for supererogation. Several other 
philosophers agree that the degree of sacrifice, cost, or risk68 accompanying 
a particular act plays a decisive role in determining the moral classification of 
an act. Frances Kamm acknowledges this point. She writes: “It is also 
commonly thought that if the efforts required of us to help are high, helping is 
supererogatory, i.e., beyond the call of duty.”69 Laura Ciubotarasu-Pricop 
seems to also endorse this view, writing: “Actions required by extreme 
circumstances transcend the duty. . . .” The three examples of extreme 
circumstances that she provides are terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and 
famine. During these times, a person acting altruistically goes beyond the 
boundaries of duty in performing acts that “place the welfare of the others 
above their own.”70 Thus, according to Ciubotarasu-Pricop, the person 
behaves in a supererogatory manner because they prioritize others’ needs 
above their own safety in extreme circumstances. However, the problem with 
such a view is the implicit assumption that great sacrifice can never be a part 
of fulfilling an obligation. But as Joel Feinberg points out, this is not necessarily 
the case. Feinberg explicitly endorses the Extreme Cost View with one caveat. 
Similar to Russell Jacobs, Feinberg makes the point that though acts of 
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supererogation require significant sacrifice, performing one’s duty can as well 
(this will be discussed shortly).71 He begins by agreeing with Urmson that the 
doctor who decides to relinquish both comfort and safety to volunteer to help 
medical workers in a distant, plague-stricken city that is not his own performs 
an act of supererogation. Feinberg then asks, “In what way does the doctor’s 
act ‘exceed’ duty?”72 Feinberg concludes that it is not sacrifice per se that 
resulted in a supererogatory classification. This would be an oversimplification. 
After all, as Feinberg points out, the doctor whose residence and practice are 
in the plague-stricken city is also required to make great sacrifices even though 
he is only thought to be doing his duty (this is enough to refute Ciubotarasu-
Pricop’s position). Unlike Ciubotarasu-Pricop, Feinberg is arguing that there 
are instances when great sacrifice is a part of fulfilling a duty. Implicit within 
this view is the idea that in a responsible account of moral worth, there are 
“degrees of praiseworthiness regarding morally obligatory actions . . . [as well 
as] supererogatory actions.”73 This is significant because it allows for the 
possibility that a morally obligatory act could deserve a significant amount of 
praise while a supererogatory act might deserve only a small amount. 
Consequently, great sacrifice in extreme circumstances does not necessarily 
result in a supererogatory classification. Returning to Feinberg’s view, what is 
the difference between a duty and a supererogatory act if great sacrifice 
cannot characterize both? Feinberg concludes, “The sacrificial element in 
supererogatory acts then does not necessarily exceed that in the performance 
of duty; what it exceeds is the sacrifice normally involved in the doing of duty.”74  
Feinberg is one of the best examples of someone who thinks that in 
order for an act to be supererogatory, the agent performing the act must pay 
the price, so to speak. His view also allows for the common-sense intuition that 
at times, even a duty can require great sacrifice. This is the main point at which 
 
71 Daniel Dombrowski also affirms this point, writing: “we should not forget how hard the 
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Russell Jacobs challenges McGoldrick’s view. In an effort to show that Pybus’ 
argument is circular, McGoldrick is right on insisting that we must adjudicate 
between the threefold and fourfold classification from an independent vantage 
point that does not presume either theory. However, her claim that an act 
cannot be classified as a duty if it requires extreme sacrifice or cost to the 
agent is problematic. Russell Jacobs agrees with McGoldrick that we have a 
duty to respect our own intrinsic value. He also agrees with her that in some 
circumstances, the level of sacrifice that an act requires is enough to warrant 
a supererogatory classification. However, he does not go as far as McGoldrick. 
In what is his chief criticism of her view, he writes: “But the more extreme claim, 
that we are never required to make large sacrifices for others, seems both 
unsupported by her premise, and implausible.”75  
Regarding the implausibility of McGoldrick’s claim, consider my 
marriage. My wife and I have been married for ten years. On our marriage day, 
I made a promise to her that I would stay by her side in health or sickness. In 
the years to come, if she were to get gravely sick and be bedridden for an 
extended amount of time, it would still be my duty to love and serve her no 
matter the personal cost. Although I would hope to provide this promised care 
out of love and not a mere sense of duty, I would still be doing nothing more 
than my duty in view of previous vows. This is the point that Jacobs is making, 
that there are times when fulfilling our duty requires a significant level of 
personal sacrifice. If this is not the case and McGoldrick’s Extreme Cost View 
is correct, then my behavior would be considered supererogatory and by 
definition, would not be required. However, this conclusion would lead to a 
contradiction in view of my past vows. As the example demonstrates, while 
McGoldrick puts forth great effort in an attempt to develop an argument for 
supererogation that does not presume either the threefold or fourfold schema, 
she goes too far in identifying “extreme cost” as an essential feature of 
supererogation for the simple reason that at least in some circumstances, 
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discharging obligations can be quite costly. Jacobs writes: “No easy 
generalizations will work when we are discussing cost-imposed limits on 
obligations.”76 Jacobs also criticizes Pybus’ view. In his estimation, both Pybus 
and McGoldrick go too far in their positions. He writes, “It seems false to say 
that high cost always overrides duty as it is to say that high cost never 
overrides duty.”77 While McGoldrick claims that an act cannot be classified as 
a duty if it entails some level of sacrifice (or else we will violate our own intrinsic 
self-worth), Pybus is on the other end of the spectrum. She does not allow for 
the fact that intuitively, the majority of people would agree that “high cost may 
well block moral obligation.”78  
The importance of considering Pybus’ argument against supererogation 
alongside other related arguments is that it introduces certain key ideas in the 
discussion of supererogation. For example, the paradox of supererogation and 
the related good-ought tie-up was introduced in discussing McGoldrick’s 
criticism of Pybus. Secondly, Pybus introduces the notion of virtue, or 
dispositions, into the discourse. One of the more interesting debates among 
moral philosophers is whether character, motive, or intent should play a role in 
the moral classification of acts. This will be presented in more detail later in the 
chapter and is integral to chapter four. And third, this subsection is important 
because whether or not you adhere to the Extreme Cost View of 
supererogation will determine in part whether smaller, unheroic acts or favors 
can qualify for supererogation. 
Before moving to the next topic, I would like to say something else 
regarding Pybus’ view. I have always found her view intriguing. However, I 
believe that one of its serious weaknesses is that she might not be able to give 
a clear answer to a direct question regarding a specific course of action in a 
particular situation. For example, if I were to ask Pybus to give a clear, yes or 
no answer to the question, “Was it the soldier’s duty in Urmson’s example to 
sacrifice his life to save his comrades by throwing himself on the grenade?” 
 
76 Ibid., 101. 
77 Ibid., 100. 
78 Ibid., 99. 
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she would find herself in a predicament. If she answers “no,” then the act is 
fully optional though it clearly possesses moral worth. Thus, answering “no” 
would result in an endorsement of supererogation. On the other hand, if she 
answers yes, then she would be giving the type of answer that she believed 
was responsible for Urmson mistakenly affirming the category of 
supererogation in the first place. After all, to answer “yes” would seem to 
suggest that there is a particular behavior that one is required to perform in 
order to act rightly. Yet, Pybus’ main objective was to argue that we do not 
need supererogation because in commending an act, we are not saying that 
everyone should be performing the exact same act. Rather, we are 
commending the virtue that lies behind the act and requiring all moral creatures 
including ourselves to cultivate that same virtue so that we will be in the best 
position to perform acts of that same type when required. Therefore, Pybus 
cannot give an unqualified “yes” to the question presented above because in 
order to stay true to her theory, she must redirect our focus to the disposition 
that lies behind the act. However, at some point this does not satisfy. After all, 
it is not logically impossible that I and five others find ourselves in the exact 
same situation of Urmson’s soldier. If this were to occur and I asked Pybus, “Is 
it a duty for each individual soldier in our group of six to act with the utmost 
courage?” then would she not have to answer yes? And in this specific 
situation, would this not entail that all six of us must throw ourselves on the 
grenade if we are to avoid moral wrongdoing? This is what the virtue of 
courage seems to require in this instance for the simple reason that there do 
not seem to be any act-alternatives by which courage could also be expressed. 
Therefore, if we all acted courageously, then needless lives would be wasted. 
If some of us do not throw ourselves on the grenade, then it appears that some 
of us are not courageous, which is morally unacceptable in Pybus’ view. In 
addition, to say that all six people are required to perform a particular behavior 
to fulfill the moral requirement to exemplify courage seems to be the type of 
conclusion (focused on a particular behavior) that Pybus wants to avoid. On 
the other hand, she cannot reasonably retreat from the question and redirect 
our focus to the virtuous dispositions behind the act. At some point, you cannot 
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hide behind virtue. You must answer the question. Of course we should be 
developing the appropriate virtues, but the real challenge is to figure out what 
those virtues entail from one situation to the next.  
 
The Broader View of Supererogation 
 
 As explained in the last section, philosophers such as Patricia 
McGoldrick and Joel Feinberg endorse the Extreme Cost View, which 
identifies “extreme cost” as an essential attribute of supererogation. Jacobs 
objected to this view because it is too formulaic, whereas for him our moral 
experience is nuanced and cannot be easily subsumed under the banner of 
broad generalized principles. As he pointed out, there are instances where the 
performance of our duty can cost the agent a great deal. In these cases, the 
cost of performing one’s duty is extreme. Thus, extreme cost is not the 
exclusive property of supererogation which poses a serious challenge to 
McGoldrick’s view. I sympathize with Jacobs’ view. Duties can require great 
sacrifice. Therefore, from a logical standpoint, extreme cost cannot be a 
defining characteristic of supererogation because it is a property that 
sometimes characterizes a duty. For a property to serve as a defining 
characteristic of any particular classification, it would have to be the exclusive 
property of that act category. Because extreme cost does not characterize 
supererogatory acts alone, it cannot serve as the distinguishing feature of this 
classification. 
There are several reasons why Jacobs’ debunking of the Extreme Cost 
View is important. For the purposes of this section, I want to focus on one in 
particular. If the Extreme Cost View had been correct, this would have logically 
precluded smaller, unheroic and unsaintly acts from being supererogatory.79 
This would be problematic, because ordinary people frequently perform acts 
that possess moral worth but are not obligatory. Benn writes, “Just as doing 
one’s duty can be more or less dramatic, acts of supererogation can be more 
 
79 Benn, “Supererogation, Optionality, and Cost,” 10. 
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or less heroic: giving a small gift to a friend or doing a favour are just as 
intuitively supererogatory as more extreme, heroic acts.”80 She defends this 
claim by appealing to the notion of comparative cost. She begins by 
acknowledging, “No one denies that the notion of optionality is central to the 
very notion of supererogation.”81 For this reason, an act of supererogation is 
often framed as a “non-duty” since the deed is considered purely optional.82 
To put it differently, it is normally thought that all acts which fulfill a duty are 
obligatory while all supererogatory acts are optional. However, as Benn points 
out, this is not always the case.  
She first points out that there are instances when an act can fulfill a duty 
while also being supererogatory. As Benn notes, these cases of 
supererogation are labeled “oversubscription” and “duty-plus” by David Heyd 
and Joel Feinberg respectively.83 Benn asks the reader to consider the 
following example: “Suppose I promise to give you £100 and then give you 
£200. This act clearly fulfils the duty generated by the promise I made. Under 
the assumption that I could have just given £100 and that instead I chose to 
give £200 (and that it would be morally good to give you £200 rather than 
£100), this act is also supererogatory.”84 In this scenario, giving £100 
represents the bare minimum that is required in order to fulfill the duty. By 
giving £200, I have behaved in a supererogatory manner while also 
discharging my duty. This raises an interesting point. If one act can fulfill a duty 
while also being supererogatory, then those acts which are normally required 
cannot be solely depicted as acts which fulfill duties and those acts which are 
normally optional cannot be solely described as non-duties.85 The situation is 
more complex. What is needed is an account of supererogation that draws a 
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different sort of line between duty and supererogation. The example above is 
sufficient to show that you cannot say that a dutiful act discharges an obligation 
while an act of supererogation does not. In this case, the supererogatory act 
discharges the duty while also going far beyond the minimum that was required 
to satisfy the obligation. It is here that Benn introduces the notion of 
comparative cost.  
Rather than assessing the cost of an act to judge whether it is 
supererogatory, Benn suggests that it is comparative cost that matters. She 
writes, “There are multiple ways of fulfilling a duty: we can fulfil it minimally or 
we can fulfil it in a way that goes beyond the minimum.”86 According to Benn, 
the class of acts that are classified as duties are the ones that “involve the 
least cost to the agent of all the permissible acts available.”87 All that is meant 
by “available” is that the act is sufficient to discharge the duty. Using the notion 
of comparative cost, Benn then argues that a supererogatory act is any that 
fulfills a duty “in a way that goes beyond this minimum.” In other words, the 
supererogatory act is optional because it “involve[s] greater cost to the agent 
than the bare minimum.” So rather than classify an act as supererogatory if it 
is costly, an act is only classified as supererogatory if it costs the agent more 
than other permissible alternatives. In this context, permissible means “able to 
fulfill the obligation.” In other words, although giving £100 represents the bare 
minimum you could do to fulfill your duty and therefore is a permissible 
alternative, you have the option to give more (i.e. £200) with the personal cost 
being greater. If you decide to do so, you have chosen to fulfill your obligation 
in a costlier manner than the bare minimum required. Thus, the act you chose 
was supererogatory because it cost more than other alternative acts that were 
available. This is important because the Comparative Cost View carves out 
theoretical space for small acts of supererogation. According to this view, an 
act does not have to cost the agent much in order to be supererogatory. 
Rather, it must only cost more than those acts which “involve merely fulfilling 
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our duty.” Therefore, even though an act may not involve a great cost to the 
acting agent, it still can be a candidate for supererogation so long as it costs 
more than other permissible acts which can also fulfill the duty. Thus, it 
expands the boundaries of supererogation, permitting a wider range of acts to 
qualify for supererogatory status.  
This is important for numerous reasons, three of which I will highlight. 
First, the majority of people go a lifetime without encountering a situation that 
calls for a saintly or heroic act. Very few of us therefore would ever have the 
opportunity to supererogate. Secondly, if “smaller” acts (not costing the agent 
too much) cannot qualify as supererogatory, then we are forced to say either 
(1) they do not possess moral value, or (2) they are required. Both outcomes 
are unappealing. On the one hand, giving a gift to a friend or paying someone 
a personal visit when you only promised to call (assuming that the individual 
prefers a personal visit) seems to be valuable from a moral perspective. Who 
would want to embrace any theory that says otherwise? On the other hand, if 
we want to say that these smaller acts possess moral worth, then without 
supererogation we must say that they are required (unless we take Pybus’ 
position, which raises other problems as previously explained). This seems 
unrealistic. Surely I am not required to help every single person in every single 
instance of my life. Of course, one could try and escape this dilemma by turning 
to Kant’s notion of imperfect duties. This might allow one to uphold the view 
that smaller acts possess moral value without having to embrace 
supererogation or require these acts on every occasion. Moral philosophers 
such as Marcia Baron have advocated such an approach, although I am 
inclined to think this approach is faulty.88 Surely there are small acts of 
kindness or favors that are never required even though morally praiseworthy 
to perform. Giving a gift to a complete stranger might be one example. If so, 
then small acts of supererogation cannot be subsumed under imperfect duties. 
 
88 Baron was not arguing for the inclusion of small acts of supererogation. Her aim was 
much broader. In her article, “A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory,” she suggests that 
Kant’s imperfect duties can accommodate acts which are normally classified as 
supererogatory. See Baron, “A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory,” 350. 
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For the topic at hand, it is sufficient to state that allowing for the possibility of 
smaller acts of supererogation better accords with the facts of our experience. 
The last reason that expanding the boundaries of supererogation to 
accommodate smaller acts is important is methodological. Horgan and 
Timmons point out that in the supererogation literature, there has been an 
“almost exclusive focus on saintly and heroic acts as primary cases of 
supererogation [and that this] has been unfortunate, distracting attention from 
cases that are far less contentious (even if not wholly uncontentious).”89 They 
consider this unfortunate because the saintly and heroic deeds of 
supererogation are laced with interpretative difficulty due to the deontic tone in 
which the agent responds when later asked about the saintly or heroic deed. 
Horgan and Timmons write:  
Furthermore (and this is our second point), cases of saints and heroes, 
at least those cases that have been documented and studied by social 
scientists and historians, raise the following well-known problem of 
interpretation which makes them particularly contentious. When 
interviewed, people who perform saintly or heroic acts consistently 
make claims much like the following, which is excerpted from an 
interview with one of the so-called righteous gentiles who, during the 
1930s and 1940s, risked their lives to hide Jews from Nazis: “I don’t 
think I did anything that special. I think what I did is what everybody 
normally should be doing. We all should help one another. It’s common 
sense and common caring for people.”90 
 
The point is that it is not uncommon for those who have performed saintly or 
heroic feats to say that they did nothing more than their duty. Many of these 
moral agents would baulk at the idea that they went above and beyond the call 
of duty and might even condemn others who would not be willing to act in a 
similar manner under similar circumstances. This demands at least a pause 
before we classify such acts as supererogatory. For this reason, Horgan and 
Timmons believe that the most straightforward method for investigating 
supererogation is to focus on the “ordinary, mundane cases of supererogation” 
because these are “comparatively uncontentious” compared to the others.91 I 
 
89 Horgan and Timmons, “Untying a Knot,” 40. 
90 Ibid., 39–40. 
91 Ibid., 40. 
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might add that this perspective conflicts with Urmson’s methodology. Urmson 
believed that the best way to argue for supererogation was to focus on the 
saintly and heroic acts. These, he wrote, are the “conspicuous cases” of the 
“whole realm of acts that lie outside the trichotomy.”92 Urmson’s 
methodological approach is on full display in the opening paragraph of M.W. 
Jackson’s “The Nature of Supererogation”: “Heroism is the archetype of 
supererogation. If the moral facts are in doubt, it [heroism] affords the clearest 
example, marking the far end of the continuum.”93 The basic idea is that if there 
is any hope of establishing supererogation as a legitimate classification, these 
more grandiose acts hold the most promise. I suspect that most moral 
philosophers have agreed with Urmson on this point, as evidenced by the fact 
that most of the examples offered by supererogationists tend to be saintly or 
heroic in nature. 
Aside from methodological debate, the more important point is that a 
significant number of moral philosophers embrace the possibility of mundane 
acts of supererogation. Though Jackson believed that heroic acts were the 
clearest instances of supererogation, he did state: “Many trifling good acts are 
not obligatory and so are supererogatory.”94 In the very article that launched 
the contemporary discussion on supererogation, Urmson stated, “It is possible 
to go just beyond one’s duty by being a little more generous, forbearing, 
helpful, or forgiving than fair dealing demands.”95 Chisholm and Sosa write: 
“But supererogation—which we will equate with non-obligatory well-doing—is 
not restricted to what is saintly and heroic; it also encompasses those small 
favors and acts of courtesy that ordinary men sometimes go out of their way 
to perform.”96 This same idea is espoused by Michael Clark in the statement, 
“An act of supererogation typically involves some sacrifice, or risk of sacrifice, 
on the part of the agent. The degree of sacrifice may well be too modest to put 
 
92 Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," 205. 
93 M.W. Jackson, “The Nature of Supererogation,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (1986): 
289.  
94 Ibid., 290. 
95 Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," 205. 
96 Chisholm and Sosa, “Intrinsic Preferability,” 326. 
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the agent into the category of saint or hero … but he will be forgoing some 
benefit to which he has a right.”97 Clark’s use of the word “degree” is 
particularly helpful because it suggests that supererogation be viewed on a 
continuum, with saintly and heroic deeds occupying one end and those acts 
which go barely above the call of duty on the other.  
What is interesting about so many of these statements is that they are 
presented without argument. The majority are made while the moral 
philosopher is arguing some other point. The majority of moral philosophers 
who endorse supererogation tend simply to assume that if there is such a 
classification as supererogation, then smaller acts are automatically included. 
But why have smaller acts of supererogation apparently been given a free 
pass? Although he was not responding this point, Alfred Archer’s remarks 
provide insight. He wrote: 
Supererogation is typically taken to be a technical term that is roughly 
equivalent to the ordinary language phrase ‘beyond the call of duty’. 
The starting point of almost all attempts to analyze supererogation is 
that this word is roughly equivalent to the ordinary language phrase 
‘beyond the call of duty’. Given that supererogation is taken to be a 
technical term for this ordinary language phrase, our analysis of the 
concept should be true to our use of the phrase. Accepting this gives us 
reason to make our definition of supererogation wide enough to 
encompass all acts that we would describe as ‘beyond the call of duty’.98  
 
Archer was arguing that we may have reason to think that someone could be 
blamed in certain circumstances for omitting acts that are beyond the call of 
duty. If this proves to be the case, then as Archer admits, we would “be going 
against [the] well-established view of the supererogatory” in allowing acts that 
are “blameworthy to omit” to still qualify as supererogatory.99 Though Archer 
knew some would have a major problem with this revision to the definition of 
supererogation, he maintained: “It may well be true that many have accepted 
that part of what it is for an act to be supererogatory is for it to be blameless to 
 
97 Clark, “The Meritorious,” 30. 
98 Archer, “Do We Need to Make Room for Quasi-Supererogation?” The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 50 (2016): 348–349. 
99 Ibid., 349. 
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omit. This, though, does not give us reason to stay loyal to this analysis when 
presented with an act that is beyond the call of duty but blameless to omit.”100 
In other words, if an act of moral worth goes beyond the call of duty, then it is 
supererogatory. Archer might have something like the following in mind: Due 
to the various issues and complexities that can arise when discussing 
supererogation, we must keep two questions in mind when evaluating any act: 
(1) Does the act possess moral worth? and (2) Does it go beyond the call of 
duty? If the answer is “yes” to both questions, then it is supererogatory even if 
other properties are absent. Some of our conceptions of what characterizes a 
supererogatory act may need to be reexamined, and we can do this so long 
as we keep the fundamental criteria in mind. 
The point of this digression is to suggest why smaller acts of 
supererogation are considered as such without a robust argument in their 
favor. They seem to come with the territory of supererogation in general. 
Archer’s reasoning helps explain why this is. According to Archer, our analysis 
of the concept of supererogation should be true to the phrase, “beyond the call 
of duty.” In other words, if an act of moral worth seems to go beyond what is 
required, then it is supererogatory. Either an act does or does not fit the bill. If 
it does not, then the deed must be classified otherwise. If it does, whether small 
or heroic, then it is supererogatory. And once you have endorsed 
supererogation, only an a priori commitment to the Extreme Cost View would 
stand in the way of the otherwise intuitive endorsement of the full range of 
supererogatory acts. But once the Extreme Cost View is defeated, the 
possibility of small acts of supererogation seems so intuitively plausible that 
proof might not seem necessary. This would explain why smaller acts of 
supererogation are often embraced but not robustly defended. The burden of 
proof seems to lie with the moral philosopher who wants to count only the 
saintly or heroic deed as supererogatory. Stated differently, common-sense 
strongly suggests that if you can exceed the call of duty in grandiose, heroic 
fashion, then you can also do so in a smaller, more humble fashion. 
 
100 Ibid., 350. 
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Much more could be said regarding this debate. However, my goal has 
been to show that the Extreme Cost View is problematic for several reasons. I 
would prefer to reject supererogation altogether than to accept the more 
restrictive view that seems to arbitrarily exclude smaller acts. 
 
Acts, Dispositions, Motives, and Intentions 
 
Two general divisions can be drawn concerning supererogation. First, 
there is the division between those that endorse and those that reject the 
possibility of acts of supererogation. Secondly, there is a further division 
between those that endorse supererogation: those who believe that internal, 
psychological elements can affect the deontic status of an act (i.e., motives, 
intentions, character) and those who do not. This section is committed to 
discussing different individuals who argue that either motives or intentions 
have deontic relevance when evaluating acts. 
There is an “anatomy” to the moral life. First, there is the act itself. 
Secondly, there is the agent’s intention at the time they acted. Third, there is 
the agent’s motive, which is different from their intention. And fourth, there is 
what in ordinary language we refer to as character. This concept is a bit more 
ambiguous. When we speak of an agent’s character, we seem to refer to a 
more permanent construct that informs moral attitudes and orients that person 
to think, feel, and act in a consistent manner from one situation to the next. 
Stanley Hauerwas writes, “Character is not just the sum of all that we do as 
agents, but rather it is the particular direction our agency acquires by choosing 
to act in some ways rather than others.”101 In this quote, Hauerwas is making 
the Aristotelian point that our acts over time shape our character by cultivating 
our dispositions to particular virtues.102 As Aristotle writes: “we become just by 
 
101 Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics 
(San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1985), 117. 
102 Of course, the opposite is also true as well in what Joseph Kotva refers to as a 
“circular relationship.” Kotva makes the clear point that actions now only flow from states of 
character, but they also help shape moral character as well. See Joseph Kotva, The 
Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 29, 
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doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave 
actions.”103 In his discussion of character, Hauerwas also uses the word 
“orientation” to signify the particular direction of agency that our acts create. 
Relative to this project, the important point that Hauerwas makes is that 
character can be thought of as the particular direction, or orientation, of the 
entire self. Intuitively, a person’s various moral orientations are more 
permanent than acts, intentions, and motives, which can be more fleeting in 
comparison. While the notion of character is closely connected with, and might 
even subsume, intentions and motives, it is distinct and must be treated as 
such when discussing supererogation. 
In light of these comments, the question related to supererogation is, 
“Should intentions, motives, or character count in the classification of acts?” If 
the answer is yes, then it must be decided which of the three (or any 
combination) should play a part. Currently, there is no clear consensus. My 
goal, therefore, is to illuminate this aspect of supererogation because not only 
is it of the utmost importance in moral philosophy, but it is the “internal world” 
of intent, motive, and character which is indispensably crucial to the larger, 
theological context of this thesis. 
As with most topics related to supererogation, it is fitting to begin with 
Urmson’s essay, “Saints and Heroes.” In my reading of Urmson, he never 
discusses the role of intentions or motives in the classification of an act. And 
although he uses the words “saint” and “hero” to refer to the person who has 
performed a saintly or heroic act, he does not address the character of the 
agent. In his defense, his task was much broader. He was primarily interested 
in arguing for the possibility of supererogation itself by establishing the 
inadequacy of the threefold classification of moral acts. Therefore, the role of 
character, intentions, and motives was peripheral to his aim and so we need 
not make too big of a deal of this omission. That being said, many moral 
 
105. Cf. Richard Mouw, The God Who Commands (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
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103 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.4 1103b, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 19. 
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philosophers believe that this oversight (as innocent as it might be) is 
significant. After all, most would have a problem saying that a person behaved 
“above the call of duty” if the motive for acting was completely selfish and had 
nothing to do with benefiting another individual.  
Methodologically, it is efficacious at the beginning of any discussion to 
eliminate any feature that is not thought to play a part in act classification. 
Character is such a feature. At first glance, this feels counterintuitive. Surely a 
person’s character matters in classifying an act. However, this is not the case. 
It is common to hear someone defending a friend’s unacceptable or immoral 
behavior with the colloquialism, “That is out-of-character for them.” Implicit 
within this statement is the idea that our character does not determine our 
behavior in every instance. In other words, although a person may be of honest 
character and thus be consistently oriented to behave in an honest manner, 
this does not mean that they are incapable of acting dishonestly. To be 
oriented toward the virtue of honesty means that a person enjoys being honest, 
believes it to be virtuous, would encourage others to do so, and acts 
accordingly unless there are extenuating circumstances that might warrant a 
dishonest act in a particular instance. However, while a person might typically 
behave in an honest manner, it is not hard to imagine this same individual 
failing to speak or act honestly in a particular instance due to some form of 
external pressure (e.g., fear of rejection, the desire for approval, the hope for 
a promotion, the desire to escape punishment or censure, etc.). As the 
Psalmist writes, “we are dust.”104 However, we would not say that the honest 
person who has lied on one occasion is dishonest. Rather, we would either 
say, “Well, nobody is perfect,” or “That is not typical of them.” One behavioral 
slip is not enough to require us to view this person’s character differently. The 
important point in all of this is that a person’s act is not always reflective of their 
underlying character. It may be or it may not. A person with a vicious character 
may on one occasion behave in a virtuous manner. As John Stuart Mill writes: 
 
104 Ps. 103:14, New Revised Standard Version (NRSV). From this point forward, this 
translation is used unless otherwise noted. 
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“a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character . . .”105 On the 
other hand, a person with a virtuous character may on one occasion behave 
in a vicious manner. Therefore, character is of no direct relevance to 
supererogation.106 To quote Mill once more: “for certainly no known ethical 
standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or 
bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, 
or the contrary.”107 However, this does not mean that character is irrelevant to 
acts of supererogation. Quite the contrary, virtuous dispositions that comprise 
one’s character can contribute to an increase of supererogatory acts being 
performed over the course of time because of the connection between 
character and proper motive. The indirect relevance of character to 
supererogation and its link with motive will be discussed at length towards the 
end of chapter four. Because character is not directly relevant to the deontic 
status of an act, all that remains is to examine whether intentions or motives 
are of classificatory relevance.  
In supererogatory literature, this is the point where the dialogue 
becomes quite nuanced and careful attention is required. Many moral 
philosophers write about motive and intention. I am going to focus on three—
Gregory Trianosky, Phillip Montague, and Alfred Archer—because they 
provide a clear framework with which other thinkers can be engaged as well. I 
will make a few brief remarks concerning each of these three before going into 
more detail. Gregory Trianosky argues that although an act may be 
supererogatory, there may still be instances when a person is blameworthy for 
not performing it. This runs counter to the traditional conception of 
supererogation, for if an act is not required, an agent is not obligated to perform 
the act. After all, if there is no moral obligation, then how could a person be 
blamed for not performing the act? In order to defend this unorthodox position, 
 
105 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2001), 20. 
106 “Direct” is emphasized because I will take time to argue why character has not 
received the attention it deserves in relation to supererogation. As I will argue in chapter 
four, character is of great importance to supererogation though not directly.  
107 Mill, Utilitarianism, 20. 
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Trianosky makes a distinction between two types of negative moral judgment. 
As will be shown, the distinction brings “less-than-virtuous” motives to the 
forefront108 while also providing support for my earlier claim that character 
should play no part in act classification. For these reasons, his argument is 
important to consider. 
Phillip Montague begins with the accurate observation, “Now, it seems 
to me that, as supererogation is commonly understood by philosophers, 
judgments of supererogation are act assessments.”109 He then argues against 
what he calls the “standard” definition of supererogation that in his opinion 
allows for certain acts to be erroneously classified as supererogatory even 
though the agent “acts at his own convenience and solely for his own 
enjoyment.”110 Montague presents a revised definition of supererogation and 
argues that what is important when classifying an act is not only the act, but 
whether the person performs the act in a praiseworthy manner. This treatment 
of supererogation is novel due to the fact that Montague is relocating the 
praiseworthy assessment from the act to the agent. As with Trianosky, this is 
an important move and deserves further treatment.  
Also of great relevance to this topic is the view of Alfred Archer. He 
makes a significant distinction between intentions and motivations. From there, 
he proceeds to argue that it is not motive, but the intentions of the agent that 
should play an important part in classifying an act. Unlike Montague who does 
not make this distinction, Archer argues that an act can be supererogatory 
even though the agent’s motivation is completely self-centered. Because most 
moral philosophers like Montague have not made the subtle distinction 
between intentions and motivations, few if any moral philosophers have made 
the audacious claim that a person could supererogate while being selfishly 
motivated.  
 
108 Gregory Trianosky, “Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the Autonomy of the Ethics of Virtue,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1996): 29. 
109 Montague, “Acts, Agents, and Supererogation,” 102. 
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Other moral philosophers have written on this topic. It is my intent to 
introduce some of them while focusing on the ideas of Trianosky, Montague, 
and Archer. These three provide a good framework within which other related 
ideas and thinkers can be presented. An appropriate place to begin is to ask, 
“Is supererogation intrinsic to the act or not? If so, then the intent, motive, and 
character of the agent is logically excluded from the stock of relevant material 
to be considered in supererogatory classification. If supererogation is not 
intrinsic to an act, then the internal world of the agent might be of classificatory 
significance after all. Montague writes: “Is supererogation a feature of actions, 
or a feature of persons, or is it perhaps a complex feature of actions and 
persons?”111 If supererogation is more than a feature of just acts, it seems that 
this would have at least something to do with intents, motives, or character. 
As previously mentioned, Trianosky argues that while an act may be 
supererogatory, there still may be instances when a person is blameworthy for 
not performing it. This goes against the traditional view. In both the threefold 
and fourfold classificatory theories, blame can only be assigned to an agent 
under one of two conditions: (1) the person failed to do their duty, or (2) the 
person performed an act that is morally wrong. The reason for this is 
straightforward. In the first instance, there is an obligation to perform the act. 
In the second instance, there is an obligation to refrain from performing the 
act. In both cases, blameworthiness results from a person not satisfying their 
moral obligation. Trianosky’s argument is interesting because he argues that 
blame can be assigned in instances where there is no moral obligation. He 
begins by highlighting what he labels a “putatively puzzling phenomenon.”112 
In a nutshell, if there is such a thing as a supererogatory act whose 
“performance is recommended but not required and whose omission is 
permitted rather than forbidden,”113 then why do people feel the need to offer 
excuses when challenged to behave in a supererogatory manner? Susan Hale 
also believes that it is not insignificant that people make excuses to justify the 
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omission of an allegedly supererogatory deed. She goes as far as to claim that 
this is one of two reasons why the supererogatory classification must be 
abandoned. She writes: “The first phenomenon inconsistent with the standard 
deontic classification114 is that we give excuses for failing to perform 
purportedly supererogatory acts and we distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate, adequate and inadequate, excuses for such failures.”115 Without 
going into much detail, Hale argues that the moral life is fraught with conflict 
between duties. Relying upon Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties, she suggests that in situations where one imperfect duty comes into 
conflict with another, the act that is considered “more onerous to ourselves” is 
typically the one that is erroneously classified as supererogatory. In other 
words, when I am confronted with a situation where two imperfect duties 
conflict, the more demanding of the two is viewed as supererogatory because 
I could have performed the less demanding act without committing a moral 
wrong. To choose the more arduous course of action when it is not required is 
viewed as supererogatory. But Hale believes this is wrong. Although a person 
chooses the more onerous option of the two imperfect duties, they are still 
duties. And for her, this is why excuse-making is so insightful. When someone 
is faced with a conflict of two imperfect duties, no matter which is chosen, they 
cannot avoid neglecting the demands of the imperfect duty not chosen. This is 
why a person makes excuses; they know as well as others that a duty was 
neglected. For Hale, subsuming the allegedly supererogatory deed under the 
banner of the more onerous imperfect duty is able to better accommodate the 
psychological impulse and behavioral tendency to make excuses.  
Trianosky does not see in the act of excuse-making a refutation of 
supererogation itself. Rather, he makes an important distinction between 
negative deontic and negative arataic judgments of the person. In his view, 
 
114 Italics mine. Hale believed that at the time of her writing, the standard view in moral 
philosophy was pro-supererogation. When Urmson wrote in the 1950s, he believed that the 
view that had been endorsed either explicitly or implicitly by moral philosophers did not allow 
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negative deontic judgments of the person “presuppose judgments about the 
wrongness of some particular act of the agent’s.”116 The person is judged 
blameworthy for failing to act in the appropriate manner. Negative arataic 
judgments are directed toward the internal world of the agent and are aimed 
at the one of the following: (1) the “viciousness of standing traits or 
dispositions,” or (2) the “viciousness of occurrent motives or states.”117 
Trianosky believes that the latter type of negative arataic judgment is most 
relevant for supererogation. With this conceptual division between negative 
deontic and arataic judgments, he has what he needs to explain the excuse-
making phenomenon in relation to supererogation without abandoning the 
classification altogether (as Hale did). He writes, “If an act is supererogatory, 
then, I suppose, no negative deontic judgments can appropriately be made of 
the person who fails to perform it.”118 He continues, “But it does not follow that 
no negative arataic judgment can appropriately be made; for the agent may 
still have acted from a less-than-virtuous motive, or it seems, even a vicious 
motive.”119 So while a person might not have acted wrongly in refraining from 
a supererogatory deed, their reason for omitting the act might be blameworthy. 
Concerning this point by Trianosky, Gregory Mellema writes: “Reacting with 
total indifference to the needs of others when refraining from an act of 
supererogation is quite different from reacting with feelings of regret and 
concern for those one fails to assist when electing not to perform an act of 
supererogation.”120 This explains why one might make an excuse for not 
performing a supererogatory act; the individual may be deflecting blame 
directed at their character or motive. If this is the case, then contra Hale, an 
individual may offer an excuse for a supererogatory omission in order to 
prevent others from thinking negatively about them (as opposed to the mere 
act). In conclusion, the significance of this line of argument is threefold. First, 
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Trianosky suggests the unorthodox idea that there are situations where a 
person is blameworthy for omitting a supererogatory deed. Because 
blameworthiness is not traditionally associated with supererogation, his view 
is valuable. Secondly, contra Hale, he provides a sound, alternative response 
to the phenomenon of excuse-making that preserves the category of 
supererogation. And third, though he does not seem to argue that motive can 
affect the classification of an act, he does give motive a much more important 
place in the supererogatory discussion. This is important because other 
thinkers will take this a step further and actually argue that motives and intents 
can actually affect the classification of an act.  
As previously mentioned, Montague begins with the observation that 
“as supererogation is commonly understood by philosophers, judgments of 
supererogation are act assessments.” Definitions that follow this line of 
thinking are what he refers to as “standard” and essentially depict an act of 
supererogation as one that satisfies the following three criteria: (1) has moral 
value, (2) not required, and (3) not forbidden. This standard definition, or act-
assessment version of supererogation, can more properly be expressed as: “if 
x is praiseworthy for doing y, the y is morally valuable and not prohibited; if y 
is morally valuable, is not prohibited, and is not required, then (and only then) 
y is supererogatory.” Essentially, this definition states that an agent is 
praiseworthy for performing the act so long as all three criteria are satisfied. 
Notice that there is no reference to the internal world of the agent. This 
approach treats supererogation as if it is intrinsic to the act; no other feature is 
relevant to its classification. But Montague strongly objects to this approach 
when he writes, “But something is surely missing from this account of 
supererogation.”121 In defense of this claim, he provides a scenario where a 
person performs an act that satisfies all three criteria for supererogation but 
does so “at his own convenience and solely for his own enjoyment.”122 For 
Montague, there is a significant problem with the standard definition because 
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it leaves room for this act to be classified as supererogatory even though its 
performance is not praiseworthy (due to the selfish motivation of the agent). 
But, as he makes clear, this is problematic because it “conflicts with the idea 
that supererogation and praiseworthiness are necessarily connected.”123 The 
fact that the standard definition allows for this is reason enough to reject it. 
What is needed, according to Montague, is a different definition that 
acknowledges the intuitively necessary connection between supererogation 
and praiseworthiness. In place of the standard or act-assessment definition of 
supererogation, he writes: “y is supererogatory (for x) if and only if x is 
praiseworthy for doing y (from which it follows that y is morally valuable and 
not prohibited), and y is not required.”124 Although the difference seems subtle 
at first glance, it is extremely important.  
This new definition reassigns the object to which praiseworthiness is 
attached. The standard definition makes the mistake of viewing 
praiseworthiness as an assessment of an act. In other words, if an act fulfills 
all three criteria, it is praiseworthy. However, Montague writes that “judgments 
of blameworthiness and of praiseworthiness are assessments of persons as 
agents.”125 Therefore, praiseworthiness is something different than moral 
value because it is a feature of persons whereas moral value is a feature of 
acts. With the separation of these two assessments, Montague can now claim 
that an act can possess moral value while not being performed in a 
supererogatory manner. In these instances, the act would not be classified as 
supererogatory. The revised definition states, “y is supererogatory (for x) if and 
only if x is praiseworthy for doing y…” Even though the act has moral value 
and is neither required nor forbidden, x did not perform y in a praiseworthy 
manner, and in the new formulation, this is enough to deny the deed 
supererogatory status. Before, the act was considered praiseworthy if it 
satisfied the following three criteria: (1) possesses moral worth, (2) is not 
obligatory, and (3) is not forbidden. Now, the “quality of the motives” plays an 
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important role in the classification of an act. This was only made possible by 
making the distinction between moral value and praiseworthiness. With 
praiseworthiness now being a judgment of a person’s motives and not an act, 
Montague can call an act morally good and yet still deny it supererogatory 
status if it is not performed in an appropriate manner. Thus, motive becomes 
an essential ingredient in the concept of supererogation.  
Over the past ten years, few moral philosophers have written more on 
supererogation than Alfred Archer. Interestingly, he makes the provocative 
claim contrary to Montague that motive does not matter in relation to 
supererogation. Prima facie, this seems wrong. How could someone perform 
a deed while caring nothing for anyone else and yet the act still qualifies as 
supererogatory? To argue this point, Archer makes a clear distinction between 
motives and intentions. This distinction is not always made in moral 
philosophy. For example, Jackson writes:  
Compare, Peterfreund asks, two doctors who each choose to go to the 
plague city to work. Assume one of them is motivated by a spirit of 
adventure. This adventurous doctor leaves behind a practice of 
seriously ill and dependent patients. The other physician is animated by 
a desire to mitigate suffering caused by the plague. This second doctor 
abandons a practice of wealthy hypochondriacs. Only this second 
doctor passes the test of altruistic intention.126  
 
Jackson uses the words “motivated” and “intention” interchangeably, 
suggesting that he makes no distinction between the two. In one essay, 
Gregory Mellema appears to conflate the terms as well. Following three 
examples of supererogation that he offers, he writes:  
it is important in situations of this type to assume that people under 
consideration behave with good or honorable intentions. For example, 
one might refrain from making public certain facts about an adversary 
only because one fears retaliation or because one is not sufficiently 
resourceful to know how to do so without appearing exploitative. If so, 
one’s refraining is probably not sufficiently meritorious to qualify as an 
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act of supererogation. Thus, in each of the scenarios it is to be assumed 
that the people are virtuous in their motives and underlying character.127 
 
In this excerpt, Mellema seems to say that “good or honorable intentions” are 
synonymous with virtuous motives. No distinction is made. When motivation 
and intention are so treated, then any view that wants to include the inner world 
of the agent when classifying an act must require that the agent’s motive is 
altruistic. But Archer believes that this is overly restrictive. After all, a person 
could risk life and limb with the intention of saving a child while being 
egotistically motivated to appear brave, gain fame, or feel better about oneself. 
Even with mixed or impure motives, surely this act is still supererogatory 
according to Archer. The claim that the intentional act to save the child in the 
face of great danger is not supererogatory because of the agent’s motive is a 
“counterintuitive result” according to Archer.128 Motivation should not count so 
long as the agent’s intention was altruistic. Archer provides the following 
example:  
Suppose a power-hungry misanthrope is standing for election as mayor. 
She wants to be mayor so she can more effectively enact her evil plans. 
Our election candidate passes a river and hears a drowning child 
scream for help. She recognizes that saving the child is likely to win her 
some votes in the forthcoming election. The candidate can be said to 
be acting with altruistic intent, securing the child’s safety is crucial to her 
plan of securing the townspeople’s votes. Her motives though are not 
altruistic.129  
 
Archer points out that for many philosophers, this act cannot be 
supererogatory because the motive of the agent is not praiseworthy. 
Montague, whose agent-supererogation view was just discussed, would agree 
with this assessment because it recognizes the role of motivation in the 
classification of the act. However, Archer denies that motivation plays a role 
and argues that the misanthrope’s act is in fact supererogatory because her 
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intent was altruistic whereas her motive was not. But this begs the question, 
“Why should intention be considered rather than motivation?” To support his 
position, Archer refers to the last two parts of David Heyd’s quadripartite 
definition of supererogation. According to Heyd, two of the four necessary 
conditions of supererogation are: (1) “It is morally good, both by virtue of its 
(intended) consequences...” and (2) “It is done voluntarily for the sake of 
someone else’s good, and is thus meritorious.”130 To further explain these two 
conditions, Heyd writes:  
The intention must be altruistic meaning that the act must be conceived 
as benefiting another person (or persons). . . . Altruistic intention should 
not, however, be confused with altruistic motive. While intention forms 
part of the description of the act, the motive is only the “feeling” which 
moves us to do it. The motives for acting supererogatorily are diverse 
in character, and are not always virtuous. One may act heroically in 
order to gain fame, to soothe one’s conscience (haunted by guilt 
feelings), or out of moral self-indulgence. High-minded motives are not 
a necessary condition for supererogatory action. . . . Although the 
motives of supererogatory acts may be self-regarding, the intention 
must be other-regarding.131  
 
The basic idea is that if the agent would have had a different motive, it is still 
possible that they would have performed the same deed.132 However, if the 
agent would have had a different intention, they would not have performed the 
same act.133 This suggests that while intentions are an integral part of the fabric 
of an act, motivation is not. Therefore it is intention, not motive, that should be 
taken into account when classifying acts.  
After Archer argues his case, he separates himself from Heyd. Archer 
argues that Heyd’s altruistic intention requirement (AIR) for supererogation is 
too restrictive. In place of this, Archer proposes the moral intention requirement 
(MIR). The best way to explain the difference between the two and why Archer 
believes in the latter’s superiority is to begin with one of his examples. He 
writes:  
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Simon Wiesenthal was a Holocaust survivor. After The Second World 
War, he dedicated his life to tracking down fugitive Nazis so they could 
be brought to justice. Most famously, Wiesenthal helped to track down 
Adolf Eichmann, leading to his capture in 1960. The reason that 
Wiesenthal dedicated his life to this cause was not vengeance but 
justice. By choosing to spend his life in this way Wiesenthal put himself 
in a position where he would have to suffer both physical attacks from 
neo-Nazis and the emotional pain of constantly reliving his traumatic 
experiences. It seems to me that Wiesenthal’s actions should be 
classed as supererogatory.134 
 
Archer asks the reader to assume that Wiesenthal’s intent was to bring about 
justice rather than to benefit anyone. Under this assumption, his intent is not 
necessarily altruistic, which according to AIR, eliminates the possibility of the 
related acts being supererogatory. But Archer believes that this conclusion is 
mistaken and a consequence of the overdemandingness of AIR. What is 
needed is a theory of supererogation that allows intentions to play a significant 
role in act classification without blocking certain acts from supererogatory 
consideration simply because they may not be intended to benefit anyone. In 
place of AIR, Archer presents his view that, “For an act to be supererogatory 
the agent must be acting with moral intentions.”135 Unlike AIR, Wiesenthal’s 
acts can be classified as supererogatory under the MIR theory of 
supererogation because his intent to bring justice is moral. The strength of this 
view is that the moral as opposed to the altruistic requirement is not nearly as 
rigorous. Many would agree with Archer that Wiesenthal’s acts possess moral 
worth but require too much of him to be considered a duty. But this would mean 
that under AIR, the act must now be classified as either a duty, moral wrong, 
or merely permissible act since it cannot be classified as supererogatory since 
the intention is not clearly altruistic. For Archer, this conclusion is preposterous 
and according to Archer, is a strong reason for favoring MIR over AIR.  
The value of this section to the overall project is key. Trianosky, 
Montague, Heyd, Jackson, Archer, and a host of other moral philosophers 
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believe that the internal world of the agent is of great importance to 
supererogation. Motives and intentions are not to be dismissed in favor of a 
more objective definition of supererogation that discounts what is happening 
in the mind of the agent when the act is performed. This is of particular 
importance to the treatment of supererogation within Protestant theology and 
practice for the straightforward reason that Jesus Christ himself places 
emphasis upon the internal world of the agent at the time of action. Stanley 
Grenz writes:  
The Jewish religious leaders were quite happy to content themselves 
with outward acts. They believed that God requires meticulous 
conformity to the standards of conduct set forth in the law. Jesus, 
however, was unwilling to stop with outward conduct. Instead his 
teaching pierced to the core, to the inward dimension of human 
existence. . . . Jesus was primarily concerned about character, 
motivation and the heart.136  
 
In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus took time to teach about generosity, prayer, 
and fasting. In all three cases, he did not merely emphasize the right course 
of action, but rather, the motive behind the act. Regarding generosity, he urged 
his listeners not to give for the purpose of earning the praise of other human 
beings.137 In relation to prayer, he taught that it was wrong in the eyes of God 
to pray in order to be noticed by people whether that be in the synagogues or 
on the street corners.138 And last, he taught that when fasting, you should be 
careful to “put oil on your head and wash your face” so that no one notices.139 
The crux of his teaching in this portion of the sermon was that if one wants 
their acts of generosity, prayer, and fasting to be approved in the eyes of God, 
then they must give, pray, and fast for God and not to gain the praise of people. 
In other words, motives matter in regard to how an act is viewed, or classified, 
in the eyes of God. What I find particularly interesting is that although Heyd’s 
division between motivation and intention and Archer’s argument for MIR over 
AIR are quite valuable in moral philosophy, it is not clear how their insights can 
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be accommodated within Protestant ethics due to Jesus’ emphasis upon right 
motivation. It might be the case that if there is a possibility for supererogation 
within Protestant ethics, an account that prioritizes motivation (as opposed to 
intention) such as Montague’s agent-supererogation might be more congruous 
with the teachings of Jesus than accounts that make intention the focal point. 
This will receive great attention in chapter four. For now, I only make brief 
mention of Jesus’ emphasis on motivation to highlight the fact that the 
treatment of motivation and intention within supererogation literature in moral 
philosophy is of great importance for the effective treatment of supererogation 
within Protestant ethics. 
 
Supererogation and Christianity  
 
Since Urmson’s landmark essay in 1958, the concept of supererogation 
has received little attention from outside moral philosophy. This point might not 
seem all that significant until one is confronted with the fact that “Christian 
theology is the origin both of the concept and of the formulation of the problem 
of supererogation.”140 David Heyd’s chapter, “The Theological Origins in 
Christianity” and Gregory Mellema’s chapter, “Theism and Supererogation” do 
a splendid job discussing the origin of the term supererogation, the importance 
of the concept to Roman Catholic theology and practice, and the reasons why 
Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, and other Reformers so 
vehemently rejected the doctrine.141 However, though Heyd and Mellema 
provide an excellent account of the history of supererogation, it is still fitting 
that I touch on certain aspects of this history in this section in order to provide 
context for the theological orientation of this project.  
The first time the word supererogation appears is in the Parable of the 
Good Samaritan in the Vulgate, which is a Latin translation of the Bible.142 After 
the Good Samaritan had brought the beaten man to the inn, he gave two 
 
140 Heyd, Supererogation, 15. 
141 Heyd, Supererogation, 15–34; Mellema, Beyond the Call, 43–67. 
142 Heyd, “Supererogation.” 
 60 
denarii to the innkeeper and said, “Take care of him; and when I come back, I 
will repay you whatever more you spend.”143 The “whatever more” is the Latin 
“quodcumque supererogaveris.” The word supererogare from which the 
phrase quodcumque supererogaveris comes means “to overspend or spend 
more than is required.”144 Interestingly, while this is the first time the word 
occurs, it would be a mistake to interpret this occurrence as an unequivocal 
endorsement of supererogation in Protestant ethics. Rather, as Heyd points 
out, the way that the term is used in this instance has “no special meaning 
beyond what it literally expresses.”145 The Good Samaritan is simply telling the 
innkeeper that if the two denarii proves insufficient, that he will cover the 
additional costs upon his return. Ulla Wessels disagrees. She writes:  
Although the expression ‘whatever more you spend’ (in Latin: 
‘quodcumque supererogaveris’) only refers to the expenses of the 
innkeeper, the Church Fathers agreed that in essence the story is about 
the efforts of the Good Samaritan. By giving the innkeeper two silver 
coins and declaring his willingness to reimburse him for any extra 
expenses, the Good Samaritan did more good than could be asked of 
him. According to the Church Fathers, he was following not only the Ten 
Commandments, but also what they called ‘consilia’, the divine 
instructions to saints, which go beyond the Ten Commandments.146 
  
By “Church Fathers,” Wessels includes a footnote that references Saint 
Augustine’s De sancta virginitate (i.e., Of Holy Virginity). However, this 
appears to be misleading for two reasons. First of all, she only mentions Saint 
Augustine though she writes, “Church Fathers,” which is plural. Secondly—
and of more significance—Augustine does not interact directly with the story 
of the Good Samaritan in this work. Consequently, Wessels last statement is 
misleading (though I am not implying that this is intentional on her part) 
because it implies that Augustine is the one that claims that the Good 
Samaritan’s act is “consilia.” However, he does not do this in De sancta 
virginitate. Therefore, it is not clear why Wessels is referring to this work unless 
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she is simply making the more general point that Augustine does distinguish 
between “praecepti” (i.e., precepts, or commands) and “consilia” (i.e., 
counsels).147 The bottom line is that Wessel needs to say much more in order 
to support the claim that the Church Fathers believed that the Good 
Samaritan’s promise to repay whatever more the innkeeper spends is an 
example of a counsel. Therefore, Heyd’s position that the Samaritan’s act is 
not necessarily a case of supererogation deserves consideration. 
Heyd’s counterpoint is enough to show that the matter is not clear and 
that there is reason to be reluctant when attempting to classify the Good 
Samaritan’s act as supererogatory. This is not to say that acts of 
supererogation are not possible within Protestant ethics, but rather, if they are, 
the Good Samaritan’s act might not be the perfect example of supererogation 
that some have thought. Besides, does the passage not conclude with a 
command (i.e., “Go and do likewise.”148)? If this be the case, then support for 
acts of supererogation in Protestant ethics must come from elsewhere. 
Considering this, I will later present what I believe is one of the clearest acts 
of supererogation in the New Testament in chapter three. 
The first systematic treatment of supererogation can be traced back to 
the writings of Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. He writes, “The 
difference between a counsel and a precept lies in this, that a precept implies 
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necessity, while a counsel is left to the choice of the one to whom it is given.”149 
He continues: 
The precepts of the new law, then, must be understood as bearing on 
whatever is necessary in order to reach the end of eternal blessedness, 
with which the New Law puts us in immediate contact. Counsels, on the 
other hand, have to be concerned with better and more expeditious 
ways by which man can reach this end.150 
 
Aquinas is saying that precepts (i.e. commandments) are obligatory for all 
agents whereas counsels are recommended but not required. Essentially, a 
counsel is an act of supererogation because although it is of great moral and 
spiritual value, it is neither obligatory nor forbidden. It goes above and beyond 
what the commandments require and gives an individual the best chance of 
attaining the salvation of their soul and securing an eternity with God in 
heaven. For Aquinas, good works play a crucial role in determining whether a 
person is justified (declared by God to be “not guilty” as well as “righteous”) 
before God. This soteriological component of good works is evident in Aquinas’ 
thought when he writes that fulfilling the commandments is “necessary in order 
to reach the end of eternal blessedness.”151 In other words, good works are 
integral to justification and therefore to salvation. As Grudem writes, “the 
logical consequence of this view of justification is that our eternal life with God 
is not based on God’s grace alone, but partially on our merit as well. . . .”152 If 
a person has failed to sufficiently keep the commandments or has not 
performed an adequate number of good works throughout the course of their 
life, they will be sentenced to purgatory for an indefinite time period. However, 
a person can have their sentence lessened through the purchase of 
indulgences. Aquinas’ distinction between commandments and counsels 
provided the “necessary theoretical justification [for] the institution of 
indulgences.”153 Mellema writes:  
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The principle underlying the idea that the purchase of an indulgence 
can lessen the penalties for sin was that Jesus Christ and the saints 
had, through their exemplary lives on earth, built up a treasury of good 
works. Since this treasury can be of no direct benefit to these 
individuals, the scheme of indulgences was devised to enable others to 
benefit. Those who fail to live saintly lives are assigned penalties 
(perhaps a period of confinement in purgatory), and through the 
purchase of indulgences it was believed possible for a measure of the 
accrued merit of Christ and the saints to be applied to their account. 
And when a measure of this merit is applied to the account of one faced 
with a penalty, the penalty is correspondingly lessened.154 
 
Through the purchase of indulgences, the superabundant merit could be 
transferred by the Church to those who were lacking so that one could be 
justified before God. Essentially, Aquinas’ endorsement of counsels, or acts of 
supererogation, made it possible for extra credit to accumulate in the treasury 
of the church so that it could be dispensed to those in need if they were willing 
to pay the right price. In this view of justification where good works are 
paramount, the importance of supererogatory acts is great. 
It is no wonder that Luther and the Reformers wholeheartedly rejected 
the possibility of supererogatory deeds. According to Luther, there is no such 
thing as an act that “gathers merits and good works,”155 because if there were, 
“Christ’s blood and death [would be] denied and blasphemed, together with 
the Holy Ghost and the Gospel.”156 Yet this is exactly what a counsel was 
claimed to be: an act that produced extra merit which could then be applied to 
those who were lacking. Thus, counsels—or acts of supererogation—were 
being used to provide theological support for selling indulgences, which was 
directly related to a faith-plus-works view of justification that Luther and the 
Reformers deemed heretical. Grudem writes, “The primary issue in the 
Protestant Reformation was a dispute with the Roman Catholic Church over 
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justification,”157 and supererogatory deeds in the form of counsels were 
indispensable to the Catholic view. The Reformers did not see a way to retain 
supererogation while rejecting the faith-plus-works view of justification that 
they believed was held by Roman Catholics. With impressive insight, Mellema 
notes, “this line of reasoning is not perfectly airtight.”158 He continues:  
There is no contradiction in affirming that a person can never be judged 
righteous in God's eyes on the basis of works alone and affirming at the 
same time that a person can perform acts of supererogation. For an act 
whose performance fulfils no duty and is yet praiseworthy may still fall 
short of justifying a person in God's eyes.159 
 
This astute observation separates the question of supererogation from the 
hotly contested doctrine of justification. This is healthy because it opens the 
door to a reexamination of supererogation within a Protestant theology that 
remains committed to a sola gratia, sola fide view of justification. As Paul 
wrote, “For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your 
own doing; it is the gift of God— not the result of works, so that no one may 
boast.”160 With the possibility of supererogation decoupled from the doctrine of 
justification, the question can now be asked, “Are acts of supererogation 
possible within Protestant ethics?”  
Interestingly, this question has received little attention over the past 
sixty years. This is ironic considering the fact that the concept of 
supererogation originated within Christian theology. It is also a bit peculiar that 
when the notion of supererogation is occasionally engaged from a theistic 
standpoint, the focus is not what you might expect. Rather than asking whether 
it is possible for a Christian to perform an act of supererogation, several 
philosophers have been more interested in whether it is possible for God to 
perform an act of supererogation. This a bit odd for the simple reason that the 
question of supererogation from the human perspective is much more relevant 
and therefore useful and I will defend this position in due course. After all, 
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many committed Christians such as myself experience considerable angst in 
the attempt to understand our moral responsibilities in a world torn asunder 
with natural disasters, starvation, disease, the refugee crisis, fatherlessness, 
sex trafficking, the threat of global warming, the abuse of power, and the like. 
Bonhoeffer’s words still ring true: we live in a “reality filled with concrete, ethical 
problems such as we have never had before in the history of the West.”161 As 
Robin Lovin writes, Christians (and those who are not) are busy thinking and 
worrying about various issues in an effort to try and “sort out our obligations” 
in “search for [an] inner peace” that is attainable only when one is “giving 
Caesar what belongs to Caesar and giving God what belongs to God (Luke 
20:20–26).”162 Nevertheless, I want to make a few brief comments concerning 
the discussion of God’s acts and supererogation. This requires an analysis of 
William Alston’s essay in which he appeals to the concept of supererogation 
in order to provide support for divine command theorists in the face of the 
Euthyphro dilemma. Following these comments, I will discuss two of Mark 
Wynn’s arguments including that supererogation may not be useful within 
Christian theology and practice. In addition to Wynn, Gregory Mellema also 
treats supererogation as it relates to human behavior from a religious 
perspective, but his viewpoint will not be addressed until the latter half of 
chapter two. And last, John S. and Paul D. Feinberg heartily embrace the 
possibility of supererogation in Protestant theology and ethics. Although I will 
make a few comments regarding their remarks on supererogation following my 
discussion of Wynn, I will wait until chapter two and especially chapter four to 
interact with them fully.  
Much of what has been written concerning whether God can perform 
an act of supererogation is in response to an essay written by William Alston 
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in 1990 titled “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.”163 In order 
to understand the place of supererogation in his argument, a little explanation 
is required. Alston’s main objective was to show how divine command theorists 
could avoid being impaled on either horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. As he 
states, “The original dilemma in the Euthyphro had to do with whether an act 
is pious because it is loved by the gods or is it loved by the gods because it is 
pious.”164 The second option must be rejected for the obvious reason that if an 
act is holy (i.e., right) due to some standard that is external to and thus 
independent from God, then there is something “above” God to which he must 
submit. This challenges the orthodox position within Christian theology that 
God is ontologically prior and superior to everything and the source of anything 
and everything good. However, the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is 
equally problematic. If the moral good is nothing more than what God 
commands, it seems that his commands are completely arbitrary. Building on 
this point, Alston writes:  
Anything that God should decide to command would thereby be 
obligatory. If God should command us to inflict pain on each other 
gratuitously we would thereby be obliged to do so. More specifically, the 
theory renders divine commands arbitrary because it blocks off any 
more reason for them. God can’t command us to do A because that is 
what is morally right; for it doesn’t become morally right until He 
commands it.165 
 
According to Alston, the only way to avoid this dilemma is to first establish that 
moral goodness is distinct from moral obligation and secondly, that God 
himself is “the supreme standard of goodness.”166 Working from the 
assumption that God is essentially perfectly good, Alston writes:  
If God is essentially perfectly good, then it is metaphysically impossible 
that God should do anything that is less than supremely good; and this 
 
163 This quickly becomes obvious when reading the following article: Alfred Archer, 
“Divine Moral Goodness, Supererogation, and The Euthyphro Dilemma,” International 
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164 William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian 
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includes the moral good as well as other modes of goodness. If it is 
morally better to be loving than to be indifferent and morally better to 
love everyone than to be agapistically selective, it will be metaphysically 
impossible for God to display indifference or partiality.167  
 
Because it is metaphysically impossible for God to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with his character, he can only behave in a way that is perfectly 
good. Due to this divine fact, Alston reasons that “moral obligations [do] not 
attach to God” because “We can say that a person ought to do A only where 
there is, or could be, some resistance on her part to doing A.”168 Because God 
is wholly good, he experiences no resistance. Therefore, any term from the 
“ought family” is not applicable to God. This leaves us with an image of an 
essentially perfectly good God who has no moral obligations. Alston writes: 
In suggesting that God is perfectly good, morally as well as otherwise, 
even though He is not subject to obligations, we are presupposing a 
fundamental distinction between value or goodness, including moral 
goodness, on the one hand, and the likes of duty, obligation, and ought, 
on the other.169 
 
In support of this fundamental distinction, Alston invokes the phenomenon of 
supererogation which he describes as “widely but not universally accepted.”170 
In the concept of supererogation we are able to see that most people already 
make the important distinction between the moral good and moral obligation. 
After all, one who believes that acts of supererogation are possible embraces 
the view that an act can be morally good without it being obligatory. Thus, this 
widely accepted concept provides support for Alston’s suggestion that we 
divide between the moral good and moral obligation so that we can say of God 
that although he is bound by no moral obligation, he can still perform acts that 
are morally good. This is only possible if the two are divided. This paves the 
way for the divine command theorist to evade the first horn of the Euthyphro 
dilemma because if the moral good is separate from the moral obligations that 
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result from divine commands, then the commands are no longer arbitrary so 
long as they are grounded in the moral good.  
According to Alston, this line of reasoning would allow the divine 
command theorist to say that while God’s commands are the source of human 
moral obligations, God’s essential perfect goodness is the source of the 
commandments. Archer writes of Alston’s view:  
On this account, then, moral goodness pre-exists moral obligation but 
does not pre-exist God. It is features of God that determine what is 
morally good and God’s commands that determine what is morally 
obliged. This account allows us to give an independent standard for 
moral goodness whilst giving God a central role in morality.171 
 
For example, under this view loving another person is not morally good 
because God commands it. Rather, loving another person is morally good 
because God is a God of love. Therefore, out of his loving nature, God 
commands people to love one another. The command simply flows out of that 
nature. While God’s commands give rise to obligation, his character 
determines what type of commands will be given in the first place. In this view, 
God is not some moral tabula rasa issuing decrees in an otherwise nihilistic 
universe. Instead, God’s nature is the source of all goodness including moral 
goodness and therefore, the commands are given to guide people morally in 
a way that is reflective of this divine goodness. Alston’s point is that in this 
view, God’s commands are not at all arbitrary. If successful, Alston has shown 
how divine command theories can avoid both horns of the Euthyphro 
dilemma.172 Though important, it is his use of supererogation that is most 
relevant to this project. It is important to note that Alston never suggests that 
God performs supererogatory acts. Rather, supererogation is used simply to 
point out that most people already make the kind of distinction between the 
moral good and moral obligation that is necessary if divine command theorists 
are going to stand their ground in the face of the Euthyphro dilemma.  
 
171 Alfred Archer, “Divine Moral Goodness, Supererogation, and The Euthyphro 
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 A myriad of responses followed Alston’s essay. As noted by Archer, 
philosophers such as J.L. Lombardi, Eleonore Stump, and K. Kraay point out 
different problems that result from Alston’s appeal to supererogation to 
distinguish moral goodness and obligation.173 In response to these, Elizabeth 
Young argues for a new analysis of the concept of supererogation in an 
attempt to defend Alston’s position.174 I will not go into detail explaining the 
various responses to Alston because the discussion would take us off course. 
As stated earlier, whether God can supererogate is not the focus of this project. 
However, it has been important to say something about Alston’s position 
because it is one of the rare instances in the last 70 years that supererogation 
has been treated from a religious perspective. 
Like Alston and the group of philosophers that responded to him, Mark 
Wynn is interested in supererogation from a religious perspective. However, 
he distinguishes himself from the group just mentioned by focusing on 
supererogation from a human standpoint. His focus is twofold: (1) the 
usefulness of supererogation for mapping the relationship between a religious 
and secular ethic, and (2) whether supererogation is of any use when 
examining and discussing the more mature stages of Christian faith. In 
examining this topic, he discusses Thomas Aquinas’ view of infused moral 
virtues as well as John of the Cross’s active and passive phases of the spiritual 
life. The latter subject is of particular importance because Wynn suggests that 
according to John of the Cross, concepts such as obligatory and 
supererogatory may “no longer [have] any ready application in the experience 
of the spiritual adept”175 following the dark night of the soul.  
To begin with, Wynn discusses Aquinas’ thought pertaining to the 
difference between the acquired and infused forms of temperance as well as 
Aquinas’ treatment of the virtue of charity. Wynn draws an important distinction 
between the rule of reason which governs secular ethics and divine rule which 
 
173 Ibid., 153. 
174 Ibid., 153; See Elizabeth D. Young, “God’s Moral Goodness and Supererogation,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2013): 90–95. 
175 Wynn, “Supererogation and the Relationship,” 177. 
 70 
governs religious ethics. The two are not in competition with one another. 
However, the divine rule “can only be grasped by reference to a theological 
context”176 and “involves a more stringent standard of conduct.”177 While a 
religious ethic will include that which is required by the rule of reason, it also 
will supersede it. For example, when trying to judge the appropriate measure 
of food to consume (not too much or too little, i.e., temperance), the rule of 
reason prescribes a “kind of dietary practice that is suited to the preservation 
of bodily health, and the exercise of reason.”178 Notice that no appeal to 
revelation is necessary. However, regarding infused temperance, what is 
required is much more demanding. Here Wynn quotes Aquinas: “[the] divine 
rule requires that a man should chastise his body and bring it into subjection 
[1 Cor. 9:27] . . . by abstinence in food, drink, and the like.”179 When compared 
with the desert fathers, Aquinas’ dietary regime could be regarded as 
moderate. However, this goes far beyond the moderation that the rule of 
reason requires for the attainment and sustaining of physical and mental 
health. Because the goal of obeying the divine rule is to be properly related to 
God now and in eternity, this stricter standard is meaningful. However, if you 
attempted to make sense of this more stringent standard through the lens of 
reason outside of any reference to a theological context, you would fail. After 
all, according to the rule of reason, temperance requires that measure of food 
that is conducive to health. But beyond this, the more difficult requirement of 
abstinence seems unnecessary (as opposed to supererogatory) from the 
vantage point of the rule of reason. Wynn writes:  
But the divine rule is at the same time more demanding. So if we are 
viewing matters from the vantage point of the relevant rule of reason, it 
seems we should say that the dietary practices that are required by the 
divine rule, in so far as they exceed those that are required by the rule 
of reason, are morally permissible (because they involve no harm of the 
body), but undermotivated (because they are more stringent, and yet 
do no more to realise the goal of the rule of reason). If that is so, then 
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from the vantage point of the rule of reason, abstinence [from food, drink 
and the like] will not be meritorious, and so will not be supererogatory.180  
 
In a nutshell, the more stringent requirement is permissible, but does not 
contribute anything extra toward reaching the goal of the rule of reason (i.e., 
health). Thus, the more stringent requirement is not supererogatory, but only 
morally permissible. However, from the perspective of divine rule, this is not 
so. In other words, the introduction of the theological context does not shift the 
boundary between obligation and supererogation from the perspective of the 
rule of reason. If anything, the theological context gives moral value to actions 
that would otherwise be superfluous. 
Next, Wynn turns his attention to the virtue of charity. Although he 
admits that Aquinas does not present an “acquired” version of the virtue of 
charity in contrast to neighbor love, he does believe that a distinction can be 
made in Aquinas’ thought between the requirements of other regard (subject 
to the rule of reason) and the requirements of neighbor love (divine rule).181 As 
with the distinction between acquired and infused temperance, infused charity 
(or neighbor love as Wynn calls it) is much more demanding than other regard 
in that it requires not only doing good to others, but also having the right 
attitude. In other words, while one can satisfy the requirement of other regard 
by behaving in the right manner, one must in addition possess the appropriate 
attitude when acting in order to fulfill the requirements of neighborly love. This 
additional and more stringent requirement is clearly articulated in Paul’s first 
letter to the Corinthians. He writes: “And if I give all my possessions to feed 
the poor, and if I surrender my body to be burned, but do not have love, it 
profits me nothing.”182 Giving all of one’s possessions to the poor would be 
impressive from a moral standpoint. Nonetheless, Paul explains that the most 
generous deed is without value in the eyes of God if not done with an attitude 
of love. Wynn writes:  
 
180 Ibid., 167. 
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. . . suppose that the corresponding rule of reason requires us not to 
harm others, but imposes no requirement to benefit them, unless they 
are in dire need, and we can relieve that need at minimal cost to 
ourselves. Such a rule would require me to pull a drowning child from a 
pool of water, if I can do so at no cost to myself, but would not require 
me, not even as a matter of imperfect duty, to relieve poverty that is 
consistent with the needy person’s basic nutritional needs being met, or 
to relieve poverty that is life-threatening if in doing so I would have to 
significantly impoverish myself. Relative to such a rule, the practice of 
neighbour love looks to be not simply permissible, but beyond the call 
of duty, and meritorious, and therefore supererogatory: from the 
vantage point of such a rule, the person who practises neighbour love 
will display a deeper practical commitment to others’ well-being than is 
required; and such behaviour therefore seems to be not under-
motivated, in the way that abstinence may appear to be under-
motivated relative to the relevant rule of reason, but meritorious.183  
 
After making this point, Wynn names three types of moral goods: (1) goods of 
reason, (2) theological goods, and (3) extended goods of reason. A good of 
reason is an object that results from following the rule of reason. A theological 
good is a good that results from following the divine rule. It is important to 
mention that theological goods are contingent upon God’s existence184 and 
that if God did not exist, there would be no grounds from the vantage point of 
the rule of reason to refer to the object as a “good.” It is the third type of good 
that is most interesting in relation to supererogation. According to Wynn, 
extended goods of reason are those goods that result from going above and 
beyond what is normally required by the rule of reason. For this reason, they 
are not goods of reason. However, they also are not contingent upon God’s 
existence185 even if they first arise within a theological context. In order to 
better explain the uniqueness of extended goods of reason, Wynn writes: 
Following our earlier account, we could say that the Samaritan’s 
conduct realises a good of reason, in so far as it relieves the dire need 
of the injured man; his conduct also realises a theological good, in so 
far as it is congruent with the beatific vision; but in addition, his conduct 
realises further goods, which are neither goods of reason nor 
theological goods. For instance by entrusting the injured man to the 
innkeeper, the Samaritan not only relieves his dire need, but helps to 
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ensure his full recovery. Although not a good of reason, this further of 
good can be seen to be good independently of any reference to 
theological presuppositions. It is, therefore, what I am calling an 
extended good of reason.186 
 
Acting to help ensure the man’s full recovery is obligatory according to the 
divine rule. However, this act would not be required from the vantage point of 
the rule of reason. The rule of reason only requires that you relieve the dire 
need. Yet, even if a person might not subscribe to the theological beliefs that 
form the context from which the obligation originates, they still can recognize 
the good that is produced by the act. As is evident, extended goods of reason 
provide a common ground of sorts between a secular ethic and religious ethic. 
Granted, the acts from which these goods are produced are classified 
differently, but this does not change the fact that there is a piece of shared 
territory between the two that involves supererogation. 
Another important point that Wynn makes is that in John of the Cross’ 
account of the spiritual life, the concepts of obligation and supererogation may 
not apply to the more mature Christian. John distinguishes between the active 
and passive phases of the spiritual life. The active phase consists of the early 
stages of a person’s spiritual development, which is characterized by the 
expenditure of significant amounts of energy in an effort to acquire virtue. A 
person “engages in various spiritual exercises, in order to root out disordered 
desires.”187 This could include Bible reading, study, prayer, fasting, penance, 
increased church attendance, periods of silence, and focused meditation. The 
point is that the person is working hard to resist evil, cultivate virtue, and be 
pleasing to God. Of these early stages, Wynn writes: “During this phase of the 
spiritual life, it seems easy enough to distinguish between those actions that 
are obligatory and those that are supererogatory.”188 
However, according to John, there comes a point in a person’s journey 
when God moves them from the active phase into the passive phase. This is 
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known as the dark night of the soul. During this indefinite time period, a person 
becomes acutely aware of their own nothingness before God. This existential 
state of brokenness paves the way for spiritual awakening. In this new state of 
being, a person’s “thoughts and feelings come to be governed by a new, 
divinely infused centre of agency.”189 Whereas prior to the dark night the 
person expended a great deal of effort to minimize vice and acquire virtue, now 
the person has been transformed in such a deep way that incessant striving 
ceases. It is not needed. A “new perceptual condition” now exists. In this new 
and more mature state of being, “the world conforms to a divinely ordered scale 
of values.”190 I take this to mean that due to God’s mighty work to make an 
individual like himself, virtue and right behavior naturally result rather than 
being a product of incessant striving. One’s fundamental disposition is similar 
to that of Christ now, and therefore, virtuous intentions, motivations, and acts 
effortlessly occur. In this new state, what room is there to speak of obligation 
and supererogation? Wynn writes:  
So in the “awakened” person’s experience, obligations will no longer be 
manifest as a constraint. In the earlier phases of the spiritual life, it is 
possible to have a sense of what one’s duty relative to God requires, 
and to experience that duty as binding, or as a constraint upon action, 
in so far as it runs counter to the tendency of some of one’s desires; but 
the feeling of being bound in this way can be no part of the experience 
of the awakened person. This is one reason for thinking that the notion 
of obligation, and in turn the notion of supererogation, no longer has 
any ready application in the experience of the spiritual adept: duty is not 
experienced by such a person in the way that it is experienced by the 
rest of us, namely, as a constraint or as binding.191 
 
Basically, the awakened person does not need to be “restrained” because they 
possess an inner nature that disposes them to act appropriately. In other 
words, the concepts of obligation and supererogation are useless. As Wynn 
points out, it remains to be seen whether the categories of obligation and 
supererogation fail to apply to the mature, awakened individual or if the 
categories simply do not register in the person’s experience though they 
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technically still exist. Interesting, Hans Urs von Balthasar—a Roman Catholic 
theologian—suggests something similar when he writes that while acts of 
supererogation might be possible for “ordinary Christians” with a “worm’s eye 
view,” the “saint sees none of this [because] he sees how much remains to be 
done if he is to help to quench Christ’s thirst for love.”192 The suggestion that 
even if supererogation does exist in a Christian ethic, it might not be relevant, 
is very interesting for the simple reason that there does not seem to be a similar 
suggestion within moral philosophy.   
Before concluding this chapter, John and Paul Feinberg are worth 
mentioning because they represent one of the rare occasions in Protestant 
ethics where supererogation is embraced. They write that supererogation is 
one of “three concepts [that] are very important in determining what may or 
may not or should or should not be done in particular situations.”193 Using 
several examples, they offer instances of what they believe are supererogatory 
acts. Just as significant is the fact that they do not believe that what makes an 
act moral or immoral can be determined without reference to the inner, 
psychological world of the agent in the moments leading up to the performance 
of an act. They use the specific phrase, “motivations or intentions,” revealing 
their position that the two are not to be treated as synonymous when 
discussing the nature of an act. However, they are not quite as precise on 
these matters as one would hope. For example, no clear definition of motive 
and intent is offered, leaving the reader to wonder which they are referring to 
when they write that “the Lord frequently stressed that he was not interested 
in mere outward conformity to the law; he wanted a proper heart attitude.”194 
This might seem like a hair-splitting question, but it is not; one should be careful 
to not use these terms in a deontic context without defining them first. Although 
these issues will be discussed at length in chapter four, it is important to state 
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that the value of their overall contribution rests with two clear affirmations: (1) 
supererogatory acts are possible in Protestant theology and ethics, and (2) the 
internal, psychological world of the agent at the time of the act (or immediately 
preceding its performance) must be considered in order to figure out what 
makes an act moral or immoral. Regarding the first contribution, I will discuss 
some of their examples in the next chapter, and regarding the second 
contribution, a few of their insights will be utilized in chapter four.  
I stated earlier that the question can now be asked, “Are acts of 
supererogation possible within Protestant ethics?” Though Wynn’s analysis of 
John of the Cross’s account of the spiritual life suggests that acts of 
supererogation might not exist or even if they do, might not be useful in the life 
of a mature (i.e., awakened) Christian, I will argue both that there is a place for 
the concept and that it can be useful. As will be discussed in chapter three, 
one of the major areas where supererogation can be found and be of benefit 
is in relation to Jesus’ teaching on divorce in the Gospel of Matthew. However, 
this does not necessarily contradict Wynn’s thesis. It could be the case that 
Wynn is right but that there is still a significant place for supererogation in 
Christian ethics for the unfortunate reason that a large number of Christians 
have not passed through St. John’s dark night and had their inner nature 
transformed so that their every thought and desire is in line with God’s every 
thought and desire. In other words, there will always be less mature Christians 
whose nature is resistant to God’s will to some degree and who struggle to 
obey God. Thus, one could take the stance that my argument for 
supererogation in Protestant ethics is at least beneficial for less mature 
Christians as well as Christians who passed through the dark night but have 
since digressed. Regarding this attempt to strike a compromise with Wynn’s 
thesis, my only goal is to show that if one accepts Wynn’s thesis, this does not 
require them to reject mine. Both Wynn’s perspective and the one that I will 





In this chapter, I have sought to provide an overview of supererogation, 
its origin in religious thought, its recent resurgence in moral philosophy 
following Urmson’s seminal article, and the various issues and thinkers that 
are either important to the development and history of the concept itself or to 
the overall aim of this thesis, which is to demonstrate the possibility and role 
of acts of supererogation in Protestant ethics. Following Mellema’s pivotal 
insight that separates the question of supererogation from the doctrine of 
justification, the question can now be asked: “Are supererogatory deeds 
possible in Protestant ethics?”  
Before moving into the heart of the thesis in chapter three where I will 
argue for the supererogatory classification of a specific act in the New 
Testament, I address a significant error in Urmson’s classification of St. 
Francis of Assisi’s preaching to the birds in chapter two. This will elucidate the 
fact that while several supererogatory-related concepts are shared between 
moral philosophy and Protestant ethics, the latter is unique because the 
biblical narrative is relevant when classifying acts. As Mark Wynn argues, the 
introduction of a theological context can affect the deontic status of an act,195 
and this must be taken into account when assessing acts from a Protestant 
perspective. This might seem too obvious to address, but considering the 
nature of the error that Urmson commits, it requires attention. Chapter two will 
conclude with a discussion of Gregory Mellema’s vocation-based theory of 
how acts of supererogation in Protestant ethics might be accommodated and 
with three specific examples of supererogation proposed by John and Paul 
Feinberg. This will prepare the way for chapter three. 
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§ 2. James Urmson’s Failed Classification of Francis’ 
Preaching and Gregory Mellema’s Proposal 
 
Any inquiry into the possibility of supererogation in a Christian context 
(i.e., Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, or Protestant) must take into account 
the theological narrative and corresponding beliefs that accompany the act. 
This is most evident with the act of forgiveness. Whereas writers such as Hagit 
Benjabi and David Heyd,1 Espen Gamlund,2 Cheshire Calhoun,3 J. Angelo 
Corlett,4 Howard McGary,5 and Neera Badhwar6 argue that the act of forgiving 
another is essentially supererogatory,7 the “introduction of a theological 
context” as Mark Wynn argues can alter the classification of this act. For 
example, while the act of forgiving someone for a wrong done is generally 
viewed as supererogatory from a secular perspective, this is most likely not 
the case in Protestant ethics. Concerning the act of forgiving others, Reinhold 
Niebuhr writes:  
Forgiveness seems to be purely in the realm of grace. Yet even 
forgiveness comes partially into the category of love as law. For we are 
warned that if we forgive not men their trespasses neither will our Father 
forgive our trespasses. This would seem to mean that forgiveness is 
something we owe the erring brother as a right. Or rather it is something 
we owe God. . . . Usually the New Testament presents forgiveness only 
as a possibility for those who are of contrite heart and whose uneasy 
conscience has been eased by divine forgiveness. Yet the fact that it is 
also presented as an obligation, which will incur the punishment of 
judgment if left undone, proves that even on this pinnacle of grace law 
is not completely transcended.8 
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4 J. Angelo Corlett, “Forgiveness, Apology, and Retributive Punishment,” American 
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Having introduced a theological context, Niebuhr makes clear that the act of 
forgiving is not optional and therefore cannot be supererogatory. Whereas the 
point that the introduction of a theological context can change the classificatory 
status of an act might at first appear too obvious to mention, it has been 
overlooked by none other than Urmson himself. I will argue in this chapter that 
in the landmark article “Saints and Heroes,” which launched the contemporary 
discussion of supererogation, Urmson mistakenly sets forth the religious 
example of Francis of Assisi’s preaching to the birds as one of his three major 
examples of supererogation precisely because he ignores the theological 
context. The chapter will then conclude with a brief summary. 
In the first section of this chapter, I argue that Urmson’s classification of 
Francis’ preaching ultimately fails for the simple reason that his moral 
philosophy cannot account for what I am designating as an “individual duty.” 
Although the term I am proposing is unique, the concept is not. In the language 
of Robert Adams, there is such a thing as an act that is obligatory for only one 
individual. Within a Christian framework (or any theistic framework where a 
divine being or beings communicate to individuals), this type of duty results 
from a “command of God addressed to a specific individual . . .”9 What is 
needed is a deontic category for acts that are obligatory in every sense of the 
word for one single individual while not being so for others. Adams identifies 
this type of act with the concept of “vocation,”10 or “calling,”11 and this is exactly 
what is missing in Urmson’s fourfold classificatory scheme.  
In the second section of this chapter, I will present Gregory Mellema’s 
vocation-based argument for supererogation. Using a concept of vocation that 
is very similar to Adams’,12 Mellema presents what is arguably the most 
 
9 Robert Adams, “Vocation,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 449-450. 
10 Ibid., 450. 
11 Ibid., 451. 
12 Robert Adams refers to a “Christian ethical theory” (see Adams, “Vocation,” 448) while 
Mellema frames his discussion of vocation in relation to supererogation using the phrase, 
“Protestant concept of vocation” (see Mellema, Beyond the Call, 148). While Adams might 
have in mind something broader than a merely Protestant ethic, the concept of “vocation” 
that he employs is remarkably similar to the concept of “vocation” that Mellema employs. So 
while it is possible that Adams does not intend on his discussion of vocation to be interpreted 
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thorough argument for supererogation that exists in Protestant ethics. Granted, 
he does so by way of suggestion, but his is both a creative and insightful 
attempt to show how supererogation can be accommodated. In all of this, the 
main point I want to make is that the theological narrative that informs Francis’ 
perspective of his act (i.e., that it is his duty) is absent in Urmson’s moral 
framework. For this reason, Urmson is unable to correctly classify Francis’ 
preaching to the birds because he does not take into account the metaphysical 
backdrop that gives Francis’ act a unique quality. This is the reason that 
Adams’ concept of vocation and Mellema’s vocation-based argument is used: 
to clearly show that one cannot correctly evaluate the possibility of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics without seriously considering the 
theological narrative within which the act occurs. 
 
Urmson’s Inability to Rightly Classify Francis’ Preaching to the Birds  
 
When Urmson argues for the necessity of this fourth classification of 
supererogation, he relies heavily on examples. As previously mentioned, the 
two examples that have dominated the literature are that of the soldier who 
throws himself on a grenade to save his fellow comrades and the doctor who 
leaves his city of residence as well as his current practice to help the suffering 
in a plague-ridden city not his own. Another of Urmson’s examples—Francis 
of Assisi’s preaching to the birds—has received far less attention than the 
other two. This may be due in part to the fact that the Francis example 
introduces religion into the discussion, which might be perceived by moral 
philosophers as unnecessarily cumbersome for Urmson’s thesis. Christopher 
Cowley affirms this point while addressing another topic: “the saint raises 
special complications not only because of her religious beliefs, but also 
because of her conception of morality in religious terms . . .”13  
 
as a solely Protestant concept, it harmonizes with Mellema’s concept, which is designated 
“Protestant.”  
13 Christopher Cowley, “The Agents, Acts and Attitudes of Supererogation,” Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 10.  
 81 
Although Urmson presents Francis’ preaching to the birds as a 
paradigm case of supererogation, it is not. I will argue the following by way of 
a principle of analytic ontology known as the Identity of Indiscernibles (which 
will be explained shortly): (1) if God did not command Francis to preach to the 
birds, then Francis’ act was morally indifferent and must be classified as 
permissible rather than supererogatory; (2) if we assume for the sake of 
argument that the Christian God did command Francis’ preaching to the birds, 
then it will be shown that the act cannot be subsumed under any category in 
the fourfold classificatory scheme; and finally, (3) another classificatory 
category is needed to accurately classify this type of act from a moral 
perspective. Regarding this last point, Mellema’s argument along with Robert 
Adams’ discussion of the notion of vocation in Christian ethical theory will be 
utilized with an eye towards further demonstrating why Urmson cannot rightly 
classify Francis’ preaching to the birds. It is important to note that this is not 
necessarily an argument for or against supererogation within Protestant ethics. 
My task is more humble; I only want to show that neither the threefold 
classificatory scheme that Urmson rejects, nor the fourfold classificatory 
scheme he proposes, is adequate to accommodate a particular type of act 
within Christian practice of which Francis’ preaching to the birds is an example.  
To accomplish these three objectives, the first section has been divided 
into the following subsections, the first two serving to lay the groundwork for 
the argument that follows: (i) Chief Characteristics of a Duty, a Permissible 
Act, a Wrongful Act, and an Act of Supererogation; (ii) Leibniz’s Law: The 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles; (iii) If God Did Not Command Francis’ 
Preaching to the Birds; (iv) If God Did Command Francis’ Preaching to the 
Birds; (v) The Individual Duty; and (vi) A Refutation of Urmson’s Three 
Reasons for Claiming that Francis’ Act was Supererogatory.  
 




For the sake of argument, I will assume the fourfold deontic 
classification of moral acts for which Urmson argued. Each category of act 
possesses certain properties. As will be shown, these are shared between two 
or more categories. However, all of the moral categories are “mutually 
exclusive,”14 meaning that no two share all of the same properties. The table 
below provides a summary of how they differ.  
 
 Duty Permissible Wrong Supererogation 
Obligatory for 
every moral agent 
yes no no no 
Forbidden for 
every moral agent  
no no yes no 
Indifferent for 
every moral agent 
no yes no no 
Optional for every 
moral agent 
no yes no yes 
 
While the last category, “Optional for every moral agent” is somewhat 
redundant and is captured conceptually within the combination of the first two 
categories, it will still be helpful for elucidating the difference between these 
various classifications later in this chapter.  
A duty is an act possessing moral worth and for this reason is not merely 
permissible. An act that is considered a duty is right to do and wrong not to do. 
Therefore, it is not optional, meaning that it is “[an act] that is forbidden to 
refrain from doing.”15 Every moral agent is obligated to perform the duty. An 
act that is morally wrong is forbidden. Every moral agent is morally obligated 
 
14 Millard Schumaker actually says that the categories are not only mutually exclusive, but 
also “jointly exhaustive.” However, I omit this phrase because it would be confusing in this 
context. The reason is simple: I am assuming the fourfold classificatory system here, 
whereas Schumaker is referring to the threefold classification system when he makes this 
remark. So while the phrase “mutually exclusive” is helpful, the latter phrase is not the point I 
am making here and would require much more explanation than what is needed considering 
my present aim. See Millard Schumaker, “Deontic Morality and the Problem of 
Supererogation,” Philosophical Studies 23 (1972): 427. 
15 C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
3. 
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to refrain from performing the act and therefore it is not optional. In other words, 
the act is “one that it is obligatory to refrain from doing.”16 A merely permissible 
act is indifferent from a moral perspective. It simply does not matter whether 
an agent performs the act or not. Unlike the choice to throw oneself on a 
grenade to save one’s comrades, whether you double-knot your shoes is not 
morally significant.17 Because the act is morally indifferent, it is optional. If the 
agent performs the permissible act, they have not acted rightly from a moral 
perspective. In a similar vein, if the agent does not perform the permissible act, 
they have not done anything wrong. The performance or nonperformance of a 
permissible act is truly of no moral consequence.  
Unlike a permissible act, an act of supererogation possesses moral 
worth. Although a supererogatory act can also be described as permissible, its 
performance or nonperformance is not arbitrary.18 It counts in the moral sphere 
for some reason or another even though, unlike a duty, it is not obligatory. 
Also, because a supererogatory deed possesses moral worth and is 
praiseworthy to perform, it is obviously not forbidden. And last, it is not like a 
permissible act because while both are optional, it is not indifferent from a 
moral perspective. As Sven Ove Hansson writes, “some optional acts are not 
supererogatory.”19 This is why Paul McNamara states that part of the classic 
conception of supererogation is the “Optional Non-Indifference of 
Supererogation.”20 Paul McNamara does an excellent job differentiating 
between the two properties of indifference and optionality. In what he labels a 
“classic candidate for supererogation,” he writes of a mailwoman who rushes 
into a burning building that has reached a dangerous stage to rescue an infant. 
 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Dale Dorsey, “The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It,” Utilitas 25, no. 3 
(2013): 356. 
18 John Rawls is helpful here. He writes that there are two types of permissible acts: ones 
that possess moral value and ones that are morally indifferent (or trivial). The former are 
classified as merely permissible whereas the latter are classified as supererogatory (since 
they are not obligatory like a duty, though a duty can also be described as “permissible”). 
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 117. 
19 Sven Ove Hansson, “Representing Supererogation,” Journal of Logic and Computation 
25, no.2 (2015): 445. 
20 McNamara, “Making Room,” 420. 
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Assuming that there is a difference between moral indifference and moral 
optionality, McNamara writes,  
Although the mailwoman’s optional rescue was not a matter of 
indifference, that she wore black socks that day was. Why? Because 
unlike her rescue, nothing of moral weight that she was permitted to do 
on that day hinged on her wearing or not wearing black socks. Morality 
shrugs at what is indifferent. But as supererogation makes clear, 
morality needn’t shrug at what is optional.21  
 
In a nutshell, what distinguishes a supererogatory act from a permissible act 
is that a supererogatory act is not morally indifferent even though both are 
optional. The above reasons help explain why Urmson believed that the 
category of supererogation is needed to correctly classify acts that possess 
moral worth but are neither required nor forbidden.  
Having briefly characterized all four types of acts within the fourfold 
classificatory scheme, I will now present Leibniz’s Law. Following this next 
section, the previous table will be utilized and expanded to show that Francis’ 
preaching cannot be classified as supererogatory as Urmson proposed. This 
table will also serve to highlight the need for another category in order to 
accommodate a particular type of moral act that cannot be subsumed in either 
the threefold or fourfold classificatory scheme.  
 
Leibniz’s Law: The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 
 
In section nine of his Discourse on Metaphysics, Gottfried Leibniz wrote, 
“it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely and 
differ only in number [solo numero]. . . .”22 The principle that was derived from 
this metaphysical statement came to be known as the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. Logically, the principle is often formulated as follows: “if, for 
every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical 
 
21 Ibid., 420. 
22 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, trans. and ed. by 
Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 9. 
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to y.”23 In everyday vernacular, Leibniz’s Law is the principle that two distinct 
things cannot exactly resemble each other because no two distinct things have 
exactly the same properties.24 If two things do have the exact same properties, 
we are no longer discussing two distinct things, but one single thing.  
Leibniz’s Law will be utilized as follows: (1) to show that if we assume 
for the sake of argument that God did not command Francis to preach to the 
birds, then the act cannot be classified as supererogatory, but rather, only as 
permissible; and (2) to show that if we assume for the sake of argument that 
God did command Francis to preach to the birds, then his act still cannot be 
classified as supererogatory. Essentially, Leibniz’s Law will help elucidate the 
fact that no matter what we assume of Francis and some otherworldly voice, 
Urmson was incorrect to offer this example as an instance of supererogation. 
At the same time, I will further argue that Leibniz’s Law demonstrates that not 
only should Francis’ preaching to the birds not be classified as supererogatory, 
it also cannot be subsumed under any of the other remaining categories in the 
fourfold scheme. Therefore, another classificatory category is needed. In more 
logical language, if the act of Francis’ preaching to the birds can be shown to 
possess a set of properties that does not exactly mirror the set of properties 
that characterize any of the act categories in the fourfold classificatory scheme, 
then this will suggest that not only is Francis’ act not supererogatory, but 
another category is needed.25 
 
If God Did Not Command Francis to Preach to the Birds 
 
Susan Hale writes, “Perhaps Francis’ belief that he was duty-bound to 
preach to the birds was mistaken.”26 From my perspective, this could mean a 
 
23 Peter Forrest, “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, 
Stanford University, 2016.  
24 Ibid. 
25 I refrain from saying a “fifth” category because I stated from the outset that I was only 
assuming the classification of supererogation for the sake of argument. No argument was 
offered. 
26 Hale, “Against Supererogation,” 282. Along with several others, Sheldon Peterfreund 
also recognizes the fact that it is not uncommon for a person performing a supererogatory 
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number of things. It could be that the God of Christianity (or any god, for that 
matter) does not exist. This would logically preclude the possibility of God 
commanding Francis since it was this God in particular from which he believed 
the command to originate. Or, it could be that God does exist but never 
commanded Francis to preach to the birds. In either case, Francis would have 
been mistaken in his conviction that God had commanded him to preach to the 
birds. In this section, I am assuming that no divine being commanded Francis 
to preach to the birds and that Francis’ claim represents an honest but 
mistaken interpretation of a psychological event. Under this assumption, the 
act must be assessed from a purely moral perspective since there is nothing 
spiritually relevant to be taken into account. 
If God did not command Francis to preach to the birds, then it can be 
shown that Francis’ act is morally indifferent and must therefore be classified 
as merely permissible rather than supererogatory. The table below is the same 
table that was presented earlier and has now been expanded to include 
Francis’ preaching to the birds: 
  
 Duty Permissible Wrong Superero-
gation 
Francis’ 
preaching to the 
birds (God did not 













no yes no no yes 
Optional for no yes no yes yes 
 
deed to consider it nothing more than a duty. He writes: “Of course, I am not denying that the 
individual who performs the act may think it is morally obligatory.” See Peterfreund, “On the 





According to Leibniz’s Law, Francis’ preaching to the birds is not 
supererogatory, because an act of supererogation and Francis’ act do not 
share all of the same properties. Granted, neither a supererogatory act nor 
Francis’ act is required or forbidden; therefore both are optional. However, an 
act of supererogation possesses moral worth whereas Francis’ act does not 
(i.e., under the present assumption). So why should Francis’ act be classified 
as merely permissible (i.e., morally neutral) in the absence of God’s 
command? Simply stated, talking to birds about anything is at best, silly, and 
at worst, a potential symptom of mental confusion. Now, if God commanded 
the act, then it is meaningful to him and that alone is sufficient to imbue the act 
with moral value. However, this section is committed to analyzing Francis’ act 
while assuming that he was mistaken and that God never commanded him to 
preach to the feathery creatures. If no divine command was being fulfilled in 
Francis’ act, then speaking to non-cognitive animals of any sort—much less 
preaching—seems utterly foolish, and one would be hard pressed to defend 
any other view. I do not think this claim requires a robust, logical defense. The 
burden of proof is on the moral philosopher or theologian who wishes to prove 
otherwise. I am not going to go outside, preach to the trees, and require 
someone to prove that the act does not have moral value. Common sense 
says that it does not.  
In the absence of God’s command, the table reveals that Francis’ 
preaching does not share all of the same properties with acts of 
supererogation. An act of supererogation is not “Indifferent for every moral 
agent” while Francis’ act is. Therefore, Francis’ act cannot be identified with a 
supererogatory act according to Leibniz’s Law. Apart from the divine 
command, the act possesses no moral worth and Urmson should have noticed 
this in the absence of the only thing that could give the act any moral worth—
i.e., God’s command. All things considered, Leibniz’s Law demonstrates that 
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in the absence of God’s command, Francis’ act cannot be classified as 
supererogatory. 
 
If God Did Command Francis’ Preaching to the Birds 
 
But what if the tables are turned? In the previous section, I argued that if 
God never commanded Francis to preach to the birds, then Francis’ act could 
not be classified as supererogatory because it would be morally indifferent 
(i.e., permissible). In this section, the opposite scenario—that God did speak 
to Francis, commanding him alone to preach to the birds—is assumed for the 
sake of argument. The point in assuming the opposite is to demonstrate that 
no matter what we assume of Francis and some otherworldly voice, Urmson 
was incorrect to offer this example as an instance of supererogation. According 
to Leibniz’s Law, if we assume that God did command Francis to preach to the 
birds, the act still cannot be classified as supererogatory. Having revised the 
scenario from the previous section, the table below has once again been 
expanded.  
 







































no yes no yes yes no 
 
An act of supererogation and Francis’ preaching to the birds once again share 
all but one property. However, the property that is not shared in this particular 
context differs from the unshared property in the previous context.  
When we assumed that God did not command Francis to preach, Francis’ 
act was of no moral worth in contradistinction to the moral value of a 
supererogatory act. On the other hand, when we assume for the sake of 
argument that God did command Francis to preach to the birds, now the 
property-discrepancy between his act and an act of supererogation shifts. 
Although his act and an act of supererogation both possess moral value under 
the revised assumption, his preaching can no longer be described as “optional 
for every moral agent.” The emphasis here is on “every.” For Francis, this act 
is now right to do and wrong not to do; it is not optional. The non-optionality of 
the act for Francis immediately rules out a supererogatory classification 
because there is at least one subject in the universe for whom this act is not 
optional. To say otherwise would violate the criterion of universal optionality 
that is a bedrock component in the classic conception of supererogation.  
 
27 For the first time in this chapter, the relevance of the fourth row, “Optional for every 
moral agent,” is apparent. At first glance, it seems to be a mere rewording of the first row, 
“Obligatory for every moral agent.” After all, if an act is obligatory for every moral agent, then 
it is not optional, and if an act is optional for every moral agent, then it is not obligatory. 
However, in the present chart, the row is necessary to distinguish between an act of 
supererogation and Francis’ act (under the present assumption that God did speak to 
Francis). Without this additional row, the nuanced distinction would not register in the table. 
If the first three rows were the only ones, then an act of supererogation and Francis’ act 
would appear to possess the same properties, which according to Leibniz’s Law, would 
mean that Francis’ act is supererogatory. However, the additional row reveals that this is not 
the case. The additional row is necessary to make theoretical room for what I am referring to 
as an “individual duty.” Otherwise, the property difference would go unnoticed using only the 
first three rows. 
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In addition, the above table also reveals that Francis’ preaching to the 
birds does not share the same set of properties with any of the other three 
remaining classifications when it is assumed that God did speak to Francis. 
This is evidenced by the following: (1) unlike a duty, the act is not obligatory 
for every moral agent; (2) unlike a wrongful act, it is not forbidden for every 
moral agent (or any for that matter); and (3) unlike a merely permissible act, 
the act is not morally indifferent for every moral agent. When you take all of 
this into consideration, it is evident that the tripartite scheme that Urmson 
criticizes, as well as the fourfold classification that he proposes, both lack a 
classificatory category for acts such as Francis’ preaching to the birds, which 
Urmson mistakenly classifies as supererogatory. Assuming that God did speak 
to Francis and that Francis was not mistaken in what he perceived God to be 
commanding, the only option that remains if one hopes to correctly classify this 
act is to introduce a different category that is properly nuanced to fit Francis’ 
act as well as others like it.  
 
The Individual Duty  
 
As indicated in the previous sections, certain types of acts cannot be 
properly classified without taking into consideration the theological context 
within which they occur. This is made clear in Urmson’s inability to classify 
Francis’ preaching to the birds correctly. This suggests that from the 
perspective of Protestant ethics, a unique category of action is needed if we 
hope to be able to classify the full range of acts from the perspective of moral 
worth.28  
To rightly assess Francis’ act, it is paramount to consider the personal 
nature of Christian experience. Analyzing God’s speech from a philosophical 
perspective, Nicholas Wosterstorff writes: “It was characteristic of Jews and 
Christians then, and it remains characteristic of them now, to speak of God as 
 
28 It is of the utmost importance to state here that one does not necessarily have to 
commit to what Robert Adams refers to as a “comprehensive divine command theory of 
obligation.” See Adams, “Vocation,” 462.  
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commanding, promising, forgiving, exhorting, assuring, asserting, and so 
forth.”29 It has been the testimony of Christians all throughout the ages that 
God speaks in a personal manner and that as a result of the divine address, 
obligations often ensue that are binding for the individual that is addressed. 
This type of divine address assumes the form of a “command that generates 
obligation.”30 In his Systematic Theology, Wayne Grudem explains that one of 
the four meanings of the Biblical phrase “Word of God” is “God’s words of 
personal address.”31 Regarding this form of communication, Grudem writes, 
“God sometimes communicates with people on earth by speaking directly to 
them.”32 After discussing various moments recorded in scripture when God 
spoke personally to Adam and Eve,33 Moses,34 and those around Jesus at his 
baptism,35 Grudem writes:  
In these and several other instances where God spoke words of 
personal address to individual people it was clear to the hearers that 
these were the actual words of God: they were hearing God’s very 
voice, and they were therefore hearing words that had absolute divine 
authority and that were absolutely trustworthy. To disbelieve or disobey 
any of these words would have been to disbelieve or disobey God and 
therefore would have been sin.36 
 
One only has to think of Abraham to conceive of the type of obligation that can 
result from God speaking a word of personal address to a specific person. God 
approaches Abraham in his later years and says: “Take your son, your only 
son Isaac,37 whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there 
 
29 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that 
God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8. 
30 It is important to note that John Hare actually applies this phrase to precepts (i.e., 
commandments, not individual duties), when he discusses five general types of divine 
prescriptions. However, I believe the phrase also applies to a command that creates an 
obligation for only one individual. See John Hare, God’s Command (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 37.  
31 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 48. 
32 Ibid., 48. 
33 Before and after The Fall.  
34 The giving of the Ten Commandments as recorded in Exod. 20:1–17. 
35 As recorded in all three Synoptic Gospels.  
36 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 48. 
37 Though Isaac was Abraham and Sarah’s only son together, Abraham had another 
son—Ishmael—with Hagar, Sarah’s “Egyptian slave-girl.” See Gen. 16:1–6. 
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as a burnt offering on one of the mountains that I shall show you.”38 In an act 
that defies understanding (the very reason for which Søren Kierkegaard sings 
Abraham’s praises in Fear and Trembling on numerous occasions39), 
Abraham obeys without hesitation.40 Rising early the next morning, he sets to 
work saddling the donkey and cutting the wood.41 He then sets out on the 
three-day journey so that he can obey God. When Abraham arrives, he and 
Isaac travel to the top of the mountain where he makes the preparations. The 
story culminates with an angel of the Lord calling his name and stopping him 
in the last moment before he kills Isaac. Although God stopped him, the point 
is that Abraham was determined to perform this act to obey God completely. 
Now how are we to interpret such an act? Nowhere in the Bible do we find 
another account of God asking a father to do such a thing. To further 
complicate matters, this command appears to violate the sixth commandment 
that God would eventually give to the nation of Israel hundreds of years later 
as part of the Mosaic covenant: “You shall not murder.”42 In Hare’s words, the 
case of Abraham seems to suggest that “God’s will and God’s command can 
diverge.”43 Setting aside this moral conundrum for now, the relevant point in 
 
38 Gen. 22:2. 
39 Concerning Abraham’s decision to leave the land of his fathers and become a foreigner 
in the land God promised, Kierkegaard writes of Abraham: “He left one thing behind and took 
one thing with him. He left his worldly understanding behind and took faith with him . . .” See 
Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Sylvia Walsh, ed. C. Stephen Evans and 
Sylvia Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14. Concerning God’s 
promise to multiply Abraham’s descendants, even though God was telling him to sacrifice 
Isaac, Kierkegaard writes: “But Abraham believed and did not doubt; he believed the 
preposterous.” See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 17. 
40 God may have never intended Abraham to sacrifice his son. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
writes that sometimes a command is given to test someone’s loyalty, obedience, or moral 
character. It could be that God only wanted Abraham to “set about the project of sacrificing 
Isaac” or merely “form the intention” of doing so. See Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 22. 
41 Gen. 22:3. 
42 Exod. 20:13; The apparent contradiction is what prompted Kierkegaard to introduce the 
concept of the “teleological suspension of the ethical” in an effort to understand God’s 
command to Abraham. See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 49. Kierkegaard writes of 
Abraham: “There is no higher expression for the ethical in Abraham’s life than this, that the 
father must love the son.” See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 52. However, God asks 
Abraham to sacrifice his son, which is a clear violation of the ethical. Thus, Abraham had to 
choose whether to act morally or to obey God. He chose to grab the knife and obey God. 
About this decision, Kierkegaard writes: “By [Abraham’s] act he transcended the whole of the 
ethical and had a higher telos outside, in relation to which he suspended it.” See 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 52.  
43 Hare, God’s Command, 57. 
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this story concerning an individual duty is straightforward: God gave Abraham 
a command that applied to no one else. It was Abraham’s task to kill his son 
and it possessed the same obligatory status for him as any other duty that 
would be considered universal in scope. God had spoken, and his words 
created a specific, individual duty that was binding upon Abraham alone.  
Grudem concludes his discussion of God’s words of personal address 
by writing: “the words always place an absolute obligation upon the hearers to 
believe them and to obey them fully.”44 In cases such as Abraham and Francis, 
God gives an assignment to a single individual, which means that the 
obligation is binding for that agent alone. It is a duty for one individual but not 
for any other. As alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, the idea of an 
“individual duty” is best explained by the Protestant concept of vocation. This 
idea came to the forefront of Protestant thought in the teaching and writings of 
Martin Luther. In his sermon titled “Exposition of Psalm 127,” Luther affirms 
the value that God places on work: “Man must and ought to work.”45 He 
continues: “God wills that man should work, and without work He will give him 
nothing,” and “man must necessarily work and busy himself at something.”46 
However, Luther does not stop at merely affirming the value of work. In his 
sermon titled, “Our Christian Duties. An Exhortation to the New Christian Life,” 
he says that a person is called by God to work in “[their] respective station, in 
the office committed to him,” as a means of “[serving] his fellows.”47 The 
phrase, “committed to him,” is important because it captures the idea of 
“calling” which, as stated earlier in the chapter, is at the heart of the Protestant 
concept of vocation. The basic idea is that because God commits an individual 
to a particular station or office, that person will experience a respective “call” 
to enter into that area of service to serve others and ultimately God. 
Essentially, this “station” or “office” is the person’s vocation.  
 
44 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 48. 
45 Martin Luther, “Exposition of Psalms 127,” in Luther’s Works, vol. 45, trans. and ed. 
Walther I. Brandt (Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), 324. 
46 Ibid., 326. 
47 Martin Luther, “Our Christian Duties. An Exhortation to the New Christian Life,” in 
Sermons of Martin Luther, vol. 7, trans. and ed. John Nicholas Lenker (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1988), 278. 
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One of the clearest places to observe Luther’s view of a station or office 
as a vocation is in his discussion of soldiers. In 1525, a professional soldier by 
the name of Assa von Kram pleaded with Luther to write on the issue of 
whether soldiers can be Christians in good conscience because it appears that 
von Kram was fearful that his profession could not be reconciled with his 
Christian faith.48 As a result, Luther wrote his treatise titled, “Whether Soldiers, 
Too, Can Be Saved.” Using John the Baptist as an example, Luther reminds 
the reader that when soldiers approached John in the wilderness to repent and 
be baptized, they would ask: “And we, what should we do?”49 Luther points out 
that rather than John the Baptist “[condemning] their office or [advising] them 
to stop doing their work,”50 he delivered the following instructions: “Do not 
extort money from anyone by threats or false accusation, and be satisfied with 
your wages.”51 Luther interprets this response from John the Baptist as one of 
the proofs that the office—or vocation—of the soldier (i.e., “military profession”) 
is “in itself a legitimate and godly calling and occupation.”52 Luther also 
mentions other stations such as: lords, servants, princes, subjects, maids, 
farmers, laborers, trial judges, and even executioners.53 In all of these 
examples, Luther’s overall point is clear: God calls an individual to a specific 
vocation as a way for that person to serve God and others.  
Regarding the doctrine of vocation, Gustaf Wingren summarizes 
Luther’s view as presented in his teaching on Psalm 127. Wingren writes:  
In his vocation man does works which affect the well-being of others; 
for so God has made all offices. Through this work in man's offices, 
God’s creative work goes forward, and that creative work of love, a 
profusion of good gifts. With persons as his “hands” and “coworkers,” 
God gives his gifts through the earthly vocations, toward man’s life on 
earth (food through farmers, fishermen and hunters; external peace 
 
48 Robert C. Schultz, Introduction to “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” in Luther’s 
Works, vol. 46, trans. Charles M. Jacobs, ed. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1967), 91. 
49 Luke 3:14. 
50 Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” 97. 
51 Luke 3:14. 
52 Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,” 100. 
53 Luther mentioned the first seven in one sermon. See Luther, “Our Christian Duties,” 
276–277. The last two examples are from his writings. See Luther, “Whether Soldiers, Too, 
Can Be Saved,” 94. 
 95 
through princes, judges, and orderly powers; knowledge and education 
through teachers and parents, etc, etc). Through the preacher’s 
vocation, God gives the forgiveness of sins. Thus love comes from God, 
flowing down to human beings on earth through all vocations, through 
both spiritual and earthly governments.54 
 
Building on this idea, Robert Adams explains that in some instances, this 
vocation “must be something that involves a divine command that adds to the 
stock of ethical principles, so to speak, something that is irreducibly about me 
as an individual. God’s address to me with a specific command is 
indispensable to the grounding of the fact that this is my task.”55 In what Adams 
labels a “divine command theory of vocation,”56 vocation means “calling”57 and 
gives rise to specific obligations that are ultimately rooted in God’s “divine 
purpose”58 for the individual that is addressed. These vocation-related 
obligations are specific to the individual and possess for that individual alone 
the normative weight of what Urmson refers to as “rock-bottom duties.”59  
In the second section of this chapter, I will explain how Gregory Mellema 
incorporates this concept of vocation to explain how theistic supererogationists 
and theistic anti-supererogationists might strike a compromise. Prior to doing 
this, however, I want to finish this section by addressing the three reasons that 
Urmson provides in support of his argument that Francis’ act cannot be 
classified as a duty. This is important because the analysis provides yet 
 
54 Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2004), 27–
28. 
55 Adams, “Vocation,” 450. 
56 Adams makes an important point concerning a “divine command theory of vocation.” 
He writes: “A divine command theory of vocation does not entail (though it is obviously 
consistent with) a comprehensive divine command theory of obligation. It does not imply that 
all obligations are constituted by divine commands, nor that ethical wrongness, for example, 
is the property of being contrary to divine commands. All it implies about the relation of 
obligation in general to God is that it is possible for some obligations to be imposed by a 
divine command.” See Adams, “Vocation,” 462. The reason that this is important is that I do 
not want my argument in this section to be interpreted as a broader argument that Christian 
ethics is primarily deontological in nature. 
57 Ibid., 451. Karlfried Froehlich makes a similar point. In an article discussing Martin 
Luther’s use of the German word beruf for “vocation” or “Christian calling,” he writes: 
“‘Vocation’ is a Latin word, vocatio, derived from the verb, vocare, to call. The English 
equivalent would be the noun ‘call’ or more precisely, ‘calling.’” See Karlfried Froehlich, 
“Luther on Vocation,” Lutheran Quarterly 8 (1999): 196. 
58 Ibid., 455. 
59 Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” 204. 
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another window into the nature of an “individual duty,” a category that Urmson 
apparently did not have at his disposal.  
 
A Refutation of Urmson’s Three Reasons for Claiming that Francis’ Act was 
Supererogatory 
 
Although Francis wholeheartedly believed that his preaching to the 
birds was a duty, Urmson claimed that he was mistaken for the following three 
reasons: (1) only Francis could call his act a duty; (2) Francis could not say it 
was a duty for any other moral agent; and 3) nobody else could call on him to 
perform the act as they could with other “rock-bottom duties” such as telling 
the truth and keeping a promise.60 For Urmson, this is conclusive evidence 
that Francis was mistaken in his belief that it was “his duty to preach to the 
feathered world.” However, the additional category of an individual duty can 
handle the peculiarity of Francis’ assertion (i.e., that it was his duty to preach 
to the birds) in the face of Urmson’s concerns, and thereby provide support for 
Francis’ evaluation of his act. Concerning Urmson’s three reasons, I will take 
each in turn.  
The first two reasons why Urmson does not think that Francis’ act can 
be construed as possessing equal normative weight with rock-bottom duties 
are directly related to each other and represent two different ways of making 
the same point. Claiming that Francis “cannot say it is a duty for any other 
moral agent” is just another way of saying “only Francis can call his action a 
duty.” Therefore, the following explanation will suffice to refute both of 
Urmson’s first two reasons why, in his opinion, Francis was mistaken to believe 
that his preaching to the birds was a duty. In a Kantian line of thought, Urmson 
is working with the presupposition that a genuine moral duty is binding on all 
moral agents. Urmson seems to have this idea in mind when he argues that 
Francis was mistaken to think of his preaching to birds as a duty. After all, 
Francis could only say that it was his duty and could in no way claim that other 
 
60 Ibid., 204. 
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moral agents were bound to do the same. For Urmson, either the act is a duty 
and is therefore universally binding or else it is merely permissible or 
supererogatory and in either case is not universally binding. Because Urmson 
did not have the idea of an individual duty in his conceptual framework, he was 
left with only two remaining options: (1) claim that Francis was mistaken in the 
classification of his act as a duty since he was not willing to say that preaching 
to the birds was a universal obligation (thus defending the supererogatory 
classification of Francis’ act in his own mind), or (2) argue that Francis was not 
mistaken, and that consequently preaching to the birds is a duty for all (or at 
least all Christians). Faced with these two options, Urmson opts for the former, 
as I suspect any rational person would. He wrote, “Subjectively, we may say, 
at the time of action, the deed presented itself as a duty, but it was not a duty.”61 
Urmson is saying that Francis’ self-report was mistaken, and that although 
preaching to the birds was thought to be a duty, it was not as a “piece of 
objective reporting.”62 In other words, the only realm in which this act could be 
considered a duty was in Francis’ mistaken, subjective psychological 
assessment of it. David Heyd affirms the possibility of an agent like Francis 
misclassifying an act when he writes: “the fact that the agent believes that his 
act is obligatory does not in itself disqualify if from being supererogatory. This 
is an important caveat, as most supererogatory acts are proclaimed by their 
agents to be duties.”63 Urmson could not imagine any scenario in which 
Francis’ act could be objectively classified as a duty. This is because Urmson 
was confronted with a false dilemma—either classify Francis’ act as a duty and 
thereby assert that it is universally binding, or claim that the act cannot be 
universally binding and therefore Francis was wrong—as a result of the 
inadequacy of his fourfold classificatory framework to accommodate the type 
of act that is absolutely obligatory for one individual while not being so for 
others. The third option, of course, is to classify the act as an individual duty 
so that it is simultaneously binding for Francis but not universally obligatory.  
 
61 Ibid., 204. 
62 Ibid., 204. 
63 Heyd, Supererogation, 138. 
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In all fairness, Urmson is not the only moral philosopher who has made 
this mistake. In the first book ever published on supererogation in moral 
philosophy, David Heyd addresses the type of situation where a person 
believes that an act is obligatory although, in Heyd’s opinion, it is not. Heyd 
then writes that the reason a person might claim an act is a duty when in fact 
it is not is “moral modesty.” This moral modesty can take one of two forms: (1) 
the moral agent who has performed the act knows it is supererogatory but does 
not want to say it, and (2) the moral agent genuinely believes that they were 
only performing a duty.64 Heyd then argues that this second form of moral 
modesty is problematic because it means one of two things: that the moral 
agent views the act as a duty and therefore as an obligation for all others, or 
that the moral agent believes the supererogatory act to be “personally binding” 
but does not believe it is binding for others. Ultimately, Heyd’s objection is that 
no matter which of the two meanings you think is implied by the second form 
of moral modesty, both are logically inconsistent. If the act that a person 
performs is supererogatory, then it cannot be obligatory for anyone, and if the 
act is binding, then it is binding for all, not just for the individual person. 
Ultimately, Heyd writes that this “attitude is inconsistent.”65 For this reason, 
Heyd rejects the possibility of a “subjective duty” because it is a betrayal of the 
notion of universalizability that accompanies our conception of duty. As with 
Urmson, there is no possibility in Heyd’s deontological framework to 
accommodate any act that is obligatory for a single individual but not for others. 
As should be obvious, Heyd faces the same logical issue that 
confronted Urmson. Neither thinker had a category for the type of act that is 
morally binding for one person but not for others. Because this category was 
absent, both thinkers had no choice but to say, “Either the act is a duty and 
binding for all, or it is not and is binding for none.” Returning to Urmson’s article 
in particular, he as a moral philosopher did not take into account the Christian 
doctrine that a personal, relational God who “formed my inward parts” and “knit 
 
64 Ibid., 138. 
65 Ibid., 138. 
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me together in my mother’s womb”66 creates each individual person to serve 
him and others in a particular way. This way represents a person’s vocation 
and is not necessarily identifiable with a specific occupation.67 According to 
this doctrine, a personal God commands person-specific tasks (in addition to 
the acts that are obligatory for all) that are binding for that agent alone in 
relation to their overall, purpose-rooted vocation. Although an omnipotent God 
could do everything himself by the “mere fiat of omnipotence,”68 he chooses 
not to. As C.S. Lewis writes of God: “Creation seems to be delegation through 
and through. He will do nothing simply of Himself which can be done by 
creatures.” God’s relationality compels him to elicit our help so that his 
kingdom can be established in partnership with us. In the words of Francis 
Schaeffer, he is the “personal-infinite God.”69 God creates a human being in a 
specific manner to serve him in a particular way and based on that calling, 
issues commands to that individual that are directly connected to the fulfillment 
of that vocation. This can easily explain why Francis believed that preaching 
to the feathered world was a duty for him while not being so for any other 
person.70 Assuming for the sake of argument that God had commanded 
Francis to preach to the birds, he was obligated to do so just as he was 
obligated to tell the truth or keep a promise. For him, it was right to do and 
wrong not to do and therefore not supererogatory. However, the act also 
cannot be classified as a duty in the traditional sense because it is not 
universally binding. Consequently, there is an act that is normatively equivalent 
to a “rock-bottom duty” for Francis, although not for any other moral agent. 
Neither the traditional tripartite classificatory scheme nor Urmson’s fourfold 
 
66 Ps. 139:13.  
67 Wingren, Luther on Vocation, 4. 
68 C.S. Lewis, Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich: 1963): 70. 
69 Italics mine. Francis A. Schaeffer, He is There and He is Not Silent, in The Francis A. 
Schaeffer Trilogy (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1990), 286. Though Schaeffer uses this 
terminology for God throughout his writings, this is one place in particular where he is 
actually arguing for the importance of the concept of the personal-infinite God. 
70 For any other person, the act would fall under one of two categories: (1) merely 
permissible (as it appears preaching to the birds would be for anyone not “called”); and (2) 
morally wrong (this might be the case if preaching to the birds actually prevented one from 
doing what God was specifically calling them to do).  
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classificatory scheme can accommodate such an act. So when Urmson 
attempted to classify Francis’ act, he had no choice but to classify it as 
supererogatory because (1) he could not classify it as a duty since a duty is 
universalizable and Francis’ act clearly was not, and (2) he could not classify 
it as merely permissible because he believed it possessed moral worth for 
Francis.71 This resulted in a supererogatory classification. However, whereas 
Urmson cannot account for an individual duty, the Christian doctrine of a 
personal, revelatory God in conjunction with the Protestant notion of vocation 
can. This is sufficient to show the inadequacy of Urmson’s first two reasons—
only Francis could call his act a duty and Francis could not say it was a duty 
for any other moral agent—for rejecting Francis’ claim that he was duty-bound 
to preach to the birds. With the classification of individual duty, Francis can call 
his act a duty (i.e., an individual duty) while still maintaining that the act is not 
obligatory for anyone else. This is exactly what Urmson and later Heyd could 
not do. 
The third reason that Urmson offers for denying Francis’ claim is that 
no one else can call on him to perform the act of preaching to the birds as they 
can other “rock-bottom duties” such as telling the truth and keeping a promise. 
For Urmson, this feature of an act is one of the distinguishing marks of a 
supererogatory deed. This point is most clearly expressed in the case of the 
self-sacrificing soldier which serves as Urmson’s paradigmatic example of 
supererogation. Urmson writes:  
We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing of live 
hand grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls 
on the ground near the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing 
himself on the grenade and protecting his comrades with his own body. 
. . . If he had not done so, could anyone have said to him, “You ought 
to have thrown yourself on the grenade”? Could a superior have 
decently ordered him to do it? The answer to all these questions is 
plainly negative.72  
 
 
71 I assume that the option of classifying Francis’ preaching to the birds as a wrongful act 
is so unmistakably absurd that it should not be considered a real option.  
72 Urmson, “Saints and Heroes,” 202–203. 
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In this example, not even the soldier’s superior could have ordered such an 
act. If a higher-ranking officer could not demand such an act although the deed 
was of great moral consequence, then surely no one else could. Michael Ferry 
writes: “where an act is obligatory there is at least someone with the normative 
authority to demand that the agent perform it.”73 Because this “someone” does 
not exist in Urmson’s view, the act remains optional though it possesses moral 
worth. It is therefore supererogatory. However, Urmson once again commits a 
significant oversight. By “anyone,” Urmson is clearly and solely referring to 
human beings. As a moral philosopher, this is fine. If he had not tried to 
address a religious example as a moral philosopher, there would have been 
no problem. However, failure to take into consideration the broader theological 
context within which Francis lives and acts once again leads Urmson astray. 
The fact that no human being can require such a behavior of Francis does not 
mean that no one can. From a Christian perspective, there exists a personal, 
speaking God who by right of creation possesses the authority to call on 
Francis alone to preach to the birds. Thus, Urmson’s third reason for rejecting 
Francis’ conviction that preaching to the birds is a duty fails when assessed 
from within the framework of Christian theology.  
With the weakness of Urmson’s three chief reasons for classifying 
Francis’ act as supererogatory exposed, I will conclude by demonstrating the 
value and uniqueness of the proposed category of an individual duty using 
Leibniz’s Law. I refrain from using the phrase “subjective duty” because this 
language is used by Urmson and later Heyd to imply that the act is not a duty 
even though the moral agent thinks that it is. In my account, Francis made no 
mistake in implying that he was obligated to preach to the birds although it was 
not obligatory for any other moral agent. Only with the introduction of the 
classificatory category of “individual duty” can this complex, spiritually-
motivated act be accommodated. I have included the table from the last 
subsection once more to show the difference between the properties 
possessed by Francis’ preaching to the birds in contrast to the other four 
 
73 Michael Ferry, “Beyond Obligation: Reasons and Supererogation,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 58. 
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categories. The table is the same except for a couple of minor changes. 
Because I am taking into account the theological context of Francis’ act and 
assuming that within Christian practice, God does sometimes command 
certain individuals to do something that he might not command others, I have 
eliminated the column where Francis’ act was assessed from the perspective 
of there being no prior divine command. In addition, I have incorporated the 
classification label “individual duty” in place of the description, “Francis’ 
preaching to the birds (assuming that God did command him to do so)” in the 
last column since that is what is being evaluated. 
 

















no yes no yes no 
 
Leibniz’s Law reveals that an individual duty cannot be subsumed under any 
of the other categories for the simple reason that its set of properties do not 
mirror any other set in the remaining four classifications. Therefore, this 
category of act stands alone and cannot be subsumed by any of the others. 
Using the property language of the table, an individual duty is the type of act 
which is obligatory for at least one agent and is therefore not optional for every 
agent. This is unique because usually an act is obligatory for every person 
(i.e., universal in scope) if it is obligatory for one, and the same is true of the 
property of optionality. Within Urmson’s deontic framework, this type of act 
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cannot be accommodated. However, if you take into account the theological 
context within which Francis was acting, the necessity and value of another 
category―the individual duty―becomes clear.  
Before moving to the second section, I would like to address the 
concern that some may have of my eagerness to introduce an additional 
classificatory category for moral acts. I admit that this should not be done 
carelessly. After all, the tried and tested Occam’s razor suggests that we 
should always proceed cautiously if we are going to multiply entities and only 
do so if absolutely necessary. In this case, I hope that I have shown that the 
individual duty classification is necessary for certain acts that possess moral 
worth and are obligatory for only one individual. Besides, introducing a new 
classificatory category (or categories) is not without precedent. In what Shlomo 
Cohen calls the “spirit of the expansionist school,”74 other moral philosophers 
have also argued that additional categories are needed in addition to 
supererogation if we hope to rightly classify the full range of human acts. Three 
come to mind. Cohen has argued for the additional classification of “forced 
supererogation.” These are acts characterized by the following: (a) 
performance is praiseworthy (unlike a duty according to Cohen); (b) 
nonperformance is not blameworthy (unlike a duty); and (c) nonperformance 
is wrong (unlike an act of supererogation). Due to this unique set of 
characteristics, Cohen believes that this additional classification is needed. 
Secondly, Chisholm and Sosa have also argued that Urmson’s fourfold 
classificatory scheme was deficient. They proposed a fifth category of action 
titled “offensive.” They write: “an act is (merely) offensive if its performance is 
morally bad and its nonperformance not morally good.”75 In other words, 
although performing the act is wrong, not performing the act is not necessarily 
commendable from a moral standpoint. Whether their defense of this claim is 
successful is another matter. What is important is that they too saw fit to 
introduce an additional category. Thirdly, Paul McNamara has gone as far as 
 
74 Shlomo Cohen, “Forced Supererogation,” European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2013): 
1006. 
75 Chisholm and Sosa, “Intrinsic Preferability,” 327. 
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to suggest that there are eight “normative statuses.”76 Describing each of the 
eight categories would take us beyond the scope of this chapter, but the more 
general point remains: introducing the category of individual duty is not without 
precedent.  
 Among the four philosophers just named, it is important to mention that 
there is one marked difference between their views and mine. In pointing out 
this distinction, the overall purpose of my thesis is reiterated. Whereas they 
take supererogation for granted and build out from that presupposition, I do 
not. On the contrary, no argument has been offered for or against 
supererogation within Protestant ethics up to this point. I have only attempted 
to show that Urmson’s supererogatory classification of Francis’ preaching to 
the birds was wrong and that he never really had a chance to get it right due 
to the inadequacy of his scheme. My argument actually leaves open the 
possibility within Christian ethics that while there are individual duties, there 
may not be such a thing as acts of supererogation. Whether there is such a 
category as supererogation in Protestant ethics will be my focus in chapter 
three. My main objective has been to argue that no matter what you assume 
about Francis and the divine, Urmson was wrong to classify Francis’ preaching 
to the birds as supererogatory. As a corollary, I have also attempted to 
demonstrate that within Christian theology and practice, the additional 
classification of an individual duty is required to account for the full range of 
human action. Whether the name “individual duty” is fitting is of little 
consequence. The point is that the threefold and fourfold classificatory 
 
76 They are as follows: “the obligatory, the morally optimal, the minimum morality 
demands, the supererogatory (action beyond the call), the morally optional, the morally 
indifferent, the morally significant and the permissibly sub-optimal.” See McNamara, “Making 
Room,” 415. It is worth noting that though he names eight normative statuses, some are 
broader in nature and therefore subsume others. For example, he writes that supererogation 
is a subclass of “the morally optional.” Presumably, the “morally indifferent” is also a 
subclass of “the morally optional.” This suggests that there may not be eight distinct 
categories by which to classify an act though he obviously recommends more classifications 
than the threefold or fourfold classificatory schemes.  
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schemas are not hospitable to the type of act within Christian practice of which 
Francis’ preaching to the birds is an example.77  
 
Gregory Mellema’s Argument for Supererogation Using the 
Protestant Concept of Vocation  
 
As suggested, the Protestant concept of vocation is well-suited to 
accommodate acts like Francis’ preaching to the birds because it allows for 
what I am referring to as an “individual duty.” Gregory Mellema employs this 
concept of vocation in an effort to suggest how theistic supererogationists and 
theistic anti-supererogationists might find common ground. He is one of the 
few philosophers to have engaged supererogation from a religious perspective 
since Urmson’s essay in 1958, and what makes his contribution of unique 
importance to my project is that his suggestion is offered from a Protestant 
viewpoint.  
Mellema begins by acknowledging that for many theists, there is 
“something powerfully wrong-headed about the idea that a supremely good 
God could make it morally permissible for his creatures to pass up 
opportunities to do that which is morally good.”78 Regarding this line of 
reasoning, he continues: “If it is God’s intent that his creatures pursue the path 
of good and turn away from evil, for what possible reason would God not 
require of us that we take advantage of these opportunities?”79 In moral 
philosophy, this conceptual connection between moral goodness and 
obligation is known as the “good-ought tie-up.” As discussed in chapter one, 
the basic idea is that moral goodness entails obligation. This view logically 
rules out the possibility for acts of supererogation. This view was adopted by 
John Wesley although he did not employ language similar to that of moral 
philosophers. In his Plain Account of Christian Perfection, Wesley writes:  
 
77 Again, this is assuming that God did in fact command Francis to preach to the birds. 
Whether he did or not, the argument still stands for those instances where God gives one 
individual a specific command to which no one else is obligated. 
78 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 149. 
79 Ibid., 149. 
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Beware of sins of omission; lose no opportunity of doing good in any 
kind. Be zealous of good works; willingly omit no work, either of piety or 
mercy. Do all the good you possibly can to the bodies and souls of men. 
Particularly, “Thou shalt in any wise reprove thy neighbour, and not 
suffer sin upon him.” Be active. Give no place to indolence or sloth; give 
no occasion to say, “Ye are idle, ye are idle.” Many will say so still; but 
let your whole spirit and behavior refute the slander. Be always 
employed; lose no shred of time; gather up the fragments, that nothing 
be lost.80  
 
It appears that for Wesley, to forego an act that is morally good is a sin of 
omission. Not only this, but omitting acts of moral goodness could lead to a 
backslidden state for the believer where God’s perfection is neither embodied 
nor reflected as required (i.e., holiness). This would represent a breach in the 
pursuit of holiness. To state this differently, a Christian is deliberately choosing 
to settle for a lesser degree of holiness when they purposely refrain from doing 
a good work. Within Wesley’s theological framework, how could this be labeled 
as anything but sin since after justification, the moral dimension of a person is 
“completely restored” (prior to justification, it was “completely destroyed), thus 
enabling a person to achieve Christian perfection.81 William Cannon makes a 
similar point, writing: “Wesley went so far as to claim that immediately on man’s 
justification he was given by God the strength not to commit a known act of 
sin.”82 This, according to Wesley’s words, includes “sins of omission.” The 
bottom line is that for Wesley, one must perform every good deed that 
presents.  
For Christian theologians and ethicists that share a similar mindset with 
Wesley such as Joseph Allen, it is not difficult to see why they cannot find room 
for supererogation within Christian theology and practice. Joseph Allen is one 
 
80 Wesley, Plain Account of Christian Perfection, 112–113. 
81 Irv Brendlinger and Eric E. Mueller, “Psychological Implications of the Doctrine of 
Christian Perfection with Special Reference to John Wesley’s View,” The Journal of Pastoral 
Care & Counseling 60, no. 3 (2006): 278. 
82 William Cannon, “John Wesley’s Doctrine of Sanctification and Perfection,” Mennonite 
Quarterly Review 35, no. 2 (1961): 94–95. The phrase “known act of sin” is probably what 
Jana Bennett means when she writes of Wesley’s view of perfection: “[it] consists in being 
free from outward sin,” as opposed to having perfect knowledge, never making a mistake in 
moral judgement, etc. See Jana M. Bennett, Singleness and the Church: A New Theology of 
the Single Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 97.  
 107 
such ethicist though his focus is more on covenantal love rather than holiness. 
In this book Love and Conflict, Allen argues that there is no place for 
supererogation in Protestant ethics. He is one of the few Protestant thinkers to 
interact with Urmson’s example of the soldier throwing himself on a grenade 
to save his comrades. This in itself makes him interesting. Allen argues that 
Urmson’s claim that the soldier’s act of self-sacrifice to save his comrades was 
supererogatory is only accurate from the perspective of “ordinary conventional 
morality.”83 While it might be classified as a “second-mile action,” this means 
two different things depending upon where you stand. From the vantage point 
of ordinary conventional morality, the act is considered “over and beyond what 
is ordinarily expected,” and for this reason is a candidate for supererogation. 
However, this is not the case from a Christian perspective. From the 
perspective of covenantal love, the soldier’s action is not “over and beyond 
what love requires” for the simple reason that sacrifice for the sake of another 
person’s interests is at the heart of what it means to express God’s covenantal 
love as required in an ethics of covenantal love. Consequently, Allen makes 
the following claim regarding the action of Urmson’ soldier:  
It is sometimes observed that we would not appropriately blame a 
person―one of the other soldiers, for example—for not being sacrificial 
in that way, but that we should especially praise someone who was. In 
contrast we would appropriately blame a soldier for not performing 
institutional duties—for going to sleep while on guard duty, for example; 
and we should certainly not praise one, at least not under ordinary 
circumstances, for staying awake. There is certainly an attraction in that 
way of thinking. From the standpoint of covenant love, however, there 
is something morally lacking, something that ought to be done, on the 
part of the soldiers who do not sacrifice their lives to save their 
comrades. Otherwise how are we to make sense of the note of 
command in Jesus’s injunctions to turn the other cheek, go the second 
mile, and love the neighbor as the self?84 
 
The bottom line is that Allen’s covenantal model of Christian ethics is very 
demanding and does not permit actions requiring a significant level of self-
sacrifice to be classified as supererogatory, because expressing love, even 
 
83 Allen, Love & Conflict, 127. 
84 Ibid., 126–127. 
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when it is sacrificial, is part of what it means to love other people. In Allen’s 
view, it is impossible for any act of love to go beyond what is required. 
Therefore, supererogatory acts are not possible because they do nothing more 
than fulfill God’s command to love others. Thus, not to perform an act of 
sacrificial love because of the cost to ourselves is to sin because in that 
moment, we have prioritized ourselves above another.  
 Along with John Wesley, Joseph Allen implicitly endorses the “good-
ought tie-up.” However, while Gregory Mellema does not directly address the 
good-ought tie-up, he implicitly rejects the principle in his discussion of how 
Protestants might make space for supererogation.  
 
Gregory Mellema’s Argument 
 
Mellema attempts to bridge the gap between the theistic proponents 
and theistic opponents of supererogation by introducing the Protestant 
concept of vocation. Mellema writes:  
The basic idea, as it has evolved primarily in Protestant thought, is that 
God calls his creatures into various areas of work or service. It is part 
of God’s plan that his purposes on earth be brought about or realized 
through the efforts of his creatures, and each of his creatures is called 
to a particular area of service.85  
 
As stated in the previous section, another term that is sometimes used 
interchangeably for the Protestant concept of vocation is “calling.” In Protestant 
thought, a calling is not ultimately a product of psychical activity although it will 
manifest itself psychologically. Rather, the call indicates that there is not only 
a “callee” hearing the call, but a caller.86 Christians identify this caller as God. 
Whether it be a teenager at a summer youth camp or an adult in a Sunday 
morning service, it is common within Protestant Christianity to hear a preacher 
exhort individuals to seek God’s direction, or calling, for their life. Normally, this 
is viewed as a much more noble and life-comprehensive task than merely 
 
85 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 150. 
86 Max L. Stackhouse, “Vocation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, ed. 
Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 190. 
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acquiring instructions for any given situation. Rather, an individual approaches 
God in prayer with the question, “What have you put me on earth to do?” It is 
the kind of question that resembles the following question that Paul asked 
when Jesus revealed himself on the road to Damascus: “What am I to do, 
Lord?”87 God then responds: “Get up and go to Damascus; there you will be 
told everything that has been assigned to you to do.”88 In terms of vocation, 
God called Paul to be an apostle. At the very beginning of his letter to the 
Romans and in his first letter to the Corinthians, Paul includes the phrase: 
“called to be an apostle.”89 On four other occasions, he begins his letter with 
the phrase: “an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God.”90 And in 1 Timothy 
1:1, he describes himself as: “an apostle of Christ Jesus by the command of 
God our Savior and of Christ Jesus our hope.” By comparing these salutations, 
it is clear that while God’s will for Paul was to serve as an apostle, this objective 
fact was experienced by Paul as a “calling” (i.e., vocation) and “command.” 
The importance of including the reference to command is that command is 
often viewed as obligatory and a calling is viewed as more of an invitation.91 
However, Paul appears to believe that his calling was not only an invitation to 
partner with God, but a command of God, and to refuse the calling would be 
an act of disobedience. God had a specific vocation for Paul and there is no 
reason to think that this is not the same for every Christian. In addition to God’s 
general commands that are applicable to all, there is a specific calling—all 
“rank[ing] the same with God, none more sacred, none more secular than 
others, no matter how they are ranked by men”92—awaiting discovery for each 
individual Christian. 
One of the clearest examples of vocation or individual calling is found 
in Jeremiah. Early in Jeremiah’s life, God tells him: “Before I formed you in the 
 
87 Acts 22:10. 
88 Acts 22:11. 
89 Rom. 1:1 and 1 Cor. 1:1. 
90 2 Cor. 1:1, Eph. 1:1, Col. 1:1, and 2 Tim. 1:1. 
91 Regarding the idea of “calling,” Robert Adams admits that he is more comfortable 
viewing it as an invitation rather than a command because of his understanding of “Christian 
liberty.” See Adams, “Vocation,” 451. 
92 Paul Ramsey, The Essential Paul Ramsey, ed. William Werpehowski and Stephen D. 
Crocco (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 41. 
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womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed 
you a prophet to the nations.”93 This word from the Lord indicated that prior to 
conception (i.e., not just birth),94 God knew that Jeremiah would exist and had 
already determined his vocation (i.e. a prophet). In contradistinction to Jean-
Paul Sartre’s atheistic humanism, this predetermined vocation can be 
expressed in the following terms: Jeremiah’s essence was determined prior to 
his existence.95  
In relation to this individual calling, Mellema points out the following 
belief that normally accompanies this particular view of vocation:  
God endows us with talents and abilities in the light of the vocation to 
which we are called. And since the carrying out of his designs requires 
a multiplicity of persons in differing areas of service, God endows 
people with differing talents and abilities. Having decided upon the 
purposes to be realized through the collective efforts of his creatures on 
earth, God calls his creatures to a variety of vocations and equips each 
with the appropriate abilities to engage in the assigned vocation with 
adequate success.96 
 
Within this framework of vocation, Mellema’s discussion of supererogation is 
straightforward. In the area of one’s vocation, God expects more due to the 
fact that God himself has uniquely equipped the individual to serve others in 
 
93 Jer. 1:5. 
94 Identifying something akin to personhood prior to conception is a radical move. In 
today’s abortion debate that largely hinges upon when a zygote or embryo or fetus is 
considered a human person, conservative evangelical Christians argue that a human being 
exists from the moment of conception. Here, God tells Jeremiah that his person and calling 
(i.e., vocation) already existed in his mind before conception. Though this is not relevant to 
my thesis, it is a point worthy of mentioning due to its relevance to an important moral issue 
today. 
95 Jean-Paul Sartre was one of the most famous (along with Albert Camus) existentialist 
philosophers and atheists. One of the expressions that he is most famous for is “existence 
precedes essence.” See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1966), 28. Sartre writes: “Atheistic existentialism . . . declares with 
greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence 
comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of 
it. That being is man . . . See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, 27–28. 
Because he did not believe in God, there was nothing that existed which could give human 
beings any grand meaning (i.e., metanarrative) prior to their existence. If a human being 
wants meaning, they have no choice but to create it. David Heyd refers to this view of 
meaning as a “modern, post-Nietzschean [conception] of life,” a view that “consists of 
numerous goals (or plans), but as a whole it does not have a goal (or a plan).” See David 
Heyd and Franklin G. Miller, “Life Plans: Do They Give Meaning to Our Lives?”, The Monist 
93, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 21. 
96 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 150. 
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that particular way. This “equipping” might include any combination of factors 
such as skills, talents, a strong desire to perform related activities, a 
complementary personality type for the appropriate tasks, relevant knowledge 
and insight, an intuitive ability to discern what needs to be done from one 
situation to the next, and the like. The point is that because the individual is 
both called and equipped by God to serve God, the church, and others most 
effectively in a specific area, more is expected of that individual in every 
situation where an opportunity to do the sort of good that corresponds to that 
area arises. Mellema even suggests that it might be the case that God’s 
expectations are so high in the area of our vocation that it might be impossible 
to supererogate in that area of our calling.97  
Conversely, there will be a multitude of areas in which an individual is 
not particularly well-equipped to serve. This is not to be used as an excuse to 
abstain from doing good in areas outside of one’s calling. However, God’s 
expectations for an individual outside the area of their vocation may be less in 
comparison with his expectations for the individual when faced with 
opportunities to do good that are more closely related to their individual calling. 
For example, pretend that there are three houses side-by-side. In the middle 
house lives a child named John who cannot read even though he is of reading 
age. If he does not learn to read soon, his chances of future success will 
quickly diminish. In the house to the right lives a man who dropped out of 
school when he was 14 and has worked on his father’s shrimping boats for 
several decades. In the house to the left, there lives a woman who is an 
elementary school teacher. Both the shrimp boat man and the school teacher 
live very busy lives and their work requires a good deal of time. According to 
Mellema’s suggestion, the vocation of each neighbor could play a role in 
determining the classification of the particular act of taking time to help teach 
John to read. If the shrimp boat man attempts to teach the child to read, it 
might be the case (though not necessarily) that he supererogates, whereas if 
the schoolteacher helps, she does not. Why? Because helping children learn 
 
97 Ibid., 151–152. 
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to read falls directly in the wheelhouse of responsibilities that characterize the 
vocation of a schoolteacher. In addition, she will possess more knowledge and 
be more skilled in tailoring an individualized tutoring plan that will serve John 
best. Along these lines, Mellema writes:  
I have many opportunities to be of service both inside and outside the 
area of my vocation, but with respect to the latter my taking advantage 
of these opportunities is sometimes morally optional. Outside the 
bounds of my vocation I am not required to go the extra mile on every 
occasion, and when I elect to go the extra mile there is a genuine 
possibility of performing an act of supererogation.98 
 
While not lowering God’s moral standard too much, Mellema finds a way to 
make moral space for supererogation. Ultimately, this suggestion is meant to 
help theistic anti-supererogationists reconsider their position since there might 
be a way of allowing for supererogation while still not compromising God’s high 
moral demands. This is, after all, the main concern of anti-supererogationists: 
that supererogation is nothing more than a “device that allows people to 
escape the rigors of the moral life.”99  
It is important to mention that a person can adopt the Protestant notion 
of vocation without committing themselves to a pro-supererogation position.100 
It could be the case that the moral good always entails ought regardless of 
whether the opportunity to do good is within or outside the bounds of one’s 
God-designated vocation. Mellema acknowledges that this is possible, but 
goes on to write:  
Rather, it is my suggestion that this notion [of vocation] makes possible 
an alternative point of view which takes seriously many of the theistic 
anti-supererogationist’s concerns about a supremely good God with 
high expectations of his creatures and yet recognizes that in certain 
areas of their lives these creatures are capable of performing acts of 
supererogation.101 
 
The strength of his view is evident. While Mellema’s view carves out a niche 
for supererogation within Protestant ethics, it does not do so at the cost of 
 
98 Ibid., 153. 
99 Gregory Mellema, “Alternative Acts and the Demands of Morality,” The Journal of 
Value Inquiry 38 (2004): 453. 
100 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 153. 
101 Ibid., 153. 
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diluting God’s high expectations of his creatures. The holiness of God is not 
impugned, and his holy expectations are not diminished. God’s moral 
expectations remain extremely high for each human being and are slightly 
loosened when opportunities to go the extra mile fall outside the bounds of the 
individual’s vocation. For the theistic anti-supererogationist who is primarily 
concerned with God’s expectations and standards for his creatures being 
diminished, it is important to note that a person will still have duties to perform 
outside their particular vocation in addition to the very high moral standards 
that still apply in the area of their vocation. All Mellema is suggesting is that 
outside those bounds, it is when going the extra mile that acts of 
supererogation are possible.  
The value of Mellema’s argument cannot be overstated. As indicated 
earlier, he offers the most thorough case in favor of supererogation in 
Protestant ethics. However, for all of its strengths, a specific act is never 
mentioned. Although this should not be viewed as a failure on his part, it 
remains to be seen whether Protestant ethics can take the next step and 
actually identify one or more specific acts that are supererogatory. Opening 
the door to supererogation is one thing; stepping through the door and 
pinpointing an actual act is another. Granted, Mellema has named specific acts 
of supererogation elsewhere. For example, on one occasion he writes about a 
lady named Margaret who has a duty to give $100 to the local broadcast facility 
as a result of a previous pledge. However, when it comes time to give, she is 
caught up in a “spirit of generosity” and gives $250 instead.102 This act 
simultaneously “fulfills a duty and goes beyond the fulfillment of duty.”103 
Leaving no room for doubt, Mellema goes on to write: “It is an act, I believe, 
which deserves to be classified as an act of supererogation.”104 In this 
example, he is clearly writing from the perspective of a moral philosopher 
rather than as a Christian ethicist. This observation is not meant as a criticism 
 
102 Gregory Mellema, “Supererogation and the Fulfillment of Duty,” The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 25 (1991): 171–172. 
103 Ibid., 172. 
104 Ibid., 172. 
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of his view, but only as an acknowledgement that after my criticism of Urmson 
for his failed attempt to correctly classify Francis’ act, one must not be too 
hasty in assuming that because an act is thought to be supererogatory in moral 
philosophy, then it will be so in Protestant ethics as well. Mark Wynn’s essay 
makes this all too clear. My only point is to provide support for my earlier claim 
that Mellema never provides a specific example of supererogation in 
Protestant ethics. He would probably say that Margaret’s act is supererogatory 
whether she performs it as a Protestant Christian or not. Although I agree, it 
still is important to say that it is not necessarily so and for this reason, her act 
should be regarded as only a suggestion by Mellema of an act of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics. For this reason, it remains to be seen 
whether a particular act can be classified as supererogatory in Protestant 
ethics. 
 
Three Acts of Supererogation: Joel and Paul Feinberg’s View 
 
Joel and Paul Feinberg take the next step and identify certain acts as 
supererogatory. It is worth pointing out that they do not argue for acts of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics. Rather, they simply assume that such acts 
are possible and proceed to offer a few examples. I will now conclude the 
chapter by discussing the three individual acts that they believe to be 
supererogatory.  
The first act that the Feinbergs identify as supererogatory is choosing 
to free a prisoner who is scheduled to be executed by offering oneself in their 
place.105 Concerning this act, they write: “It would be a great sacrifice for me 
to do so, but am I required to make this sacrifice? It is hard to imagine that 
either Christian or non-Christian ethicists would say I am obligated to do 
this.”106 They do not spend much time arguing their case, but instead trust that 
it would be difficult to find an ethicist that would classify this act as a duty. 
Besides the particular act, their proposal suggests that supererogation in its 
 
105 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 25.  
106 Ibid., 25.  
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basic form is the same in Christian ethics as it is in non-Christian ethics (i.e., 
whatever form that may take) in that it is characterized by the following three 
criteria: (1) not obligatory, (2) not forbidden, and (3) possessing moral worth. 
However, they also write that these criteria alone are not sufficient for 
classifying acts because motivations and intentions are not emphasized.107 I 
will refrain from commenting further on this aspect of their view until chapter 
four.  
The second act that the Feinbergs present as supererogatory is when 
a woman chooses to raise a child that is the result of rape or non-consensual 
incest. They write:  
because the sex and resultant pregnancy are involuntary, the woman 
involved does not have a responsibility to raise this child. That is, since 
raising the child will significantly burden the rest of her life, and because 
this added burden and responsibility were forced on her against her will, 
it is not her duty to raise the child. Of course, if she chooses to raise the 
child anyway, she is permitted to do so. Doing so under such 
circumstances would be an act of supererogation, that is, a deed that 
goes beyond the call of duty and thus is morally praiseworthy as an act 
of great sacrifice.108 
 
At first glance, this appears to be an implicit endorsement of a woman’s right 
to abort the fetus. However, this is not the Feinbergs’ position. They write that 
if the same woman chooses not to raise the child, she can avoid aborting the 
baby by offering it up for adoption. The issue of abortion aside, the Feinbergs 
appear to be saying that there may come a point when the level of sacrifice 
that accompanies an act is so great that the act can no longer be considered 
obligatory. The problem with such thinking is that not everyone would agree. 
For example, could it not be argued that if the woman does not have an 
obligation to raise the child, neither should she be obligated to put her body 
through the nine-month, rigorous process of nurturing a fetus and then 
experiencing the pain of child-birth? The real question is, “Where do you draw 
the line?” According to the Feinbergs’ argument, why does the victimized 
woman’s freedom only begin once the child is born? And if they want to make 
 
107 Ibid., 21. 
108 Ibid., 130. 
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this argument, then what justification can be given for drawing such a line in 
the moral sand? Presumably, the reason is that the embryo or fetus is deemed 
a person from their Protestant evangelical perspective and no matter how the 
person originated, it is a person now and deserves to be given equal rights 
and protection under law as any other human being that has been born. This 
is most evident in their statement: “We agree that after victimizing the woman 
by rape or non-consensual incest it is neither right or necessary to victimize 
her again by requiring her to raise the child. But neither is it right to victimize 
the child by requiring that he or she loses his or her life.”109 Wayne Grudem 
makes this point as well. He writes:  
But once again the question must be asked: Would we think it right to 
kill a baby conceived through rape or incest after it is born? Most people 
would say certainly not. Such a child does not lose its right to live 
because of the circumstances of its conception. Therefore, we should 
not think it right to kill the child before it is born either. The rape that 
occurred was not the fault of the child, and the child should not be put 
to death because of someone else’s crime.110  
 
This explains why the Feinbergs draw the line of freedom where they do. 
Because the embryo or fetus is considered a person, the victimized woman 
must give birth, but this does not require her to be the one that raises the child. 
Having explained their view, it should be clearer now why they think that a 
victimized woman performs an act of supererogation when she chooses to 
raise the child herself. 
Although the Feinbergs make a strong case for this second act being 
supererogatory, all one must do to call the supererogatory status of the act into 
question is to challenge their position on whether an embryo or fetus is actually 
a person or to make a case that whatever the status, this should never take 
precedence over a woman’s reproductive rights to determine what she wants 
to do with her body and her future. I now want to mention the third act that the 
Feinbergs claim is supererogatory. The Feinbergs have us imagine a scenario 
where a pregnant woman finds out that she has a type of cancer that will 
 
109 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 130. 
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eventually result in her death if it goes untreated during the gestation period. 
At this point, the alternatives are clear: either she begins treatment to save her 
own life even though this will terminate the life of the fetus, or she foregoes 
treatment to save the life of the fetus even though it will cost her own life.111 
Concerning the first option, they write that it is morally permissible for the 
mother to commence treatment. They reason:  
we believe that there are principles that justify taking the baby’s life in 
these cases, if the mother chooses. One is that if it is possible to do 
good to someone else without endangering or harming oneself, one is 
obligated to do so; otherwise there is no obligation. As applied to these 
kinds of cases, this rule means the mother is not morally required to 
give up her life to save that of the baby.112  
 
The Feinbergs go on to say that although the mother is not required to give up 
her life, she can choose to do so with the intent of saving the baby. Using the 
real-life case of Rita Fedrizzi who was faced with this tragic dilemma in 2004–
2005 (not to mention that she already had two children and had to take them 
into account in her decision), they tell the story of how Rita made the decision 
to forego treatment. She gave birth and died within a few months. In response 
to this act, the Feinbergs write: “what she did was an act of supererogation 
(beyond the call of duty), a heroic act. Such an act of courage and love is 
morally praiseworthy and certainly morally permissible, but she was not 
morally obligated to make that decision.”113 The choice of the mother to 
sacrifice her life so that the baby can live is the third act that the Feinbergs 
classify as supererogatory.  
Of the three acts that the Feinbergs mention as examples of 
supererogation, this last one seems to be the least contestable for two 
reasons. To begin with, the first act that is mentioned seems more akin to a 
thought experiment than an event that could transpire in real life. In the United 
States, a person is not legally permitted to be executed in someone’s place in 
 
111 The reasoning behind this latter option is that if she foregoes treatment, by the time 
she gives birth, the cancer would have progressed to the point that the treatment would be 
ineffective. 
112 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 139. 
113 Ibid., 139. 
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states that still permit capital punishment. This is not to say that the 
hypothetical situation is not useful and that the act might not be 
supererogatory, but I think this is a poor example because it is difficult to 
imagine this situation actually occurring. The second reason is that the 
supererogatory status of the second act is questionable once you consider the 
perspective of theologians and ethicists outside the Protestant evangelical 
tradition. These two reasons are why the last of the three acts that the 




I began this chapter by arguing that Urmson misclassified Francis’ 
preaching to the birds because he failed to consider what Mark Wynn labels, 
“the theological context.” Because Urmson did not entertain the notion that the 
God of Christianity might have commanded Francis to preach to the birds, he 
had no choice but to classify Francis’ act as either merely permissible (i.e., a 
morally neutral act) or supererogatory. In the absence of God speaking, a 
merely permissible classification would have been more accurate than his 
supererogatory classification. Ultimately, I argue that whether God spoke to 
Francis or not, his act cannot be classified as supererogatory. After arguing 
this point, I suggest that an “individual duty” could be a helpful deontic category 
in Protestant ethics to account for the type of act that is obligatory for one but 
not all.  
Next, I presented Mellema’s proposal as to how supererogation might 
be accommodated based on the Protestant doctrine of vocation. Contrary to 
Urmson, Mellema rightfully considers the theological context of an act when 
he utilitizes the doctrine of vocation. With his proposal, Mellema hopes to strike 
a compromise between pro-supererogationists and anti-supererogationists in 
Christian theology. His proposal seeks to affirm the possibility of 
supererogation while “[taking] seriously many of the theistic anti-
supererogationist’s concerns about a supremely good God with high 
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expectations of his creatures.”114 The value of his proposal is that he asserts 
the possibility of supererogatory acts in Protestant ethics in a way that does 
not challenge the sola gratia and sola fide doctrine of justification.   
This chapter concludes with a discussion of three acts that the 
Feinbergs’ believe are supererogatory. Of the three, the third act—a pregnant 
woman who chooses to forego treatment for a type of cancer that will 
eventually result in her death if it goes untreated during the gestation period 
so that she can avoid aborting a fetus—is the strongest candidate for 
supererogation. However, although all three acts are a valuable contribution, 
no systematic argument is offered. The possibility of supererogation is 
assumed, and then three specifics acts are identified. Furthermore, none of 
their supererogatory acts are grounded in the Bible. Though this is not a 
problem, a robust account of supererogation in Protestant ethics needs to be 
able to offer biblical support for the possibility and role of supererogation. In 
the next chapter, I argue that there is an act of supererogation in the New 
Testament. It appears to have been overlooked by the few thinkers that have 
engaged supererogation from a Protestant perspective. In line with the pro-
supererogationist attitude of Mellema and the Feinbergs who both write from 
a Protestant perspective, I will now turn my attention to the particular act. 
 
114 Mellema, Beyond the Call of Duty, 153. 
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§ 3. An Instance of Supererogation in the New Testament 
 
Chapter one consisted of a general overview of the concept of 
supererogation, the religious origins of the concept, the more recent interest in 
moral philosophy since J.O. Urmson’s landmark article in 1958, and a thorough 
yet not exhaustive survey of some of the more central issues revolving around 
supererogation that are found in the literature. As stated toward the end of 
chapter one, Gregory Mellema opened the door for a reevaluation of 
supererogation in Protestant theology and ethics with the following insight:  
There is no contradiction in affirming that a person can never be judged 
righteous in God's eyes on the basis of works alone and affirming at the 
same time that a person can perform acts of supererogation. For an act 
whose performance fulfils no duty and is yet praiseworthy may still fall 
short of justifying a person in God's eyes.1 
 
With the question of supererogation decoupled from the doctrine of 
justification, Protestants can entertain the possibility of supererogation without 
committing to a doctrine of justification that is in part dependent upon the 
performance of meritorious deeds. This is vital because in the Reformer’s sola 
gratia, sola fide doctrine of justification, good works do not have any power to 
justify a person before God, so any account of supererogation in Protestant 
ethics must take this into consideration.  
In chapter two, I demonstrated that to discover whether there is a place 
for supererogation in Protestant ethics, we must take the broader theological 
context into account when assessing acts and types of acts. Evidence for this 
claim was provided by arguing that Urmson wrongly classified Francis’ act 
because he failed to consider its broader theological context. I then argued 
that the classification of an individual duty can do what none of Urmson’s 
classifications could, and that this classification is best understood through the 
Protestant concept of vocation. This opened the door to an in-depth look at 
Mellema’s pro-supererogation proposal. The chapter concluded with three 
 
1 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 52. 
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specific acts that John and Paul Feinberg claim are supererogatory, noting that 
although significant, none was taken directly from the New Testament.2  
In this chapter, I defend the unorthodox view that there is at least one 
act of supererogation in Protestant theology and ethics. Going a step further 
than Mellema’s general theory and the Feinbergs’ three examples, I work 
directly from the New Testament to argue that one act of supererogation in 
particular is commended in the Gospel of Matthew. This is as follows: choosing 
to remain married to an adulterous spouse in an effort to reconcile and prevent 
divorce. Considering that different people have different ideas of what 
constitutes adultery, I will use the following definition for the purpose of this 
chapter: “voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and 
someone other than that person's current spouse or partner.”3 This simple 
statement provides a clear, objective definition that eliminates the potential for 
confusion due to various distinctions such as “emotional adultery”4 and “visual 
adultery” (pornography, etc.) that are also associated with the more general 
term “adultery.” Although these distinctions are important and relevant to 
Christian ethics as well, I will not be treating them in this chapter. In addition, 
neither will I address alternative arrangements where two marriage partners 
agree to a threesome, partner swapping, or group sex since, as Dennis 
Hollinger writes, “the biblical commandment regarding adultery precludes 
[them].”5 My only goal in this chapter is to demonstrate the much broader point 
 
2 This is not meant to be a criticism of their view. Rather, this point is made only to call 
attention to my proposal which will focus on an act that is described in the Gospel of 
Matthew.  
3 “Adultery.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adultery. 
4 Dr. Abigail Brenner compares “platonic relationships” with “emotional affairs.” While 
platonic relationships are described as healthy, emotional affairs are not. She writes: “An 
emotional affair describes a relationship where the level of emotional intimacy is excessive 
and where the level of emotion invested in someone outside of the marriage infringes upon 
the intimacy between spouses or committed partners.” This is what I have in mind when I 
use the term, “emotional adultery.” See Abigail Brenner, “6 Signs That Your Spouse Is 
Having an Emotional Affair,” Psychology Today, March 17, 2019, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/in-flux/201903/6-signs-your-spouse-is-having-
emotional-affair. 
5 Dennis P. Hollinger, The Meaning of Sex (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 
169.  
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that there is a good example of supererogation in Protestant ethics in the New 
Testament. 
While celibacy is often embraced as the quintessential supererogatory 
deed in Roman Catholic theology, this is much less likely from a Protestant 
perspective that hinges upon the notion of vocation. As will be discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter, even Karl Rahner―one of the best known 
Roman Catholic theologians of the 20th century―defended the idea that 
marriage, not just celibacy, is a vocation to which one is called (as opposed to 
the view that marriage is the inferior path for the majority of people who cannot 
find it within themselves to be celibate in their service to God). For this reason, 
focusing upon the implied act of choosing to remain married to an adulterous 
spouse in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce is a less difficult path (and 
therefore more promising) to traverse in an effort to demonstrate that there is 
an example of supererogation in the New Testament. After using the basic 
criteria for supererogation in moral philosophy6 to analyze this act, I will argue 
that having the proper motive when performing the act is also required for the 
deed to count as supererogatory. This additional criterion―the motive 
component―will be addressed in chapter four in both general fashion and in 
relation to this specific act.  
This chapter is divided into three sections, which will then be followed 
by a conclusion: (1) A Life of Celibacy: Supererogatory?, (2) Remaining and 
Reconciling with an Adulterous Spouse, and (3) Two Additional Scenarios. In 
the first section, I suggest that celibacy―named by Aquinas as one of three 
counsels―is not so clearly a case of supererogation when viewed through the 
Protestant doctrine of vocation.7 In doing so, I introduce Melanchthon’s 
affirmation of celibacy as the sole counsel. This exercise is valuable for two 
reasons. First, it helps clarify Melanchthon’s conception of a counsel since he 
represents a rare moment in Protestant history when a counsel (i.e., the 
 
6 The act is (1) not obligatory, (2) not forbidden, and (3) possesses moral worth.  
7 There is a close relationship between Aquinas’ counsels and acts of supererogation in 
moral philosophy. Although not perfectly analogous, counsels have been described as 
“supererogatory” in more recent times. 
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spiritual equivalent to an act of supererogation in moral philosophy) is affirmed 
as such. Secondly, Melanchthon’s conception of a counsel leads to a 
discussion of an alternative, vocation-based view of celibacy that challenges 
the notion that celibacy is supererogatory. In the second section of this 
chapter, I argue that choosing to remain married to an adulterous spouse in 
an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce is supererogatory. This second 
section is organized as follows: (i) theological commitments that I am making 
for the sake of the argument; (ii) the argument itself. In the third section, I will 
address the following two questions concerning two distinct yet related acts in 
conjunction with the act discussed in section two: (i) In the case that the 
innocent spouse wants to remain and reconcile, is the choice by the guilty 
spouse to remain and reconcile―which will obviously require genuine 
repentance―also supererogatory? (ii) If both partners in a marriage commit 
adultery,8 does this alter the classificatory status of the act addressed in 
section two assuming both partners are repentant and want to salvage the 
marriage? After attempting to answer this question, I will conclude with a few 
remarks concerning grace (i.e., unmerited favor).  
 
A Life of Celibacy: Supererogatory?  
 
 Thomas Aquinas wrote that counsels represent a “better and more 
expeditious” method of securing “eternal blessedness.”9 He named three in 
particular: (1) the counsel of perpetual poverty, (2) the counsel of perpetual 
chastity,10 and (3) the counsel of obedience. Each was said to counter one of 
three worldly goods so that the “good” did not become the final end for which 
 
8 The term “double-adultery” will be used henceforth to denote a situation in which both 
marriage partners are simultaneously guilty of adultery. This definition is helpful in 
distinguishing my use of the term from how the term is used in the American legal system. In 
the American legal context, double-adultery is used in contrast to single-adultery to indicate 
that both of the individuals involved in the act are married. In this context, I use the term to 
signify that each spouse in the marriage has committed adultery (i.e., two acts of adultery). 
9 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae, q. 108, a. 4, ad 1, vol. 30 (Oxford: 
Blackfriars, 1972), 61, 63. 
10 The phrase “perpetual chastity” is synonymous with “virginity.” The two are used 
interchangeably in this passage.  
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an individual strove. The soteriological component in Aquinas’ counsels was 
the reason for the Reformers’ wholehearted rejection of counsels. This 
component of good works is evident when Aquinas writes that fulfilling the 
commandments is “necessary in order to reach the end of eternal 
blessedness.”11 Furthermore, counsels represent those acts which possess 
the power to secure eternal blessedness in a more efficacious manner, which 
directly contradicts the Reformers’ sola gratia, sola fide doctrine of justification. 
Sarah Mortimer writes: “From Luther onwards, Protestants came to see God’s 
standards for human beings in absolute terms, rejecting any suggestion that 
there were ‘counsels of perfection’, or good works which were optional rather 
than obligatory.”12 As explained in the previous chapter, John Wesley is 
another example of a Protestant who rejected the possibility of supererogation. 
He appears to endorse what Horgan and Timmons refer to as the “good-ought 
tie-up”13 although he did not address the topic of precepts, counsels, or 
supererogation specifically. Some of Wesley’s phrases such as “lose no 
opportunity of doing good,” “willingly omit no work,” and “Do all the good you 
possibly can”14 provide strong support for the idea that Wesley did not believe 
that there could be a good work that is non-obligatory. His position is 
reminiscent of Luther’s opening line in A Treatise on Good Works: “The first 
thing to know is that there are no good works except those works God has 
commanded . . .”15 The point is that whether we consider the views of 16th 
century Reformers or the views of Wesley, an 18th century revivalist 
responsible for the birth of Methodism, Mortimer is correct to say that from 
Luther onwards, Protestants have rejected the possibility of supererogation.  
 
Philip Melanchthon’s Affirmation of One Counsel: Celibacy 
 
 
11 Ibid., 61. 
12 Sarah Mortimer, “Counsels of Perfection and Reformation Political Thought,” The 
Historical Journal (2018): 1. 
13 Horgan and Timmons, “Untying a Knot,” 30. 
14 Wesley, Plain Account of Christian Perfection, 112–113. 
15 Luther, A Treatise on Good Works, 23. 
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However, there is one exception. Philip Melanchthon broke with the 
Reformers concerning one act in particular. He writes: “But there is a counsel 
found in the Gospels, and this is the only one as far as I know―celibacy.”16 
Interestingly, Mortimer never mentions this concession. While she rightly 
affirms that Melanchthon “added his voice to the assault upon counsels”17 on 
a general level, she appears to have overlooked the fact that Melanchthon did 
make one exception in Loci Communes 1521.18 Later in the same article, she 
writes: 
The natural and moral law which underpins our political societies 
demands full obedience, for Melanchthon; there is no space above or 
beyond that law for acts of supererogation or of specifically religious 
virtue. Like Luther, Melanchthon denied that the moral law was a 
permissive law, but instead saw it as prescribing and commanding all 
acts of virtue―which must be done in the right spirit of love and faith.19 
 
In an effort to give Mortimer the benefit of the doubt, it could be said that she 
recognizes that what Melanchthon meant by the word “counsel” and what 
Aquinas meant was completely different. Therefore, if she is answering the 
question, “Did Melanchthon affirm a counsel according to how Aquinas 
conceives of it?” then the answer is an obvious no. This would justify her failure 
to mention this one exception. Whatever we make of her view, it is important 
to state that Melanchthon clearly affirmed that there is one example of a 
counsel in the New Testament. Yet, as previously implied, this assertion is not 
as straightforward as it may first appear because there is no evidence that 
Melanchthon’s conception of a counsel resembled Aquinas’. What complicates 
the attempt to clearly discern what Melanchthon meant by the term “counsel” 
in Loci Communes 1521 is that he did not clearly define the term, which could 
give the impression that he might agree with Aquinas when he writes that 
celibacy is a counsel. However, one of Melanchthon’s statements clearly 
shows this impression to be false: “But is it not because of celibacy that you 
 
16 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, trans. Christian Preus (St. Louis, MO: 
Concordia Publishing House, 2014), 73. 
17 Mortimer, “Counsels of Perfection and Reformation Political Thought,” 8. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Ibid., 16. 
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argue whether counsels are superior to commandments? These are the 
absurdities of the Scholastics, who do not understand what a commandment 
is or what a counsel is.”20 Although the last statement does not provide a 
positive definition or list of criteria similar to that which we have for 
supererogation in moral philosophy, it at least shows that Melanchthon does 
not view a counsel in the exact same manner as Aquinas and the Scholastics. 
If he had, then this would have committed him to a doctrine of justification that, 
in the view of the reformers, was unbiblical and therefore heretical.  
 Although Melanchthon does not explicitly define the terms in Loci 
Communes 1521, he does do so in Loci Communes 1555 when addressing 
some of the teachings of the Anabaptists and monks.21 He writes:  
A commandment is so called because it speaks of necessary 
obedience. Everything that is contrary to the commandments is sin, and 
this brings eternal punishment if man is not converted to God.  
 A counsel is a doctrine, not a commandment; it does not demand 
a work, even though it praises the work as blameless and useful.22 
 
In conjunction with some of what Melanchthon wrote in Loci Communes 1521, 
the above passage is of great value for establishing a basic set of criteria that 
according to Melanchthon, constitute a counsel. Before doing so, it is important 
to show where Aquinas and Melanchthon differ in order to eliminate any 
impression that the two are in agreement. 
At no point does Melanchthon suggest that celibacy or any other act 
could aid an individual in their quest to―as Aquinas states―reach the end of 
eternal blessedness. In other words, it plays no role in the justification of a 
person before God. The inability of a counsel to serve a justificatory role in the 
 
20 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 73. 
21 This is pure speculation, but it could be the case that Melanchthon did not have time to 
further develop this section about counsels (and other sections as well) due to the fact that 
he had to publish Loci Communes 1521 before he was ready. Clyde Manschreck points out 
that some of his students “printed and widely distributed his lecture notes on Romans” and 
because Melanchthon was “unable to recall these notes, [he] resolved to print the material in 
a more acceptable form.” See Clyde L. Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1958), 82. 
22 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, in Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci 
Communes 1555, trans. and ed. Clyde L. Manschreck (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), 130. 
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life of a person performing the deed is the irreconcilable difference that forever 
separates Melanchthon from Aquinas. As mentioned earlier, Melanchthon 
breaks with Luther and Calvin (whose views would obviously be expressed 
later) when he affirms that there is at least one counsel. However, it will 
become clear that while his position concerning counsels places him at odds 
with other Reformers, this is not as significant as it might initially seem for the 
simple reason that he at no point suggests that the performance of a counsel 
can help a person earn God’s forgiveness and subsequent righteousness and 
thereby secure “eternal blessedness.” In other words, Melanchthon seems to 
affirm the possibility of a counsel while simultaneously denying that a counsel 
has any justificatory power. Due to the importance of this last point, I want to 
briefly discuss Melanchthon’s position on justification in more detail in order to 
convincingly demonstrate that his view of a counsel is, as it pertains to the 
doctrine of justification, diametrically opposed to Aquinas’. I will then conclude 
the discussion of Melanchthon’s conception of a counsel by showing that the 
attributes he assigns to a counsel match the three standard criteria that 
characterize a supererogatory act in moral philosophy. Together, these two 
exercises represent a concerted effort to show that Melanchthon’s treatment 
of celibacy as a counsel foreshadows Mellema’s pivotal insight that it is 
possible in Protestant ethics for there to be a supererogatory act that does not 
contribute in any way to the justification of a person performing the act.  
 
Melanchthon and the Doctrine of Justification 
The doctrine of justification is a topic that Melanchthon wrote on 
throughout his entire life due to the central role it occupied in the 
Reformation.23 Sachiko Kusukawa writes: “[Melanchthon] was always at pains 
to point out that controlling external actions did not merit salvation.”24 In Loci 
 
23 Michael Rogness makes this point, writing: “Without doubt, Melanchthon considered 
justification the critical center of evangelical faith.” See See Michael Rogness, Philip 
Melanchthon: Reformer Without Honor (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1969), 105. 
24 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip 
Melanchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 72. 
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Communes 1521, Melanchthon attacks Aquinas and the Scholastics for their 
view that merit can be earned through certain external acts for the purpose of 
securing eternal life with God. One of the reasons for this is that according to 
Melanchthon, a person cannot perform a virtuous or righteous deed prior to 
salvation and the subsequent indwelling of the Holy Spirit.25 The primary 
reason he offers in support of this claim is the corruption of the human heart 
due to original sin and the resultant inability to perform a genuinely meritorious 
deed without divine assistance. For Melanchthon, the “heart’s inner 
disposition”26 plays a crucial role in determining whether an act is righteous, 
and he did not think that a person without the Spirit could have a proper 
disposition even if they are able to perform the external act. Basically, 
Melanchthon reasoned that apart from the Spirit’s assistance, a person cannot 
help but to act selfishly and this includes the performance of deeds that appear 
good. Considering this last point, he mentions three motivations that are rooted 
in self-love: (1) performing an act to gain fame, (2) performing an act to feel 
self-satisfied, and (3) performing an act to garner the praise of human beings. 
The first two he attributes to Socrates and the latter he attributes to Cato, who 
followed the teachings of Stoicism.27 It might seem odd that he introduces the 
philosophers at this point. However, his reason is clear: he believes that there 
is a strong similarity between the way that the ancient Greek philosophers 
viewed virtuous acts and the way that Aquinas and the Scholastics viewed 
virtuous―or meritorious―acts.28 Melanchthon continues: “Philosophy looks at 
nothing but the facades that men exhibit. Holy Scripture perceives the 
innermost affections.29 This is why he says earlier that the “constancy of 
Socrates, integrity in Xenocrates, [and] self-control of Zeno” are only “shadows 
 
25 Cf. Luther, A Treatise on Good Works, 25–26, 38. 
26 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 45. 
27 Ibid., 41. 
28 Melanchthon makes this same point in article IV (titled “Of Justification”) of the 
Apology. He writes: “Here the scholastics have followed the philosophers. Thus, they teach 
only the righteousness of reason-that is, civil works-and maintain that without the Holy Spirit 
reason can love God above all things.” See Philip Melanchthon, “Apology of the Augsburg 
Confession,” in The Book of Concord, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert and Jaroslav 
Pelikan (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1959), 108. 
29 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 43. 
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of virtue.”30 In his view, these philosophers performed their deeds out of “their 
esteem and love [for] themselves”31 although the acts appeared externally to 
be noble and virtuous. After all, these philosophers did not have the Holy Spirit 
and for this reason, their behaviors must have proceeded from motives that 
were ultimately products of the “flesh”—“everything in us foreign to the Holy 
Spirit”32—and for this reason, were not righteous.  
As just mentioned, Melanchthon defines “flesh” as “everything in us 
foreign to the Holy Spirit” and went as far as to say that this includes “the 
highest powers of human nature and its noblest endeavors.”33 Concerning 
what Melanchthon perceives to be a justification-related focus on virtue by both 
ancient Greek philosophers and Aquinas and the Scholastics, E.P. Meijering 
writes:  
The most important aspect of God’s will is that God wants to justify the 
sinner through Christ. It is constantly stressed by Melanchthon that here 
we find the difference between philosophy, which teaches that man can 
be just through his virtues, and the gospel which teaches that man is 
justified by God through His grace in Christ. . . . Melanchthon is strongly 
opposed to Thomas’ doctrine that justification takes place through faith 
which has been formed by these theological virtues, especially love. 
This means, according to Melanchthon, that man is in fact justified 
through his own virtues.34 
  
Meijering’s statements are helpful because they explain why Melanchthon 
grouped the ancient Greek philosophers and Aquinas together when 
discussing the role of virtue in the life of a person seeking to be just. 
Melanchthon reasoned that without the Holy Spirit, our best behaviors and 
 
30 Ibid., 41. 
31 Ibid., 41. 
32 Ibid., 47. 
33 Ibid., 46. 
34 E.P. Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 
1983), 7, 107. This theme of the soteriological centrality of faith and not love occurs 
elsewhere in Melanchthon’s writings. Following the Augsburg Confession which was 
published on June 25, 1530 which Melanchthon signed as the chief author, he wrote to 
fellow reformer John Brentz, “I am revising the Apology [to the Augsburg Confession]. . . . At 
the present time the article that men are justified by faith, rather than my love, is being 
copiously treated. If Christ is our atonement, then it is necessary to understand that we are 
justified by faith, and that justification by love is justification according to the Law and not 
according to the Gospel. The Gospel sets forth one kind of righteousness, the Law another.” 
See Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer, 16. 
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pursuits are rooted in an unwavering self-centeredness and for this reason, no 
act can ever merit eternal life.35 Even if the act looks virtuous and noble, the 
affection and motivation lying “behind” it are corrupt. This thought bears a close 
resemblance to Helmut Thielicke’s motive-centered account of Protestant 
Christian ethics which will be treated in detail in chapter four. Melanchthon 
goes on to write that a person without God’s spirit who is acting virtuously may 
not even be aware of the true nature of their motivation.36 According to 
Melanchthon, only by the indwelling Holy Spirit can a person perform an act 
that is not sinful because it is only by the Holy Spirit that one is enabled to act 
for reasons other than the self. He writes: “Everything that godless fools37 have 
written about free will and the righteousness of works comprises nothing but a 
thoroughly pharisaical tradition.”38 The overemphasis of external evaluation 
that is inherent in pharisaism is best represented in Jesus’ rebuke of the 
Pharisees:  
Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you clean the 
outside of the cup and of the plate, but inside they are full of greed and 
self-indulgence. You blind Pharisee! First clean the inside of the cup, so 
that the outside also may become clean. Woe to you, scribes and 
Pharisees, hypocrites! For you are like whitewashed tombs, which on 
the outside look beautiful, but inside they are full of the bones of the 
dead and of all kinds of filth. So you also on the outside look righteous 
to others, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness.39 
 
In Melanchthon's view, past philosophers, the Pharisees, Aquinas, and the 
Scholastics all commit the same error: they believe that a person without the 
Holy Spirit can perform a righteous or virtuous deed. For this reason, he 
addresses his attack toward all of them since in his view they all fail to consider 
 
35 Manschreck provides a similar summary of Melanchthon’s thought on self-love, the 
insufficiency of external acts, and the identification of the “inordinate self-concern” with 
original sin. See Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer, 85. 
36 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 40. 
37 Melanchthon follows Luther’s example by maligning Aquinas and the Scholastics with 
terms such as “sophists,” “godless fools,” pseudo-theologians,” and “pharisaical Scholastics.”  
38 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 35. In the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, 
Melanchthon makes a similar point, writing: “So if we accept this teaching of the opponents 
that we merit forgiveness of sins and justification by the works of reason, there will be no 
difference between philosophical or Pharisaic righteousness and Christian righteousness.” 
See Melanchthon, Apology of the Augsburg Confession, 109. 
39 Matt. 23:25–28. 
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the innermost affections.40 As he writes: “But what do external works have to 
do with Christian discipline, if meanwhile the heart is corrupt?”41  
 Later in Loci Communes 1521, Melanchthon writes: “Our righteousness 
does not, then, consist in our works, no matter how good they are or seem to 
be. Rather, faith alone in the mercy and grace of God in Jesus Christ is our 
righteousness.”42 By the term “faith,” Melanchthon means: “not merely a 
historical knowledge (historie notitiam) but rather a trust (fiducia) in the mercy 
promised for the sake of (propter) the Son of God.”43 In reference to this view 
of faith as trust and the non-justificatory role of good works in Melanchthon’s 
thought, Rogness writes: “Faith is a trust and acceptance of Christ. It is not 
something which takes shape by doing works, but which expresses itself in 
works.”44 This faith-alone stance is typical of a Protestant view of what is 
required for salvation and is the doctrine that Melanchthon defends throughout 
the entirety of his life and ministry. As Luther wrote: “[Works] do not make you 
a Christian. Actually they come forth from you because you have already been 
made a Christian.”45  
A clear view of Melanchthon’s doctrine of justification also appears nine 
years later in the Augsburg Confession, which he wrote and signed in the 
company of others.46 Manschreck writes that this document is one of the “three 
foundational pillars of the Reformation along with Luther’s 1520 essays” and 
Melanchthon’s Loci.47 In article IV titled, “On Justification,” Melanchthon writes: 
And they [Lutheran churches] teach that men cannot be justified before 
God by their own abilities, merits or works, but are justified freely by 
Christ through faith, when they believe they have received it by grace, 
and that their sins are forgiven by Christ who in his death made 
 
40 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 43. 
41 Ibid., 35. 
42 Ibid., 115. 
43 John V. Fesko, Beyond Calvin: Union With Christ and Justification in Early Modern 
Reformed Theology (1517-1700) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 143.  
44 Rogness, Philip Melanchthon, 106. 
45 Martin Luther, “A Brief Introduction on What to Look For and Expect in the Gospels,” in 
Luther’s Works, vol. 35, trans. and ed. E. Theodore Bachmann (Philadelphia, PA: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1960), 120. 
46 Though there were several men who worked with Melanchthon to produce the 
Augsburg Confession, the document is chiefly viewed as Melanchthon’s work. See Rogness, 
Philip Melanchthon, 103. 
47 Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer, 88. 
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satisfaction for our sins. God imputes this faith for righteousness in his 
sight.48 
 
This kind of righteousness—that which is imputed and cannot be “produced by 
[oneself]”49—is what Luther labels, “alien righteousness,” which he describes 
as “the righteousness of another, instilled from without.”50 Staying with this 
theme, article VI, titled “Of the New Obedience” states: “it is right to do good 
works commanded by God because of God’s will, not so that we may be 
confident of deserving justification from God because of those works.”51 Article 
XX of the Augsburg Confession, titled “Of Faith and Good Works,” states:  
our works cannot reconcile us to God, or merit remission of sins, grace, 
and justification, but that we receive them in faith when we believe that 
we are received into grace for Christ’s sake. . . . And whoever believes 
that he deserves grace because of his own works, spurns the merit and 
grace of Christ, and seek the way to God without Christ, by human 
ability, although Christ says of himself, I am the way, the truth, and the 
light (Jn.14:6).52 
 
In this same article, Melanchthon goes on to say that he has not stepped 
outside of historical Christianity and offered a “new interpretation of Paul.” 
Rather, he writes that he and the Lutheran churches have done nothing but 
present a view of justification that can be traced back to Augustine, Ambrose, 
and Paul himself.   
For further evidence for Melanchthon’s view of justification, the Apology 
and Loci Communes 1555 are also helpful53. Concerning the former, 
Manschreck writes: “No document is more important in the theological writing 
 
48 Philip Melanchthon, “Augsburg Confession,” in A Melanchthon Reader, trans. Ralph 
Keen (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1988), 101. 
49 Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia, 
PA: Fortress Press, 1963), 227. 
50 Martin Luther, “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” in Luther’s Works, vol. 31, trans. Lowell 
J. Satre, ed. Harold J. Grimm (Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), 297. For a clear 
explanation of Luther’s “alien” righteousness, see Robert Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of 
Righteousness,” in Harvesting Martin Luther’s Reflections on Theology, Ethics, and the 
Church, ed. Timothy J. Wengert (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 
48. 
51 Ibid., 101. 
52 Ibid., 106. 
53 The 1555 edition of Loci Communes was one of the last. It preceded the last edition 
which was published in 1559 by only four years. Melanchthon died in 1560. 
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of the Reformation than the Apology of the Augsburg Confession.”54 In this 
document, Melanchthon affirms in no uncertain terms: “For it is false that by 
our works we merit forgiveness of sins. It is false, too, that men are accounted 
righteous before God because of the righteousness of reason.”55 He 
continues:  
Now we shall know that faith justifies. In the first place, we would remind 
our readers that if we must hold to the proposition, “Christ is the 
mediator,” then we must defend the proposition, “Faith justifies.” For 
how will Christ be the mediator if we do not use him as mediator in our 
justification and believe that for his sake we are accounted righteous? 
But to believe means to trust in Christ’s merits. . . . When we say that 
faith justifies, some may think this refers to the beginning, as though 
faith were the start of justification or a preparation for justification. Then 
it would not be faith, but the works that follow, by which we would 
become acceptable unto God. . . . Regarding faith we maintain not this, 
but rather that because of Christ by faith itself we are truly accounted 
righteous or acceptable before God. And “to be justified” means to make 
unrighteous men righteous . . . that faith alone makes a righteous man 
out of an unrighteous one, that is, that it receives the forgiveness of 
sins.56 
 
As Manschreck observes, “Justification by faith keyed the contents, for not only 
was this itself copiously treated, but every topic was inevitably brought back to 
this central doctrine.”57 You can barely turn a page or read a paragraph without 
Melanchthon affirming again and again that no work―whether a precept (i.e., 
command) or counsel―can justify a human being before God. In Loci 
Communes 1555, Melanchthon remains consistent in his defense that 
justification is only by faith. He writes: “it is obvious that our works cannot merit 
forgiveness of sins; so also are our works not perfection, for in this weak life 
we are still far from fulfillment of the law, and much sin, doubt and disorder 
remain in us . . .”58 The mention of “perfection” is important because 
 
54 Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer, 213. 
55 Melanchthon, Apology of the Augsburg Confession, 110. “By reason” is in reference to 
deeds that are reasoned virtuous and for that reason, performed. However, reason cannot 
purify the motive. For Melanchthon, good acts can only be done with the right motive after 
one has been justified, not before. Following justification, a person has the Holy Spirit who 
enables them to perform virtuous acts for God and others rather than some selfish motive. 
56 Ibid., 116–117. 
57 Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer, 212. 
58 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, 131. 
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Melanchthon is clearly referring to counsels, not precepts, when making the 
point that no matter how respectable an act is that one might perform, it still 
falls far short of the perfection that the law requires. As Paul stated, if someone 
is going to attempt to be justified by keeping the law, they must obey the entire 
law, which from a Protestant perspective, is meant to convey that it is 
impossible to be justified by works.59 This impossibility is what Calvin 
emphasizes in what he writes is the first of three functions of the moral law in 
Scripture:  
First, while showing God’s righteousness, that is, what God requires of 
us, [the law] admonishes each one of his unrighteousness and convicts 
him of his sin. All men, without exception, are puffed up with insane 
confidence in their own powers, unless the Lord proves their vanity. . . 
. it is fitting that this arrogance be cast down and confounded that, naked 
and empty-handed, they may flee to God’s mercy, repose in it, hide 
within it, and seize upon it alone for righteousness and merit.60 
 
Returning to Melanchthon’s discussion of celibacy, it is clear that he does not 
think that a person can be justified before God via the counsel of celibacy 
because of his more general point that no act can justify a person before God. 
He goes as far as to say that it is the married man who is in a better position 
to obey God than a man who has taken a vow of celibacy. He writes:  
For no matter how celibate a man is, he cannot fulfill the law against 
adultery since it cannot happen that concupiscence does not inflame 
him, no matter how chaste he is. But concupiscence is forbidden by the 
commandment. It can happen sometimes that married men are closer 
to keeping this commandment than virgins.61 
 
Later in Loci Communes 1555, Melanchthon writes in article XIII titled, “Of the 
Word ‘Justification’ and ‘To Be Justified’”: “God forgives us our sins, and 
accepts us, in that he imputes righteousness to us for the sake of the Son, 
although we are still weak and sinful. We must, however, accept this imputed 
righteousness with faith.”62 As was the case with the 1521 version of Loci 
Communes, the Augsburg Confession, and the Apology, neither time nor 
 
59 Gal. 5:3. 
60 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 
1975), 35. 
61 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 73. 
62 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, 161. 
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space allows for a detailed account of Melanchthon’s treatment of the doctrine 
of justification in Loci Communes 1555. Yet the above material is adequate to 
demonstrate Melanchthon’s pro-Reformation teaching that no work, whether it 
is labeled a precept or counsel, can contribute to a person’s justification before 
God. So if Melanchthon did not mean what Aquinas meant by the term 
“counsel,” what did he mean when he used the term and affirmed celibacy as 
one instance? And more importantly, considering the focus of this thesis, does 
Melanchthon’s concept of a counsel mirror the concept of supererogation? I 
will argue that it does. 
 
The Attributes that Melanchthon Assigns to Counsels 
As stated earlier, Melanchthon defines a counsel in Loci Communes 
1555 as a “doctrine, not a commandment; it does not demand a work, even 
though it praises the work as blameless and useful.” Beginning with this 
definition, I will compare different aspects of this definition with some of 
Melanchthon’s most significant comments about counsels in Loci Communes 
1521 in an effort to extract any general principle that is either explicitly or 
implicitly present. The reason for this approach is that though a definition of 
counsels is provided in 1555, it is ambiguous. Moreover, Melanchthon’s 
treatment of counsels in the Loci Communes 1521 is unsystematic. By 
combining both, I hope to develop a more precise definition. The general 
principles will then be combined in an effort to understand Melanchthon’s 
notion of a “counsel” and to show that it closely resembles the concept of 
supererogation in moral philosophy. Once this is in place, I will attempt to 
explain what Melanchthon must have meant when he wrote that celibacy was 
the only counsel he found in the Gospels.63 Last, I will conclude this opening 
section by discussing why there are viable reasons for challenging the view 
that celibacy is supererogatory.  
Similar to an act of supererogation, Melanchthon held the view that a 
counsel is optional. At the beginning of the section titled “Counsels,” he writes:  
 
63 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 73. 
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The sophists commit a horrible godless error when they make 
“counsels” out of Divine Law. They teach that God does not command 
certain things as a necessity but merely urges us to do them, so that if 
anyone wants to obey them, he may. . . . Moreover, they generally 
include among these counsels those commandments that are found in 
Matthew 5, namely, loving your enemies . . . forgiving, lending to anyone 
who has need with no hope of return. We say that all these things are 
required, and we number them among the commandments.”64 
 
In this opening passage, it is clear that Melanchthon considers a 
commandment as obligatory, something that―as he writes later in 
1555―“speaks of necessary obedience.”65 In Melanchthon’s terms, “Divine 
laws are those laws that God has decreed through the canonical Scriptures.”66 
The laws stem directly from the fact that God has issued a command and the 
act of commanding has generated duties which are universally and irrevocably 
binding. Therefore, these laws or commands are not optional. Obedience is 
required. On the other hand, it is clear that Melanchthon conceives of a counsel 
as optional from the statement: “God does not command certain things as a 
necessity but merely urges us to do them, so that if anyone wants to obey 
them, he may . . .” Granted, Melanchthon is rejecting what he labels as a 
sophistic view, but in doing so, he provides insight into his conception of a 
counsel. Commanding and urging are two different types of acts. Whereas the 
former obligates a person, the latter only encourages them to perform a 
particular act. If I urge someone to do something, most often I am 
communicating something like, “I really want you to do this, but I do not require 
it.” An agent can decide to perform or not perform the urged act. This is in line 
with Melanchthon’s 1555 definition of a counsel when he writes: “A counsel is 
a doctrine, not a commandment; it does not demand a work . . .”67 In other 
words, if a person decides to not perform a counsel, no moral wrong has been 
committed. This clearly resembles an act of supererogation because a 
supererogatory act is also optional. 
 
64 Ibid., 71. 
65 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, 130. 
66 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 66. 
67 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, 130. 
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Melanchthon’s view of a counsel as optional is also evident from 
another angle. He argues that Aquinas and the Scholastics have mistakenly 
interpreted several commands in Matthew 5 as counsels. Melanchthon writes: 
So also [Jesus] threatens blame and judgement on anyone who gets 
angry with this neighbor or shows contempt for him by saying, ‘Racha’ 
(Matthew 5:22). But if he were merely giving us advice not to get angry, 
why did he threaten judgment? If we are free either to get angry or not 
to get angry against someone who does us wrong, why does he warn 
of punishments?68 
 
In arguing that the Scholastics have wrongly classified the act of calling 
another “Racha,” he provides another glimpse into his concept of counsel. He 
clearly states Jesus’ threats of judgement and warnings of punishment are out 
of place if not calling someone “Racha” is merely a counsel. Implicit within this 
view is that like advice, one can act on a counsel or not. This underscores the 
property of optionality. Melanchthon’s view of a counsel is that its performance 
is neither obligatory nor forbidden and for this reason, a moral agent is free to 
perform the act or not. Due to a counsel’s optionality, the act cannot be 
classified as a duty or an act of wrongdoing. This leaves only two options for 
Melanchthon’s counsel: it is either a supererogatory act possessing moral 
worth or it is merely permissible, being morally indifferent.  
Turning once again to the 1555 definition, Melanchthon writes: “even 
though [the doctrine of a counsel] praises the work as blameless and useful.” 
By “blameless,” it seems clear that Melanchthon is saying that the work, or act, 
is morally good from a moral perspective. It is not trivial from a moral 
perspective. This indicates that Melanchthon conceived of a counsel as 
possessing moral worth. This is clear when you look at what he wrote about 
celibacy as a counsel. In Loci Communes 1521, he quotes the words of Christ 
concerning celibacy in Matthew 19:12: “Whoever can receive it, let him receive 
it.”69 The reverse is implied: If you cannot receive it, then do not do so. This 
was in response to the disciples saying, “If this is the situation between a 
 
68 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 71. 
69 Ibid., 73.  
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husband and wife, it is better not to marry.”70 Melanchthon casts Jesus as 
recommending celibacy if one is able to accept such a lifestyle. He then goes 
on to write: “I do not deny that celibacy has been recommended. But since the 
weakness of our flesh is such that even Christ denies that all can accept his 
speech about celibacy, what good does it do to make so precarious and 
dangerous a lifestyle common to so many thousands of men?”71 It is also 
interesting that Aquinas seems to suggest something similar to Melanchthon’s 
point about the weakness of the flesh in relation to the counsels. He writes: 
“The above-mentioned counsels, considered in themselves, are of advantage 
to everyone; but owing to the lack of the proper disposition in certain cases, it 
happens that they are of no advantage to someone, since he is not drawn to 
them.”72 The phrase “lack of the proper disposition” bears some resemblance 
to Melanchthon’s “weakness of the flesh.” Both seem to be communicating that 
the inability to live a celibate life is due to an internal deficiency of some sort. 
This could be the result of a lack of calling. If God has not called a person to 
celibacy, then they will not have received the grace from God that empowers 
them to live in such a manner. This is the vocation-based perspective of 
celibacy, of which more will be said towards the end of this section. Returning 
to Melanchthon, his view can probably be summarized as follows: If someone 
believes that they can live celibately, then they should because it is 
recommended, but if someone does not believe that they can forego marriage 
and abstain from sexual relations, then they are free to marry. This mirrors 
Paul’s teaching in the first part of 1 Corinthians 7. The point is that Melanchthon 
views the counsel of celibacy as being morally valuable as well as being 
optional (i.e., neither obligatory nor forbidden). Thus, it appears that his view 
of what constitutes a counsel matches the standard criteria for an act to be 
classified as supererogatory in moral philosophy. 
As an aside, it is interesting that Melanchthon attributes this solely to 
the weakness of the flesh, considering that he himself was married. 
 
70 Matt. 19:10. 
71 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 74. 
72 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae, q. 108, a. 5, resp., 65. 
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Melanchthon appears to have intended on living celibately in order to fully 
devote himself to the tasks that God had set before him. It was his custom to 
rise at 2 a.m. and not retire until the evening.73 Luther was afraid that 
Melanchthon, as a result of his relentless work ethic, small stipend, and the 
northern climate in Wittenberg, would either die due to bad physical health 
brought on by these conditions or that he would take another post elsewhere.74 
Robert Stupperich observes: “The labors that burdened Melanchthon had 
greatly undermined his health. His friends were anxious for the Master, who 
knew only work without regard for his outward welfare and circumstances.”75 
At one point, Luther pleaded with Melanchthon to get married so that “he might 
have someone to take care of his weak body.”76 In response, Melanchthon 
“first rebelled at the suggestion of marriage; not because he hated women, or 
esteemed marriage lightly, but because he loved study more.”77 However, 
Melanchthon finally consented to Luther’s incessant nagging (albeit friendly) 
and married Katharine Krapp on November 25, 1520. What is interesting is 
that it seems that Melanchthon possessed both the desire and will to accept a 
celibate life but then still chose to marry. This raises an interesting question: 
Had God given Melanchthon the grace to live celibately but he chose to marry 
anyway? This question cannot be addressed here, but it is instructive because 
it suggests that God might have equipped Melanchthon for celibacy which, in 
Melanchthon’s words, is recommended, although he eventually decided to 
forego this lifestyle in favor of marriage. Would Melanchthon admit that he had 
taken the less recommended path or would he have defended marriage as 
being a worthy calling similar to that of celibacy? The following excerpt from 
Loci Communes 1555 suggests the latter: “All these are commanded works: 
in marriage, to avoid all forbidden sexual relationships; and outside marriage, 
 
73 James W. Richard, Heroes of the Reformation: Philip Melanchthon (London: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1898), 62. 
74 Ibid., 62. 
75 Robert Stupperich, Melanchthon, trans. Robert H. Fischer (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1966), 61. 
76 James W. Richard, Heroes of the Reformation, 62. This point is also made by 
Stupperich. See Stupperich, Melanchthon, 61. 
77 Ibid., 62–63. Stupperich also confirms this point concerning study that Richard makes. 
See Stupperich, Melanchthon, 61. 
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to live purely without any misuse of sex. If one has not the gift to live purely or 
chastely outside marriage, then he is commanded to get married.”78 In this 
passage, Melanchthon seems to take a more spiritual approach to celibacy, 
interpreting it as a call to sexual purity rather than the concrete reality of chosen 
singleness. However, this does not negate the fact that when Melanchthon 
writes that celibacy is a counsel in Loci Communes 1521, he has in mind the 
actual state of being unmarried so that one is unhindered in their devotion to 
the Lord. As will be discussed in this chapter, Melanchthon’s use of the word 
“gift” in relation to celibacy implies a vocation-oriented view of celibacy, and by 
implication of marriage as well.  
Whatever we make of the apparent discrepancy between 
Melanchthon’s comments about celibacy as a recommended counsel in Loci 
Communes 1521 and his choice to get married, it is not at all evident that 
Melanchthon’s achieved less for Christ than he would have if he would have 
remained single. Instead, the opposite seems true. Richard writes that 
Melanchthon and his family extended a “liberal hospitality” to “exiles, 
wandering scholars, comers and goers of every age, sex, and condition. . . .”79 
Regarding this “steady stream of visitors,” George Wilson writes “not a few of 
them came for help.”80 Due to a combination of Katharine’s boundless charity 
and Philip’s limitless generosity,81 their home was not only a hub for lively 
theological debate and discussion, but also a place where people came and 
were ministered to in the name of Christ. Although he originally did not intend 
to get married so that he could devote more time to study, one does not get 
the impression that Melanchthon’s influence and service in God’s kingdom 
suffered as a result. In fact, the opposite could be claimed. The choice that he 
made and the influence of his marriage on others suggests that marriage was 
just as holy a path for Melanchthon as celibacy would have been, though in a 
completely different way.  
 
78 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1555, 138. 
79 Richard, Heroes of the Reformation, 66. 
80 George Wilson, Philip Melanchthon: 1497–1560 (London: The Religious Tract Society, 
1897), 131. 
81 Ibid., 130–131. 
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Whichever view we take of these events, it remains clear that 
Melanchthon does not think that every Christian will be able to live a celibate 
life, and he attributes this in Loci Communes 1521 to the weakness of the flesh. 
Yet, the weakness could be explained differently if framed by the Protestant 
doctrine of vocation. Regarding the inability of most people to choose celibacy, 
it could simply be that most people have not received the appropriate calling. 
As stated earlier, Melanchthon seems to suggest this in Loci Communes 1555 
by using the word “gift” in relation to celibacy.82 The basic idea is that celibacy 
is a vocation―or calling―that God issues to certain individuals. If God has not 
called a person to celibacy, then that individual will not possess or experience 
the necessary grace to obey the call. This vocation-related interpretation 
seems to go hand-in-hand with another remark that Jesus made that 
Melanchthon does not mention. After Jesus teaches on divorce in Matthew 
19:1–9, the disciples remark: “If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is 
better not to marry.”83 Jesus then responds: “Not everyone can accept this 
teaching, but only those to whom it is given.”84 Only after this exchange does 
Jesus say: “Whoever can receive it, let him receive it.”85 The phrase “to whom 
it is given” suggests that if God has not “given” celibacy to a person in the form 
of a grace-empowered calling, then not only will the individual not feel 
“drawn”86 to it, but more importantly, the person will not have the internal 
resources necessary to live in such a manner. Arguing that 1 Corinthians 7 
does not offer support for the traditional understanding of commands-
counsels, John Glaser writes the following about celibacy:  
 
82 Cf. 1 Cor. 7:7. 
83 Matt. 19:10. 
84 Matt. 19:11. 
85 While this statement is found in Matt. 19:12, I have chosen to use Melanchthon’s 
wording as opposed to the NRSV since I am discussing Melanchthon’s view of counsels in 
this section. Besides, there is not much difference between the two. Jesus’ statement in the 
NRSV reads, “Let anyone accept this who can.” For all practical purposes, the statements 
are semantically identical. 
86 I wonder if by “drawn” Aquinas is communicating something along the lines of “desire.” 
It seems characteristic of God’s goodness that the calling he issues to an individual would 
result in the individual actually desiring that to which God is calling them. This would be part 
of the empowering grace due to the fact that desire is a strong, psychological force that 
propels one to walk in the direction it recommends.  
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In chapter 7 we find only that virginity is recommended as better in 
general. If one finds that he lacks the necessary charisma for this, he 
should marry . . . if he finds that he cannot live in the state of virginity 
this indicates that he has another charisma: ho men houtōs [“one having 
one kind”], ho de houtōs (7b) [“and another a different kind”]. The very 
question that has to be answered to establish the doctrine of 
commands-counsels is never asked or discussed by Paul here: whether 
for the individual to whom such a call is directed, this ‘better state’ of 
virginity is only recommended or commanded.87  
 
Several pages later, Glaser writes: “this inability to live as virgin or widow is a 
sign that such a state in life is not the specific one to which this individual is 
called; it is not his specific charisma-grace.”88 As Karl Rahner points out in a 
different context, this would require the Church to affirm that there is not only 
a positive call to celibacy, but also a positive call to marriage. Rahner writes:  
It follows that for those called to it, marriage is not just something 
permitted, but is really a vocation, and that God means it to be a positive 
element in the holiness set before them. Hence it can, and in the last 
resort must, be said that for the great majority of Christians, marriage 
(and with it in general state of life ‘in the world’) is the best positive 
means God gives them for reaching the perfection he expects of them. 
. . . For the majority of men, marriage is a positive call from the God of 
creation and redemption, and not merely a fragment of the old order 
tragically upset by sin and tolerated in the redeemed because of their 
weakness and hardness of heart.89 
 
If this were the case, any notion of celibacy being supererogatory would be 
challenged. After all, if there exist positive calls to both marriage and celibacy, 
then it can be argued that the calling is also a command. Within this vocation-
related paradigm, to be called is in some respects the same as being 
commanded. If one is called to marriage, then celibacy would actually be an 
act of disobedience for that person. Likewise, if a person is called to celibacy, 
then marriage would be an act of disobedience for that individual. Von 
Balthasar makes a similar point, which is interesting considering that he is 
writing from a Roman Catholic perspective: “The decision to embrace the 
 
87 John W. Glaser, “Commands-Counsels: A Pauline Teaching?”, Theological Studies 31, 
no. 2 (1970): 277. 
88 Ibid., 285. 
89 Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Religious Life,” in Religious Orders in the Modern 
World, trans. Walter Mitchell (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1966), 50–52.  
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evangelical counsels depends on a personal experience of being called (if this 
is lacking, it would be imperfect, even sacrilegious, to enter this state, and it 
would be decidedly more perfect to choose to remain in the world).”90 This 
would mean that a celibate life in service to God is not supererogatory; that is, 
it is nothing more than an obedient response of an individual called by God to 
such a life. In the words of Craig Blomberg: “Neither celibacy nor marriage is 
superior to the other in God’s eyes.”91 
 This discussion is important because it opens the door to a vocation-
based interpretation of celibacy that directly challenges the idea that celibacy 
represents a counsel or act of supererogation. The mere possibility of being 
able to question the supererogatory status of celibacy suggests that it is wise 
to search elsewhere in Protestant Christianity for acts of supererogation. In the 
next two sections, I argue that there is at least one clear act of supererogation 
in the New Testament that has hitherto gone unnoticed. It is my hope that by 
identifying one such act, the door will be opened to consider other acts and 
types of act as well. Before moving ahead with the argument in section two, I 
want to conclude this section by bringing together the various attributes that 
Melanchthon assigns to a counsel, to define a coherent concept from his 
otherwise unsystematic treatment of the idea. This will allow for a more direct 
comparison between his view of a counsel and the concept of supererogation 
with the intent of showing that in essence, Melanchthon—a Protestant—
endorsed something very similar to supererogation. 
 Melanchthon’s view of a counsel is that its performance is neither 
obligatory nor forbidden and for this reason, a moral agent is free to decide 
whether to perform it. Therefore, only two categories remain: a merely 
permissible act and a supererogatory act. In moral philosophy, the only 
property that separates a permissible act from a supererogatory act is moral 
worth. The question that now presents itself is: “Is a counsel in Melanchthon’s 
 
90 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “A Theology of the Evangelical Counsels,” CrossCurrents 16, 
no. 2 (1966): 225. 
91 Craig Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy: An Exegesis of 
Matthew 19:3–12,” Trinity Journal 11 (1990): 194.  
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view indifferent or does it possess worth from a moral point of view?” 
Melanchthon clearly holds the view that a counsel―in his case, celibacy in 
particular―is an act that possesses moral worth. As mentioned earlier, he 
writes: “I do not deny that celibacy has been recommended.”92 The 
“recommended” is clearly a reference to Jesus’ words: “Whoever can receive 
it, let him receive it.” This recommendation-oriented language can also be 
found in Paul’s writings concerning celibacy. In 1 Corinthians 7, Paul writes:  
I want you to be free from anxieties. The unmarried man is anxious 
about the affairs of the Lord, how to please the Lord; but the married 
man is anxious about the affairs of the world, how to please his wife, 
and his interests are divided. And the unmarried woman and the virgin 
are anxious about the affairs of the Lord, so that they may be holy in 
body and spirit; but the married woman is anxious about the affairs of 
the world, how to please her husband. I say this for your own benefit, 
not to put any restraint upon you, but to promote good order and 
unhindered devotion to the Lord.93  
  
Paul continues: “So then, he who marries his fiancée (parthenos) does well; 
and he who refrains from marriage will do better.”94 While Paul writes that 
marriage is not a sin,95 he draws a key distinction between that which is good 
and that which is better to suggest that from a practical standpoint, celibacy is 
the superior option because it allows a person to serve the Lord without 
distraction. With some of these passages presumably in mind, Melanchthon 
writes: “When Paul is discussing virginity in 1 Corinthians 7, he does not dare 
to prescribe anything because he does not want to throw a noose around 
anyone. Instead, he wants people to choose the kind of life in which they can 
constantly serve God without any distraction . . .”96 Combining Melanchthon’s 
scattered comments into a more systematic account, the counsel of celibacy 
is an act which is highly recommended by the Lord as a practical means to 
 
92 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 74. 
93 1 Cor. 7:32–35. 
94 1 Cor. 7:38. 
95 1 Cor. 7:28, 36. 
96 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1521, 88; One minor point is that Melanchthon seems to 
suggest that both celibate and married individuals are capable of “serving God without any 
distraction.” On the other hand, Paul seems to suggest that only those who refrain from 
marriage and choose celibacy can live a life that is characterized by “unhindered devotion to 
the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:35).  
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“serve God without any distraction.” For this reason, it clearly possesses great 
moral worth in Melanchthon’s thought because it frees a person to serve God 
wholeheartedly.97 
 There is strong support for the claim that Melanchthon’s affirmation of 
one counsel can be interpreted in contemporary language as an affirmation of 
the possibility of supererogation within Protestant ethics. The reason for this is 
straightforward. As just demonstrated, Melanchthon affirms the possibility of 
an act that is neither obligatory nor forbidden and that possesses moral worth. 
Putting aside the issue of intentions and motives for now, Melanchthon’s 
counsel satisfies the standard three criteria for supererogation as set forth by 
J.O. Urmson and other moral philosophers. Not only is it relevant to 
understanding what Melanchthon really meant when he appeared to agree 
with Aquinas in affirming celibacy as a counsel, it is also valuable because it 
provides an instance in the history of Protestantism of an individual doing 
exactly what Gregory Mellema suggested is possible―namely, affirming that 
an act of supererogation is possible while rejecting the idea that the act is 
capable of “justifying a person in God's eyes.”98 As I have reiterated, this 
double-move is theologically necessary for defending the notion that acts of 
supererogation are possible in Protestant Christian ethics. 
 
Remaining and Reconciling with an Adulterous Spouse 
 
The main reason Melanchthon’s claim that celibacy is a counsel is 
important to this thesis is that his concept of a counsel closely resembles the 
concept of supererogation in moral philosophy. As a Protestant thinker, he 
embraced supererogation. This makes my pro-supererogation argument in 
this section seem more feasible since I also am engaging supererogation from 
a Protestant perspective. Granted, his view can be challenged by a vocation-
 
97 Craig Blomberg makes a similar point. He writes: “We need more John Stotts or Amy 
Carmichaels who consciously commit themselves to a life of singleness for the sake of 
devoting more energy and resources to kingdom priorities. See Blomberg, “Marriage, 
Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy,” 195.  
98 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 52. 
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based view of marriage and celibacy, but this does not change the fact that he 
saw a place for something like supererogation within a Protestant framework. 
I will argue that there is at least one clear act of supererogation that has 
hitherto gone unnoticed by those who oppose the possibility of supererogation 
in Protestant Christian ethics. The act is as follows: choosing to remain married 
to an adulterous spouse in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce. For the 
sake of the argument, it is assumed that the adulterous spouse is repentant of 
their sin.99 It is also worth mentioning that for the purpose of this chapter, I will 
initially discuss a sanitized version of adultery where one spouse is labeled 
“innocent” and the unfaithful spouse is labeled “guilty.” However, I readily admit 
that in real life, things are much messier; seldom is there an “innocent” spouse. 
There are multiple reasons―some “better” than others―that someone 
chooses to cross the line and cheat on their spouse. The “innocent” spouse 
might have been physically absent, uninterested in sex, a workaholic, verbally 
abusive, selfish, unconcerned with their spouse’s physical and emotional 
needs, uninterested in emotional intimacy, or too obsessed with hobbies. 
Stanley Grenz writes that it is most likely that “both partners share in the 
responsibility for the destruction of the marriage” no matter which committed 
the concrete act.100 The point is that although only one spouse commits the 
act of adultery, the “fault is usually not just one-sided.”101 This does not remove 
the guilt of the unfaithful partner, but it would be superficial and a gross 
oversight to believe that in cases of adultery, there is one spouse who is wholly 
innocent. However, I maintain the distinction between “innocent” and “guilty” 
throughout the chapter for conceptual clarity.  
 
99 The reason for this assumption is simple. If the guilty spouse is not repentant, then 
there is no reason to think that they will return to the innocent spouse and seek 
reconciliation, and if they do not return, the innocent spouse is not presented with an 
opportunity to supererogate in the first place.  
100 Stanley Grenz, Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1990), 126. 
101 David Instone-Brewer, Divorce & Remarriage in the Church: Biblical Solutions for 
Pastoral Realities (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 89. 
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There are four instances in the Synoptic Gospels where Jesus’ teaching 
on divorce is recorded.102 Two of these occur in Matthew, one in Mark, and the 
other in Luke. In Matthew 5:31-32, Jesus is recorded as having said the 
following: “It was also said, ‘Whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a 
certificate of divorce.’ But I say to you that anyone who divorces his wife, 
except on the ground of unchastity, causes her to commit adultery; and 
whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.” Several chapters later, 
Matthew writes: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for 
unchastity, and marries another commits adultery.”103 In the Matthean account, 
the phrases “except on the ground of unchastity” and “except for unchastity” 
constitute what is commonly referred to as the “exception clause.” Essentially, 
Matthew presents a version of Jesus’ teaching that allows a person to divorce 
a spouse who has committed adultery and thereby proven unfaithful to the 
marriage covenant. In contrast, the Markan and Lukan accounts do not include 
the exception clause. Mark writes: “Whoever divorces his wife and marries 
another commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and 
marries another, she commits adultery.”104 In a similar vein, Luke writes: 
“Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and 
whoever marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.”105 
Needless to say, this prompted a centuries-old debate among Biblical scholars 
and theologians over whether the exception clause should be attributed to 
Jesus or whether it is a “Matthean redaction [and therefore] not authentic 
historical Jesus tradition.”106 The significance of this is obvious: If the clause 
can be attributed to Jesus, then the absence of the clause in both Mark and 
Luke will be explained differently (and with drastically different implications) 
 
102 Richard Hayes makes a similar observation when he writes that there are “five 
significant passages in the New Testament that deal directly with divorce.” 1 Cor. 7:10-16 is 
the only passage of the five that does not appear in one of the three Synoptic Gospels. See 
Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (London: T&T Clark, 1996), 349. 
103 Matt. 19:9. 
104 Mark 10:11–12. 
105 Luke 16:18. 
106 David L. Turner, Matthew: Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 172. 
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than if the clause was added by Matthew but never taught by Jesus. A more 
detailed discussion of this issue will follow.  
As the above issue suggests, there are a number of exegetical and 
hermeneutical issues related to the words of Jesus in the Synoptics concerning 
divorce. David Janzen writes: “It is likely that not a truer word has been written 
in the field of biblical studies than Ben Witherington’s observation that nearly 
everything about the two Matthean divorce exception clauses is disputed.”107 
Considering this, I will now enumerate three theological commitments that I 
am making in order to present my argument. 
 
Three Theological Commitments  
 
The first theological commitment involves the interpretation of the word 
πορνεία (porneía) which occurs in both Matthean exception clauses. In English 
translations of the Bible, the word is translated differently from one translation 
to the next. Here are a few examples: fornication,108 unchastity,109 
immorality,110 sexual immorality.111 As with every other aspect of these 
passages concerning divorce, there is disagreement on whether porneía 
means adultery, some other sexually immoral act, or both. For example, Abel 
Isaksson believes there is strong Scriptural support for not interpreting porneía 
to mean adultery. Referring to Matthew 15:19, Mark 7:22, 1 Corinthians 6:9, 
and Hebrews 13:4, he argues that porneía and moicheía (μοιχεία) are used to 
describe two different sins.112 Moicheía is the specific word for adultery in 
Koine Greek, having a much narrower meaning than porneía. Because this 
distinction is maintained on several occasions in the New Testament, Isaksson 
 
107 David Janzen, “The Meaning of Porneia in Matthew 5.32 and 19.9: An Approach From 
the Study of Ancient Near Eastern Culture,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 80 
(2000): 66. 
108 New King James Version. 
109 NRSV. 
110 NASB. 
111 New International Version, Holman Standard Christian Bible, English Standard 
Version (ESV). 
112 Abel Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple, trans. Neil Tomkinson and 
Jean Gray (Copenhagen: C.W.K. Gleerup Lund, 1965), 134. 
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believes that it is a mistake to conclude that in the Matthean exception clauses 
porneía means adultery. In addition, both Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 use both 
Greek terms, which would appear to support Isaksson’s thesis. In Matthew 
5:32, porneía is used once and moicheía twice, and in Matthew 19:9, porneía 
is used once and moicheía once. If there is no distinction between the terms, 
then why was porneía used at all when moicheía would have been the more 
parsimonious choice? For this reason among others, Isaksson argues that 
porneía in Matthew 5 and 19 must mean something other than the specific act 
of adultery. He concludes by arguing that porneía should be interpreted to 
mean a “sexual offense committed by the wife before her marriage.”113 This 
suggests that if a young woman had had sexual intercourse with another man 
prior to marriage but hid this knowledge from her husband and proceeded with 
the marriage, then the husband could divorce his wife once this knowledge 
came to light.  
Having presented an abbreviated view of Isaksson’s interpretation of 
porneía in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9, it is important to stress that his view 
represents a departure from the norm. Although there are a variety of opinions 
regarding the exact meaning of this word, many Biblical scholars agree that 
while moicheía is the specific word for adultery in Koine Greek, porneía 
includes this act along with a broader range of sexually immoral acts as well.114 
The main issue is not whether an adulterous act is an instance of porneía, but 
rather, what other acts fall within the term’s scope. As an example of this last 
point, R.T. France, who interprets porneía to mean “sexual unfaithfulness,” 
writes: “Here as applied to a married woman it most likely applies to adultery 
or to the discovery of premarital intercourse with someone other than the 
husband, or more likely to either or both.”115 Leon Morris adds: “the word is 
 
113 Ibid., 135. 
114 Robert H. Smith, Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament: Matthew 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1989), 100; John Murray, Divorce 
(Philadelphia, PA: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1972), 20-21; 
Janzen, “The Meaning of Porneia,” 68; Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and 
Celibacy,” 178. 
115 R.T. France, The Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2007), 208-209. 
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used for all sorts of sexual sins. It is much more likely that in this passage 
[Matthew 5:31-32] it signifies adultery than something that happened before 
the marriage.”116 Further support for this theological commitment is provided 
by David Janzen. He suggests that the main reason that Matthew uses porneía 
rather than moicheía is because unlike moicheía, porneía can also include the 
act of having sex with someone other than the person you are betrothed to.117 
In addition, Blomberg offers a more straightforward objection to Isaksson’s 
thesis, writing: “What is more, the Pharisees asked Jesus to respond to a 
debate concerning adultery and not premarital sex.”118 In summary, my first 
theological commitment―that porneía refers to an adulterous act committed 
by a married spouse―is consistent with the views of several Biblical scholars.  
My second theological commitment is that the marriage bond is not 
automatically severed when adultery occurs. The issue is best expressed by 
the following series of questions posed by Lewis Smedes: 
The first question our Lord’s words pose is this: does the act of adultery 
itself break a marriage, or does it only provide moral grounds for the 
innocent partner to break it? Does the innocent partner seeking a 
divorce ask only for legal recognition of the fact that his/her marriage 
has been destroyed? Or is adultery a wound in the tissue of a deeply 
personal sexual partnership so serious that it gives a partner the moral 
right to dissolve the marriage through divorce?119 
 
Blomberg observes that marriage is two-fold: “a commitment of one’s 
fundamental allegiance and an interpersonal relationship culminating in sexual 
intimacy.” According to Blomberg, the former is exegetically grounded in the 
creation ordinance to “leave father and mother” and “cleave to one’s 
spouse,”120 whereas the latter element in marriage is grounded in the 
injunction “be one flesh” which “focuses on the sexual union of marriage . . .”121 
This two-fold view of marriage is important for Blomberg because he reasons 
 
116 Leon Morris, The Gospel According to Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 121-122. 
117 Janzen, “The Meaning of Porneia,” 72. 
118 Blomberg, Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy, 176. 
119 Smedes, Sex for Christians, 193. 
120 Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy,” 166. Blomberg uses the 
King James Version in this context. 
121 Ibid., 167. 
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that because two elements are involved in the making of a marriage, vows 
apart from sexual relations and sexual relations apart from vows are not 
enough to make a marriage. Both are required.122 He continues: “both a 
commitment and a sexual consummation create a marriage. Infidelity does not 
by itself dissolve a marriage; it does so only if it is accompanied by a refusal 
to continue to honor the commitment to ‘leave and cleave.’”123 In other words, 
if two elements are necessary to make a marriage, both elements must be 
renounced to end it. For these reasons, the act of adultery does not dissolve 
the marriage covenant by necessity according to Blomberg’s interpretation. In 
his view, the choice remains for the innocent spouse to forego divorce in an 
effort to reconcile with the adulterous spouse. This would require that the guilty 
spouse is both repentant and desires reconciliation.  
On the other hand, if the act of adultery necessarily results in the 
spiritual dissolution of the marriage bond, the innocent spouse would have no 
choice but to seek a divorce in order to acknowledge in both legal and social 
terms what had already occurred spiritually. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson 
explain this position well: “Divorce is not God’s design for marriage. Even when 
it is permitted, in the case of infidelity, this is only because the sexual 
exclusivity of the covenant has already been breached. A formal divorce 
declares de jure nothing more than what de facto is already the case.”124 In 
addition, several scholars have noted that Jewish law required divorce in cases 
of adultery.125 This requirement is on full display when the Pharisees asked 
Jesus: “Why then did Moses command us to give a certificate of dismissal and 
to divorce her?126 The use of “command” is strong language and conveys the 
message that in certain circumstances―adultery definitely being one 
 
122 Lewis Smedes also appears to hold a two-fold view of what is required to make a 
marriage. See Smedes, Sex for Christians, 180. 
123 Blomburg, “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy,” 168. 
124 G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson, ed. Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old 
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 24; France, The Gospel of Matthew, 
210-211; David Hill, The Gospel of Matthew, ed. Matthew Black (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), 125; Talbot Chambers, “Divorce in the New 
Testament,” Reformed Quarterly Review 1 (Jan 1895): 40. 
125 Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, 467; Beale and Carson, ed. 
Commentary, 24; Smith, Augsburg Commentary, 99–100. 
126 Matt. 19:7. 
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example―one is required to divorce one’s spouse. However, Jesus responds 
by saying that Moses only “allowed” divorce and this was only as a concession 
to rebellious hearts that refused to abide by God’s original intent that marriage 
be lifelong. The only exception is if adultery has been committed, but even 
then, the innocent spouse is not obligated to divorce the guilty spouse. 
Therefore, one can choose to remain and reconcile if they choose. As Beale 
and Carson write: “Even though he [Jesus] will allow an exception (19:9) that 
seemingly parallels the perspective of Shammai,127 he will never require 
divorce, even in the case of marital unfaithfulness.”128 Providing further support 
for this point, David Turner writes: “Moses did not command divorce, and 
certainly neither did Jesus. Even in the case of marital infidelity, divorce should 
not be the first option.”129 Beale and Carson as well as Turner would not be 
able to make the above points if they believed that adultery automatically 
dissolves the marriage bond. Therefore, the option to forego divorce remains. 
More will be said concerning the significance of Jesus’ choice of words and 
the subsequent implications, but for now, let it suffice to say that there is biblical 
support for this second theological commitment.  
My third theological commitment is that the supposed contradiction 
between the Matthean account of Jesus’ teaching on divorce, which includes 
the exception clause, and the Markan and Lukan accounts, which do not, is 
only apparent. Although it does not fall within the scope of this chapter or my 
thesis at large to address this topic at length, it is important to demonstrate that 
there is Biblical precedent for this third theological commitment. In what is 
known as the Markan Priority, many scholars accept the hypothesis that the 
Gospel of Mark was written first and both Matthew and Luke used it as a source 
when writing their own. Concerning the four passages of Scripture in the 
 
127 Shammai was a first century, conservative Jewish Rabbi who took a conservative 
approach to interpreting what Moses said about divorce in Deut. 24:1. This is sufficient detail 
for now, but a more detailed explanation is forthcoming later in the chapter. 
128 Beale and Carson, ed. Commentary on the New Testament, 59; Much of the debate 
during this time revolved around a rabbinic dispute between Shammai and his followers and 
Hillel and his followers. Shammai interpreted a certain phrase in Deut. 24:1 as meaning that 
someone could only divorce in the case of adultery whereas Hillel interpreted the same 
phrase quite liberally to mean “for any cause.” 
129 Turner, Matthew: Baker Exegetical Commentary, 463. 
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Synoptics that deal with the topic of divorce, the hermeneutical consequence 
of prioritizing Mark’s account is that, as stated earlier, the exception clause in 
Matthew is treated by some as a literary modification rather than as the words 
of Christ.130 Consequently, someone might object that the exception clause 
would then lose its normative authority because its origin would be human (i.e., 
Matthew) rather than divine (i.e., actually spoken by God in the person of 
Jesus). Ultimately, this would result in the dismissal of the clause which would 
leave us with the Markan and Lukan accounts that do not allow for divorce in 
any situation including cases of adultery. 
There are socio-cultural reasons for rejecting the view that the 
exception clause originated with Matthew rather than with Jesus himself. The 
basic line of argument is that Mark and Luke did not include the exception 
clause because this would have been unnecessary. David Hill, Leon Morris, 
and Craig Keener all note that because Jewish law required a man to divorce 
a wife who had committed adultery, it is safe to assume that whereas Matthew 
chooses to explicitly include the exception clause, Mark and Luke might have 
assumed the exception and believed that the Jews of the day would have 
mentally added the phrase without prompting.131 Basically, Mark’s and Luke’s 
reasoning could have been that because spiritual and legal permission to 
divorce an adulterous spouse was common knowledge, they need not state 
the obvious. On the other hand, because Matthew was concerned with framing 
the debate in a more rabbinic, pedagogical context, he left no stone unturned 
and chose to include it.132 After all, Matthew does the same thing with the 
phrase “for any cause.”133 This might not seem all that significant except for 
the fact that the Jews of Matthew’s day would have immediately recognized 
 
130 See Robert H. Gundry, Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Act 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982), 90. Robert Stein also 
takes this view. He writes that Matthew’s exception clause could be Matthew’s attempt to 
help his readers adapt to Mark’s teaching to their situation since Mark’s original teaching is 
so challenging. See Robert Stein, Mark: Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 457. 
131 Hill, The Gospel of Matthew, 281; Morris, The Gospel According to Matthew, 121; 
Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, 467. 
132 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 173. 
133 Ibid., 134. 
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that the “for any cause” phrase was at the heart of the rabbinic debate between 
the school of Shammai and the school of Hillel regarding how to interpret 
Deuteronomy 24:1–4,134 which is the most direct teaching about divorce in the 
Old Testament. More will be said later in the chapter about these two schools 
of thought, but let it suffice to say for now that the school of Shammai took a 
very conservative approach to when divorce was permissible (i.e., when 
adultery had been committed) whereas the school of Hillel took a very liberal 
approach (i.e., for any reason). By including “for any cause,” Matthew situates 
this discourse between Jesus and the religious leaders in the common debate 
of the day. This view allows for the possibility that the divorce clause is to be 
attributed to Jesus while also providing a sound explanation as to why two of 
the three Synoptic writers omitted it. In support of this view, David Instone-
Brewer writes: 
Although I will agree that Matthew has probably added these phrases 
to the tradition that he received, I will also argue that he has correctly 
reinserted something that was present in the original debate. These 
phrases (or their equivalent) were removed when the debate was 
summarized for oral or written transmission. They were so obvious and 
well known to the original audience that they were considered 
superfluous. They would have been mentally inserted whether they 
were included or not. . . . I suggest that its inclusion is so obvious in this 
context that any intelligent Jew would have mentally supplied it if it were 
missing.135 
 
What is thought-provoking about Instone-Brewer’s position is that he 
represents a middle-ground between the following two extremes: (1) Jesus 
spoke what is known as the exception clause, and (2) Jesus did not speak 
what is known as the exception clause and therefore the words do not possess 
the same authority as the rest of the text. Instone-Brewer’s position is a 
compromise between the two, allowing one to say, “Jesus did not speak the 
exception clause” while still maintaining the view that “the exception clause is 
nonetheless, authoritative,” because everyone would have known that it was 
implied based on the rabbinic language being used to frame the discussion. 
 
134 Gundry, Matthew, 377. 
135 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 134. 
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John Davis offers another perspective on why Mark and Luke did not 
include the exception clause. He writes: “It is likely that Jesus, like most 
preachers and teachers, repeated the same material in slightly different forms 
on various occasions. The differences would reflect not a fundamental change 
in content, but an adaptation of the message to different contexts and 
audiences.”136 Instone-Brewer also mentions this as a possibility, writing: 
“Mark’s version is more suitable for use in a sermon,” while “Matthew’s version 
reflects a real rabbinic debate.”137 Donald Juel’s writes that the point of the 
marriage and divorce discussion in Mark is to clarify the intent of the law, and 
that “acknowledging that God does not will divorce does not settle specific 
cases.”138 The broader point is that context matters, and like any good 
speaker, Jesus was aware of both his audience and purpose in each specific 
context and tailored his message accordingly. Thus, the absence of the 
exception clause in the Markan and Lukan accounts should not be interpreted 
as providing apodictic proof that the exceptional clause in Matthew is invalid. 
One last objection to the view that the Markan and Lukan accounts are 
at odds with Matthew’s account is based on the belief in the inerrancy of the 
Bible. Typical of anyone writing from an Evangelical Protestant perspective, 
John and Paul Feinberg state: “our basic problem with the idea that Jesus 
never uttered the exception is that it undermines the inerrancy of Scripture.”139 
The reason for this is quite simple: if Jesus did not utter the exception clause, 
then there is a mistake in the Bible because Matthew presents the exception 
clause as being spoken by Jesus. According to John and Paul Feinberg, this 
would represent a lie on the part of Matthew and would be a mistaken 
attribution. Thus, the Bible would have an error, which would ultimately reflect 
negatively on God’s providential oversight of its writing. Presupposing the 
doctrine of inerrancy, the authors reject the possibility that Jesus’ words about 
 
136 John J. Davis, Evangelical Ethics: Issues Facing the Church Today, 2nd. ed. 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1993), 86. 
137 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 173. 
138 Donald H. Juel, Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament: Mark (Minneapolis, 
MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1990), 140; cf. Ben Witherington III, The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-
Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001), 275. 
139 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 613. 
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divorce in Matthew are not really his words. Whichever position one takes 
concerning this last argument, the more general point is that the omission of 
the exception clause in the Gospels of Mark and Luke is not conclusive 
evidence that Jesus did not utter the exceptional clause. As stated earlier, my 
goal is not to defend a theological position but merely to demonstrate that there 
are adequate Biblical grounds for making this third theological commitment.  
Having articulated the three theological commitments which underpin 
my argument for an instance of supererogation in the New Testament, I will 




 I propose that the act of choosing to remain married to an adulterous 
spouse in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce is supererogatory. For the 
sake of the argument, it is assumed that the adulterous spouse is repentant. 
My argument rests upon the following criteria: (1) Jesus does not command 
the innocent spouse to perform the act in question; (2) Jesus does not forbid 
the innocent spouse from performing the act in question; and (3) the act 
possesses moral worth and consequently cannot be classified as merely 
permissible. As stated earlier, the fourth, motive-related criterion will not be 
discussed in relation to this particular act until the latter half of chapter four, 
following a more systematic theoretical treatment of supererogation from a 
Protestant perspective. Because each of the three criteria named above must 
be satisfied in order for the act in question to be classified as supererogatory, 
I will take each in turn.  
 
Remaining and Reconciling is Not Obligatory for the Innocent Spouse  
In this section, I argue that the implied act of choosing to remain married 
to an adulterous spouse in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce is not 
obligatory. In doing so, I argue against David Instone-Brewer’s position that 
the exception clause only applies when the guilty spouse is unrepentant. If he 
is right, then the opportunity to supererogate disappears because: (a) if the 
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adulterous spouse is unrepentant, the option to remain and reconcile does not 
present, and (b) if the adulterous spouse is repentant, the innocent spouse 
would be morally obligated to remain and reconcile. Assuming that the 
adulterous spouse is repentant for the sake of argument, I will argue that the 
command to forgive does not obligate a person to take the additional step to 
remain and reconcile. One can do the former without the latter and not be 
morally blameworthy. 
Matthew 19:9 reads: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, 
except for unchastity, and marries another commits adultery.” Modifying the 
syntax could prove helpful. Staying true to the meaning, the statement could 
read as follows: “whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits 
adultery (except in the case of unchastity).” A straightforward reading of the 
text suggests that Jesus allows an innocent spouse to divorce an adulterous 
spouse in the case of adultery. Stated differently, no moral obligation exists 
requiring the innocent spouse to remain married in an effort to reconcile with 
the adulterous spouse. They can leave if they desire. This appears to clearly 
satisfy the first criterion of supererogation, namely, that the act in question is 
not obligatory since Jesus by no means requires it. Prima facie, the logic is 
simple and the conclusion firm. However, David Instone-Brewer objects, 
writing:  
Jesus appeared to imply that the divorce law should only be used if the 
guilty partner was stubbornly refusing to repent and give up the 
adulterous behavior, as in the case of Israel in Jeremiah. This agrees 
with Jesus’ teaching on forgiveness in Luke: Luke 17:3-4: Take heed to 
yourselves; if your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, forgive 
him; and if he sins against you seven times in the day, and turns to you 
seven times, and says, “I repent,” you must forgive him.140  
 
What is unusual about Instone-Brewer’s view is that he places an additional 
qualification on the exception clause―that it should only be used if the 
adulterous spouse is unrepentant.141 In her review of Instone-Brewer’s book 
 
140 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 146; Instone-Brewer, Divorce & 
Remarriage in the Church, 68. 
141 If the adulterous spouse is not repentant, then the additional qualification is irrelevant 
because the opportunity to reconcile does not present.  
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Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, Jule Ward acknowledges this 
qualification when she writes: “[Instone-Brewer] argues that the Church needs 
to reemphasize that believers are called never to break their marriage vows, 
but that the breaking of vows by a partner who refuses to repent can be valid 
grounds for divorce.”142 The implication is that if an adulterous partner has 
repented and wants to remain married, then the decision to divorce the guilty 
spouse no longer finds biblical support and is therefore morally wrong. For 
Instone-Brewer, the reference to stubborness (i.e., hard-heartedness) is key 
to understanding the true meaning of the exception clause. He suggests that 
Jesus was referring to a passage in Jeremiah 4 where God was both rebuking 
and warning the Southern Kingdom of Judah for being hard-hearted—defined 
by W.D. Davies and Dale Allison as “moral and spiritual petrification”143—and 
unrepentant like the Northern Kingdom of Israel had been prior to their collapse 
at the hands of Assyria in 722 B.C.E. Importantly, this rebuke and warning 
follows Jeremiah 3, where God refers to the Northern Kingdom of Israel as 
“that faithless one” and a “whore.”144 In response to this spiritual adultery, God 
“sent [the Northern Kingdom of Israel] away with a decree of divorce” and 
warned the Southern Kingdom of Judah through the prophet Jeremiah that a 
similar outcome was imminent unless they repented of their waywardness.145 
The relevance of this passage for Instone-Brewer is that God offers another 
opportunity for the Southern Kingdom to return to him, its husband, even after 
it has committed spiritual adultery.146 However, the one requirement is that 
they choose to not be hard-hearted and to repent. Instone-Brewer believes 
that it is likely that Jesus’ allusion to hardness of heart in Matthew 19:8 and 
Mark 10:5 refers to this set of events in Jeremiah 3 and 4 because there is no 
other place in the Old Testament that includes clear references to both hard-
 
142 Jule DeJaeger Ward, “Review of Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and 
Literary Context, by David Instone-Brewer,” Theological Studies 65 (2004): 179. 
143 W.D. Davies and Dale C. Allison Jr., Commentary on Matthew XIX–XXVIII, vol. 3, A 
Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, ed. J.A. 
Emerton, C.E.B. Cranfield, and G.N. Stanton (London: T&T Clark, 2000), 14.  
144 Jer. 3:6.  
145 Jer. 3:8. 
146 Jer. 3:13–14; 4:1. 
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heartedness and divorce in the same passage. Therefore, Instone-Brewer 
argues that God’s declaration that he is willing to remain and reconcile with his 
adulterous spouse (i.e. the Southern Kingdom of Judah) so long as it ceases 
to be hard-hearted and repent is a key text for making sense of what Jesus 
meant by the exception clause. Like God (in reference to his attitude and act 
toward the Southern Kingdom of Judah in Jeremiah’s day), an innocent spouse 
is only justified in divorcing an adulterous spouse if the latter refuses to repent 
due to hard-heartedness. In more discipleship-oriented terms, God’s example 
carries normative force for Christians, and considering how God responded to 
Judah’s adultery, the exception clause obligates Christians to respond in the 
same way if the condition of repentance is satisfied. If the condition is not 
satisfied, then the innocent spouse can invoke the clause and end the 
marriage, but if the adulterous spouse repents, the innocent spouse is 
obligated to remain and reconcile.  
For Instone-Brewer, forgiving an adulterous spouse who is repentant 
requires the additional step of remaining and reconciling. This view suggests 
that if someone is not willing to remain and reconcile with an adulterous spouse 
who is repentant, then this is proof that the innocent spouse has not truly 
forgiven from the heart. If Instone-Brewer is correct that forgiving necessitates 
reconciling, then this would defeat my argument. After all, if the command to 
remain and reconcile with an adulterous spouse who is repentant is implicit in 
the command to forgive another person, then the act must be classified as a 
duty and consequently, cannot be regarded as supererogatory. However, I 
believe that Instone-Brewer makes a crucial mistake in arguing that the act of 
forgiving obligates a person to remain and reconcile, resulting in a loss of moral 
freedom as well as oppression for the innocent spouse.  
There are three reasons to reject Instone-Brewer’s claim that the 
exception clause only applies if the adulterous spouse is unrepentant. First, 
there is reason to think that Jesus’ reference to hard-heartedness does not 
refer only to the hard-heartedness that would prevent the adulterous spouse 
from reconciling with the innocent spouse. Wayne Grudem offers a different 
assessment which challenges Instone-Brewer’s interpretation. This calls into 
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question Instone-Brewer’s use of Jeremiah 3 and 4 to defend his view which 
is significant due to the fact this is the primary passage that he employs to 
substantiate his claim. This reveals the second weakness of his view which is 
that Instone-Brewer’s claim primarily depends on a single passage in the Old 
Testament that is not even about marriage between a man and a woman. The 
third problem is that Instone-Brewer’s position is oppressive for the innocent 
spouse, robbing them of a guilt-free option to decide for themselves whether 
to remain and reconcile with the adulterous spouse or to divorce.  
Contrary to Instone-Brewer, Grudem offers a different view of what 
Jesus meant by “hard-heartedness.” He writes:  
Jesus ’s statement “Because of your hardness of heart . . .” should not 
be understood to mean that only “hard-hearted” people initiate divorces, 
but rather, “because your hard-hearted rebellion against God led to 
serious defilement of marriages.” The presence of sin in the community 
meant that some marriages would be deeply harmed by hard-hearted 
spouses, and therefore Moses “allowed” the other spouse to obtain a 
divorce. God was providing a partial remedy for the harm that a hard-
hearted husband or wife could do to the other person in the marriage.147  
 
The significance of this view is that the hard-heartedness is ascribed to 
adulterous spouses in general rather than to a more restricted subset (i.e., 
adulterous spouses that have not repented). In Grudem’s view, hard-
heartedness (presumably toward both God and the spouse) is the root from 
which the adulterous act springs. Therefore, all adulterous spouses can be 
said to be hard-hearted at the time when adultery was committed. This 
challenges Instone-Brewer’s use of Jeremiah 3–4 to defend his position 
because if the exception clause applies when an adulterous spouse is hard-
hearted but all adulterous acts are viewed as a fruit of hard-heartedness, then 
the exception clause would apply in all adulterous cases rather than only to 
the subset of unrepentant cases specified by Instone-Brewer. Ultimately, 
Grudem’s view makes it possible for an innocent spouse to not remain and 
reconcile even if the adulterous spouse is repentant and to also avoid the 
moral charge of hard-heartedness themselves. This is important because it is 
 
147 Wayne Grudem, Christian Ethics, 808. 
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a step toward showing that while the act of forgiving is obligatory, the 
subsequent act of remaining and reconciling is not. I do not pretend that 
Grudem’s view is a conclusive rebuttal of Instone-Brewer’s position. My only 
aim is to show that one is justified in rejecting Instone-Brewer’s view that 
forgiveness entails marital reconciliation when the adulterous spouse is 
repentant. 
So far we have looked at two reasons why Instone-Brewer’s view can 
be rejected. Others agree that the command to forgive in other places of 
Scripture does not forbid a person from using the exception clause even if their 
spouse is repentant after committing adultery. For example, David Turner 
writes:  
Even in the case of marital infidelity, divorce should not be the first 
option. The deep wounds caused by marital infidelity can be healed by 
the love of God in Christ. Couples contemplating divorce must 
contemplate the implications of [Matthew] 18:21–35 and [Matthew] 
19:8. When one is sinned against, forgiveness is the primary Christian 
duty. Forgiveness can lead to restored relationships…148  
 
Turner stresses that if the innocent spouse forgives the adulterous spouse, 
this act of obedience can lead to a restored relationship (i.e., a reconciled 
marriage). Instone-Brewer would agree thus far. However, Turner’s statement 
implies something more. The key word here is “can.” The use of this word 
leaves open the possibility that there will be occasions when a person forgives 
an adulterous spouse without wanting to remain and reconcile. Might it be ideal 
to not only forgive, but reconcile? Yes. But is it required? No. Even Saint 
Augustine appears to take this position, although his view is nuanced. He 
states that divorce is warranted in cases when a spouse has committed 
adultery. However, he also believes that if the innocent spouse has a strong 
enough faith and if both spouses are humble, then reconciliation will be 
easy.149 Part of the defense that he gives for such an audacious claim is that 
“a husband should forgive what the Lord, the Lord of them both, has forgiven 
 
148 Turner, Matthew: Baker Exegetical Commentary, 463. 
149 Augustine, Adulterous Marriages, in Marriage and Virginity, trans. Ray Kearney, ed. 
John E. Rotelle (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1999), 169, 171-172. 
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. . .”150 At this point, it seems as though Augustine’s words would lend support 
to Instone-Brewer’s additional qualification. In other words, genuine 
forgiveness requires reconciliation. Yet Augustine goes on to say of 
reconciliation: “It is true, we see, that sometimes this cannot be done; no one 
forces anyone to do it.”151 He seems to be saying that although faith makes 
reconciliation possible, no one is forced to it. This suggests that even if the 
adulterous spouse is repentant, an innocent spouse does not commit a moral 
wrong if they divorce the adulterous spouse. Granted, Augustine would be 
quick to add that a refusal to remain and reconcile when the adulterous spouse 
is repentant is a symptom of the following two deficiencies: (1) a lack of faith, 
and (2) an inability to view the adulterous partner as forgiven by God. He even 
goes as far as to write that the guilty partner ought not even be labeled an 
adulteress because “sins are forgiven through the power of the keys of the 
kingdom of heaven,”152 and that this is part of the reason why “reconciliation 
between husbands and wives, even after adultery has been committed and 
expiated, will not be degrading or difficult.”153 Yet, as pointed out, Augustine 
unequivocally states that God does not require one to remain and reconcile.154 
No matter the response of the adulterous spouse, a genuine moral option 
exists for the innocent spouse.  
 I would like to conclude my critique of Instone-Brewer’s additional 
qualification thesis by expanding on the earlier claim that his view is oppressive 
for innocent spouses because it strips them of a genuine moral option. His 
view might be easier to accept if we were considering only one instance of 
adultery in a marriage, especially if it is what Hollinger refers to as an 
“accidental” affair. An “accidental” affair is one in which there is “no advanced 
 
150 Ibid., 169. 
151 Ibid., 172. 
152 Ibid., 172. 
153 Ibid., 172. 
154 One very important aspect of Augustine’s theology is that if the innocent spouse does 
choose to divorce, he (or she) still cannot remarry. Based primarily on 1 Cor. 7:39 (“A wife is 
bound as long as her husband lives. But if the husband dies, she is free to marry anyone she 
wishes, only in the Lord.”), Augustine argues that only death releases a person from the 
marriage covenant so that they do not commit adultery when remarrying. 
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planning.”155 Though the act would still cause great pain to the innocent 
spouse, the one consolation might be that the adulterous spouse did not intend 
that day to meet another and engage in sex. The act is spontaneous and not 
premeditated, and the lack of forethought might actually increase the likelihood 
that the innocent spouse not only forgives, but chooses to remain and 
reconcile the marriage. On the other hand, a “romantic” affair—one that has 
“[culminated] in a deep relationship of love]”156—would most likely lessen the 
likelihood that the innocent spouse would want to seek marital reconciliation 
with an adulterous spouse (assuming they are repentant). The thought of the 
adulterous spouse not only having sex, but actually loving another person, 
might seem too great an obstacle to work through. It might simply be the case 
that the innocent spouse is too wounded that the other could contemplate 
sharing not only their body, but their heart and life with someone else. This 
betrayal would surely be felt more deeply than what would be experienced 
following an accidental affair. Yet even after a “romantic” affair, the innocent 
spouse has, according to Instone-Brewer, no choice but to forgive and 
reconcile the marriage so long as the adulterous spouse is repentant and 
desires reconciliation. But pretend that this “romantic” affair is with the innocent 
spouse’s sibling or best friend. Can we really expect the innocent spouse to 
not only forgive, but also to remain and reconcile the marriage? Would God 
require it? It seems that Instone-Brewer’s interpretation of what Jesus meant 
by hard-heartedness does requires it, and if the innocent spouse refuses to 
reconcile, then this is to serve as evidence that the person has not really 
forgiven the guilty partner. I suggest that this interpretation can lead to an 
innocent spouse being victimized, trapped, and ultimately taken advantage of 
if they truly do not have the option to forgive but not reconcile the marriage. 
Ultimately, Instone-Brewer’s view lacks compassion and gives preference to 
the adulterous spouse, even at the expense of the innocent spouse’s 
psychological and spiritual health. 
 
155 Hollinger, The Meaning of Sex, 168. 
156 Ibid., 168. 
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Because Instone-Brewer uses the passage about forgiveness in Luke 
17 to support his view that forgiving also means reconciling, I have taken some 
liberty to revise this verse to fit what Instone-Brewer appears to argue: “And if 
the same [spouse commits adultery] against you seven times a day, and turns 
back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive [and be 
reconciled].” The point in this revision is to show just how implausible such an 
interpretation can be if you argue that forgiving an adulterous spouse also 
requires reconciling the marriage. Though the language is a bit hyperbolic in 
Matthew’s account (i.e., 77 times or 490 times), the same overall point is made: 
“forgiveness is not to be limited.”157 While Christians are obligated to forgive,158 
nothing is explicitly stated or seemingly implied about a required subsequent 
act of reconciliation. To reason otherwise would result—admittedly with a dose 
of hyperbole—in the ridiculous conclusion that if a spouse commits adultery 
seven times in a day with seven different people but repents after each sin, 
then the innocent spouse must forgive and remain in the marriage each time.  
In response, someone could argue that if an adulterous spouse is truly 
repentant, they would not commit adultery again, and especially not in the near 
future. Thus, if the adulterous spouse is continuing to commit adultery, they 
must not be repentant, and therefore the innocent spouse can divorce them, 
based on Instone-Brewer’s view. This might be what Instone-Brewer is 
referring to when he writes: “divorce is ‘allowed’ if one partner stubbornly 
continues to break the vows, as Israel did when God divorced her.”159 This 
suggests that a person can never commit adultery for a second time with a 
 
157 Anthony Bash, Forgiveness and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 96. In a footnote, Bash acknowledges that there is a debate among biblical 
scholars as to whether Jesus said “seventy plus seven” or “seventy multiplied by seven”. 
However, Bash rightly follows this observation with the phrase: “Whichever is right makes 
little difference, for the point is that forgiveness is not to be limited.”  
158 Concerning Jesus’ teaching on forgiveness in Luke 17:3–4, Bash writes: The number 
seven indicates completion or perfection, and what Jesus means is that, no matter how 
many the wrongs are and no matter how frequently they recur, a victim must go on forgiving 
a repentant wrongdoer.” Bash goes on to write that because Peter does not “distinguish 
between repentant and unrepentant wrongdoers” in Matt. 18:21–22, we have reason to 
believe that Jesus is also teaching that we should “strive to forgive” unrepentant wrongdoers 
as well. See Bash, Forgiveness and Christian Ethics, 96.  
159 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 146. 
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different person—whether it be one year, five years, or 25 years after the first 
occurrence—unless the guilty spouse is “stubborn” (i.e., not really repentant).  
If this were the case, then it would suggest that a spouse who is genuinely 
repentant will never commit the same sin twice. Therefore, an innocent spouse 
would never be faced with a having to forgive a spouse who is guilty of adultery 
more than once. However, this is too naive a view of human nature, 
considering the all-too-human reality of moral and spiritual weakness that even 
Christians can experience. It is possible to sin in the same way on multiple 
occasions even though a person is both sorrowful and repentant each time. 
Who has not experienced this in one way or another? Committing adultery for 
a second or third time does not mean that the person was not genuinely 
repentant after the first occurrence; rather, it is a testimony to our weakness 
as human beings no matter what our good intentions may be.  
It is helpful to consider two distinct definitions for “forgive” and 
“reconcile.” According to Oxford Dictionaries, the word “forgive” means: “Stop 
feeling angry or resentful towards (someone) for an offense, flaw, or 
mistake”160 This same source also states that forgiveness entails that a person 
no longer wishes punishment on the offender.161 The word “reconcile” means: 
“Restore friendly relations between.”162 As defined, the act of forgiving 
someone is a psychological act with social implications163 while the act of 
reconciling is a social act with psychological implications. These definitions 
allow for a clear distinction between the two acts. If the innocent spouse 
desires to reconcile the marriage, forgiveness is necessary. This will require 
what Everett Worthington labels “emotional forgiveness” as opposed to mere 
“decisional forgiveness.” Decisional forgiveness is “arrived at rationally or by 
will,” and while it is “aimed at controlling future behavior,” it is not aimed at 
 
160 “Forgive.” Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/forgive.  
161 Ibid. 
162 “Reconcile.” Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reconcile.  
163 This is not always the case. Someone may choose to forgive another person though 
the other person does not want to continue the relationship. In this case, forgiveness only 
helps the person forgiving to let go of bitterness and resentment, but it accomplishes nothing 
socially. 
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controlling motives or emotions.164 Most likely, decisional forgiveness would 
not be enough for marital reconciliation to occur, though it could begin the 
process if both parties are willing. On the other hand, emotional forgiveness 
according to Worthington is the “replacing of negative, unforgiving stress 
emotions”165 such as “resentment, bitterness, hostility, hatred, anger, and 
fear”166 with “positive, other-oriented emotions.”167 If the innocent spouse 
chooses to reconcile the marriage, then it is emotional forgiveness that must 
eventually occur. Concerning relationships in general, Worthington writes: 
emotional forgiveness “may improve interactions and promote 
reconciliation.”168  
Whereas reconciling the marriage with a spouse who has committed 
adultery will eventually require forgiveness, I am arguing that the reverse—
that forgiveness requires marital reconciliation—is not what Jesus taught. A 
person can forgive without reconciling, for they may be able to “stop feeling 
angry and resentful” but still not want to reconcile the marriage for any number 
of reasons. Consider the following scenario:  
Brandon and Sarah are married and have been for five years. In the last 
three months, Brandon has committed adultery with another woman 
with whom he works. Although Sarah still loves Brandon and deeply 
desires that he be happy, Sarah cannot be in the same physical space 
as Brandon without reliving the emotional pain of betrayal each time. In 
some sense, this is evidence of how deeply she loves Brandon and for 
that reason, how deeply his infidelity wounded her. After receiving 
consistent counseling from both a pastor and a psychologist for several 
months, getting involved in a local support group, and getting her mind 
off of the pain by serving others, she no longer feels angry or resentful 
towards Brandon. She truly wishes him well and wants him to be happy 
although she still has no desire to reconcile the marriage. She feels that 
she would be better off either remaining single or eventually starting 
afresh with someone else in the distant future.  
 
 
164 Everett Worthington Jr., Forgiveness and Reconciliation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 
59. 
165 Ibid., 17. 
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The above scenario does not strike me as unlikely. After several months and 
a strong community of support, Sarah ceased to experience feelings of anger 
and resentment. She wishes him well and wants him to be happy.169 According 
to the definitions cited earlier, Sarah has forgiven Brandon though she does 
not believe that she has the emotional capacity to remain and reconcile the 
marriage. Therefore, she proceeds with the divorce.  
It may be the case that she does not think that she could ever trust 
Brandon again. After all, forgiving someone and trusting someone are two 
distinct acts. Forgiveness may make trust possible at some point in the future, 
but there is no guarantee. Concerning the importance of trust, Hollinger writes: 
“Adultery constitutes such a serious breach of trust that Jesus indicated that it 
was a ground for divorce.”170 He continues: “[Divorce] is not necessary and is 
not ideal, but is allowable. The ideal is always forgiveness and reconciliation 
which often takes time, patience, and God’s grace because the nature of 
adultery is so pernicious.”171 Grenz also emphasizes that broken trust may be 
the main reason that two partners make the ultimate decision to end the 
marriage following adultery. He writes: “Unfaithfulness constitutes the ultimate 
breach of marital trust. . . . It does not make divorce inevitable. But it increases 
the risk.”172 Although Hollinger does not shy away from presenting God’s ideal, 
he also makes the realistic point that there will be cases when an innocent 
spouse’s broken trust is―as Blomberg expresses―irreparable.173 Concerning 
the “not ideal, but allowable” point, Andrew Osborn uses the analogy of the 
body and the need to sever a limb to explain. He writes:  
If a medical man were asked if it were right to cut off a hand or a foot, 
he could only reply that to do so would be mutilation, and that mutilation 
 
169 In a chapter about forgiveness in Mere Christianity, C.S. Lewis writes that to forgive 
someone and to love them is to “[wish] them well, not feeling fond of him nor saying he is 
nice when he is not.” See C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, in The C.S. Lewis Signature 
Classics (New York: HarperOne, 2017): 101. 
170 Hollinger, Sex in Marriage, 169. 
171 Ibid., 169; Joel and Paul Feinberg say the same, writing: “When a marriage is 
strained—even in a case where one of the partners has committed porneia—reconciliation is 
still possible, and it is the preferred response.” See Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a 
Brave New World, 633. 
172 Grenz, Sexual Ethics, 130.  
173 See Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy,” 182; see also 
Smedes, Sex for Christians, 200.  
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is definitely wrong. But, if he were asked in a particular case whether it 
was necessary to remove a limb in the interests of the body as a whole, 
his answer might be just as clearly that it should be taken off. . . . 
Applying the same process of reasoning to the marriage relationship, 
we must admit that in some cases there is no alternative to separation, 
whereas in others judgement and tact might restore harmony. 
Separation is essentially wrong, just as it is wrong to sever an arm or a 
leg, but, if the social unit is failing to function and it has proved 
impossible to restore balance and harmony . . . it may sometimes prove 
best to dissolve the partnership.174 
 
While divorce is always to be viewed as a tragic failure of God’s creation 
ordinance to “cling” to one’s spouse and life as “one flesh,”175 a realistic 
Christian ethic takes into account the fact that in “certain situations [divorce] 
could loom as a better course of action than any available alternative.”176 If an 
innocent spouse really believes that they will never be able to trust the 
adulterous spouse again, then it is probably best that they seek a divorce for 
the simple reason that the lack of trust will prevent a reconciliation in all of its 
fullness from ever materializing. Therefore, the inability to trust a spouse who 
has committed adultery—even if they are repentant—would be a strong reason 
in favor of getting a divorce. Of course, Instone-Brewer would most likely not 
agree, because if the adulterous spouse is repentant, then the innocent 
spouse must reconcile the marriage regardless of whether they currently think 
that they will ever be able to trust the other again. This view seems harsh, 
failing to give the innocent spouse the liberty to end the marriage if they do not 
think they can ever trust again. Smedes writes: “Adultery can wound the 
relationship so deeply and violate the moral contract so flagrantly that, in some 
instances, a genuine renewal of marriage is not possible.”177 However, if we 
reject Instone-Brewer’s additional qualification the exception clause can be 
understood as a God-sanctioned, compassionate permission for those who 
cannot imagine ever trusting the adulterous spouse again.  
 
174 Andrew R. Osborn, Christian Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), 181–
182. In this context, Osborn uses the word “separation” as synonymous with divorce.  
175 Gen. 2:24. 
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The bottom line is that Instone-Brewer takes the decision to remain and 
reconcile out of the hands of the victim and places it into the hands of the guilty 
spouse. For this reason, his view appears to be oppressive, favoring the 
adulterous spouse at the expense of the innocent spouse who is a victim. For 
this reason and the other two previously mentioned, I believe that Instone-
Brewer’s additional qualification thesis is neither the best nor most desirable 
interpretation of the exception clause. The innocent spouse’s act of remaining 
and reconciling with an adulterous spouse is not obligatory because the 
exception clause applies whether the adulterous spouse is repentant or not. 
Consequently, the first criterion of supererogation—that an act is not 
obligatory—is satisfied. 
 
Remaining and Reconciling is Not Forbidden for the Innocent Spouse 
I now want to argue that the act of remaining and reconciling with a 
spouse who has committed adultery is not forbidden (i.e., the innocent spouse 
is not obligated to divorce the adulterous spouse). If successful, then the 
second criterion of supererogation—that the act in question is not morally 
forbidden—will be satisfied.  
At first glance, it might seem obvious that the act of remaining and 
reconciling with an adulterous spouse is not forbidden and that this criterion 
does not need defending. However, this was not the predominant view among 
religious leaders in Jesus’ day. As Instone-Brewer notes, “early rabbis believed 
that God commanded divorce when adultery had occurred.”178 This belief is on 
display in the Pharisees’ response to Jesus: “Why then did Moses command 
us to give a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her?”179 This response 
reveals the Pharisees’ belief that an innocent spouse was not morally 
permitted to remain and reconcile with an adulterous spouse. Other biblical 
scholars have made similar claims, noting that Jewish laws required a man to 
 
178 Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible, 143. 
179 Matt. 19:7. 
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divorce their wife if she committed adultery.180 In order to demonstrate that the 
act in question is not forbidden and therefore is a candidate for supererogation 
in Protestant ethics, it must be shown that Jesus did not consent to the 
Pharisees’ belief that the innocent spouse was forbidden from remaining and 
reconciling with the adulterous spouse. 
As recorded in Matthew 19, the entire conversation about divorce began 
with the Pharisees asking Jesus the following question: “Is it lawful for a man 
to divorce his wife for any cause?”181 The phrase “for any cause” is extremely 
important and, like the exception clause, is yet another example of Matthew 
inserting a phrase that is not found in the Markan or Lukan accounts. The 
significance of the phrase is that it represented the views of Rabbi Hillel and 
his followers, as opposed to the school of thought associated with Rabbi 
Shammai. The debate hinged on a phrase found in Deuteronomy 24:1—the 
only passage in the Pentateuch that treats the matter of divorce directly182—
which served as the focal point of the debate.183 Deuteronomy 24:1 reads: 
“Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman, but she does not please 
him because he finds something objectionable [ervat davar] about her, and so 
he writes her a certificate of divorce, puts it in her hand, and sends her out of 
his house; she then leaves his house . . .” The ultimate question for the Biblical 
scholars of Jesus’ day was: “How is Deuteronomy 24:1 to be interpreted?”184 
Instone-Brewer writes that ervat davar can be translated as “matter of 
indecency,” which is similar to the ESV translation “some indecency.” He 
explains that the Hillelites separated these two words resulting in the view that 
a divorce could be based on either an act of “indecency” (i.e., adultery) or for 
“a matter” which they interpreted to mean “any matter.”185 Consequently, the 
prevailing Hillelite theology of divorce was quite liberal and allowed divorce for 
 
180 Hill, The Gospel of Matthew, 281; Morris, The Gospel According to Matthew, 121; 
Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, 467. Keener makes the additional 
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any cause―even for such mundane acts as failing to prepare a meal 
properly186―as opposed to the Shammaites, who interpreted the same phrase 
as a single linguistic unit meaning “a matter of indecency.”187 Hillelite theology 
led to, as Luther preached: “The Jews . . . divorcing their wives for all kinds of 
reasons whenever they saw fit, even though unchastity was not involved.”188 
Unlike their counterparts, the Shammaites did not separate the words 
“indecency” and “matter” and therefore believed that the phrase was a unified 
expression signifying the specific act of adultery. Whereas the Hillelites 
believed that any cause was a just cause for divorce, the Shammaites 
interpreted ervat davar in Deuteronomy 24:1 in a much stricter manner to 
mean that only adultery constituted a just cause for divorce.189 So when 
Matthew includes the phrase “for any cause” in the Pharisees’ initial question 
which prompted the dialogue in Matthew 19, it is significant. Ultimately, the 
religious leaders were trying to get Jesus to take a side in the debate and 
declare whether the phrase should be interpreted in either a theologically 
conservative or liberal manner.  
 Following the initial question, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife 
for any cause?” Jesus responded:  
Have you not read that the one who made them at the beginning “made 
them male and female,” and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his 
father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become 
one flesh”? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what 
God has joined together, let no one separate.190  
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At this point, Jesus appears to be teaching that there is no just cause for 
divorce. This created a sharp theological tension for the Pharisees because 
they interpreted Deuteronomy 24:1 as Moses commanding divorce in certain 
circumstances, one of which was adultery. This tension is on display in the 
Pharisees’ next question: “Why then did Moses command us to give a 
certificate of dismissal and to divorce her?”191 Until Matthew 19:8, Jesus 
seems to be teaching that there is no just cause for divorce, while Moses is 
interpreted as commanding it. Jesus then responds in verse eight: “It was 
because you were so hardhearted that Moses allowed you to divorce your 
wives, but from the beginning it was not so.” Rather than addressing the 
interpretation of ervat davar, Jesus refers to the will of the Creator in the very 
beginning when God declared: “Therefore a man leaves his father and his 
mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh.”192 The strength of 
this approach is hermeneutical. David Hill writes: “The form of argumentation 
employed was acceptable in Jewish exegesis: ‘the more original, the 
weightier’; an appeal to God’s intention in creation outweighs (but does not 
therefore annul) the ordinances of Moses.”193 By redirecting the focus of the 
debate, Jesus is able to reframe Moses’ teaching in Deuteronomy 24:1 as a 
mere concession that was only granted due to the hardness of heart that 
characterized the Hebrew people at that time. In other words, God’s original 
intent for marriage to be lifelong “is prior in every sense to the permission and 
concession offered by Moses [in response to] . . . human failure.”194 John 
Murray echoes this point, writing: “The Mosaic permission was, therefore, a 
departure from the creation ordinance and from the practice to which it 
obligated men.”195 Having recast Moses’ words as a mere concession, Jesus 
is able to say “Moses allowed” in place of the Pharisees’ “Moses commanded.” 
Murray writes:  
 
191 Matt. 19:7. 
192 Gen. 2:24. 
193 Hill, The Gospel of Matthew, 279; this point is also made by Leon Morris. See Morris, 
The Gospel According to Matthew, 480–481. 
194 Jones, The Gospel of Matthew, 117. 
195 Murray, Divorce, 32. 
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There can be no question but the exceptive clause provides an 
exception to the wrong of putting away. The kind of wrong from which it 
relieves the husband is not intimated as in Matthew 5:32 but, like the 
latter passage, it does enunciate a liberty granted to the innocent 
husband. It does not intimate, any more than Matthew 5:32, that the 
man is obligated to divorce his wife in the event of adultery on her part. 
It simply accords the right or liberty.196 
 
After making this all-important distinction between “command” and “allow,” 
Jesus goes on to say: “And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for 
unchastity, and marries another commits adultery.”197 After responding that 
Moses’ never commanded divorce, Jesus makes it clear that no person is ever 
obligated to divorce. They can, but it is not mandatory. In other words, the act 
of remaining and reconciling with an adulterous spouse is not forbidden 
because divorce is not required. Consequently, the act in question satisfies the 
second criterion of supererogation. 
 
Remaining and Reconciling Possesses Moral Worth 
 Having argued that the innocent spouse’s act of reconciling with the 
adulterous spouse is neither obligatory nor forbidden, it remains to be shown 
whether the act possesses moral worth (i.e., is not morally indifferent or trivial). 
This is necessary for the third criterion of supererogation to be fulfilled. I 
suggest that not only does the act in question possess moral worth, but is one 
of the greatest manifestations of agape love in Christian practice. In an effort 
to demonstrate that the act in question satisfies the third criterion of 
supererogation, I will briefly discuss four attributes of the act: an instance of 
God’s forgiveness, holiness-producing, evangelistic, and beneficial for 
children.  
 One of the most obvious reasons that remaining and reconciling with 
an adulterous spouse possesses moral worth is that this embodies God’s 
mercy and forgiveness for the partner who has sinned. I can only imagine that 
after committing adultery, it is very difficult for the guilty spouse―especially if 
 
196 Ibid., 35. 
197 Matt. 19:9.  
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a Christian―to forgive oneself. Surely the key to forgiving yourself is to first be 
able to receive the forgiveness that God has made available through the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. However, for so many people, this is 
the problem and not the solution. The spouse who has committed adultery 
cannot forgive themselves because they find it impossible to believe that God 
is able to forgive them for what they have done. A person may reason that their 
attempt to forgive themselves is empty and futile unless backed by a more 
authoritative source. In other words, only when a Christian believes that God 
has forgiven them in Christ do they give themselves cognitive and emotional 
permission to forgive themselves. Thus, when an innocent spouse chooses to 
remain and reconcile, they partner with Christ in a mission to make God’s love, 
mercy, and forgiveness tangible for the adulterous spouse. Presumably, this 
will make it much easier for the adulterous spouse to believe in and accept 
God’s forgiveness. From the perspective of the adulterous spouse, the internal 
logic might go something like this: If the spouse whom I have betrayed can not 
only forgive but also reconcile, then God must also be willing to forgive me and 
continue our relationship. And if God forgives me, I am free to receive his 
forgiveness and thereby forgive myself. Because the act in question can result 
in the adulterous spouse receiving God’s forgiveness, forgiving themselves, 
and finding deep emotional healing, it possesses moral worth.  
 Secondly, the act of remaining and reconciling with an adulterous 
spouse possesses moral worth because it can lead to an increase of holiness 
in the life of the innocent spouse. The apostle Peter writes: “Like obedient 
children, do not be conformed to the desires that you formerly had in 
ignorance. Instead, as he who called you is holy, be holy yourselves in all your 
conduct; for it is written, ‘You shall be holy, for I am holy.’”198 This command to 
be holy applies to all Christians everywhere. For Christians, growing in 
holiness (i.e., sanctification) is a fruit of cooperating with the Holy Spirit—a 
“conscious engagement”199—so that his sanctifying work of forming Christ in 
 
198 1 Pet. 1:14–16. 
199 Horton, Pilgrim Theology, 309. 
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us over time is not obstructed.200 Concerning the act in question, it is an 
opportunity for an innocent spouse to voluntarily share in the sufferings of 
Christ201 in order to have Christ formed more deeply within. Difficult 
conversations, couples’ therapy, and enduring an awkward, undefined period 
of time while issues get sorted out will prove extremely challenging. Most likely, 
it would be easier for the innocent spouse to divorce and either remain single 
or remarry someone else. Choosing to remain and reconcile requires that the 
innocent spouse endure suffering that is not mandatory in order to achieve 
reconciliation. Concerning the innocent spouse, Smedes writes: “it is also 
possible that, in forgiveness and understanding, the ‘innocent’ partner may not 
choose to interpret the adultery of the spouse as the destruction of their 
marriage but as a wound that can be healed by love.”202 This attitude and 
subsequent act of remaining and reconciling is a perfect representation of what 
Christ did at Calvary in order to reconcile sinful human beings with a holy God: 
the innocent voluntarily suffers and thereby makes reconciliation possible. It is 
a redemptive type of suffering that not only has the potential to save a 
marriage, but also to enable the innocent spouse to identify with Christ at a 
deeper, previously unknown level. Stated differently, the choice of the innocent 
spouse to remain and reconcile can play a significant role in the person’s life 
as a disciple of Jesus Christ. The word “disciple” in the Greek is μαθητής 
(mathētēs) and occurs 261 times in the New Testament. It means “disciple, 
student, follower; a committed learner and follower, in the NT usually of Jesus 
Christ.”203 For the innocent spouse, making the difficult choice to remain and 
reconcile when it is not required is an opportunity to become more like Christ 
which can be described in more discipleship-oriented terms as being an 
 
200 Concerning the idea of holiness being an effect of both God’s grace at work in us and 
the effort we expend to yield to that grace, I have in mind Phil. 2:12–13. Paul writes: “work 
out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, enabling 
you both to will and to work for his good pleasure.”  
201 Phil. 3:10. 
202 Smedes, Sex for Christians, 197–198. 
203 William D. Mounce, “μαθητής,” in The Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1993), 306.  
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attentive student of Christ. Bringing the concepts of marriage and discipleship 
together, Richard Hays writes:  
Within Mark’s Gospel, this teaching on divorce occurs in the central 
section of teachings on discipleship (8:31–10:45). . . . At first glance, 
the controversy discourse pericope on divorce (10:2–12) seems to sit 
oddly in this context, both form-critically and materially. Why has Mark 
placed this unit here rather than in one of his two major collections of 
controversy materials (2:1–3:6 and 11:27–12:37)? Upon reflection, the 
answer becomes clear: by placing this material in its present narrative 
location, Mark presents marriage as one aspect of discipleship.204 
 
The difficult choice to remain and reconcile can be embraced by the innocent 
spouse as a response to the call to discipleship which entails a constant pursuit 
of holiness.  
To a limited degree, this occurs in the life of Hosea, an ancient Hebrew 
prophet, when God commands him: “Go, marry a promiscuous woman . . .”205 
It appears that among others, there are two reasons why God gives this 
command: (1) that Hosea will better understand the disappointment and 
various emotions that God is feeling as a result of his own bride’s (i.e., the 
nation of Israel) unfaithfulness, and (2) that Hosea receiving back his wife after 
adultery will serve as an example of the mercy that God is willing to extend to 
the Jewish people if they will only return. This latter reason is why Hays refers 
to what is asked of Hosea as a “symbolic plot,”206 for his actions (which God 
commanded in this instance) also serve as a symbolic picture of what God is 
willing to do if his people repent. Concerning the first reason, Hosea’s obedient 
act to receive Gomer back after her adultery allowed him to identify emotionally 
at a deep level with what God was experiencing. This act of identification is 
important from the perspective of holiness. If growing in holiness is becoming 
more and more like God, then Hosea’s deep identification with God was an 
opportunity for Hosea to grow in holiness because feeling what God feels can 
result in a person becoming more like God. Granted, the example of Hosea 
has limited applicability because unlike the act in question, Hosea was 
 
204 Hays, The Moral Vision, 349.  
205 Hosea 1:2. 
206 Hays, The Moral Vision, 362.  
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commanded to reconcile with his adulterous spouse. On the other hand, the 
act in question in this chapter is fully optional. That distinction aside, the case 
of Hosea offers a prime example of how the act of returning and reconciling 
possesses moral worth because the act can result in an increase of holiness 
for the innocent spouse. To return to an earlier point, the act in question 
possesses moral worth because an innocent spouse chooses―by God’s 
grace―to imitate the example of God by bearing a non-mandatory suffering 
for the purpose of achieving reconciliation. This is but one way that the act in 
question is holiness-producing for the innocent spouse.  
 The third reason that the act in question possesses moral worth is that 
it is evangelistic in nature. There is a clear call in the New Testament for 
Christians to share the εὐαγγέλιον of Jesus Christ. In light of this command to 
“be imitators of God, as beloved children,”207 Christians look for ways to 
partner with Christ whose self-professed mission was to “seek out and to save 
the lost.”208 Regarding the relationship between the act in question and 
evangelism, David Turner writes: “Forgiveness can lead to restored 
relationships and is a powerful testimony to the power of Jesus’s gospel.”209 In 
essence, a restored relationship has the potential to be an embodied 
ἀπολογία210 of the reality, goodness, and power of God. In addition, the 
powerful testimony of a restored marriage can be beneficial for those who 
already profess Christ. Though it goes without saying, Christians are not 
immune to times of suffering, intense doubt (the existence of God, the 
goodness of God, etc.), depression, and unfaithfulness. Witnessing a 
reconciled relationship following an act of adultery can be a catalyst to 
reawaken and motivate other compromised Christians. The bottom line is that 
the act in question can be a powerful testimony to both Christians and non-
Christians alike and for this reason can be said to possess great moral worth.  
 
207 Eph. 5:1. 
208 Luke 19:10. 
209 Turner, Matthew: Baker Exegetical Commentary, 463. 
210 1 Pet. 3:17. 
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The fourth and last reason why the act in question possesses moral 
worth is that keeping the home together is likely to be in the best interest of 
children. Granted, if the innocent spouse chooses to remain and reconcile 
without truly forgiving the adulterous spouse, this will only result in a bitter, 
tense, unhealthy atmosphere at home. This would obviously not be beneficial 
for children. It would be better for the innocent spouse to take advantage of 
the exception clause and divorce the adulterous spouse than to seek a 
superficial reconciliation. However, if the innocent spouse forgives the 
adulterous spouse and chooses to remain and reconcile, then it is safe to 
assume that healing will eventually occur in the marriage and that the home 
atmosphere will be a healthy, safe place for any children. 
 I began this section by proposing that the act of choosing to remain 
married to an adulterous spouse in an effort to reconcile is supererogatory. 
This required defending the view that the act is neither commanded nor 
forbidden by Jesus and that it possesses moral worth. Regarding this third 
criterion, the following four reasons were briefly discussed in support of the 
claim that the act in question possesses moral worth: (1) the act makes God’s 
mercy and forgiveness more tangible for the adulterous spouse; (2) the act 
can lead to an increase of holiness in the life of the innocent spouse; (3) the 
act is a powerful testimony to the reality, goodness, and power of Jesus Christ; 
and (4) the act can keep the home together which is in the best interest of 
children. Having presented my argument, one interesting question arises: If 
this act is supererogatory because it is neither commanded nor forbidden by 
Jesus and because it possesses moral worth (assuming a proper motive), then 
what prevents the act of marrying from also being supererogatory?211 In 
response to this question, one might ask: “Why is it significant if the act of 
marrying is also classified as supererogatory?” The second question is 
significant because if my account allows for marriage to be supererogatory, 
then this is problematic due to the fact that the New Testament never gives 
 
211 I was asked this question after sharing a paper at the Society for the Study of 
Theology’s 2019 annual conference. The person who asked the question chose to remain 
anonymous when I asked about including this in my thesis. 
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even the slightest impression that marriage might be supererogatory. 
Therefore, if my account allows for it, then I see this as a problem. For this 
reason, I want to explain why marriage is not supererogatory in my view.  
 What rational support can be provided for denying the act of marriage 
supererogatory status? Although I do not intend to go into great detail, I once 
again invoke the concept of vocation, which has occupied an important place 
in my thesis thus far. If there is a positive call not only to celibacy but also to 
marriage, as Karl Rahner suggests, then both celibacy and marriage can be 
viewed as a response to God’s call (i.e., call understood as a command). A 
positive call to marriage means that although the married life is one in which a 
person’s “interests are divided,”212 this by no means implies that it is morally 
inferior, because it is God’s will for each person that receives the call. This 
means that marriage would be obligatory for every person who is not called to 
live celibately. As mentioned earlier, Glaser writes: “this inability to live as virgin 
or widow is a sign that such a state in life is not the specific one to which this 
individual is called; it is not his specific charisma-grace.”213 Granted, he admits 
that he does not know if marriage, like celibacy, should be considered a 
charisma that is also accompanied with necessary “gifts and talents” for living 
such a life, but he also does not rule out the option.214 In response, it seems 
strange that there would be a positive call for one but not the other. This is 
what makes the asymmetry in Glaser’s view not only awkward, but 
undesirable, because it suggests—to the detriment of the majority215—that 
God might not view those who marry as needing a specific grace to live that 
life faithfully. I suspect that most married Christians would disagree for the 
simple fact that marriage—in the midst of its great joys and delights—can be 
challenging at times. It seems more logical to say that there is either a positive 
call that precedes both vocations or a call to none.  
 
212 1 Cor. 7:34. 
213 Glaser, “Commands-Counsels,” 285. 
214 Ibid., 279. 
215 Balthasar, “A Theology of the Evangelical Counsels,” 222. 
 180 
 If Rahner is right and both celibacy and marriage are preceded by a 
positive call to an individual, then this would mean that a person is either 
obligated to marry or obligated to be celibate. Furthermore, striving to live a 
celibate life when one is called to marry (and vice versa) would not be 
supererogatory, but rather an act of disobedience. And trying to live a married 
life even though one is called to celibacy would also be disobedient. While 
retaining the notion of counsels, von Balthasar seems to affirm this last point: 
“The decision to embrace the evangelical counsels depends on a personal 
experience of being called (if this is lacking, it would be imperfect, even 
sacrilegious, to enter this state, and it would be decidedly more perfect to 
choose to remain in the world).”216 When Balthasar uses the phrase, “in this 
world,” he means one of two ways in which “the Lord calls to men.” In his view, 
a person is called either “out of the world” or “to stand in the world.” Though 
an oversimplification of his view, celibacy is an example of the former whereas 
marriage is an example of the latter.217 It is of great significance that von 
Balthasar suggests that a person could be committing an act of sacrilege if 
they attempt to live a celibate life when they have been called to marry and 
vice versa. Concerning my effort to show that marriage is not supererogatory, 
this point is crucial. If there is a positive call to marriage, then a person’s 
relationship to marriage takes one of two directions based on whichever call 
they have received: (1) it is an act of obedience if they have been called to 
marriage; or (2) it is an act of disobedience if they have been called to celibacy. 
What this vocation-based view of both marriage and celibacy suggests is that 
there is not a situation where marriage can qualify as supererogatory. This 
removes the possibility of marriage being “optional,” which is an essential 
characteristic of a supererogatory act due to the fact that supererogatory acts 
are neither obligatory nor forbidden. I now transition to the last of three major 
sections that comprise this chapter.  
  
Two Additional Scenarios 
 
216 Ibid., 225. 
217 Ibid., 222. 
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 In the previous section, I addressed a simple version of adultery for the 
general purpose of demonstrating that there is at least one act of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics. I now turn my attention to answer the 
following two questions in order: (i) In the case that the innocent spouse wants 
to remain and reconcile, is the guilty spouse’s act to return and reconcile also 
supererogatory? (ii) In the case of double-adultery, does the classificatory 
status of the guilty spouse’s act to reconcile change? The distinctive feature of 
the latter situation is that both spouses―as opposed to one―are guilty of 
adultery. As previously mentioned, these two distinct scenarios are closely 
related to the act of supererogation discussed in section two of this chapter. 
The three theological commitments named in the first part of section two are 
once again assumed in answering these two questions.  
 
Question 1  
 
At the risk of sounding redundant, the first question that I would like to 
address is: In the case that the innocent spouse wants to remain and reconcile, 
is the choice by the guilty spouse to reconcile the marriage also 
supererogatory? Or, is the act not supererogatory since they are the guilty 
party? I will argue that in a case involving an innocent and guilty spouse, the 
latter’s choice to reconcile the marriage—unlike the innocent spouse’s act— is 
not supererogatory.  
 Imagine the following scenario, which was used earlier in the chapter 
and has now been revised: 
Brandon and Sarah are both Christians and have been married for five 
years. In the last three months, Brandon has committed adultery with 
another woman with whom he works. After months of painstaking 
emotional work, Sarah has decided that she wants to remain and 
reconcile with Brandon if he is willing. The couple have kept in touch 
over the last few months and Sarah calls Brandon to communicate her 
decision. She includes stipulations such as (1) increased accountability, 
(2) that Brandon find another job, and (3) that they undergo marriage 
counseling until Sarah is satisfied with their progress. Upon hearing 
Sarah’s desire and conditions, Brandon informs Sarah that he would 
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like to reconcile and salvage their marriage. Both do what is required 
and as a result, save their marriage.  
 
Unlike the original version earlier in the chapter, Sarah decides that she wants 
to remain and reconcile with Brandon. In response, Brandon makes the 
decision to reconcile as well. As stated earlier, it is my view that Brandon’s 
choice and subsequent act of reconciliation with Sarah is―unlike Sarah’s 
choice to reconcile―not supererogatory. The reason for my claim is 
straightforward: Brandon’s spouse did not commit adultery whereas Sarah’s 
spouse did. In other words, the innocent spouse’s act of reconciling and the 
guilty spouse’s act of reconciling are asymmetrical. This can be demonstrated 
using modus ponens218 to frame Sarah’s and Brandon’s respective acts in light 
of the inherent logic in Jesus’ teaching about divorce in Matthew’s Gospel. In 
order to defend the view that Brandon’s act is not supererogatory, it is helpful 
to begin by employing a modus ponens to reveal part of the logic that supports 
the claim that Sarah’s act to remain and reconcile is supererogatory. Using 
modus ponens, the logic inherent in Jesus’ teaching is as follows:  
Premise 1  If a spouse has committed adultery, then the other spouse 
is permitted to divorce.  
Premise 2 Sarah’s spouse has committed adultery. 
Conclusion Therefore, Sarah is permitted to divorce her spouse. 
 
Based on the words of Jesus concerning divorce in Matthew’s Gospel, Sarah 
is permitted to divorce which opens the door for the supererogatory act of 
remaining and reconciling.219 On the other hand, this same Matthean-based 
logic reveals that Brandon’s act of reconciling with Sarah is not 
supererogatory. In order to remain consistent, the first proposition in the 
previous modus ponens has been restated in negative terms in the following 
argument in order to avoid the denying the antecedent fallacy.  
Premise 1  If a spouse has not committed adultery, then the other 
spouse is not permitted to divorce.220  
 
218 Modus ponens argument form: (Premise 1) If P, then Q. (Premise 2) P. (Conclusion) 
Q. 
219 I have discussed and defended this position in detail in section two of this chapter. 
Therefore, I am not elaborating here. 
220 At this point, one might suggest that this argument is shortsighted because Paul 
describes another type of situation where a Christian is permitted to divorce. In 1 Cor. 7:12–
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Premise 2 Brandon’s spouse has not committed adultery. 
Conclusion Therefore, Brandon is not permitted to divorce his spouse.  
 
A modus ponens is a valid argument form and is therefore truth-preserving. 
This means that if the premises are true (and of course related to each other 
in content), then the conclusion necessarily follows. In the case that an 
argument form is valid, and the premises are also true, the argument can be 
deemed sound. Assuming that the above premises are true in both arguments, 
then both arguments are sound.  
 The logic of both arguments shows the disjunct in classification between 
Sarah and Brandon’s acts. On the surface, it would appear that both spouses 
perform the same act: reconciling with the other spouse. However, this is not 
the case because the contexts of their acts are very different. Based on Jesus’ 
teaching on divorce in Matthew, Brandon is not permitted to divorce Sarah 
because Sarah has not committed adultery. To express it differently, whereas 
the exception clause applies to Sarah’s act because her spouse committed 
adultery, it does not apply to Brandon’s act because his spouse has not 
committed adultery. If my reasoning is correct, then one corollary is that if 
Sarah wants to remain and reconcile, then Brandon is obligated by God to do 
so. And if this last claim is right, then Brandon’s act of reconciling with Sarah 
is a moral duty. Of course, he can choose not to obey, but this is another 
matter. Therefore, in the case that Sarah chooses to remain and reconcile, 
Brandon’s act of reconciliation is right to do and wrong not to do. Ergo, it is not 
supererogatory. As I have attempted to show, this results in a different 
classification of the same act depending upon whether the innocent or guilty 
spouse is performing the deed.  
 
 
15, Paul writes that a believing spouse is free to divorce if an unbelieving spouse wants to 
end the marriage because of the other spouse’s Christian faith. This most likely would 
happen in a situation where two people who are not Christians marry each other. Then, one 
spouse becomes a Christian at a later point and the unbelieving spouse does not want to 
continue the marriage on these grounds. In this case, Paul seeks to ease the conscience of 
the believer and permits a divorce: “in such a case the brother or sister is not bound” (1 Cor. 
7:15). However, prior to presenting both modus ponens, I state that both Brandon and Sarah 
are Christians. By doing so, I get around the objection that my logic is shortsighted because 




I will now address the following question: In the case of double-adultery, 
is the classificatory status of the act of reconciling with the other spouse 
supererogatory? This question presents a unique situation concerning 
supererogation because, unlike the previous two acts, both spouses are now 
assumed guilty of adultery for the sake of argument. In section two, only the 
act of the innocent spouse was examined. In the last subsection, only the act 
of the guilty spouse was examined. In the former situation, the act was 
supererogatory whereas in the latter it was not. However, in this scenario both 
spouses are guilty. It would be easy to assume that each spouse’s act of 
reconciling is not supererogatory because the guilty spouse’s act of reconciling 
with an innocent spouse is not as I have just argued. However, this is not the 
case. For the sake of the question, it is assumed once again that both 
individuals are Christians, both are genuinely repentant, and both want to 
reconcile. Using a similar logic as that which was utilized to answer the 
previous question, I contend that both acts of reconciling are supererogatory 
in the case of double-adultery.  
Unlike the first two acts discussed,221 there is no innocent spouse in this 
revised set of circumstances. In the last subsection, modus ponens was used 
to indicate that the guilty spouse’s act of reconciling with the innocent spouse 
was not supererogatory. However, in an ironic twist, having two guilty spouses 
rather than one actually makes a significant moral difference to the 
classification of the act from the perspective of the guilty spouse. With two 
guilty spouses, each is the victim of adultery (both being also guilty does not 
change this fact). A person can be guilty of adultery while simultaneously being 
the victim of adultery. Concerning the act of reconciling, modus ponens proves 
helpful once again. For purposes of framing the argument, I will once again 
use the case of Brandon and Sarah except for one significant change: both 
are now guilty of adultery. Using a modus ponens, the following two arguments 
 
221 One in section two and the other act discussed in the first subsection of this section. 
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reveal that neither act of reconciling is obligatory which allows for a 
supererogatory classification. The first argument is from Sarah’ vantage point 
and the second is from Brandon’s.  
Premise 1  If a spouse has committed adultery, then the other spouse 
is permitted to divorce.  
Premise 2 Sarah’s spouse has committed adultery. 
Conclusion Therefore, Sarah is permitted to divorce her spouse. 
 
Premise 1  If a spouse has committed adultery, then the other spouse 
is permitted to divorce.  
Premise 2 Brandon’s spouse has committed adultery. 
Conclusion Therefore, Brandon is permitted to divorce his spouse. 
 
In both cases, the Matthean-based logic framed with modus ponens reveals 
that neither Brandon nor Sarah is obligated to reconcile with the other. Jesus’ 
condition that one’s spouse must have committed adultery in order for the 
other spouse to be permitted to divorce is satisfied in both scenarios. Unlike 
the previous example, Brandon’s spouse has also committed adultery, so he 
too is permitted to divorce Sarah whereas before he was not. In an unexpected 
twist, the case of double-adultery creates a possibility for two acts of 
supererogation because each partner is the victim of adultery and has the 
moral permission to divorce the other.  
 It should now be clear why I used the word “other” rather than “innocent” 
in the first proposition. If I had said, “If a spouse has committed adultery, then 
the innocent spouse is permitted to divorce,” then I would have unjustifiably 
excluded the possibility of supererogation in the case of double-adultery. The 
word “unnecessarily” is used because this exclusion would have been 
unwarranted based on a close reading of Jesus’ teaching on divorce in the 
Gospel of Matthew. What Jesus said was: “whoever divorces his wife, except 
for unchastity, and marries another commits adultery.”222 Nowhere does Jesus 
say or even seem to imply that the permission to divorce an adulterous spouse 
is only reserved for a spouse if they are innocent of adultery. Instead, the 
permission to divorce is granted if your spouse has committed adultery. To 
 
222 Matt. 19:9. 
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make the claim that the spouse must be innocent in order for the exception 
clause to apply is to go beyond what Jesus teaches. Simply stated, the 
Matthean account of Jesus’ teaching on divorce does not support the idea that 
both spouses cannot supererogate in the case of double-adultery.  
Having shown that each spouse’s act of reconciling with the other in the 
case of adultery is supererogatory, it remains to be seen whether the act 
possesses moral worth. In section two, I argued that the innocent spouse’s act 
of remaining and reconciling is supererogatory because in addition to not being 
required or forbidden, it possesses moral worth for the following four reasons: 
(1) the act makes God’s mercy and forgiveness more tangible for the 
adulterous spouse; (2) the act can lead to an increase of holiness in the life of 
the innocent spouse; (3) the act is a powerful testimony to the reality, 
goodness, and power of Jesus Christ; and (4) the act can keep the home 
together, which is likely to be in the best interests of children. In order to answer 
the present question, one minor alteration needs to be made. Rather than the 
second reason reading, “the act can lead to an increase of holiness in the life 
of an innocent spouse,” it should read, “the act can lead to an increase of 
holiness in the life of spouse choosing to remain and reconcile” (since neither 
is innocent). Once this modification has been made, it is clear that these same 
four characteristics are also true of the act of reconciling in the case of double-
adultery. From the perspective of moral worth, there is no difference. 
Therefore, each spouse’s act of reconciling with the other adulterous spouse 
possesses moral worth. Thus, all three basic criteria for supererogation are 
satisfied: (1) the act is not obligatory, (2) the act is not forbidden, and (3) the 
act possesses moral worth. As stated earlier in the chapter, I will argue in 
chapter four that proper motive is also required if my account of supererogation 
in Protestant ethics is to accurately reflect the teachings of the New Testament. 
I will therefore discuss this act further in the latter half of chapter four. 
I expect that some may oppose the idea that two people who have 
committed adultery are now in a unique position to perform an act of 
supererogation. However, any person that opposes my claims needs to ask 
the honest question: “Is my objection supported by Scripture or is my objection 
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primarily emotional in nature?” An emotional objection might be a disguised 
legalism. In other words, a self-righteous attitude may consciously or 
unconsciously despise the possibility that someone who has committed a 
significant moral failure could then turn around and supererogate. Someone 
might even object on the grounds that my position seems to raise the question 
that Paul posed to the church in Rome: “Should we continue in sin in order that 
grace may abound?”223 After all, in the case of double-adultery there are two 
distinct sins, which makes two acts of supererogation possible instead of only 
one. In the case of double-adultery, there is an opportunity for more χάρις 
(grace) to be both realized and shared. However, this is not an excuse to sin, 
as Paul explains in Romans. Rather, it is a testimony to God’s goodness and 
power that in the midst of greater sin,224 “grace [abounds] all the more.”225 To 
say it differently, God is able to bring good out of all things, even sin. A case 
of double-adultery opens the door for the realization, sharing, and glorification 




The overall aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that there is at 
least one act in Protestant ethics that is supererogatory: an innocent spouse’s 
act of remaining and reconciling with a repentant spouse who has committed 
adultery. This is also true in the case of double-adultery when both spouses 
choose to reconcile with the other. This is important for two reasons. First, my 
account provides an instance of supererogation that is in the Bible, which 
Protestants treat as the ultimate authoritative source in determining what is 
true. Secondly, there is good reason to doubt the claim that celibacy is a 
supererogatory act from a Protestant perspective due to the doctrine of 
 
223 Rom. 6:1. 
224 “Greater” is only intended to communicate the quantitative increase of sin in the case 
of double-adultery as opposed to a case in which only one spouse has committed adultery.  
225 Rom. 5:20. 
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vocation, so my account is valuable because it provides another possibility that 
is also found in the Bible.  
While suggesting that celibacy might not be supererogatory in 
Protestant ethics, I discussed Philip Melanchthon’s endorsement of celibacy 
as a counsel in great detail. After stating that Melanchthon’s concept of a 
counsel greatly differed from Aquinas’ conception, I then argued that 
Melanchthon’s acceptance of celibacy as a counsel turns out to be a clear 
affirmation of a type of act that resembles supererogation in every respect. 
Thus, Melanchthon can be viewed as another example—along with Mellema 
and the Feinbergs—of a Protestant affirming supererogation. Although his 
view of celibacy as supererogatory can be challenged using the Protestant 
idea doctrine of vocation, this does not change the fact that Melanchthon 
appears to affirm the possibility of supererogation. 
Considering the unfortunate fact that divorce will continue to be a part 
of life, the concept of supererogation can be of significant theological and 
pastoral value in helping Christian ministers, counselors, and lay persons in 
the church navigate these waters and help others do the same. Having argued 
for at least one act of supererogation in Protestant ethics, it remains to be 
shown whether an additional criterion is required: proper intention or proper 
motive. As previously stated, I argue in the next chapter that proper motive 
should be embraced as a fourth criterion in a Protestant account of 
supererogation. 
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§ 4. Motive, Not Intent: The Fourth Criterion in a Protestant 
Account of Supererogation 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that there is a clear example of 
supererogation in the New Testament. The deed satisfies the following three 
standard criteria for supererogation in moral philosophy: (1) not obligatory, (2) 
not forbidden, and (3) possesses moral worth. The question now remains: Is 
there a fourth criterion for supererogation in Protestant ethics? As mentioned 
in chapter three, I argue in this chapter that right motive, not intent, should be 
included among the criteria. This would result in a quadripartite theory of 
supererogation. From the perspective of moral philosophy, this is both 
interesting and significant, because over the past four decades, the trend in 
moral philosophy has moved toward intent and away from motive. 
Accentuating motive rather than intent situates my view closer to the likes of 
Sheldon Peterfreund, Mark Jackson, and Phillip Montague rather than to David 
Heyd, who emphasizes altruistic intent, and to Alfred Archer who emphasizes 
moral intent.  
In order to argue for the primacy of motive in a Protestant account of 
supererogation, the chapter has been divided into the following five sections: 
(1) defining the terms: “motive” and “intent”; (2) an argument for motive based 
on Helmut Thielicke’s motive-centric account of Protestant ethics; (3) 
addressing the philosophical objection presented by David Heyd and Alfred 
Archer that only intent, not motive, should be considered in the deontic 
classification of an act (taken from John Stuart Mill); (4) the application of a 
motive-account to the act of supererogation in chapter three (an innocent 
spouse choosing to reconcile with a spouse who has committed adultery but 
has repented); and (5) the indirect relevance of character to acts of 
supererogation. These five sections are then followed by a summary. 
 
Defining the Terms: Motive and Intent 
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This chapter depends on a clear delineation between motive and intent. 
For this reason, this first section offers an initial definition of the two terms. 
John and Paul Feinberg write:  
How does one know if he is being moral or immoral in his actions? . . . 
Two answers, though often heard, are wrong. First, some answer that 
an agent is moral if he does an act that is morally good or refrains from 
doing a morally evil act. This answer does not emphasize motivations 
or intentions for doing an act, but merely notes that the agent did what 
the law demanded. If this sounds familiar, it should, for the Lord 
frequently rebuked the Pharisees for adopting this approach. They were 
very careful to conform their actions externally to the law, but Jesus was 
clear that mere external conformity to the law did not gain eternal 
reward, nor was it morally acceptable. . . . Traditionally, philosophers 
and theologians have agreed that something else is required.1 
 
To place this quote in the larger context of what I am discussing, the Feinbergs 
are rejecting an approach to classifying acts that omits elements from the 
inner, psychological world of the agent. What is of interest is that they mention 
both motives and intentions. After doing so, they take what appears to be a 
decisive step in writing: “moral praise or blame depends heavily on the agent’s 
motives for doing what he did,” and “Motivation, then, is crucial in determining 
whether someone acts morally. . . .”2 It seems that they are identifying proper 
motive, not intent, as a criterion for determining whether someone has acted 
morally. Granted, they do not refer to supererogatory acts specifically when 
they discuss motive and intent, but nowhere do they suggest that such acts 
would be exempt from the deontic requirement that they be performed with 
proper motive or intent. However, as mentioned towards the end of chapter 
one, they fail to give a clear definition of either motive or intent. As a result, it 
is unclear whether they make a clear conceptual distinction between the two 
terms, or are using them interchangeably when they use the conjunction “or” 
in the following statement: “This answer does not emphasize motivations or 
intentions for doing an act . . .” On the one hand, they seem to affirm that 
proper motive is necessary for a person to act morally, whether the act be 
obligatory or supererogatory. And based on their discussion of Kant’s 
 
1 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 26–27. 
2 Ibid., 22. 
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requirement that to act morally one must act from a sense of duty, it seems 
that they define motive similarly to how I will define the term. In this sense, my 
argument for proper motive being a criterion for supererogation in Protestant 
ethics can be first attributed to them. On the other hand, it is unclear how they 
view intentions. Are they the same as motives? Are they different, and if they 
are different, how so? In other words, how would they define motive and how 
would they define intent? And after doing so, would their prioritization of motive 
be consistent with their definitions? While I must acknowledge their motive-
based account of classifying acts (including supererogatory acts), there is still 
much to be desired in terms of preciseness and clarity. For this reason, a more 
systematic presentation of a motive-based account of supererogation is 
needed and should not be viewed as a mere repetition. 
In one of the most helpful examples in supererogation literature for 
distinguishing between motive and intent, Alfred Archer writes:  
Suppose a power hungry misanthrope is standing for election as mayor. 
She wants to be mayor so she can more effectively enact her evil plans. 
Our election candidate passes a river and hears a drowning child 
scream for help. She recognizes that saving the child is likely to win her 
some votes in the forthcoming election. The candidate can be said to 
be acting with altruistic intent, securing the child’s safety is crucial to her 
plan of securing the townspeople’s votes. Her motives though are not 
altruistic.3 
 
Archer goes on to argue that the woman performs an act of supererogation 
regardless of her motive because her intent was moral. His conclusion aside, 
this example is helpful because motive and intent are set forth as two distinct 
concepts. As mentioned in chapter one, this is not always the case. In this 
example, the motive is to secure the townspeople’s votes while the intent is 
“securing the child’s safety.” Using this example, Archer appears to present 
the motive as the reason for which the agent acts. There is a strong precedent 
for this. Steven Sverdlik also identifies “motive” with the reason that explains 
why an agent acts. He writes: “Let us suppose for now that the reason S had 
for doing what she did is her motive for doing it.”4 One chapter later, he 
 
3 Archer, “Supererogation and Intentions,” 450. 
4 Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 1. 
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provides what he calls a formal definition of motive: “The motive of an action 
is the ultimate desire of the agent that explains its occurrence, or some feature 
of it.” Sverdlik’s use of the word “desire” might give the impression that the two 
definitions are not identical. However, he argues that whether a motive takes 
the form of a reason or emotion, desire is at the root of what makes that reason 
or emotion a motive. He writes: “I think we can say that all our motives are 
desires in a broad sense.”5 To show how a desire can present as a motive 
even when not explicitly stated, he writes the following about emotion: “In 
specifying a person’s motive we often use simple terms like revenge or fear or 
greed. But such terms are understood to imply the presence of something like 
a desire. It would be absurd to say that S’s motive was greed but that she had 
no desire for money. . . . The emotions we regard as motives characteristically 
generate desires to act in ways related to the content of the emotions.”6 
Whatever we make of this desire-based account of motive, it is clear that 
Sverdlik identifies a motive as the reason that compels a person to act no 
matter what form the reason assumes. It is the reason why a person performs 
a specific act. Here the etymology of the word “motive” is helpful. In a chapter 
about Thomas Aquinas’ view that motive is part of what specifies a human 
action, Joseph Pilsner writes: “The word motivum is derived from motus, the 
past participle of the Latin verb movere, to move. . . . The word motivum can 
refer to anything with the power to move another.”7 Although this word can be 
used in a way that has little to do with human acts, this is not always the case. 
This idea of a motive “moving” a person to perform certain acts is very similar 
to the idea that motive explains why a person performs an act. This idea of 
“moving” is also found in The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy’s 
definition: “The moving force which leads a person to behave or act in this way 
rather than in another way. A motive is closely related to our desire for the 
 
5 Ibid., 21. 
6 Ibid., 21.  
7 Joseph Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 200. 
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objects for which we act.”8 In Archer’s example, the woman’s desire to garner 
the votes of the townspeople was the reason that moved her to act. Clearly, 
garnering additional votes was her motive. 
 Defining motive as the reason a moral agent performs a particular act 
finds support from other thinkers as well. In his book Christian Ethics, Wayne 
Grudem writes that when a Christian is trying to make a decision, there are 
four elements that must be considered. Of these four, the third is motive, which 
he defines as “the reason why the person does something.”9 Concerning 
motive, John Stuart Mill writes: “He who saves a fellow creature from drowning 
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being 
paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, 
even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater 
obligations.”10 In the first example, each of the two hypothetical motives 
mentioned (from a sense of duty or to get paid) answers the question, “Why 
did X save Y from drowning?” In both cases, Mill’s two potential motives are 
reasons that would explain why person X saved person Y.11 The bottom line 
is that conceiving of motive as the reason for doing a particular act seems 
uncontroversial.  
Staying with Archer’s example, how is intent to be defined if a clear 
distinction between it and motive is to be maintained? In Archer’s example, the 
intent is clear: securing the child’s safety. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western 
Philosophy defines “intention” as: “a state of mind directed toward action.”12 In 
the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, “intention” is defined as: “a state of mind 
that is favorably directed towards bringing about (or maintaining, or avoiding) 
some state of affairs . . . [that] sets the subject on a course to bring that state 
 
8 Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, “Motive,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 450. 
9 Grudem, Christian Ethics, 150. 
10 Mill, Utilitarianism, 18. 
11 Mill, which had a clear influence on David Heyd’s altruistic intent requirement view of 
supererogation (see chapter one), did not believe that motives mattered in the deontic 
classification of an act. However, Mill’s stance will be addressed in detail in the next section, 
so I do not elaborate here. 
12 Bunnin and Yu, “Intention,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Philosophy, 353. 
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of affairs about.”13 Although both convey the same idea, the latter definition is 
more precise. Using the Oxford Dictionary definition, the woman in Archer’s 
example acted to bring about the following state of affairs: securing the child’s 
safety by rescuing the child. This aligns nicely with Mill’s definition of intent as 
well. In a footnote where Mill is drawing a distinction between motive and 
intent, he defines an intention as, “what the agent wills to do.”14 The woman in 
Archer’s example willed to save the child from drowning. In other words, the 
child’s safety was the state of affairs that she was trying to bring about when 
she acted (i.e., intent). Notice that this does not tell us anything about the 
reason she performed the act. If Archer had not told us that she wanted to earn 
additional votes, we would have been left to speculate about her motives (i.e., 
reasons for acting). After all, the fact that her intent was to save the child tells 
us nothing about her reasons for doing so. While the intent answers the 
question, “What state of affairs is the agent aiming to bring about by acting?”, 
the motive answers the question: “Why does the agent want to achieve this 
particular outcome?” The importance of my use of the word “aiming” here 
should not go unnoticed. In the legal field, intention is defined as: “The state of 
mind of one who aims to bring about a particular consequence.”15 This is in 
contrast to “motive,” which is defined by the same source as: “The purpose 
behind a course of action.”16 Both definitions lend support for how the two 
terms are being defined in this chapter. This is worth noting because I suspect 
that there are few areas other than the legal field where the distinction between 
intention and motive is given such careful attention due to the fact that the 
requirements of justice are being decided.  
Clearly, a distinction between motive and intent is necessary if acts are 
to be properly understood and evaluated in relation to supererogation in 
Protestant ethics (and outside of Protestant ethics too). From this point 
 
13 Simon Blackburn, “Intention,” in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 188.  
14 Mill, Utilitarianism, 26. 




forward, motive is used to signify “the reason or reasons for which an agent 
acts” whereas intent is defined as: “a state of mind that is favorably directed 
towards bringing about (or maintaining, or avoiding) some state of affairs . . . 
[that] sets the subject on a course to bring that state of affairs about.”  
 
A Motive-Based Account of Supererogation in Protestant Christian 
Ethics 
 
In chapter three, I argued that according to Jesus’ teaching on divorce 
in the Gospel of Matthew, the act of remaining and reconciling with an 
adulterous spouse is supererogatory. Having defined motive as “the reason or 
reasons for which an agent acts,” it seems inconsistent with Jesus’ emphasis 
on “the inward dimension of human existence”17 in the Gospels to say that a 
person could reconcile with an adulterous spouse for any number of selfish 
reasons (i.e., motives) but still be said to perform an act of supererogation. As 
Stanley Grenz writes: “Seen from the perspective of the whole, the biblical 
viewpoint does not lead to a concern solely for acts in themselves and hence 
for a pure ethic of doing. In addition to an obvious interest in right actions, the 
biblical authors display a great concern for what motivates conduct.”18 
Admittedly, Grenz is not concerning himself with the moral classification of 
acts. However, his point could be viewed as support for the claim that 
evaluating and classifying an act in Protestant ethics requires that we take the 
agent’s motive into account. As part of my argument, I will now present 
German theologian Helmut Thielicke’s view that motive is central to Christian 
ethics. 
Thielicke claims that the motive from which an individual acts is what 
distinguishes Christian ethics from secular ethical theories. He writes: “The 
specifically ‘Christian’ element in ethics is rather to be sought explicitly and 
 
17 Grenz, The Moral Quest, 108. In support of this claim, Grenz refers to the following 
verses (to name a few): Matt. 5:20, Matt. 12;33, Mark 7:11, Mark 7:6. 
18 Grenz, The Moral Quest, 228. 
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exclusively in the motivation of the action.”19 Though he does not have acts of 
supererogation in mind when he writes about motive, the fact that he is 
concerned with acts in general is enough to connect his motive-based, 
Protestant account of moral acts with acts of supererogation in particular 
(which I have argued exist, whether he would agree or not). My reasoning is 
straightforward: If acting with proper motive is required in order to obey God 
when doing what he has commanded, then it stands to reason that acting with 
the proper motive is also an essential element in the performance of an act 
that is supererogatory. To express this differently, if performing an act that is 
commanded by God requires an agent to perform the act with a good motive, 
then performing a supererogatory act as a Christian would also require an 
agent to perform the act with a good motive.  
To understand the importance of Thielicke’s work in relation to my 
argument for a motive-centric account of supererogation in Protestant ethics, 
an in-depth account of his view is required. Steven Sverdlik writes: “every 
tradition that utilizes deontic concepts at all will sometimes make the rightness 
of an action hinge on its motives.”20 Though I am not comfortable arguing that 
Christian ethics is solely a deontic affair, I unhesitatingly affirm that the New 
Testament utilizes deontic concepts. For example, John writes that Jesus once 
told his disciples, “If you love me, you will keep my commandments” (John 
14:15). Another example of the use of deontic concepts in the New Testament 
is found in what is known as The Great Commission. Prior to his ascension, 
Jesus speaks the following words to his eleven apostles: “All authority in 
heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples 
of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of 
the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that I have commanded 
you. And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age” (Matthew 
28:18–20). Later in the New Testament, Paul also does not shy away from 
using deontic language. On one occasion he writes, “Children, obey your 
 
19 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics—Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (London: 
Adam & Charles Black, 1968), 20. 
20 Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 15. 
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parents in everything, for this is your acceptable duty in the Lord” (Colossians 
3:20), and on another occasion, “If a widow has children or grandchildren, they 
should first learn their religious duty to their own family and make some 
repayment to their parents; for this is pleasing in God’s sight” (1 Timothy 5:4). 
Although these verses represent only a small number of verses containing 
deontic language and concepts in the New Testament, the deontic element in 
Christian ethics is clear. Besides, it is important to point out that emphasizing 
the deontic elements in Protestant ethics does not necessarily forbid reference 
to virtues or values—“Christian ethics must be concerned about both.”21 On 
this point, John and Paul Feinberg write: “Taken together, the theory of value 
and the theory of obligation comprise the whole field of ethics. Some theories 
of ethics focus more on value than on obligation, though each ethical theory 
usually addresses both issues at least implicitly. . . .”22 The point is that 
emphasizing the deontic elements in Christian ethics is not the same as 
claiming that Christian ethics is fundamentally deontological in nature. 
The main question to ask in an effort to understand Thielicke’s view is: 
“Why did he think that motive is the essential element in Christian ethics?” 
Thielicke presents his motive-based view of Christian ethics in a chapter titled, 
“The Challenge of Humanism.” This is worth noting because the chapter does 
not begin with a discussion of ethics, but rather, of interchangeability. This is 
important because he opens the section titled, “The Interchangeability of 
Ethics” with the following statement: “The same phenomenon of 
interchangeability observed in connection with the concept of faith has with the 
progress of secularism, also come to exist in the field of ethics.”23 
Understanding his notion of “interchangeability” and its relation to faith is 
crucial to understanding what is driving his claim about the centrality of motive 
in Protestant Christian ethics.  
 
21 J. Philip Wogaman, Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1994), 278. 
22 Feinberg and Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World, 22.  
23 Ibid., 17. 
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When Thielicke employs the notion of “interchangeability” in reference 
to faith and then to ethics, the general point that he is making is negative in 
nature. Due to the process of secularization, faith as well as ethics has been 
reinterpreted in ways that has resulted in the Christian faith and Christian 
ethics losing their distinctiveness. According to Thielicke, the Christian faith 
becomes interchangeable (this is not a positive phenomenon in his view) when 
it is reinterpreted through the lens of other immanent categories of thought 
such as psychology. Using psychology as his main example, he writes:  
with the help of psychology it is possible to reduce faith to the level of 
the spiritual processes inside a man. It is characteristic of those who 
thus view Christian faith as only a subjective, psychological matter that 
they employ many expressions which receive their stamp from 
secularization. For example, they typically employ the term ‘credulity’ in 
order to suggest that faith does not primarily refer to and receive its 
character from its object, but is simply one of the many products of 
man’s creative subjectivity.24 
 
When faith becomes nothing more than a “psychical factor” and the objects of 
faith of “secondary rank,”25 then the Christian faith becomes interchangeable 
with all other forms of faith (i.e., other major religions, folk religions, New Age 
spirituality, etc.) for the simple reason that what is believed is no longer 
important. All that remains is the act of believing itself. The focus shifts to the 
subjective realm of thought and emotion and away from the priority of the 
objective existence and character of the deity. At this point, the object becomes 
nothing more than a psychological projection; subjectivity is all that matters. 
This essentially psychological view of religion that results in the 
interchangeability of faith is reminiscent of Ludwig Feuerbach’s theory of 
religion. In a very humanistic turn, Feuerbach believed that the idea of God 
and related doctrines represent the highest ideal of humanity that we can 
imagine. He writes: “Thus God, as an object of feeling, or what is the same 
thing, the feeling of God, is nothing else than man’s highest feeling of self. But 
God is the freest, or rather the absolutely only free being; thus God is man’s 
 
24 Ibid., 15. 
25 Ibid., 16. 
 199 
highest feeling of freedom. . . . This feeling of freedom is God.”26 Stated 
differently, God in Feuerbach’s thought is nothing more than “a composite of 
human predicates” and “synthesis of the human perfections.”27 From this 
perspective, faith―whatever form it takes―becomes nothing more than a 
psychological approach to the world that does not (and need not) correspond 
to any objective reality. This subjective view of the Christian faith is exactly 
what Thielicke opposes, yet he believes it is unavoidable if the focus is 
redirected to the act of belief rather than the object of belief. Thielicke writes: 
“It may thus be seen that Christian existence, to the degree that it is expressed 
in faith, loses its distinctiveness.”28 If one were to read this last statement out 
of context, it might be confusing because “expressed in faith” sounds exactly 
like what Christians ought to be doing.29 However, in this context, the phrase, 
“expressed in faith” indicates a subjective interpretation of the Christian faith 
that has been untethered from its “object,” Jesus Christ.30 Christ is dismissed 
as inconsequential, maybe even as nonexistent. When this interpretive 
transition has occurred and Christianity is viewed as nothing more than 
another form that faith takes, it is no longer unique and the narratives, 
doctrines, traditions, values, virtues, and encouraged acts become accidental 
in nature since the focus is solely on the act of believing. At this point, all faiths 
become little more than spiritually-flavored, psychological paradigms through 
which people navigate a life in which there no longer remains any overarching 
plan or meaning. 
 
26 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Buffalo, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 1989), 284. 
27 Van A. Harvey, Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 25. 
28 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 16. 
29 I am thinking of the verse, “for we walk by faith, not by sight” (2 Cor. 5:7) and others 
like it. 
30 Regarding the use of the word “object” in connection to Jesus Christ, Thielicke writes in 
this chapter that Martin Luther “binds faith to the object of faith, to Jesus Christ” (Thielicke, 
Theological Ethics, 16–17). Thielicke is presenting Luther’s view as the antithesis to the 
reduction of the Christian faith to the mere “faith” level that is interchangeable by virtue of 
ignoring its object.  
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 After Thielicke explains the process by which the Christian faith is 
psychologized and rendered “co-ordinate and of equal worth”31 with all other 
forms of faith, he turns his attention to how Christian ethics sometimes 
succumbs to the same fate at the hands of the progress of secularism. He 
begins by writing:  
For any particular deed of “Christian action” is not unequivocal; it is quite 
interchangeable with acts having completely different motivation. After 
all, once it has left the inner sphere of motives and become an 
objectified “work,” even the Christian deed enters into a framework of 
values which is comprehensible quite apart from considerations of any 
particularly Christian motive.32 
 
By “framework of values,” Thielicke has secular theories of morality in mind 
such as Kant’s deontological ethics and also what he refers to as “Idealistic 
humanism.”33 His point is that if you do not consider motive, the distinctness 
of Christian ethics is lost. In making this point, ignoring motive in the evaluation 
of acts is analogous to the psychologization of faith: in both cases, all that 
remains is now too generic to be described as “Christian.” He defends his 
thesis by arguing the following two points: (1) apart from motive, an act is 
“ambiguous,” and (2) apart from motive, the act is comprehensible (and even 
realizable) within secular ethical frameworks. I will take each of these in turn.  
 When Thielicke writes that an act is ambiguous apart from any 
reference to motive, he means that we cannot know the true moral nature of 
the act by observing the act itself.34 He gives the following example: “If 
someone endows an orphanage, this tells us very little about the real nature 
of the act. For he could be doing so merely out of a desire for fame or status, 
especially if he insists that the orphanage be named after himself―in immortal 
 
31 Ibid., 16. 
32 Ibid., 17. 
33 Ibid., 18. 
34 P.H. Nowell-Smith makes a similar point regarding patriotism. After describing a man 
whose acts seem to convey that he is patriotic, Nowell-Smith writes: “For granted that he 
acts in these ways, it is still open to us to ask what is his motive for so acting.” He then goes 
on list three possible motives, and argues that only the third motive in the list would result in 
the man rightly being called: ‘truly patriotic.’” See P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954), 126. 
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memory of so noble and unselfish an action.”35 This bears a resemblance to 
Archer’s misanthrope who intended to save a child from drowning but only for 
selfish reasons (i.e., motives). The point that Thielicke is making is 
straightforward: you do not know very much about an act until you know the 
agent’s motive―the reason or reasons for which an agent acts―at the time of 
action (or immediately preceding it). Consider the act of giving someone a kiss. 
Countless people use a kiss to communicate eros, love, loyalty, faithfulness, 
friendship, or gratitude to another person. On the other hand, a kiss can mean 
something entirely different. The Bible states: “While he was still speaking, 
Judas, one of the twelve, arrived; with him was a large crowd with swords and 
clubs, from the chief priests and the elders of the people. Now the betrayer 
had given them a sign, saying, ‘The one I will kiss is the man; arrest him.’ At 
once he came up to Jesus and said, ‘Greetings, Rabbi!’ and kissed him.”36 
Unlike the list of virtuous reasons associated with a kiss that were previously 
mentioned, this same act of giving a kiss, in this particular case, betrays an 
innocent man. The point is that if someone told you, “Judas has kissed Jesus,” 
you would still not know much about the act until someone explained Judas’ 
motive. Upon analysis, this becomes clear. Kissing Jesus was the act. What 
was Judas’ intent? Judas was trying to bring about the arrest of Jesus.37 So 
what was his motive? Earlier in the chapter, we learn that Judas was interested 
in self-gain. Prior to the kiss, Judas asks the chief priests: “What will you give 
me if I betray him to you?”38 In response, he was promised thirty pieces of 
silver. Judas’ selfish desire for personal gain at the expense of others is also 
on display six days earlier39:  
Mary took a pound of costly perfume made of pure nard, anointed 
Jesus’ feet, and wiped them with her hair. The house was filled with the 
fragrance of the perfume. But Judas Iscariot, one of his disciples (the 
one who was about to betray him), said, “Why was this perfume not sold 
for three hundred denarii and the money given to the poor?” (He said 
 
35 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 23. 
36 Matt. 26:47–49. 
37 “The one I kiss is the man” (Matt. 26:48). 
38 Matt. 26:15. 
39 The time period of six days can be confirmed by comparing the following verses: John 
12:1 and Matt. 26:17, 20. 
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this not because he cared about the poor, but because he was a thief; 
he kept the common purse and used to steal what was put into it.)40 
 
It is clear that Judas was greedy, and as his question, “What will you give me 
if I betray him to you?” reveals, Judas gave the kiss of betrayal in order to 
acquire greater wealth. This was his reason for acting―that is, his motive. This 
is consistent with the definitions provided in the first section. As I have 
suggested and will be further explained in the next section using Helmut 
Thielicke’s motive-based account of Christian ethics, an act—including Judas’ 
kiss—does not provide sufficient information to determine moral rightness or 
moral wrongness. In a sense, the act is amoral in nature apart from a reference 
to motive. 
Consider the Good Samaritan’s deeds in helping the man that had been 
beaten, stripped, and left to die on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho.41 The 
Bible reports: “But a Samaritan, who was on a journey, came upon him; and 
when he saw him, he felt compassion.”42 At first glance, one might wonder 
what “compassion” has to do with motive. Steven Sverdlik rightly argues that 
emotions can be intimately connected with motives.43 Recall that Sverdlik 
defines the motive of an act as: “the ultimate desire of the agent that explains 
its occurrence, or some feature of it.”44 He goes on to write that in some cases, 
emotions can “give rise to motives” because the emotions can “generate 
desires to act in ways related to the content of the emotions.”45 So while 
Sverdlik does not identify an emotion with a motive, he does not hesitate to 
identify the desire that springs forth from the emotion as a motive due to the 
fact that he ultimately defines motive as a desire. Sverdlik writes: “In specifying 
a person's motive we often use simple terms like revenge or fear or greed. But 
 
40 John 12:3–6. 
41 Luke 10:30. 
42 Luke 10:33 (NASB). 
43 Richard McCarty makes this same point in relation to Kant’s ethics. He writes that 
painful feelings can give rise to fear and pleasant feelings can give rise to inclinations (i.e., 
desires). In the case of both fear and inclination, they can serve as “motivational states.” 
Essentially, McCarty is making the same point about Kant’s ethics that Sverdlik is making: 
that emotions can give rise to motives. See Richard McCarty, Kant’s Theory of Action 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175.  
44 Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 18. 
45 Ibid., 21. 
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such terms are understood to imply the presence of something like a desire. It 
would be absurd to say that S's motive was greed but that she had no desire 
for money.”46 The bottom line is that the desire stemming from the emotion 
fulfills the criterion that Sverdlik sets forth for something to be counted a 
motive: it is something in the psychology of an individual that helps explain an 
act and make it comprehensible.47 In other words, the desire reveals why (i.e., 
provides the reason or reasons) the agent acted in the manner they did.  
Returning to the story of the Good Samaritan, compassion is an 
emotion which moved the Samaritan to act. If we take a bit of liberty with the 
text, what desires might have motivated the Good Samaritan as a result of 
feeling compassion for the stranger? Was his reason for acting a desire to 
show the man that he and his people should not be deemed inferior?48 Or 
maybe the Samaritan was aware that the Jewish priest and Levite had already 
passed and he wanted to show their hypocrisy by his act of kindness. It could 
be the case that his motive for acting was the simple, straightforward desire to 
communicate the love of God to the helpless victim. On the other hand, 
imagine if there was no reference to compassion in this story. If the story had 
only provided a catalogue of acts performed by the Good Samaritan, then we 
could only speculate as to the reason (i.e., the motive) why he helped the 
stranger.49 Maybe the Good Samaritan helped because although he cared 
nothing for anyone, he hoped to gain fame and popularity among the Jewish 
 
46 Ibid., 21. 
47 Ibid., 19. 
48 The Samaritans were viewed as inferior to Jews because they were not full-blooded 
Jews. A Samaritan was half-Jew, half Assyrian. This mixed race resulted from the 
intermarrying that happened between Jews and Assyrians after Assyria conquered the 
Northern Kingdom of Israel around 722 BCE. For this reason, the Samaritan could have 
relished the opportunity to show another person that there is no reason to condemn either 
him or the people of his race.  
49 Nardo and Francis write: “The Good Samaritan is lauded for his action; we do not know 
his intent.” See Massimo N. Nardo and Ronald D. Francis, “Morality and the Prevention of 
Corruption: Action or Intent—a New Look at an Old Problem, Journal of Financial Crime 19, 
no. 2 (2012): 130. However, I wonder if they, like Mark Jackson, are treating intention and 
motive as synonymous. I say this because surely we do know the Good Samaritan’s intent: 
to rescue the man on the side of the road and prevent his death. It seems more accurate to 
say that we do not know his motive, that is, the reason or reasons why he rescued the 
victim. That being said, if motive is closer to what Nardo and Francis mean, then I disagree 
once more because a range of motives is implied as I explained earlier due to the mention of 
“compassion.” 
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community, which held a derogatory view of him and his people. Whatever the 
case, the point is that without reference to the emotion of compassion and 
whichever motive-related desire that followed, the moral character of the act is 
ambiguous. Based on Sverdlik’s argument that emotionally-based desires 
often explain why someone performs a certain act, it is safe to say that the 
reference to compassion in this story narrows the field of potential motives 
from which the Good Samaritan could have acted. This example provides 
further support for Thielicke’s argument that we must look to the motive that 
lies “behind” the act (i.e., whatever form it may take) if we want to discover the 
real nature of the act. Only when you know the motive or motives behind the 
act do you know whether the act is meritorious. This implies that motive is part 
of the “Christian character of an action.”50 Without any reference to motive, the 
ambiguous nature of the act results in Christian ethics being interchangeable 
with any other framework of values. More will be said about this later in the 
section, but I now want to discuss the second reason that Thielicke believes 
that motive is the essential element in Christian ethics.  
The second reason that motive is essential to Protestant ethics is that 
apart from motive, any act that one might want to label as “Christian” remains 
comprehensible (and even realizable) within secular ethical frameworks. 
Thielicke asks: “Cannot the goals of Christian action (service to one’s 
neighbor, establishment of community, unselfishness, obedience, etc.) be as 
well achieved―or at least sought―‘without Christ,’ simply within the 
framework of secular ideologies?”51 Stated differently, if the moral value of a 
particular act can be understood, explained, and accommodated by any 
number of normative theories, then why bother trying to account for the act 
within Christian ethics when this only complicates matters? Occam’s razor 
would advise otherwise. Returning to Thielicke’s example of the person 
(henceforth, I will refer to him as “John”) who makes a significant donation to 
an orphanage, this act can be understood and encouraged within various 
systems of ethics. For example, Mill’s utilitarianism suggests that the right act 
 
50 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 23. 
51 Ibid., 18. 
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is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest 
number of people. John’s substantial donation to the orphanage will 
undoubtedly satisfy this Greatest Happiness Principle. If John had kept the 
money for himself, then he would have been happy. However, by donating the 
money to the orphanage, several children as well as workers will benefit and 
thereby experience greater happiness. The right course of action is clear: 
donate the money. Besides, John may also benefit emotionally from the act, 
feeling as though he used his money for a good purpose or that he is not selfish 
after all. Assuming that this is the case, John also will experience increased 
happiness along with the workers and children, which serves to further 
increase the total sum of happiness. From the perspective of Mill’s 
utilitarianism, the motive does not matter; only the consequences do. Another 
way of making this same point is to say that utilitarianism is future-oriented, 
that is, “only future consequences are material to present decisions.”52 Sverdlik 
writes: “the motive of an action, as such, is one of the causes of it and thus 
belongs to the history of the world preceding the action. A completely ‘forward-
looking’ theory of rightness like consequentialism cannot allow that an 
antecedent of an action affect its rightness.”53 Because a motive is prior to an 
action, it is dismissed as irrelevant to the classification of an act because it has 
nothing to do with the consequences. For this reason, motive is not central to 
a utilitarian classification of an act. Returning to the orphanage example, why 
would the workers or orphans care about John’s motives? Motives do not feed 
children; acts do. The overall point is that the value of the act of donating the 
money to the orphanage can be comprehended not only in a Christian 
framework of values but also in a secular one (in this case, utilitarianism), so 
long as motives are ignored.  
Does the same hold true if we evaluate this same act from within Kant’s 
ethics? The answer is a clear “yes” if we once again ignore motive. Granted, 
 
52 John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” The Philosophical Review 64, no. 1 (Jan. 1955): 
5. For further support of this future-oriented type of objection to motives having deontic 
relevance in Utilitarianism, see Mark Timmons, Significance and System: Essays on Kant’s 
Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 173. 
53 Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 9. 
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this example is more nuanced than the previous example because Kant does 
require proper motive. However, although he requires motive, it is not the same 
as the type of motive that is required in Christian ethics. I will say more on this 
soon. For Kant, it is not enough to perform the act that the categorical 
imperative requires;54 rather, it must be performed in the right manner. One 
must not only perform the act, but one must do it “from duty,” not merely “in 
conformity with duty.”55 Essentially, this is a reference to motive. Kant thinks 
that if the reason (i.e., motive) that someone performs a deed is because it is 
their duty to do it, then the act possesses moral worth. However, if a person 
does that act because they are inclined to do it or because instinct prompts 
them, then no matter the act, it does not possess moral value. This is not to 
say that the act is morally wrong, but only that it does not possess moral value, 
because the will is not motivated from duty.  
Concerning this aspect of Kant’s ethics, Thielicke notes: “It is indeed a 
proof of the moral worth of an action when that action involves struggle and is 
wrung out of me despite my natural inclination to do the opposite.”56 In a similar 
tone, C.S. Lewis echoes Thielicke’s point when he contends that Kant has 
been accused of a “‘morbid frame of mind’ which measures the value of an act 
by its unpleasantness.”57 Of course, Lewis was not a Kantian. However, his 
assessment that for Kant, an act only possesses moral value if it is performed 
“out of pure reverence for the moral law, that is, without inclination . . .”, seems 
accurate.58 Acting from a motive of duty is essential to performing a deed that 
possesses moral worth in Kant’s deontological system of ethics, and this 
 
54 Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative is: “act only according to that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” See 
Kant, Groundwork, 33.  
55 Ibid., 13. 
56 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 33; cf. Allen W. Wood, The Free Development of Each: 
Studies on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 16.  
57 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, in The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics (New York: 
HarperOne, 2017): 608. 
58 Ibid., 608; Similar to Lewis, David Daniel writes of an act performed form duty that it 
“excludes inclination.” See David M. Daniel, Briefly: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (London: SCM Press, 2006): 43; See also Badhwar, “Justice and Supererogation, 
125. 
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motive is on display in its purest form when all inclinations and instincts are 
absent.59 As Christine Korsgaard writes: “When such a person does his duty, 
not otherwise wanting to, we know that the thought of duty alone has been 
sufficient to produce the action.60 The bottom line is that for Kant, motive is 
everything. It determines whether an act possesses moral value or not. This 
focus on motive, an element in one’s psychology which is related to character, 
is most likely why Thielicke refers to Kant’s ethics as an “ethics of 
disposition.”61  
So is Thielicke’s example of a person donating money to the orphanage 
comprensible in Kant’s system? As was the case with utilitarianism, the answer 
is clearly “yes.” The main requirement is that one gives from duty and not 
merely in conformity with duty. If someone makes the donation while thinking, 
“I am doing this because it is my moral duty to help those in need when I am 
able,” then they have acted primarily out of a sense of duty. Could we will that 
this principle of action become a universal law, that every person in the world 
would act on the maxim, “When someone is in need and has the means to 
help, then it is their moral duty to act.” Again, the answer is “yes.” Kant 
described this duty in the following terms: “To be beneficent where one can . . 
.”62 However, Kant quickly notes that performing this act from the motive of 
duty requires that the donor not act from any other motive, whether it be 
negative (e.g., vanity, self-interest) or positive (e.g., to experience the pleasure 
of spreading joy to others).63 Granted, Kant would not have an issue with 
someone experiencing pleasure or a deep sense of self-satisfaction because 
 
59 See Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
29. 
60 Christine M. Korsgaard, forward to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. 
Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), xv. 
61 Referring to Kant’s ethics as an “ethics of disposition” is surprising for the simple fact 
that Kant’s ethics might be considered the deontological ethic par excellence. Yet, the word 
“disposition” suggests a closer affiliation with the family of terms and concepts associated 
with virtue ethics (e.g., character, virtue, vice, etc.) than it does an ethic of obligation. 
However, I believe that Thielicke is right to use this label because of the central role that 
motives play in Kant’s system.  
62 Kant, Groundwork, 13. 
63 Ibid., 13. 
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he does not view them as intrinsically wrong.64 His only stipulation is that these 
positive feelings not be the main reason for which someone acts. One is to do 
their duty from duty (i.e., because it is their duty), and if positive feelings 
happen to accompany such acts, so be it. They are to be nothing more than 
the spontaneous by-products of an act performed out of a sense of duty. In 
this sense, they are accidental in nature and ought never be the reason that a 
person performs an act if they desire that the doing of the act be considered 
moral in nature.  
To avoid getting too sidetracked, let it suffice to say that this beneficent 
act is “comprehensible quite apart from considerations of any particularly 
Christian motive.”65 Although Kant does require that the moral agent act with 
a right motive (i.e., a sense of duty) in order for their act to be considered 
moral, this is not what Thielicke has in mind when he writes of “Christian 
motivation.” More will be said later in this section, but let it suffice for now to 
say that in Thielicke’s view, doing an act “as to the Lord” and not “unto men” 
constitutes proper motive.66 Most likely, Thielicke would rightly view Kant’s 
“from a sense of duty” motive as an impoverished criterion in comparison with 
the Christian motive of doing an act to please and honor the Lord. This is not 
to imply that these two motives are antithetical: one could perform an act out 
of a sense of duty in an effort to please and honor the Lord. However, this does 
not mean that all acts done out of a sense of duty are done to please and honor 
the Lord. While both Kant and Thielicke agree that motive is crucial in 
determining the moral classification of an act, they disagree on the required 
nature of the motive. In this instance, the quality of the motive must be 
assessed, and if it is not, then John’s donation to the orphanage is 
indistinguishable between both Kant’s and Thielicke’s account. Yet, if the 
quality of the motive is considered, then one will have no problem 
distinguishing John’s act in Thielicke’s account from the same act in Kant’s 
 
64 Mark Packer, “Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50, 
no. 3 (1989): 435; Richard McCarty, Kant’s Theory of Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009): 175, 178–179. 
65 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 17. 
66 Ibid., 21.  
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account because of the two different types of motive. Reiterating Thielicke’s 
point, there can be nothing “Christian” about the act unless the level of motive 
is consulted. 
The previous discussion of the donor’s act within both utilitarianism and 
Kant’s deontology is sufficient to demonstrate that when motive is ignored, 
most normative theories can easily account for any act that would be 
encouraged within a Christian framework of values. At this point, the Christian 
narrative and framework of values become superfluous. However, this is not 
the case if motive is given preeminence as Thielicke suggests. Having 
discussed the two reasons that Thielicke offers in defense of the essential role 
that motive must play in Christian ethics in order to preserve its distinctiveness, 
I now want to take a deeper look into Thielicke’s account of motive. For 
transparency, it is important to begin with the fact that Thielicke does not 
distinguish between motive and intent. As with moral philosophers such as 
M.W. Jackson, the failure to draw such a line can result in confusion.67 
Although there are moments when Thielicke describes motive in a way that 
might better resemble an intention, based on our earlier definition, his overall 
use of the term is consistent with the definition of motive provided earlier: “the 
reason or reasons for which an agent acts.” 
Thielicke uses clear, strong language concerning the importance and 
place of motive in Christian ethics. Not only does he describe motive as the 
“specifically ‘Christian’ element in ethics,” but he also uses other language to 
communicate its importance. On one occasion, he describes proper motive as 
a “divine requirement,”68 and in another place, he employs more discipleship-
oriented language: “that which is distinctive about obedience to God.”69 His 
point seems clear: Obedience to God requires proper motive, and without 
 
67 See Jackson, “The Nature of Supererogation,” 294. 
68 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 20. Walter Wilson also notes that motive is a major focus 
in Jesus’ teaching on the following three practices in Matt. 6: giving alms, prayer, and 
fasting. He begins by noting that there are two ways that this passage is interpreted. In the 
second of two interpretative options, he writes that a “contrast between proper and improper 
motivations for practicing one’s piety occurs in all three” (Walter T. Wilson, “Seen in Secret: 
Inconspicuous Piety and Alternative Subjectivity in Matthew 6:1–6, 16–18,” The Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 72, no. 3 (July 2010): 477). 
69 Ibid., 21. 
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proper motive, one cannot fulfill their God-given duties. One must do the right 
deed (or avoid the wrong one) in the right way, which for Thielicke means 
having the right motive. Grudem makes a similar point, writing: “Jesus taught 
us to beware of doing good actions with wrong motives, such as the desire to 
be praised by other people.”70 Grudem then mentions Matthew 6:1–2 in 
support of his claim: “Beware of practicing your righteousness before other 
people in order to be seen by them, for then you will have no reward from your 
Father who is in heaven. Thus, when you give to the needy, sound no trumpet 
before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they 
may be praised by others. Truly, I say to you, they have received their 
reward.”71 With the use of italics, Grudem uses Jesus’ words to show that 
giving alms from a selfish motive is forbidden by Jesus. Concerning motive, 
Jesus makes similar points later in Matthew 6 in his teaching on prayer72 as 
well as fasting.73 It seems that Jesus would rather someone not give, pray, or 
fast if their ultimate motivation is to perform these acts for “mere outward 
show.74 Grudem is making the point, like Thielicke, that proper motive is crucial 
to obeying God. It is not just the outward act that matters. The act must be 
“genuine,” a property that comprises, in part, the “basis of Christian action.”75 
This property is characterized by a harmony between the inner realm of motive 
and the outward realm of acts.76 Presumably, genuineness is to be understood 
as the opposite of hypocrisy for which Jesus so often maligned the religious 
leaders of his day.77 In support of the importance of genuineness, Thielicke 
mentions Matthew 23:25, where Jesus rebukes the Pharisees in the following 
manner: “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you clean the 
outside of the cup and the plate, but inside they are full of greed and self-
 
70 Grudem, Christian Ethics, 150. 
71 Wayne Grudem uses the ESV for these two verses. 
72 Matt. 6:5–6. 
73 Matt. 6:16–18. 
74 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 21. 
75 Ibid., 21. 
76 Ibid., 21. 
77 For several examples of Jesus rebuking the Pharisees for hypocrisy, see Matt. 23. 
Although there are several examples scattered throughout the four Gospels, Matt. 23 
records six examples. 
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indulgence.” The point is that for Jesus, a lack of harmony between the inward 
(i.e., motive) and outward (i.e., the act) can result in disobedience because 
though the obligatory act be performed, the “inner structure of the action”78 
remains un-Christian due to motive (and thus, out of harmony with the 
objective act).  
This view that Thielicke sets forth (which is very similar to Grudem’s 
treatment of motive in Protestant ethics) is made clearer with a distinction by 
George Hughes. Hughes distinguishes between an “act duty” and a “total 
obligation.” Whereas the former is subsumed into the latter, the reverse is not 
at all true. Hughes writes: 
When I ask myself, “What is my duty?” or “What ought I to do?” what I 
may be doing is this: I may be surveying the various acts which . . . are 
open to me, and from these trying to select one as the right act in the 
situation. In order to do this I may have to take into account a great 
many factors . . . but the essential point here is that on the basis of my 
answers to these questions I am trying to select an act out of those 
which I am surveying. Clearly then, if this is what I am doing, the 
question, “What is my duty?” is here a question about the nature of acts 
and their relations to the situation in which I find myself; it is in fact, the 
question, “What is the right act?” And if I do the act which is in fact the 
right one in the situation, then clearly in this sense I have done my duty 
(objectively). . . . But all these questions are questions about acts alone. 
I propose to employ the term “act-duty” to refer to this usage. My act-
duty in a given situation will be that act which it is my duty to do.79 
 
Assessing whether a person, particularly a Christian, has performed their duty 
would mean that neither intent nor motive is considered. For many moral 
philosophers and Christian thinkers, this cannot be tolerated. David 
Cunningham is quick to point out that part of what Jesus’ teaching reveals is 
that it is wrong for people to “mistake their observation of the letter of the law 
for truly good moral behavior.”80 In other words, an act-duty approach is 
insufficient. If Jesus would prefer people not pray than pray for mere outward 
show, it appears that he is teaching that motive is a key element in the inner 
 
78 Ibid., 22. 
79 George Hughes, “Motive and Duty,” Mind 53, no. 212 (Oct. 1944): 325. 
80 David Cunningham, Christian Ethics: The End of the Law (London: Routledge, 2008), 
12. 
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structure of the act. If motives do not possess deontic relevance, it seems that 
Jesus would prefer people to perform acts regardless of motive. However, this 
does not appear to be the case. So whether we are discussing Mill’s, Heyd’s, 
or Archer’s preferences for intent or Grenz’s, Grudem’s, Kant’s, or Thielicke’s 
preferences for motive, most thinkers seem to reject an act-duty conception of 
duty. Hughes agrees that the act-duty conception of duty is deficient. After 
presenting the act-duty view, he proceeds to offer a more complete and robust 
conception of duty, which he calls “total obligation.” He writes: 
But from the fact that there is this established use of the term “duty” it 
clearly does not follow that my “total obligation” (i.e. the complete 
discharge, within the limits of my powers, of everything―whether mere 
acts, or something more―which the situation requires of me) consists 
in nothing but the doing of my act duty. . . . I might have other moral 
obligations in addition to the obligation to perform it. The term “duty” is 
commonly used to refer to this notion of total obligation; but neglect to 
draw the distinction between these two notions has led to many 
confusions.81 
 
Having drawn this distinction, Hughes goes on to attack W.D. Ross’ view of 
ethics as essentially act-duty in nature. He then makes the important point that 
while an act-duty view of moral obligation precludes any reference to motive, 
a total obligation perspective “may include acting from a certain motive.”82 
Considering the Matthean passages that Thielicke and Grudem use to defend 
the centrality of motive, Hughes’ point that confusion results from a failure to 
distinguish between “act-duty” and “total obligation” is relevant. In Jesus’ 
polemic against the Pharisees, it seems evident that this is exactly what he 
was rebuking them for. From the perspective of “act-duty,” they were 
outstanding in their performance. However, Jesus was not content with mere 
external compliance. On one occasion, he expressed disapproval of several 
of the Jewish religious leaders, saying: “Isaiah prophesied rightly about you 
hypocrites, as it is written, ‘This people honors me with their lips, but their 
hearts are far from me.’”83 Something more was required than the mere act. 
 
81 Hughes, “Motive and Duty,” 325.  
82 Ibid., 327. 
83 Mark 7:6; see also Matt. 15:8. 
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Using Hughes’ language, the “act-duty” conception of duty was not 
representative of the “total obligation” that God requires as revealed in Jesus’ 
scathing rebuke of the Pharisees. Proper motive is essential if a Christian 
desires to fulfill their duty in the second sense (i.e., total obligation). According 
to Hughes, total obligation is a fuller, more complete notion of duty, and I am 
arguing that it should to be preferred in Protestant ethics. Considering the fact 
that Thielicke believes an act is ambiguous without reference to motive, his 
view of duty easily fits Hughes’ notion of “total obligation” rather than mere act-
duty.  
Earlier it was mentioned that according to Thielicke, the “base” of a 
Christian act is the quality, or property, of genuineness. For Thielicke, this 
“base” is only half of what comprises something much broader, that is, the 
“fundamental imperative of Christian conduct.” He writes: “Hence the 
specifically ‘Christian’ element in ethics is found only at the level of motives. 
This is pointedly expressed in the saying in Colossians 3:23: ‘Whatever ye do, 
do it from the heart (ἐκ ψυχής), as to the Lord, and not unto men.’”84 As alluded 
to earlier, the “base” of the act concerns the genuineness of the act, that is, 
whether a person acts “from the heart.” Thielicke equates acting “from the 
heart” with not acting from a “motive of mere outward show.”85 What makes an 
act genuine, therefore, is that the act does not appear to be one thing but is 
actually something else at the level of motive. Below is a good example of the 
inner-outer harmony that is indicative of genuineness:  
Consider a couple who are talking together about whether they should 
agree to help with their church’s youth ministry one night a week. If they 
honestly ask themselves why they want to do this, they might find that 
their motives are very positive ones, such as a desire to minister 
effectively to young people who come to their church, to be involved in 
a church activity in which their children participate, to do some kind of 
ministry together, to meet a need because of a shortage of volunteers 
at the time, or because of other similar motives. They might just want to 
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This is an example of inner and outer harmony because the potential motives 
match the act being considered. All I mean is that the act of volunteering seems 
to communicate that one loves God, wants to honor God, and wants to help 
others. In the above scenario, the potential motives are to this effect. Thus, the 
person can be said to be “fully present in his action.”87 On the other hand, they 
could be considering volunteering from un-Christian motives. Consider the 
revised scenario below: 
They might be thinking about helping in the youth ministry because a 
neighbor has been putting pressure on them to do so and they are tired 
of telling him no, even though they do not feel it is the right thing for 
them to do. Or they might want to become better known and gain 
recognition from others in the church, which is a simple appeal to their 
pride. Or they might be seeking an opportunity to observe the youth 
pastor so they can lodge more criticisms against him with the church 
leaders!88 
 
In this revised scenario, there is a lack of inner-outer harmony. As before, the 
act of volunteering communicates that one loves God, wants to honor God, 
and wants to help others. However, the couple are not volunteering for any of 
these reasons, even though the outward act might suggest otherwise. The 
point is that the potential motives do not correspond with the act itself; 
disharmony exists. Therefore, the act is not genuine and each person is not 
fully present in their act.  
 Besides the “base” of the act, Thielicke writes that we must also 
consider the “goal” because it comprises the other half of the fundamental 
imperative of Christian conduct. Whereas the “base” was captured in the 
phrase, “from the heart” in Colossians 3:23, the “goal” of the act is expressed 
in the words, “as to the Lord, and not unto men.”89 In other words, a Christian’s 
reason for acting (i.e., motive)—whether it be giving, praying, fasting, or some 
other behavior—should never be to impress, flatter, or gain the approval of 
people (i.e., “unto men”) rather than the Lord. With this in mind, it seems that 
Thielicke’s notion of “goal” represents the reason for which one acts, and 
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therefore, can be replaced with “motive.” Essentially, the goal of an act for a 
Christian is to do the act from the following motive: “to the glory of the Lord, 
the kurios.”90 Though the “base” has more to do with a Christian being present 
in the act and the goal more to do with the Lord being present in the act, both 
are ultimately to be determined by the kurios if the act is to be called 
“Christian.”91 Ultimately, the fundamental imperative of Christian conduct 
according to Thielicke is to act with the motive of bringing glory to the Lord 
(i.e., goal), and by doing so, both the act that appears to be for the Lord and 
the motive will be in harmony (i.e., base).  
Further support for my claim that Thielicke is using the word “motive” in 
the same way that I am is found in his treatment of Luther. Thielicke refers to 
Luther’s use of the phrase, “We should fear and love God” which Luther placed 
at the beginning of each of the ten commandments in the book, Small 
Catechism, which was written for pastors and preachers with whom he was in 
contact. For example, regarding the commandment about adultery,92 Luther 
writes: “‘You shall not commit adultery.’ What does this mean? Answer: We 
should fear God and love God, and so we should lead a chaste and pure life 
in word and deed, each one loving and honoring his wife or her husband.”93 
This is extremely important because Luther’s beginning phrase, which is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Decalogue in Exodus 20, suggests to Thielicke that 
Luther also did not interpret the commands in an act-duty manner. Thielicke 
interprets the addition of the phrase, “We should fear God and love God,” as 
confirmation that Luther also believed that “obedience to the commandments 
is rendered on the level of motives.”94 Thielicke continues: “All right action 
springs from the fact that I fear and love God. And any action which does not 
spring from this fact is to be disparaged either as an attempt to earn salvation 
by merit or as hypocrisy.”95 For Thielicke, doing an act because one fears and 
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loves God is to obey God with proper “Christian motivation.” When this is the 
case, both the “base” and the goal of the act are being determined by the 
kurios, which means that the motive is proper and that the “inner structure of 
the action is ‘Christian.’”96  
Considering this same point from another angle, fearing and loving the 
Lord seems to refer more to why someone would perform a particular behavior 
rather than to a specific state of affairs that the person is trying to bring about. 
For example, if someone asks: “What state of affairs is the agent aiming to 
bring about by acting?” someone would not say, “Because I fear and love the 
Lord.” This would not make sense. But if someone were to ask: “Why does the 
agent want to achieve this particular outcome?” then it would be appropriate 
to respond with: “Because I fear and love the Lord.” In other words, fearing and 
loving the Lord helps explain why someone performs X, which in essence 
gives us their reasons. And as defined earlier, motive―not intent―is 
concerned with “the reason or reasons for which an agent acts.”  
 Though I have just argued that Thielicke’s combined use of the words 
“goal” and “base” are similar to how I am using the word “motive,” it would be 
amiss to not acknowledge some ambiguity in Thielicke’s writing, especially in 
relation to my argument in this chapter. Like M.W. Jackson and others, 
Thielicke does not draw a distinction between motive and intent. He speaks 
only of motive, and some might think that the word “goal” resembles something 
close to intent. However, as previously argued, the word “goal” is clearly 
associated with doing an act to please God, not people. Thus, one need not 
pay so much attention to the specific word that Thielicke uses (i.e., “goal”) as 
opposed to how he uses the term. My point is that though there is some 
ambiguity in Thielicke’s writing, his argument can safely be viewed as an 
argument for motive, not intent, as the essential element in Protestant ethics. 
As a result, his work remains crucial to my view that proper motive is a 
necessary criterion in a Protestant account of supererogation.  
 
96 Ibid., 22.  
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Although my main focus in this section has been to argue for the 
centrality of motive rather than intent in a Protestant account of 
supererogation, I have focused primarily on the role of motive in duty. One 
reason for this is that there is a multitude of duties listed in the New Testament, 
which provides ample opportunity to investigate the more general deontic role 
that motive plays in classifying acts in Protestant Christianity. As stated earlier, 
my reasoning is as follows: If acting with proper motive is required in order to 
obey God when doing what he has commanded, then it stands to reason that 
acting with the proper motive is also an essential element in the performance 
of an act that is supererogatory. It would be odd from a Protestant perspective 
if motive were an essential element in performing a duty while not being an 
essential element in performing an act of supererogation. For this reason, I 
interpret Thielicke’s argument for motive as the essential element in Protestant 
ethics in a broad manner to encompass both duties and acts of 
supererogation. 
Before addressing a significant objection to my motive-argument 
presented by Mill in the next section, I want to clarify my use of the terms 
“proper” and “improper” in reference to motive. Whether writing of motive in 
relation to obligatory or supererogatory acts, proper motive is any motive that 
is ultimately Christ-centered and Christ-honoring as opposed to one that is 
selfish, fearful, vengeful, greedy, lustful, prideful, or any other that is contrary 
to the nature and teachings of Jesus Christ. Upon initial consideration, the 
requirement that motives be Christ-centered and Christ-honoring might seem 
quite narrow, too strict a criterion, or too vague. However, I do not believe that 
this is the case. In a section titled, “Motives for Obedience to God in the 
Christian Life,” Grudem provides eleven examples of what proper motivation 
might look like from a Christian perspective. They are as follows (though I have 
omitted the specific Bible verses that he gives in support of each):  
(1) a desire to please God and express our love to him . . . (2) the need 
to keep a clear conscience before God . . . (3) the desire to be a “vessel 
for noble use” and have increased effectiveness in the work of the 
kingdom . . . (4) the desire to see unbelievers come to Christ through 
observing our lives . . . (5) the desire to receive present blessings from 
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God on our lives and ministries . . . (6) the desire to avoid God’s 
displeasure and discipline on our lives (sometimes called “the fear of 
God”) . . . (7) the desire to seek greater heavenly reward . . . (8) the 
desire for a deeper walk with God . . . (9) the desire that angels would 
glorify God for our obedience . . . (10) the desire for peace . . . and joy 
in our lives . . . (11) the desire to do what God commands, simply 
because his commands are right, and we delight in doing what is right. 
. . .97 
 
This list is valuable because it helps us imagine real motives that do not seem 
generic in nature. Most people can probably identify with one or more of these, 
whereas the terms “Christ-centered” and “Christ-honoring” might seem too 
generic. In section four, this list will be helpful in evaluating the act of 
supererogation presented in chapter three in light of the present chapter’s 
emphasis upon motive as a required criterion of supererogation in Protestant 
ethics. Before doing so, I want to address Heyd’s and Archer’s significant 
objection to a motive-based account of supererogation (and presumably, any 
act in question) that is based on John Stuart Mill’s comments in chapter two of 
Utilitarianism.  
 
Response to David Heyd’s and Alfred Archer’s Intent-based Theory 
 
As is obvious by now, David Heyd is a very important figure in the 
literature on supererogation. His book, published in 1982, preceded Alfred 
Archer’s work on supererogation by approximately three decades. Both offer 
an intent-based account of supererogation although their views regarding the 
nature of intent differ significantly.98 In this section, my goal is to show that 
there are good reasons for questioning Heyd’s and Archer’s argument for 
intent rather than motive. However, this task is not as straightforward as it 
seems. Heyd’s position is clearly rooted in John Stuart Mill’s argument for 
intent over motive in his book, Utilitarianism. Thus, Mill must be engaged on 
 
97 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 757–758. 
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restrictive. Instead, he argues that the intent must only be moral because there are deeds 
that though not altruistic, are still supererogatory.  
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some level in order to respond effectively to Heyd. In order to accomplish this 
goal, I will do the following in this section: (1) Present and argue against Heyd’s 
and Archer’s view in conjunction with Mill, and (2) show that there are certain 
scenarios where motives clearly have deontic relevance for a particular act 
both in moral philosophy and the New Testament. Assuming that I am 
successful, this will provide additional support for my view that motives have 
deontic relevance in a Protestant account of supererogation. 
In his book, Supererogation, Heyd provides a quadripartite definition of 
supererogation. The third part of the definition reads: “[An act of 
supererogation] is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences 
and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty).”99 The importance of 
the first parenthesis cannot be overstated. In choosing to make intention a 
criterion of supererogation, he is rejecting the following two views: (1) an 
objective account of supererogation that decides the status of an act without 
any reference to the inner, psychological world of the agent, and more 
specifically, (2) a motive-based account of supererogation. Later in the same 
chapter where Heyd provides his definition, he explains why intent should be 
a criterion of supererogation. He writes:  
Altruistic intention should not, however, be confused with altruistic 
motive. While intention forms part of the description of the act, the 
motive is only the “feeling” which moves us to do it (Mill, 1969a, pp. 219-
20n). The motives for acting supererogatorily are diverse in character, 
and are not always virtuous. One may act heroically in order to gain 
fame, to soothe one’s conscience (haunted by guilt feelings), or out of 
moral self-indulgence. High-minded motives are not a necessary 
condition for supererogatory action as so many theorists tend to believe 
(e.g. Peterfreund, 1978, p. 55). Although the motives of supererogatory 
acts may be self-regarding, the intention must be other-regarding.100  
 
The key phrase in Heyd’s account of how acts (in this case, supererogatory 
acts) are to be individuated is “intention forms part of the description of the act 
. . .” The corollary is that motives do not. Heyd’s intent-based theory of act 
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classification is derived from John Stuart Mill’s view of intentions. In a famous 
footnote found in chapter two of Utilitarianism, Mill writes:  
I submit that he who saves another from drowning in order to kill him by 
torture afterwards does not differ only in motive from him who does the 
same thing from duty or benevolence; the act itself is different. The 
rescue of the man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first step 
of an act far more atrocious than leaving him to drown would have been. 
Had Mr. Davies said, “The rightness or wrongness of saving a man from 
drowning does depend very much”—not upon the motive, but—“upon 
the intention,” no utilitarian would have differed from him. Mr. Davies, 
by an oversight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case 
confounded the very different ideas of Motive and Intention. . . . The 
morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon 
what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which 
makes him will so to do, if it makes no difference in the act, makes none 
in the morality: though it makes a great difference in our moral 
estimation of the agent.101 
 
Referencing Heyd’s remarks as well as Mill’s well-known footnote, Archer 
offers the following summary of Heyd’s intention-based view: “An agent in the 
same situation but acting with different intentions would have performed a 
different act. As a result, the motivation that led to the act does not alter the 
moral evaluation of the act; it only alters our evaluation of the agent.”102 The 
line of thought seems to be that because it is “possible for different motives to 
lead to the same action,”103 whereas this is not true for intent, intentions must 
be intrinsic to acts, unlike motives. In other words, if a person can perform act 
A from either motive X or Y but can only perform act A from intent S, then it 
appears that only intent S is intrinsic to act A and is therefore a necessary 
constituent of the act. On the other hand, no particular motive is associated 
with act A, so from a deontic perspective, it is superfluous. This is not to say 
that motive is completely irrelevant, but that any influence it might have will be 
indirect at most.  
 Before going any further, two points need to be made. First, interpreting 
Mill’s comments in a footnote in chapter two of Utilitarianism is not as 
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straightforward as it might appear, which other philosophers have noted.104 
Secondly, Heyd and Archer do not address the complexity of Mill’s footnote, 
even though this is clearly the text that they use for support of their intent-
based view of supererogation. They stay with a very basic, straightforward 
interpretation of Mill’s intent-based account of act evaluation: intents are 
relevant, motives are not. This is not necessarily bad, but it is worth mentioning 
to make the point that an in-depth analysis of Mill’s theory of act-evaluation is 
not necessarily required in order to effectively respond to Heyd and Archer. 
Therefore, though it is important to present and engage Mill’s view, I plan to 
focus only on the aspects of his theory that are relevant to Heyd’s and Archer’s 
arguments for intent over motive.  
Mill devotes chapter two in Utilitarianism to expounding the theory of 
utilitarianism, which is the best-known version of consequentialist ethics. This 
is important because his overall normative theory plays an important role in his 
intent-based account of act classification. It is also in chapter two that Mill 
makes a clear distinction between motives and intentions and then proceeds 
to argue that the “morality of the action depends entirely on the intention,” not 
the motive.105 Liezl van Zly describes this view as “anti-motivism.” This is the 
view that motive is not relevant in the evaluation of actions although it is useful 
when assessing the character of agents.106 For Zly, Mill’s intent-based theory 
of classifying acts is a paradigmatic example.107 Contrary to anti-motivism, 
Sverdlik defends the “Motives Matter” thesis, which states: “There is an action 
X such that if X were performed from one motive it would fall into one deontic 
category and if X were performed from another motive it would fall into a 
second deontic category in virtue of this difference in motives.”108 If this can be 
demonstrated, then the example would be sufficient to defeat anti-motivism. 
Zly proceeds to describe three different forms that Motives Matter can take: 
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weak-motivism, partial-motivism, and strong-motivism. Weak-motivism is the 
view that “a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to move an act 
from one deontic category into another.”109 Strong-motivism is the view that “a 
good motive always serves to make an act right, whereas a bad (or 
insufficiently good) motive always makes it wrong.”110 And partial-motivism is 
the view that “a good motive is necessary but not sufficient for right action.”111 
While all three are distinct from one another, they all represent an antithesis to 
Mill’s anti-motivist position. 
According to Mill, at no point is motive relevant to classifying acts. In 
one example, he writes: “He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does 
what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for 
his trouble.”112 Christoph Schmidt-Petri refers to the former motive as “benign” 
and the latter as “selfish.”113 One can see why this is an attractive example for 
Mill to use. After all, no one would excuse another person for refusing to rescue 
a drowning person because they feared acting from a wrong motive. No matter 
the motive, it seems that the right thing to do is to save the drowning person. 
Archer makes the same point when he writes that if someone pays their taxes 
intentionally, they have fulfilled their obligation, whether they did so out of a 
sense of duty or because they feared punishment. Situations like the two just 
mentioned suggest that Mill may be right. However, he writes that the Rev. J. 
Llewellyn Davies provided him with the following objection which Schmidt-Petri 
names the “tyrant” case:  
Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does 
depend very much upon the motive with which it is done. Suppose that 
a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved 
him from drowning simply in order that he might inflict upon him more 
exquisite tortures, would it tend to clearness to speak of that rescue as 
“a morally right action?”114 
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By this last rhetorical question, Davies clearly does not think that saving the 
individual with this motive is a morally right action. One might object: But surely 
letting someone drown when you could have saved them cannot be a morally 
right act? Yet Schmidt-Petri points out that unlike the benign and selfish cases, 
the tyrant case does not result in a “net-benefit” for the person rescued 
because of the simple fact that the “victim may well have preferred to drown 
rather than to first get ‘rescued’ and then tortured and killed somewhat later.”115 
From Davies’ perspective, it is unthinkable that a person could fulfill their duty 
while acting from such a despicable motive. Yet this is exactly what Mill seems 
to argue and both Heyd and Archer follow his lead. Mill accuses Davies of 
confusing motive with intention, and suggests that as a result, Davies is wrong 
to assert that the rescuer’s motive is responsible for determining the deontic 
status of the act. However, Mill’s remarks are far from clear and various 
philosophers have spent considerable time trying to figure out exactly what he 
meant by phrases such as, “the act itself is different,” and “only the necessary 
first step of an act . . .”  
All other issues aside, one possible interpretation of Mill’s footnote is 
that intention is affirmed rather than motive because there is a direct link 
between intentions and the consequences of an act, whereas there is no direct 
link between motives and consequences. To explain this view, some context 
is needed. One serious problem with Mill’s intent-based account is that he 
seems to be making two contradictory claims. Jonathan Dancy writes: “There 
is of course a general difficulty in coping with Mill’s claim that (6) the morality 
of the action depends entirely on the intention. How is this compatible with his 
utilitarianism? Should not the rightness or wrongness of the action depend on 
its consequences?”116 One wants to ask Mill: “Which is it? Do the 
consequences determine the moral status of an act or is it intentions?” Dancy 
suggests that one way around this problem is to embrace both positions by 
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arguing that “only intended consequences count.”117 Schmidt-Petri is quick to 
argue that if this is what Mill intended, then he should have said so clearly and 
offered a reply to the following objection: “But an action causing terrible 
suffering could not plausibly become less wrong just because the person 
performing it is careless at predicting its consequences or even culpably 
ignorant of what will happen as a result of his action—if anything, it makes 
matters even worse.”118  
But there is another response to the apparent incompatibility between 
Mill’s utilitarianism and his claim that intentions have deontic relevance. 
Schmidt-Petri writes: “If the benign rescuer pulling the drowning person out of 
the pond wants to save him, the person will be saved. If the tyrant wants to 
torture and kill him, he will be tortured and killed. Clearly, the difference in 
intention brings about a difference in the effects.”119 If one substitutes 
“consequences” for the word “effects,” then it becomes clearer why Mill might 
have believed that intentions are a necessary component in act evaluation. 
Being a utilitarian, changing the intent necessarily results in a different act 
which automatically results in a different outcome. Take a look at the following 
two examples:  
Intent A → Act AA → Consequences AAA 
Intent B → Act BB → Consequences BBB 
For the sake of the example, if you eliminate the column of acts for visual 
effect, then intent A ultimately leads to consequences AAA and intent B leads 
to consequences BBB. Intent A cannot lead to any other consequences. In 
whatever situation is being analyzed, the only way that you can have 
consequences other than AAA is if you change the original intent that initiated 
the entire sequence. In any given situation, there is an intrinsic connection 
between a particular intent and particular consequences, and changing the 
intent always results in different consequences. Schmidt-Petri makes this point 
nicely, writing: “If the moral value of an action is determined by its 
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consequences, the consequences depend entirely on the intention of the 
agent, the moral value also depends ‘entirely’ on the intention of the agent.”120 
By this logic, the direct link between intentions and the consequences of an 
act demonstrates that intentions are fundamentally connected to 
consequences, and in utilitarianism, the consequences are what determine the 
moral rightness or wrongness of an act. Thus, intentions are an integral 
component of acts and therefore part of what must be considered when 
evaluating the deontic status of any particular act. 
Although this argument is a good attempt to reconcile Mill’s insistence 
that both intent and consequences are pivotal for act evaluation, its application 
is limited. First of all, does this position necessarily require one to adopt the 
extreme anti-motivist position? There seems to be room to allow motives to 
have deontic relevance at least in some instances even if you allow intentions 
a more dominant role. A second and potentially stronger criticism revolves 
around the nature of Utilitarianism itself. Sverdlik suggests that ultimately, 
Mill’s intent-based account of assessing acts is a direct result of his overall 
commitment to the principles of Utilitarianism. Sverdlik writes: “the motive of 
an action, as such, is one of the causes of it and thus belongs to the history of 
the world preceding the action. A completely ‘forward-looking’ theory of 
rightness like consequentialism cannot allow that the antecedent of an action 
affects its rightness.”121 However, he further observes that the “conclusion that 
[Motive Matters] is false collapses if we reject [utilitarianism’s] claim that only 
features of the world after the action are relevant to its rightness and 
wrongness.”122 To my knowledge, the forward-looking conclusion that an 
antecedent of an action cannot have deontic relevance would not be consistent 
with any other normative theory, suggesting that Mill’s argument for an intent-
based account of act evaluation is completely dependent on initial consent to 
the principles of utilitarianism.123 As Schmidt-Petri pointed out, if 
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consequences ultimately determine the moral status of an act and intentions 
are directly linked to consequences in a one-to-one correspondence, then 
Mill’s intent-based view might need to be adopted if one is a utilitarian. 
However, the obvious rejoinder is: “What if you are not a utilitarian?” 
Considering the fact that Protestant ethics might resemble a utilitarian ethic 
least in comparison to other normative theories, there is no reason to demand 
that Protestant ethics must first disprove Mill’s intent-based view before 
proceeding to argue for a motive-based account of acts and in particular, acts 
of supererogation. For example, pretend that person Y holds theory Z, and in 
theory Z, “A is dependent on B and C” is a fundamental axiom. If person X, 
unlike person Y, does not hold theory Z, then person X is no longer bound to 
accept the proposition: “A is dependent upon B and C.” In this analogy, theory 
Z is Mill’s utilitarianism, A is an act’s moral deontic status, B is consequences 
and C is intent. Thus, because person X rejects theory Z altogether, then they 
are not bound to accept that an act’s deontic status (i.e., A) is dependent on 
either consequences (i.e., B), intentions (i.e., C), or both. Therefore, person X 
(i.e., myself) can begin straightaway with motive, since they are not asking the 
question about motive and deontic relevance within the framework of theory Z. 
All of this to say, Protestant ethics can ask the question, “Are there examples 
of motives having deontic relevance?” without first having to stop to address 
Mill’s argument. In the next section, I will focus on a few acts in the New 
Testament. For now, I want to present an example of motives having deontic 
relevance that Sverdlik provides. This is the desire for money.124 
Regarding the desire for money motive, Sverdlik writes: “Mill says that 
an agent who saves someone from drowning ‘does what is right’ even if her 
motive is ‘the hope of being paid’ for her trouble.”125 He then writes that Mill 
may be right about saving the drowning person regardless of motive. This 
might seem like an odd way to begin if you are wanting to show that motives 
can have deontic relevance, but it presents no problem for Sverdlik because 
he later admits that his goal is modest in that he only wants to show that 
 
124 Sverdlik, Motive and Rightness, 14–15. 
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motives are only sometimes deontically relevant (i.e., he is not a strong-
motivist). After admitting that Mill may be right that the morally right act in the 
drowning case is to save the person no matter the motive, Sverdlik then 
presents four cases where he believes motive does makes a deontic 
difference. In the first instance, he uses one of Mill’s phrases in the drowning 
example. Sverdlik writes: “But I think that many people would say that if 
someone has sex with someone else ‘in the hope of being paid,’ the agent 
would be acting wrongly.”126 Conversely, Sverdlik goes on to say that many 
people would agree that if an agent has sex with someone else because they 
love the other person, then the act would not be wrong. In this case, expressing 
love is deemed a proper motive for sex whereas the motive to earn money via 
sex is deemed morally wrong. If we assume that all other factors are similar 
and that the only difference is motive, then it appears that the sex act to 
express love is morally right whereas the sex act to earn money is morally 
wrong. This is an example of a motive having deontic relevance.  
Sverdlik then mentions two more acts that “mix badly” with the desire 
for money motive: (1) marrying someone for money, and (2) putting a child up 
for adoption in order to gain money. If someone were to marry because they 
were offered a large sum of money but cared nothing for the person, then it 
seems undeniable that this act would be morally wrong. If motive is not 
considered, then the act of marriage is ambiguous. It could be for money, but 
it could also be for love. An appeal to motive is required in order to assess the 
deontic status of the act. The same is true of putting a child up for adoption. If 
a parent genuinely feels that they do not have the mental, emotional, or 
financial means to raise a child, then putting the child up for adoption could be 
the right thing to do even if it results in the parent receiving money. The key to 
unlocking the deontic status of the act is whether gaining money is the main 
reason (i.e., motive) that the parent put the child up for adoption. In each case, 
the point is the same: motive seems to play a crucial role in determining the 
deontic status of each act. Following Hughes’ lead, the person in each of the 
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named situations has a “total obligation” to not use someone as a mere means 
(the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative). However, we do not 
know whether a person has performed the “total obligation” without reference 
to motive. As Thielicke emphasized, the act itself is ambiguous until imbued 
with content, and in both the marriage and adoption case, motive is what 
supplies the deontically relevant content.  
Though I do not endorse the entirety of Joseph Fletcher’s situational 
ethics, it is to his credit that he emphasizes the absolute necessity of 
considering all relevant aspects of a situation before deciding which particular 
act ought to be performed in a specific situation. For Fletcher, only agapeic 
love is “intrinsically good”127 and for this reason, all else (including laws and 
commands) is disposable if it competes with love’s way in any given 
situation.128 His overall point is that the morally right act cannot be decided a 
priori. One can only determine the moral rightness of an act (i.e., the most 
loving act) once the relevant contingencies of the situation are available for 
consideration. In other words, context is crucial. In Sverdlik’s sex example, a 
deontically relevant part of the context is the agent’s motive (i.e., expressing 
love or earning money). Taking some liberty with Fletcher’s view, if we say that 
motive counts as one of the situational factors upon which the moral character 
of an act depends, then my view at least partially aligns with his.  
The main point in this section is that there are three good reasons for 
rejecting Heyd’s and Archer’s intention-based accounts of moral worth: (1) 
thinking that intentions determine moral worth does not seem to require the 
anti-motivism that Mill, Heyd, and Archer all embrace; (2) Sverdlik provides 
strong evidence by way of example that motives can have deontic relevance; 
and (3) Mill’s intent-based theory, which is utilized by both Heyd and Archer in 
their respective accounts, seems to require that a person accept the more 
general theory of utilitarianism. After responding to each, I maintain that 
motives can play an important role in determining the deontic status of an act. 
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Application of the Motive-Based Account 
 
 In this section, the supererogatory act of an innocent spouse reconciling 
with an adulterous spouse in chapter three is revisited and evaluated from the 
perspective that proper motive is necessary if any act is to be classified as 
supererogatory in Protestant ethics. Although my main focus will be on this 
act, certain acts discussed in the New Testament are mentioned in an effort to 
show that motives do have deontic relevance in Protestant ethics.  
 I argued in chapter three that according to Matthew’s Gospel, an 
innocent spouse is permitted to divorce an adulterous spouse. This is by no 
means a command, but a concession. Jesus does not require the innocent 
spouse to divorce; if they want to remain and be reconciled to the spouse who 
has committed adultery, then it is permitted. Based on this account, an 
innocent spouse’s choice to remain and reconcile is supererogatory because: 
(1) it is not obligatory (i.e., Jesus does not command the innocent spouse to 
reconcile), (2) it is not forbidden (i.e., Jesus does not command the innocent 
spouse to divorce), and (3) the act possesses moral worth. Also in chapter 
three, I mentioned that I would revisit this act in the latter half of this chapter to 
show that these three criteria are necessary but not sufficient conditions to 
earn a supererogatory classification; proper motive is also required. 
Regarding the innocent spouse’s act of remaining and reconciling with 
a spouse who has committed adultery, motive plays a crucial role in 
determining the deontic status of the act. To say this differently, the innocent 
spouse’s act of remaining and reconciling should not be classified as 
supererogatory in the absence of a proper motive. Using Grudem’s list of 
eleven proper Christian motives that he believes would be pleasing to God in 
acts of obedience (and by extension, acts of supererogation), eight are 
particularly relevant. They are as follows:129  
(1) a desire to please God and express our love to him . . . (2) the need 
to keep a clear conscience before God . . . (3) the desire to be a ‘vessel 
for noble use’ and have increased effectiveness in the work of the 
 
129 The numbers used earlier in the chapter are kept so that it makes it easier to identify 
which motives have been omitted. 
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Kingdom . . . (4) the desire to see unbelievers come to Christ through 
observing our lives . . . (5) the desire to receive present blessings from 
God on our lives and ministries . . . (7) the desire to seek greater 
heavenly reward . . . (8) the desire for a deeper walk with God . . . (10) 
the desire for peace . . . and joy in our lives . . .130  
 
In one way or another, all eight of these motives would satisfy the proper 
motive condition from a Protestant perspective for this particular act. However, 
I want to narrow the list further and focus on the motives (3), (4), and (8).  
In chapter three, I argued that the innocent spouse’s act of remaining 
and reconciling with a spouse who has committed adultery possesses moral 
worth for the following four specific reasons: the act (a) embodies God’s 
forgiveness for the guilty spouse, (b) produces holiness, (c) is evangelistic in 
nature, and (d) is in the best interests of any children involved. Of these four 
reasons, reason (a) corresponds with motive (3) in Grudem’s list, reason (b) 
corresponds with motive (8), and reason (c) corresponds with motive (4). I will 
now take each in turn in an effort to show what form a proper motive might 
take in order to satisfy the motive-based criterion that I have defended in this 
chapter.  
As stated in chapter three, one of the main reasons that an innocent 
spouse reconciling with a spouse who has committed adultery possesses 
moral worth is that it embodies God’s mercy and forgiveness for the partner 
who has sinned. For the spouse who has committed adultery and who is 
repentant, the road to forgiving oneself might be long, and as explained in 
chapter three, the innocent spouse’s decision to remain and reconcile can help 
make God’s willingness to forgive much more real. Thus, the act of remaining 
and reconciling possesses great moral value. From the perspective of motive, 
the act of remaining and reconciling in order to embody forgiveness for the 
guilty spouse closely resembles the third motive that Grudem praises: “the 
desire to be a ‘vessel for noble use’ and have increased effectiveness in the 
work of the Kingdom.”131 By effectiveness, I simply mean that God’s mercy and 
forgiveness can be made more believable and thus more real to the spouse 
 
130 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 757.  
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who has committed adultery. If the innocent spouse remains and reconciles in 
order to make the mercy and forgiveness of God more real to the guilty spouse, 
then the innocent spouse is allowing God to use them as a vessel in order to 
further his kingdom work in the life of the guilty spouse. From a Christian 
perspective, this is definitely a proper motive and easily satisfies the fourth 
criterion for supererogation in Protestant ethics.  
There are also other motives that the innocent spouse could act from 
that would satisfy the fourth criterion of proper motive. Returning to chapter 
three, the second reason that I gave for why the innocent spouse’s act of 
remaining and reconciling is morally praiseworthy it that it has the potential to 
produce holiness. The act of remaining and reconciling with an adulterous 
spouse possesses moral worth because it can lead to an increase of holiness 
in the life of the innocent spouse. This somewhat corresponds with Grudem’s 
eighth motive: “the desire for a deeper walk with God.”132 If the innocent 
spouse chooses to remain and reconcile because they view the act as an 
opportunity to identify with Christ in a deeper way than ever before, this 
decision will allow the innocent spouse to experience emotionally much of what 
God experiences when humans sin and desert God. This has a direct influence 
on a person’s relationship—or “walk,” as Grudem writes—with God. The 
reason is simple: acts of empathy possess great potential to strengthen the 
relationship between two people. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines 
empathy as: “the state of being emotionally and cognitively ‘in tune with’ 
another person, particularly by feeling what their situation is like from the 
inside, or what it is like for them.”133 Rather than interpret the phrase “in tune 
with” in mystical fashion, this phrase can be interpreted to simply mean that 
empathy enables a being to better understand what another person is 
experiencing on a cognitive and emotional level. As most people have 
experienced, a greater intimacy between two beings is often forged when the 
sufferer believes that another understands what they are feeling and what they 
are enduring. Essentially, intimacy can grow in the soil of shared suffering, by 
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identification. The apostle Paul appears to provide support for this point in the 
context of his relationship with Jesus Christ, writing: “I want to know Christ and 
the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his sufferings by becoming like 
him in his death. . . .”134 Thus, when an innocent spouse chooses not only to 
forgive, but to remain and reconcile, they position themselves to feel much of 
what God must feel due to the fact that he too has been betrayed at some point 
by every human being. This shared emotional experience can result in the 
transformation of the person in one way or another, ultimately resulting in 
greater holiness. Granted, not every act of empathy will result in a closer 
relationship between two people, but this does not alter the fact that it not only 
can, but often does, result in greater intimacy. In a sense, the relationship 
between the increase in intimacy with God and the increase in holiness in the 
life of a Christian is reciprocal—as one becomes more like Christ, it is very 
likely that they will love Christ more, and as their love for Christ grows, it is also 
very likely that they will become more and more like Christ (i.e., increase in 
holiness).  
Another motive in Grudem’s list I wish to focus on is the fourth: “the 
desire to see unbelievers come to Christ through observing our lives.”135 This 
mirrors what I explained in chapter three when I wrote that one of the reasons 
that the innocent spouse’s act of remaining and reconciling with a spouse who 
has committed adultery possesses moral worth is that it is evangelistic in 
nature. An innocent spouse could choose to remain and reconcile because, 
amidst other reasons, they desire the restored relationship in order to 
demonstrate to unbelievers that God is real and able to provide the needed 
grace to forgive and work through difficult issues in order to save the marriage. 
This can serve as evidence—an ἀπολογία—that God is real and wants to 
come to the assistance of people. In the end, this could result in emotionally 
wounded people who are not Christians seeking salvation and hope in Christ. 
Also, the reconciled marriage can serve as a catalyst to reawaken and 
motivate other compromised Christians as was mentioned in chapter three. 
 
134 Phil. 3:10. 
135 Grudem, Systematic Theology, 757.  
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Or, it could simply provide needed encouragement to another Christian who 
has lost hope that God is going to be faithful in their circumstances.  
Before moving on, imagine the innocent spouse remaining and 
reconciling the marriage with the guilty spouse from an improper—even 
vengeful—motive, rather than from one of the motives just discussed. It could 
be that the spouse wants to reconcile the marriage so that they can be in a 
good position to emotionally torment the guilty spouse. From the innocent 
spouse’s perspective, the best way to accomplish this goal would be to 
reconcile with the spouse so that once they are together again, the innocent 
spouse can employ various passive-aggressive techniques in an effort to “pay 
back” the spouse who committed adultery. The innocent spouse will need to 
pretend two things: that they (1) have forgiven the guilty spouse (or is at least 
in the process of doing so), and (2) have a genuine desire to reconcile the 
marriage for all the right reasons. In this scenario, the innocent spouse’s 
motivation for remaining and reconciling is vengeful. The innocent spouse is 
only wanting to reconcile the marriage so that they are in an optimal position 
to inflict future emotional harm (i.e., through shaming, manipulation, etc.). In 
this example, the intent is clearly to remain and reconcile. However, as stated 
earlier in the chapter, the intent by itself does not reveal why the subject wants 
to bring about this state of affairs. Instead, the intention only shows the state 
of affairs that the innocent spouse wants to bring about. Like Judas’ kiss 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, the moral status of the innocent spouse’s act 
of reconciling with the guilty spouse is unclear without knowledge of their 
motive. Without knowing this, the act of remaining and reconciling is 
ambiguous because, as Thielicke points out, the “inner structure” of the act 
cannot be determined.136 Knowing the innocent spouse’s intention does not 
tell us much. The reason is simple: a particular state of affairs can be brought 
about for morally good or morally bad reasons. Only the motive tells us whether 
the act is meritorious or not, and whether the performance of the act is 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. Considering this, how could the act of remaining 
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and reconciling be classified as supererogatory if the innocent spouse’s sole 
motivation for doing so is to be in a better position to inflict psychological harm? 
Based on what we know of God as revealed in the New Testament, would he 
not prefer the innocent spouse to forego marital reconciliation than reconcile 
only as a means to inflict harm? I think the answer is “yes.” To express this 
point in more analytical terms, how could motives not have deontic relevance 
if there are situations like the one just described when if a person has motive 
X, God approves of the act, but if the person has motive Y, then God does 
not? In this situation, the motive of the agent determines the deontic status of 
the act whereas the intention does not.  
Contrary to Heyd’s and Archer’s views that intentions, not motives, have 
deontic relevance, it appears that the exact opposite may be true when 
comparing the two scenarios—the innocent spouse reconciling the marriage 
from a proper Christian motive versus the innocent spouse reconciling the 
marriage from an improper Christian motive—from a Protestant viewpoint. It 
appears that the intent to reconcile the marriage is the same for both the 
innocent spouse acting from a proper motive and the innocent spouse who 
only intends to reconcile in order to be in a better position to inflict harm. This 
implies that the deontic status of acts cannot be determined by intentions in 
Protestant ethics, or else, one would be forced to accept the claim that the 
innocent spouse in both scenarios has behaved in a supererogatory manner. 
But surely this is not the case. Reconciling in order to satisfy one’s desire (i.e., 
motive) to inflict harm is wrong from a Christian standpoint and is therefore 
sinful. It cannot be claimed that in this instance, motive only relates to the 
character of the agent but does not affect the deontic status of the act.137 This 
is because motive is the only way to distinguish between the two external acts. 
So while Mill may be right that motives provide us with glimpses into a person’s 
character, his anti-motivism is too strong because there are situations where 
the deontic status of an act (from a Protestant perspective) hinges upon 
motives. 
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Besides the act in question, there are other acts in the New Testament 
where motive appears to make a deontic difference. Although these do not 
directly involve acts of supererogation, they are valuable because they shed 
light on the fact that the deontic status of an act can change depending on the 
motive. Returning to Matthew 6, which was mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Jesus talks about three acts whose deontic status seems to rely on motive. 
Regarding giving, praying, or fasting, he rebukes the Pharisees for acting from 
self-centered motives. Concerning giving, Jesus accuses them of doing so 
“that they may be praised by others”;138 concerning prayer, he accuses them 
of doing so “that they may be seen by others”;139 and regarding fasting, he 
accuses them of doing so “to show others.”140 Concerning each criticism, 
respectively, Jesus begins his instructions to his disciples in the following 
manner: “But when you give alms. . . . But whenever you pray. . . . But when 
you fast. . . .”141 The point is that Jesus does not tell his disciples to avoid 
performing these acts. Rather, he tells them to perform the same acts but from 
different motives. In other words, motive plays a crucial role in determining 
whether God approves of an act, which supports my claim that motives have 
deontic relevance for some acts in the New Testament. Granted, I am 
concerned with acts of supererogation, but this shows that whatever 
classification of act is in question, motives can have deontic relevance.  
In harmony with what Matthew recorded in Matthew 6 about prayer, 
Mark 12:40 and Luke 20:47 reveal that Jesus rebuked the Pharisees for saying 
long prayers “for the sake of appearance.” In both verses, the Greek word from 
which the phrase, “sake of appearance” is translated is πρόφασις (prophasis). 
The word means: “that which appears in front, that which is put forward to hide 
the true state of things; a fair show or pretext.”142 It is to act in such a way “as 
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to disguise one’s real motives.”143 This Greek word occurs in six places in the 
New Testament, although not every instance is relevant due to the shift in 
meaning due to context.144 Depending on the context, the word can mean any 
of the following: “actual motive or reason, valid excuse; pretext, ostensible 
reason, excuse, false motive.”145 According to another source, the word can 
mean either a “real motive” or a “falsely alleged motive.”146 In Mark 12:40 and 
Luke 20:47, the phrase “sake of appearance” seems to be a clear reference to 
a falsely alleged motive. Jesus is rebuking the Pharisees because though their 
praying appears to be a sign of their devotion to God, this is hiding “the true 
state of things” which is that they are selfish, consumed with winning people’s 
praise, and seem to care nothing about really conversing with God. Their act 
of praying appears to be righteous from an external standpoint, but this only 
disguises the true selfish nature of the act. Because their motives are false and 
not pleasing to God, their “long prayers” do nothing but earn them “greater 
condemnation.”147 This strong language gives no impression that the act of 
praying with a false motive could ever be pleasing to God. On the other hand, 
praying with a motive to bless God, petition his help, or pray for others is 
pleasing to him and an act that he rewards.148 The bottom line is that if one is 
praying to God, motive occupies a decisive role in determining the deontic 
status of the act.149  
Another place where the word πρόφασις is used to refer to motive is 1 
Thessalonians 2:5. Concerning preaching, Paul writes: “we never came with 
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words of flattery or with a pretext [πρόφασις] for greed. . . .”150 By way of 
reminder, Sverdlik defends the idea that a greed-related desire can serve as a 
motive in some instances, so Paul referring to greed as an immoral motive is 
a fitting example.151 Paul wants the people in the church at Thessalonica to 
know that his reason (i.e., motive) for preaching was not a desire to earn 
money or benefit materially. His preaching was: “not to please mortals, but to 
please God who tests our hearts.”152 The motive to “please God” aligns well 
with Thielicke’s use of Colossians 3:23 as the ultimate motive from which a 
Christian is to act: “Whatever your task, put yourselves into it, as done for the 
Lord and [not unto men].” It explains the “why” behind Paul’s preaching.153 In 
addition to greed, Paul also mentions “flattery” and “seek[ing] praise from 
mortals” as potentially wrong motives for preaching in order to communicate 
that these were not motives from which he preached.154 The bottom line is that 
Paul wanted the church in Thessalonica to know that he never performed the 
act of preaching in their church from false or impure motive.  
Using the Greek definition for πρόφασις, his act of preaching had not 
been a facade in order to “put forward to hide the true state of things.” In 
Thielicke’s terms, Paul is claiming that his acts of preaching in the past are 
genuine because “there is an agreement between the inner side” (i.e., motive) 
and “the outer” (i.e., the act of preaching itself).”155 His preaching gives the 
appearance that he wants to please the Lord and that he cares about the 
spiritual state of the believers, and Paul is writing that these were his true 
motives. In Vine’s terms, nothing needs disguising because what the act 
suggests and the underlying motive are in agreement. Interestingly, Paul 
makes a similar comment in one of his letters to the church in Corinth 
concerning preaching and greed that serves to endorse Thielicke’s point. Paul 
writes: “For we are not peddlers of God’s word like so many; but in Christ we 
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speak as persons of sincerity, as persons sent from God and standing in his 
presence.”156 For Paul, a preacher who is ultimately motivated by the prospect 
of earning money is not sincere because they are handling the Gospel as a 
commercial item. What Paul is saying in his letter is that he and his preaching 
are sincere because his motivation has never been to earn money; therefore, 
he can be trusted. This aligns well with Thielicke’s point that part of what it 
means to be rightly motivated from a Christian standpoint is that a person’s act 
does not suggest something that is contrary to the underlying motive from 
which they act. According to Paul, his preaching is sincere—what Thielicke 
would label “genuine”—because he has preached from a motive to glorify God 
and benefit others rather than to benefit himself.  
As further evidence that motives are being discussed in this passage, 
the phrase “impure motives,”157 occurs in 1 Thessalonians 2:3. The verse 
reads: “For our appeal does not spring from deceit or impure motives or 
trickery. . . .” In this verse, “impure motives” is translated from the Greek, 
“ἀκαθαρσία” (akatharsia). This is different from the word, “πρόφασις” which 
occurs in verse five of this same chapter and is used to indicate a motive of 
greed. The Greek definition of ἀκαθαρσία is “uncleanness; lewdness; impurity 
of motive.”158 The word appears a total of ten times in the New Testament, but 
only in 1 Thessalonians 2:3 does it bear any resemblance to motive as I define 
the term in this chapter. Trenchard defines this term as “dirt, refuse; immorality, 
vileness.”159 As in verse five in this chapter, Paul is talking about preaching 
and telling the church in Thessalonica that he never preached immorally—that 
is, from wrong motives. Using Trenchard’s terminology, to preach from impure 
motives would be vile. Paul seems to be making the point that to preach from 
a proper motive is praiseworthy, whereas to preach from a motive of flattery, 
greed, or the desire to gain praise is morally wrong. Once more, the basic idea 
is that if one performs an act—in this case, preaching—from a proper motive, 
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they have acted rightly, whereas if they have performed the same act from a 
improper motive, they have acted wrongly. This is yet another example in the 
New Testament where motive makes a deontic difference in the classification 
of an act.  
As in the passages on giving, prayer, and fasting, it is difficult to imagine 
God approving of Paul’s preaching if in fact he acted from “impure motives.” If 
Paul’s ultimate motive was any of the impure motives mentioned in 1 
Thessalonians 2:5–6a, then according to Paul’s words in 2 Corinthians 2:17, 
he would not have been sincere in his preaching. An impure motive can result 
in insincere preaching that is ultimately motivated by selfish ambition. This kind 
of preaching is condemned in Paul’s letter to the church in Philippi. He writes: 
“the others proclaim Christ out of selfish ambition, not sincerely but intending 
to increase my suffering in my imprisonment.”160 The word “sincerely” is 
translated from the Greek term “ἁγνῶς” (hagnōs), meaning “purely, with 
sincerity.”161 This occurs once as an adverb in the New Testament and another 
eight times as the adjective “ἁγνός.” In adjective form, the word means “pure, 
chaste, modest, innocent, blameless.”162 Of the nine occurrences, Philippians 
1:17 is the only place where something similar to our concept of motive is 
inferred. The adverb ἁγνῶς modifies the verb “proclaim” in Philippians 1:17, 
conveying that some have proclaimed Christ in an impure, or insincere, 
manner. This is a clear reference to motive. Vine provides support for this claim 
that this is a clear reference to motive when he writes that ἁγνῶς, “denotes 
with pure motives.” This lends credence to the NASB translation of “οὐ ἁγνός” 
as “rather than from pure motives.” Paul is accusing several individuals of 
preaching from selfish motives rather than doing so as “unto the Lord.” Motives 
matter in assessing whether the act of preaching is right or wrong in any given 
context.  
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There are two other Greek words in the New Testament that are used 
to communicate something similar to motive: “κακός” (kakos), and διαλογισμός 
(dialogismos). The term “κακός” is an adjective that appears 50 times in the 
New Testament and has several different meanings depending on context. It 
is used to refer to a corrupt disposition on at least five occasions, evil behavior 
at least 19 times, and wrong motive once. Concerning the one time that the 
word refers to motive, it appears as an adverb: “κακῶς.” James 4:3 reads: “You 
ask and do not receive, because you ask wrongly [κακῶς], in order to spend 
what you get on your pleasures.” The word “κακῶς” is related to κακός, which 
occurs 16 times in the New Testament, and means: “amiss.”163 Trenchard 
even states that part of the definition for κακῶς is “with wrong motives.” In this 
verse, the adverb “κακῶς” modifies the verb “ask,” and reveals that the 
recipients of James’ letter were asking amiss because they were asking with 
a wrong motive. James is not communicating that they are wrong for asking, 
but instead, that they are not presenting their requests to God for the right 
reasons. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, a motive is the reason that 
compels a person to act no matter what form the reason assumes, so to ask 
for selfish reasons is to ask from motives that are “bad, evil, and base.”164 It is 
to ask with wrong motives. James is saying that some Christians were not 
receiving what they were asking for in prayer because of their wrong motives. 
So while this has more to do with how to pray and receive a favorable answer 
to one’s prayers, it is yet another instance of the importance of motive.  
The Greek term διαλογισμός appears in the New Testament 14 times 
and means “reasoning; thought, opinion, design; dispute, argument, doubt.”165 
Of these, only James 2:4 appears to be a reference to motive. James writes: 
“and if you take notice of the one wearing the fine clothes and say, ‘Have a 
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seat here, please,’ while to the one who is poor you say, ‘Stand there,’ or, ‘Sit 
at my feet,’ have you not made distinctions among yourselves, and become 
judges with evil thoughts [διαλογισμός]?”166 In order to show that διαλογισμός 
can be viewed as “motives” in this verse, context is required. As with many 
passages in the New Testament, there are several different interpretations of 
what is occurring among those to whom James is writing. For the sake of 
clarity, two aspects are worth mentioning. First, there are three groups involved 
in the passage under investigation: the poor, the rich, and the recipients of the 
letter.167 Secondly, the type of meeting where this behavior is occurring is—as 
William Brosend writes—“not at all clear.”168 Part of the confusion is that the 
word “assembly” in James 2:2 is translated from the Greek word “συναγωγή,” 
which means in this particular context: “the congregation of a synagogue.”169 
This suggests that it is a meeting of Jews. However, this is not necessarily the 
case because as James Adamson notes: “Till the final rift between Judaism 
and Christianity both Christian and non-Christian Jews used, at least often, the 
same word for their sacred meeting-place.”170 Dale Allison names six possible 
interpretative options for συναγωγή: (1) a Christian religious gathering, (2) a 
Christian building, (3) a Christian court, (4) a Jewish religious gathering, (5) a 
Jewish building, and last, (6) a Jewish court.171 Having listed the options, he 
gives his own view that the most accurate interpretation is that the word is a 
“reference to entering a synagogue building (5) for a judicial convocation (6).” 
Contrary to Allison, Scot McKnight writes that the court interpretation of 
συναγωγή is most likely wrong due to the fact that there is no “sketch of a 
judge, defendants, and litigants” in James 2:2–4.172 For my purposes, I will 
assume that James is referring to a “Christian gathering, to which visitors rich 
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or poor may come.”173 Besides, as Brosend mentions, the emphasis in James 
2:1-4 is “not on the type of gathering,” but rather, on the “treatment of visitors 
no matter what the gathering.174 
Having presented the background to this passage that is commensurate 
with my aim in this section, the question remains: “Are there justifiable reasons 
from a biblical perspective to think that διαλογισμός in James 2:4 might refer 
to motive?” Unlike the passage in James 4 about prayer, this passage is clearly 
about moral behavior because it is about how Christians treat others. James 
is concerned that Christians are trying to “combine faith in Christ with worship 
of social status.”175 Making the same point but in different words, Kurt 
Richardson writes: “a combination of favoritism and faith in Jesus is 
impossible.”176 James is contrasting the “exaggerated courtesy” in greeting the 
wealthy visitor with the “dismissive ‘stand there’” treatment of the poor 
visitor.177 He “likens [their] discriminator behavior to that of corrupt judges who 
are biased or bribed and give rulings in preference to rich clients. . . .”178 
Ultimately, this is sinful,179 because the behavior represents a breach of the 
“royal law according to the scripture” which is: “You shall love your neighbor 
as yourself.”180 However, James is doing more than condemning their 
behavior: he is also condemning the thoughts that give rise to the behavior—
a connection that any cognitive-behavioral therapist readily endorses181—as 
evidenced by his accusation that they had “become judges with evil thoughts 
[διαλογισμός].”182  
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Returning to the question posed earlier: “Are there justifiable reasons 
from a biblical perspective to think that διαλογισμός in James 2:4 might refer 
to motive?” According to McKnight, διαλογισμός refers to “corrupt mental 
process[es]” that result in any of the following: (1) “severing the unity,” (2) 
“usurping the place of God,” (3) using a worldly standard that roots honor in 
wealth and status,” and (4) “corrupting the mind of Christians to render 
judgement on God’s will for the community.”183 In this list of possible meanings, 
no clear reference to motive can be found. However, other commentators have 
said otherwise. Concerning διαλογισμός in James 2:4, Brosend writes: 
“James’s own judgment is as swift as his examples is brief: you are making 
judgments about and distinctions among those who come to your assembly, 
thereby not only making judges of yourselves but judges with questionable, 
even evil, motives.”184 Although he opts for a different interpretation of 
διαλογισμός than “motives,” McCartney admits that in this context, διαλογισμός 
“might mean ‘having evil motives.’”185 Douglas Moo also suggests that 
translating διαλογισμός as “motives” is “a perfectly acceptable rendering,” 
although he ultimately thinks that “standards” is a better translation.186 The 
point here is not to present a conclusive argument that διαλογισμός ought to 
be translated as “motives.” Instead, my more modest goal is to show that 
interpreting διαλογισμός as “motives” is a viable option and will provide another 
example of how motives can have deontic relevance. Besides, even if 
διαλογισμός does not refer to “motive” in this specific context, one does not 
have to expend much effort to imagine an ecclesial context where favoritism is 
shown for motives related to social status. For example, a pastor might pay 
more attention to wealthy folk who enter the church because they possess 
more potential for increasing the amount of money given each week. It could 
be that a layperson who serves as a door-greeter favors wealthier individuals 
who enter the church because they might bring beneficial social connections 
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in the community at large. Or maybe a person gives favorable treatment to the 
wealthy in the church because it might eventually result in a friendship that 
grants them access to the social elite in that community. The bottom line is that 
even if someone wants to argue against the claim that διαλογισμός means 
“motive” in the James 2 context, this is still a useful example for showing that 
motives can possess deontic relevance.  
This suggests that διαλογισμός may mean “motives” in James 2:4. To 
further demonstrate how motives can have deontic relevance, consider the 
following revised example from James 2. Imagine a scenario where the same 
speech-acts are not morally wrong even though all other variables—except for 
motives—remain constant. If deontic status can be shown to change due to a 
shift in motive only, this is further evidence that motives possess deontic 
relevance in the New Testament. First, imagine that the same two 
individuals—a rich person in fine clothes and a poor person in dirty clothes—
enter the assembly, as in the original context. Secondly, imagine a person in 
the assembly speaking the same exact words to each as recorded in the 
original context: “Have a seat here, please” (to the rich person), and “Stand 
there” (to the poor person).187 Is this speech-act necessarily wrong? Based on 
the mere act or what Hughes labels the “act-duty” conception of duty, one 
cannot answer with certainty. As Thielicke argues and as I have argued 
throughout this chapter, motives must be consulted in order to make a 
conclusive judgement. The person greeting the rich and poor people could 
have said what was said for completely different reasons. Using James’ 
language, the same words could have been spoken to each person, 
respectively, but not because the greeter was making an ontological-ethical 
distinction between the two individuals based on their economic status. After 
all, James writes: “if you take notice.”188 In this context, this does not mean that 
one simply noticed that one was dressed in fine clothes and the other was 
dressed in dirty clothes. One cannot help but notice such things. Instead, 
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James is referring to “taking notice” in a moral sense. People in the church are 
taking notice in that they are not only observing a difference in dress and 
status, but they are allowing the disparity to affect how they treat each person. 
The NASB captures this point well: instead of using the phrase, “if you take 
notice,” it uses the phrase, “pay special attention.” The “taking notice” is giving 
preferential treatment based on the observation, not making the initial 
observation itself. So what if a person makes the initial observation, but 
chooses to not treat the rich and poor people differently? Furthermore, what if 
the same words are spoken to each person but with different motives? For 
example, pretend that the first person wearing fine clothes is an elderly man 
and the person wearing poor clothes is a young man. In our modified example, 
the rich elderly man who is wearing fine clothes is told, “Have a seat here, 
please,” because the greeter notices that he is obviously frail and the places 
to sit are nearby. On the other hand, when the young man who is poor enters, 
the greeter assumes that he will have no problem standing for a long period of 
time since he is young, so he instructs him to, “Stand there,” because the 
standing area is on the other side of the room. In this modified example, the 
same speech acts are performed toward the same person (i.e., one rich and 
one poor). However, the greeter does not appear to have done anything wrong 
in this scenario because although he could not help but notice how differently 
the two individuals are dressed, he does not address them based on that 
information. Instead, the greeter’s reason—or motive—for saying what he said 
to the elderly man was to provide compassionate care for him considering his 
physical weakness. Regarding the younger man, the greeter asks him to 
“stand there” on the other side of the room only because he wants to reserve 
the remaining vacant seats which are nearby (presumably near the entrance) 
for other elderly or disabled individuals who may attend. If anything, the 
greeter’s motive is loving, and he may very well walk to the other side of the 
room when he is finished and stand with other able-bodied individuals 
including the young man dressed in dirty clothes. 
The point in the modified example is to demonstrate that the motives 
must be considered if the speech-acts in James 2 are to be accurately 
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classified. As Thielicke notes: “the level of overt deeds no longer tells us as a 
matter of course anything about the underlying level of motives . . .”189 If we 
assume for the sake of argument that James is referring to motives with the 
word διαλογισμός, then the speech acts in James 2:3 are clearly wrong 
because of the motives from which the greeters act. On the contrary, the same 
speech acts are not morally wrong in the modified example because of the 
change in motive. Because all other variables were kept the same in order to 
isolate the motive-variable, the change in the deontic status of the speech-acts 
must be attributed to the change in motive because nothing else would explain 
it. Along with an innocent spouse’s act of reconciling a marriage with a spouse 
who has committed adultery, the act of prayer, the act of giving, the act of 
fasting, and the act of preaching, this is yet another example of why we can be 
confident that motives possess deontic relevance in the New Testament 
whether duties or acts of supererogation are being discussed. 
 
The Indirect Relevance of Character to Acts of Supererogation 
 
Before concluding, I wish to address the indirect contribution that 
character makes to motives and acts of supererogation. There are three 
reasons why this is important in Protestant ethics. First, there is a clear 
message throughout the New Testament that acts are often the fruit of a 
person’s character. This is on clear display when Jesus talks about the 
relationship between the condition of a tree (i.e., a person’s character or moral 
condition) and the quality of the fruit that is produced (i.e., acts performed 
including speech-acts) in the following passages: Matthew 7:15–20, 12:33–37, 
and Luke 6:43–45. W.D. Davies and Dale Allison draw a similar conclusion 
from these three passages, writing: “The subject is the continuity between 
outward acts and inward states. Bad deeds inhere in bad natures, good deeds 
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in good natures.”190 Because character is closely associated with acts and the 
deontic status of acts is closely associated with motives, character is of some 
relevance to supererogation although not in a status-determining way. The 
second reason that character is important to the discussion of supererogation 
in Protestant ethics is because the value of character is often overlooked when 
moral philosophers discuss supererogation since the relationship between 
acts of supererogation and character is indirect. Granted, while there are 
notable exceptions such as Elizabeth Pybus and Gregory Trianosky, only the 
latter is relevant to this section and will therefore be utilized. The third reason 
that character is important to the discussion of supererogation is that it 
possesses the potential to increase the probability of supererogatory acts 
being performed. While this has nothing to do with determining the deontic 
status of a particular act in a specific set of circumstances, character is still of 
great significance regarding the frequency and number of supererogatory acts 
that are performed. More will be said on this shortly. For these three reasons, 
character deserves more attention in conversations about supererogation.  
In chapter one, I wrote the following about character: “When we speak 
of an agent’s character, we seem to refer to a more permanent construct that 
informs a person’s moral attitudes and orients that person to think, feel, and 
act in a consistent manner from one situation to the next.” I followed this 
definition with Stanley Hauerwas’s definition of character: “Character is not just 
the sum of all that we do as agents, but rather it is the particular direction our 
agency acquires by choosing to act in some ways rather than others.”191 The 
reason that these definitions were offered was because character, along with 
intentions and motives, represent another aspect of the internal world of the 
agent that had the potential to affect the deontic status of an act. Having said 
this, no moral philosopher or Christian ethicist believes—to my knowledge—
that character is directly relevant to whether a specific act should be classified 
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as supererogatory. Assuming that this is correct, why does character deserve 
any attention at all in relation to supererogation?  
The best way to answer this question is to begin by making the 
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” relevance. In this chapter, I have 
argued—contrary to Mill, Heyd, and Archer—that motives have a direct 
influence on the deontic classification of an act in Protestant ethics. Setting 
aside this difference for a moment, there is one similarity between myself, Mill, 
Heyd, Archer, and several others: we all believe that some item in the 
psychology of the agent is relevant to the deontic status of an act. This simply 
means that, depending upon your view, either intentions or motives have a 
direct and immediate effect on the deontic status of an act. On the other hand, 
the same cannot be said of character. In chapter one, I wrote: “A person with 
a vicious character may on one occasion behave in a virtuous manner. Or, a 
person with a virtuous character may on one occasion behave in a vicious 
manner.” This implies that a person’s motive and act can be inconsistent with 
their more general character at any given moment. Therefore, character is not 
helpful when trying to judge the deontic status of an act in a specific set of 
circumstances. Granted, it might help to consider a person’s character when 
trying to figure out the motive from which a person might have acted, but this 
would only be valuable as a means to discovering the true motive. The bottom 
line is that a person’s various dispositions which comprise their character does 
not help determine the deontic status of an act from one moment to the next.  
However, this conclusion can be taken to an extreme and used to 
dismiss the importance of character to supererogation altogether. Character is 
important not because it plays a role in determining the deontic status of an 
act in any given situation, but because it has the potential to increase the 
probability of supererogatory acts being performed. Using the virtue of 
generosity as an example, a person with a strong disposition to this virtue (i.e., 
a generous person) will most likely have motives that are altruistic or generous 
in nature more frequently than someone who is not similarly predisposed. This 
means that when the person is presented with an opportunity to supererogate 
in the area of generosity, they will be more likely to have proper motives which 
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will result in them behaving in a supererogatory manner more often than 
someone who is not well-disposed toward generosity. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, a person predisposed toward generosity might have the 
proper motive in nine of ten situations, whereas a person who is not 
predisposed toward generosity might only act with proper motive three of ten 
times in similar situations. Because proper motive is the fourth criterion in 
Protestant ethics that must be satisfied in order for an act to be considered 
supererogatory, the above example shows that having a generous character 
will result in an increased number of supererogatory deeds over time. So while 
being generous does not directly determine whether someone behaves in a 
supererogatory manner in any given situation, it is likely to increase the overall 
number of supererogatory deeds performed. For this reason, a person’s 
character is extremely important and thus relevant to discussions of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics. 
In a very important article on supererogation, Gregory Trianosky spends 
considerable time distinguishing character and motives. As discussed in detail 
in chapter one, one of his main goals is to show—contrary to Susan Hale—
that a person may still feel the need to provide an excuse for not performing 
an act of supererogation. Hale’s position is that if the act is not obligatory, then 
a person should feel no need to explain its nonperformance. So, if a person 
feels the need to explain why they did not perform an act, then this is evidence 
that the act is not optional, but obligatory.192 In disputing this claim, Trianosky 
draws a distinction between negative deontic judgements and negative aretaic 
judgements. The former are concerned with the “wrongness of some particular 
act” while the latter is concerned with the “viciousness of some conative or 
affective state of the agent’s.”193 After making these two distinctions, Trianosky 
makes a further division into two types of negative aretaic judgements: 
“standing traits or dispositions” and “occurrent motives.”194 After making this 
distinction, he takes the position that while the omission of a supererogatory 
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act cannot warrant a negative deontic judgement, it may call for a negative 
aretaic judgement. However, Trianosky clarifies this position, adding that a 
negative aretaic judgement for not performing a supererogatory act has more 
to do with a flaw in the agent’s “motivational structure on some particular 
occasion” rather with a “general flaw in the agent’s moral character.”195 In 
support of this claim, Trianosky rightly points to the fact that a vicious motive 
on a given occasion does not necessarily entail a corresponding vicious trait. 
He writes: “One may act insensitively on a given occasion (when under great 
stress, for example) and yet be acting entirely out of character.”196 His overall 
point is the same as mine: permanent traits or dispositions are not relevant 
when assessing the deontic status of a particular act.  
Just as importantly, Trianosky proceeds to argue that a purely “deontic 
characterization of supererogatory action . . . provides no such connection with 
the judgements of a person,” and that for this reason, is “incomplete.”197 
Granted, it is not clear whether Trianosky is saying if motives have deontic 
status. However, this interpretation cannot be ruled out even though his larger 
aim is to show that there is a strong relationship between supererogation and 
virtue.198 Trianosky’s assertion that a purely deontic theory of supererogation 
is incomplete is similar to Montague’s rejection of “act supererogationism.” In 
“act supererogationism,” an act is supererogatory if it is “identifiable with being 
morally valuable but neither required nor prohibited.” This is an objectivist view 
because, in a sense, the status resides completely “in” the act. No reference 
to the psychology of the agent at the time of the act is considered. Labeling 
this as the “orthodox view” and ultimately identifying it with Urmson, Montague 
goes on to reject this view in favor of “agent supererogationism.” Agent 
supererogationism requires not only that the act be morally valuable and 
neither obligatory nor forbidden, but also that the act be performed in a 
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praiseworthy manner by the agent.199 For Montague, this a clear reference to 
“the motives with which [an act] is performed.”200  
Before concluding this chapter, I want to show how my view is related 
to the three pro-motive accounts that Zly presents: weak-motivism, strong-
motivism, and partial-motivism. Of the three different forms that Sverdlik’s 
Motives Matter position can take, I envision a Protestant account of 
supererogation to be a combination of weak-motivism and partial-motivism but 
not strong motivism. According to Zly, weak-motivism is the view that “a 
change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to move an act from one 
deontic category into another.”201 I would prefer to reword this as: “Weak-
motivism is the view that motives can and often do affect the deontic 
classification of an act.” The strength of this view for Protestant ethics is 
twofold: (1) motives are said to have deontic relevance, and (2) the door is left 
open to the possibility that there might be specific occasions when motives 
might not have deontic relevance. Granted, I think this latter situation will be 
rare, but it is nonetheless important to allow for the possibility. 
I am not comfortable labeling Protestant ethics as strong-motivism 
because it goes too far. Claiming that “a good motive always serves to make 
an act right, whereas a bad (or insufficiently good) motive always makes it 
wrong”202 misses the mark in one way in particular: it does not take into 
account the possibility that someone might be culpable for making a poor 
moral judgement. For example, imagine a scenario where Richard is wanting 
to give an additional £100 to a local charity to which he and his partner have 
already promised £100. However, due to poor planning, a failure to 
communicate with his significant other who balances the budget, and an 
overall unwillingness to pause and do a bit of number-crunching, the additional 
gift of £100 (£200 total) results in overdraft charges that month. When the 
charges are totalled, it resulted in fines totaling over £150. In an effort to pay 
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the fines and replenish the extra £100 so that there is enough in the account 
to live on next month, the couple decide not to give any money to the local 
charity for the next two months. The point is that although Richard’s motive 
could have been morally praiseworthy when giving the additional £100 to a 
local charity, it could very well be the case that his refusal to pause, 
communicate with his partner who balances the budget, and think through the 
personal and familial ramifications of such an act results in the act no longer 
being considered supererogatory. He simply did not take the time to consider 
all of the relevant factors and as a result, made a poor moral judgement even 
though his motive was good. Though I do not pretend that this is flawless 
example, it suffices to show that proper motive might not be enough in some 
circumstances for an act to fulfill an obligation or to count as supererogatory. 
After all, Richard is to some degree culpable for the ignorance from which he 
gave. One could easily argue that because Richard does not obtain the 
necessary information about the likely consequences of the act, his deed is 
not meritorious because it actually hurt more than helped.  
“Partial-motivism” is the view that “a good motive is necessary but not 
sufficient for right action.”203 The argument that I have set forth in this chapter 
aligns well with the first part of the definition: “a good motive is necessary” for 
an act to be classified as supererogatory in Protestant ethics. However, 
because there could be instances when a good motive is sufficient (assuming 
that the corresponding act is performed) for an act to be morally right or 
supererogatory, I do not embrace the second part of the definition for partial-
motivism (i.e., that a good motive is not sufficient). Having previously stated 
why weak-motivism is in harmony with my view, I envision a motive-based 
account of supererogation in Protestant ethics that is a hybrid of weak-
motivism and partial-motivism. It might look something like this: A good motive 
is necessary for an act to be classified as supererogatory in Protestant ethics 
(i.e., partial motivism) because motives can and often do affect the deontic 
status of an act (i.e., weak-motivism). Admittedly, this last italicized statement 
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is somewhat repetitive, because to say that a good motive is necessary is to 
already admit that motives have deontic relevance. However, it is important to 




In this chapter, I have argued that motives have deontic relevance in 
Protestant ethics. Leaning heavily on Helmut Thielicke’s motive-centric 
account of Protestant ethics, I argued that a person cannot perform an act of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics without proper motive. It seems 
unthinkable that God would consider a person to have fulfilled their duty if they 
gave, prayed, fasted, preached, or chose to reconcile with a guilty spouse from 
a selfish motive. At different points in this chapter, I address each of these acts 
in relation to motive, including an entire section (i.e., section four) devoted to 
the last act due to its place of prominence in my thesis.  I then worked with the 
following presupposition: if obligatory acts named in the New Testament 
require proper motive, then surely this is also true of supererogatory acts. 
The view that I have defended stands in opposition to three other views: 
(1) acts of supererogation are not possible; (2) an objectivist account of 
supererogation that does not include any reference to the internal world of the 
agent (i.e., character, intentions, motives); and more specifically, (3) any type 
of intent-based theory that rejects the deontic relevance of motives. 
Concerning the last view, I spent a considerable amount of time showing why 
there is room to doubt Heyd’s altruistic-intent requirement (AIR) and Archer’s 
moral-intent requirement (MIR). Ultimately, they rely on Mill’s anti-motivist 
stance which is too strong. Besides, the larger issue with Mill’s view, and with 
Heyd’s and Archer’s related views is that their intent-requirement theories 
require a commitment to utilitarian principles. Simple logic suggests that if one 
rejects a utilitarian perspective, then any conclusions derived from that 
presupposed foundation—for example, that intentions, not motives, possess 
deontic relevance—disappear. This opened the door for my argument that 
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from a biblical perspective, right motive is a necessary condition if any act is 




The main purpose of my thesis has been to demonstrate the possibility, 
internal structure, and role of supererogatory acts in Protestant Christian 
ethics. The concept has been wrongly rejected for far too long by Protestant 
thinkers. As far back as the Reformers, the concept was rejected in order to 
preserve a doctrine of justification that did not depend upon works in any way. 
Following Mellema’s lead, I have argued there is at least one supererogatory 
deed in the New Testament—an innocent spouse reconciling with an 
adulterous spouse—that, while being supererogatory, does not “[justify] a 
person in God’s eyes.”1 Like Melanchthon’s endorsement of the counsel of 
celibacy, it is an act that possesses moral worth, is neither obligatory nor 
forbidden, and lastly, does not challenge the Protestant position that “a person 
can never be judged righteous in God’s eyes on the basis of works alone.”  
I argued in chapter four that the additional criterion of proper motive is 
also required for an act to be classified as supererogatory in Protestant ethics. 
Toward the end of chapter four, I reexamined the innocent spouse’s act of 
reconciling with a spouse who has committed adultery, in light of my argument 
that an act must be performed with proper motive in order to qualify for 
supererogatory status. Chapter four concluded with an important but often 
overlooked topic: the indirect relevance of character to supererogation. This 
last topic is very important for two reasons: (1) it recognizes that the character 
of a person can, in the long-term, impact whether supererogatory acts are 
performed while admitting that character never has a role in determining the 
deontic status of a particular act at any given time, and (2) the value of 
character and the development of virtues is affirmed in relation to 
supererogation, a subject that is overwhelmingly deontic in nature for obvious 
reasons. This reaffirms my stance that Protestant ethics can embrace the 
possibility and role of supererogation without having to be considered purely 
 
1 Mellema, Beyond the Call, 52. 
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deontological. Importantly, this perspective allows for acts of supererogation 
in Protestant ethics, while not forcing one to unnecessarily reject other 
elements which are also important for “the explication of the Christian life” such 
as “narrative, character, the virtues, and tradition.”2  
Assuming my argument is successful and that acts of supererogation 
are possible in Protestant ethics, as Gregory Mellema and John and Paul 
Feinberg concur, what is the value of this affirmation? First of all, it is important 
in Protestant ethics. In addition, the concept of supererogation—as I stated in 
the Introduction of the thesis—might also prove helpful in counseling, biblical 
interpretation, and homiletics. I want to take each in turn.  
Affirming the possibility of supererogation in Protestant ethics is 
important for several reasons. First, affirming supererogation creates a 
common ground upon which both Protestants and Roman Catholics can stand 
and converse. Granted, there will still be significant differences between how 
acts of supererogation are viewed in relation to justification, but this point 
aside, the affirmation has the potential to initiate a more fruitful discourse about 
the nature of such acts, which will hopefully foster better understanding of the 
other’s view as well as an increased level of respect. Secondly, affirming 
supererogation in Protestant ethics opens the door for greater engagement 
with moral philosophers who are writing about supererogation. Protestant 
theologians and ethicists can benefit richly from some of the ideas that have 
been discussed in great detail in moral philosophy (e.g., the distinction 
between intent and motive, the concept of the good-ought tie-up, etc.) as they 
seek to better understand and articulate both the Bible and our moral 
responsibilities. Thirdly, affirming supererogatory acts prevents Protestant 
ethics from becoming what Meilaender calls a “tyrannical” normative theory, 
which refers to any ethical theory that does not permit a person to forego the 
performance of a good deed when it is in their power to do so. Supererogation 
entails that a person does not have to perform a good deed every time an 
opportunity presents. The importance of this cannot be overstated. For 
 
2 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1983), xvii.  
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example, if a person must perform a good deed every time there is an 
opportunity, then what place remains for interests such as “reading . . ., playing 
the oboe, or improving [one’s] backhand?”3 After listing these three activities, 
Susan Wolf goes on to argue that human life would be “strangely barren” if 
these types of interests were forbidden due the excessive moral demand that 
is characteristic of “tyrannical” normative theories.4 Ultimately, Meilaender 
argues that a “tyrannical” normative theory prevents a person from accepting 
themselves as a human being with limitations.5 Therefore, the affirmation of 
supererogation can be viewed as a safeguard which protects Protestant ethics 
from becoming “tyrannical,” making room for creativity and personal projects 
that might otherwise be forbidden. A richer, more beautiful conception of God, 
human beings, and life in general result from affirming the possibility of 
supererogation in Protestant ethics.   
Another way that affirming supererogation in Protestant ethics can be 
helpful is in counseling contexts. The act that I argued is supererogatory in 
chapter three pertains to marriage, adultery, divorce, forgiveness, and marital 
reconciliation, all of which are surely some of the most common issues for 
which people seek pastoral and professional help. For example, divorce rates 
in the United States for adults 50 and older have doubled since 1990 and have 
tripled for adults 65 and older.6 Even with these increases, the divorce rate for 
adults under 50 in the United States is still twice as high as for the former 
group. There can be little doubt that some of these divorces are because of 
adultery. Issues like adultery, reconciliation, and divorce are continuing, and I 
 
3 Susan Wolf, The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, and Love (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 13.  
4 Though Wolf’s comments are helpful, it is worth mentioning that she is actually arguing 
that a moral saint—which she defines as “a person whose every action is as morally good as 
possible . . . [and] who is as morally worthy as can be”—is both an “unattractive” person and 
ideal. See Wolf, The Variety of Values, 11–12. Robert Adams argues against Wolf’s position, 
claiming that her argument fails because her conception of a moral saint as someone that 
lacks individuality and cannot enjoy the good in life is inaccurate. See Robert Adams, 
“Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 7 (1984): 392–393, 396. 
5 Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness, 99, 108. 
6 Renee Stepler, “Led by Baby Boomers, divorce rates climb for America’s 50+ 




believe that supererogation can provide valuable clarity in relation to Jesus’ 
teaching on divorce for an innocent spouse who is suffering. In this sense, the 
term can be a means of grace because it can help to eliminate moral confusion 
for a person who is considering their moral options and desiring to be faithful 
to Jesus Christ. The bottom line is that supererogation can provide valuable 
clarity in situations like the one described, which can ultimately help innocent 
victims. 
Another area where the concept of supererogation can be useful is in 
interpreting various biblical passages. As I stated at the end of chapter two, I 
believe it is a great advantage to any Protestant account of supererogation if 
concrete examples of supererogation can be shown to exist in the New 
Testament. This is by no means a criticism of Mellema’s vocation-based 
proposal nor of the three examples that the Feinbergs provide. Mellema’s 
creative proposal, which centers around the Protestant idea of vocation, is an 
ingenious attempt to bring theistic supererogationists and anti-
supererogationists together. Regarding the Feinbergs’ three examples, they 
are to be commended for their courage to not only affirm what so many 
Protestants have rejected, but also for listing three specific acts. However, one 
is still left with the question: Since many Protestants like myself believe that 
ultimate authority belongs to Scripture alone, can acts of supererogation find 
support in the New Testament itself?7 By way of example, I argued in chapter 
three that they can. However, it would admittedly be disappointing if an 
innocent spouse reconciling with an adulterous spouse were the only act. 
However, I do not believe it is. There is ample opportunity to explore other 
Bible passages with an eye toward supererogation. And more important than 
merely looking for such acts in the New Testament—for that in itself would be 
nothing more than an academic version of Where’s Wally—is the potential 
 
7 I have in mind the following statement by Michael Horton: “The churches of the 
Reformation do not deny the ongoing authority of the church in its representative 
assemblies, but the key difference is this: whereas the Roman Catholic Church combines 
Scripture and tradition as one source of magisterial (i.e., ruling) authority, we confess that 
this belongs to Scripture alone, with tradition as ministerial (i.e., serving). See Horton, Pilgrim 
Theology, 67-68. 
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utility of the concept of supererogation for making sense of what is there. I 
have two passages in mind, the first of which I will discuss briefly: The Parable 
of the Laborers in the Vineyard (Matthew 20:1–16) and where Paul discusses 
the mutual act of abstaining from sex for a determined amount of time in the 
context of marriage in order to devote oneself more fully to prayer (1 
Corinthians 7:5–6). The latter is valuable because while Protestants may reject 
the idea that celibacy is supererogatory, as discussed close to the start of 
chapter three, the more “restricted act” of “abstain[ing] from sensual pleasure 
for a fixed time so as to give himself up to prayer,” might count as 
supererogatory.8 The reason for this is straightforward: while married 
Christians are commanded to pray (as are all Christians), they can do so 
without having to abstain from sex in marriage. Thus, abstaining from sex in 
order to more fully devote oneself to prayer appears to go above and beyond 
what is technically required. It would be an act that is neither obligatory (Paul 
himself writes that it is a “concession,” not a “command”), nor forbidden, 
possesses moral worth, and would therefore qualify for supererogatory status 
so long as it is performed with proper motive. If I am correct, this would be of 
immense value because it would represent a point of agreement between 
Roman Catholics and Protestants which should always be welcome in the 
spirit of ecumenism. 
In the Parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard, a landowner pays out 
more than he is obligated to pay to the group of laborers that only worked one 
hour. This act bears the marks of a supererogatory deed. In the story, the 
landowner went out early in the morning to hire people to come and work in 
his vineyard. He and the first group of laborers agreed that their pay would be 
one denarius, which was the typical day’s wage in Jesus’ day. The landowner 
then went out again at nine in the morning, noon, three in the afternoon, and 
 
8 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae, q. 108, a. 5, resp., 63; Granted, 
Aquinas means something much broader than abstaining from sex in marriage for a fixed 
time when he writes: “abstaining from sensual pleasure.” However, there is no reason to 
think that the former is not subsumed in the latter. Concerning this act, David Heyd confirms 
that for Aquinas, the more restricted version of celibacy (which can occur in marriage) is an 
act of supererogation (he even uses the term, “supererogation” rather than “counsels” 
reaffirming once more how interchangeable the terms are). See Heyd, Supererogation, 22.  
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one last time at five in the afternoon to hire additional laborers. Only the first 
group hired knew what they were to be paid. To the group that started working 
at nine, and presumably to all the others, the landowner simply said: “I will pay 
you whatever is right.”9 When the workday was over, the landowner told the 
manager to gather the workers and pay them in reverse order from when they 
started. Thus, the laborers who only worked one hour were paid first. The 
manager gave each laborer that had worked only one hour a full day’s wage 
(i.e., a denarius), the same amount that had been promised to the first group 
that was hired early in the morning. The first group initially did not have a 
problem with this, believing that they would in turn receive more. To their 
surprise, they received a single denarius just as the laborers that had only 
worked one hour. At this they “grumbled,” saying: “These last worked only one 
hour, and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of the 
day and the scorching heat.”10 When the landowner heard their complaints, he 
replied: “Friend, I am doing you no wrong; did you not agree with me for the 
usual daily wage? Take what belongs to you and go; I choose to give to this 
last the same as I give to you. Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what 
belongs to me? Or are you envious because I am generous?’ So the last will 
be first, and the first will be last.”11 With the first group of laborers, the 
landowner was obligated to pay them a denarius because that was what both 
parties agreed upon. Thus, when the manager gave each a denarius, the 
obligation was fulfilled and the duty discharged.  
Now if a denarius was fair pay (which the passage seems to imply) for 
someone who had worked a full day and the landowner had not specified a 
certain amount of pay for the laborers hired at five in the afternoon, then it is 
safe to conclude that he was not obligated to pay a full day’s wage to those 
that had worked only one hour. The first group had presumably worked twelve 
hours, because the Jewish workday was from six in the morning to six in the 
evening. If there had been a way to “make change,” then paying the one-hour 
 
9 Matt. 20:4. 
10 Matt. 20:12. 
11 Matt. 20:13–16. 
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laborers 1/12 of a denarius would have been morally acceptable because they 
had only worked 1/12 of the amount that the laborers hired early in the morning 
had worked. Because 1/12 of a denarius would have been morally permissible, 
anything more appears to be “above and beyond” what might be considered 
obligatory because it pays out more than is due. If I am right, then the 
landowner’s act is a great example of supererogation in the New Testament 
because it not only possesses moral worth (i.e., it embodies and expresses 
generosity), but is neither obligatory not forbidden. Granted, the act must be 
performed with proper motive, so if the landowner acted with the motive to 
anger the all-day laborers, then the act is not supererogatory. However, the 
Bible tells us that the landowner acted from a generous motive, and thus the 
fourth motive-criterion is satisfied.  
Although I do not pretend that this is a conclusive argument for the 
landowner’s act being supererogatory, I do believe that the act is a strong 
candidate for supererogation. One reason why this is important is that the 
concept of supererogation directs our focus from the group of laborers claiming 
that the landowner’s act is unfair to the overlooked, marginalized group that 
seems to have wanted to work a full day but were not hired. Their working only 
one hour was due to no fault of their own, and in the end, grace, not merit, 
prevailed; they were blessed out of the generosity of the landowner, not paid 
based on merit. Ultimately, they were not given what they deserved. More than 
anything, the landowner’s act reflects the generous character of God—the 
giver of “every perfect gift”12—as well as the beauty of the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ, a gospel that is extended to those who “thirst” but “have no money,” a 
gospel of heavenly “wine and milk” that can be purchased “without money and 
without price.”13 Ultimately, the concept of supererogation helps to redirect our 
focus so that the landowner’s act can be appreciated for what it is—a very 
generous act performed for the benefit of unfortunate individuals who felt 
overlooked, possibly judged or scorned, or even marginalized as evidenced by 
 
12 James 1:17. 
13 Isa. 55:1. 
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their response: “no one has hired us.”14 Apart from the concept of 
supererogation, one might be tempted to belittle the landowner’s actions and 
focus solely on the fact that it seems he should have paid the all-day laborers 
more than what was initially agreed. However, looking at this passage through 
the lens of supererogation shifts our focus from the apparent unfairness of the 
situation to the abundant generosity of the landowner. The real focus of this 
passage is the generosity of the landowner, and the concept of supererogation 
helps appreciate this feature. Granted, one can arrive at this conclusion apart 
from the concept of supererogation, but I suggest that being more aware of the 
concept while reading the Bible and interacting in the world can greatly enrich 
our interpretations and experience. Whether the application of supererogation 
in this passage ultimately inspires one to greater worship of God for his 
generosity which is on display in symbolic form (i.e., the landowner’s act) or 
whether a small business owner is challenged to rethink what they pay their 
employees, the concept can be of value. 
Furthermore, the concept of supererogation can be of homiletic value. 
If the concept can enrich our reading and interpretation of various passages in 
the New Testament, then it stands to reason that the preaching of those 
passages will be improved as a direct consequence. However, the concept of 
supererogation can also be useful in another way as it relates to homiletics. 
Imagine a priest or preacher wanting to make the case that the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ obligates relatively affluent Christians to give charity to alleviate world 
hunger on a consistent basis. It could be the case that the priest or preacher 
is teaching in a socio-cultural and ecclesial context where such acts are 
deemed absolutely optional. In order to make the point, the concept of 
supererogation would be most helpful even if the act in question is not 
supererogatory. For example, the preacher may frame the talk by using the 
concept of supererogation to communicate that it is often the case that people, 
as well as Christians, believe that we have no moral obligation to act in an area 
where one might in fact exist. In making the point, they will use the concept to 
 
14 Matt. 20:7. 
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explain that Christians are neglecting a specific moral obligation due to an 
erroneous belief that the act is supererogatory rather than obligatory. Of 
course, the distinction between a perfect duty and imperfect duty will need to 
be made, but this is not my present focus. Many Christians no doubt view the 
act of giving to charity to prevent the death of someone on the other side of 
the world as supererogatory. By using the concept, the priest or preacher will 
have a single term that allows them to more efficiently communicate in an effort 
to convince their congregants that the act in question is not supererogatory 
though it is treated as such. This results in the off-beat proposal that the 
concept of supererogation can possess functional value even when an act of 
supererogation is not possible. One might even take this to an extreme to 
argue that if there are no acts of supererogation in Protestant ethics, the term 
and concept can still be of great benefit in homiletics and the other contexts 
previously mentioned.  
Ultimately, acts of supererogation are possible in Protestant ethics. 
Furthermore, the concept of supererogation has an important and enriching 
role to play in Protestant ethics, counseling sessions with people who are 
hurting, in understanding various New Testament passages, and in the 
teaching and preaching of the Gospel. The time has come for Protestants to 
wholeheartedly embrace supererogation as a means of grace that can aid 
individual Christians, lay leaders, counselors, priests and preachers, and the 




A Dictionary of Law. 9th ed. Edited by Jonathan Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. Online.  
Adams, Robert. “Saints.” The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984): 392–401. 
–––––––––. “Vocation.” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 448–462.  
Adamson, James B. The Epistle of James. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1976. 
Allen, Joseph L. Love & Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1995.  
Allison Jr., Dale C. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle of 
James. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013. 
Alston, William. “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In 
Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael 
D. Beaty, 303–326. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990.  
Althaus, Paul. The Theology of Martin Luther. Translated by Robert C. 
Schultz. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1963.  
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologiae IaIIae, q. 63, a. 4. Edited by T. 
Gilby. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964–1974.  
–––––––––. Summa Theologiae IaIIae, q. 108, a. 4. Vol. 30. Oxford: 
Blackfriars, 1972. 
Archer, Alfred. “Divine Moral Goodness, Supererogation, and The Euthyphro 
Dilemma.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2016): 
147–160. 
–––––––––. “Do We Need to Make Room for Quasi-Supererogation?” The 
Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2016): 341–351. 
–––––––––. “Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent.” Philosophia 41 
(2013): 447–462. 
Archer, Alfred and Michael Ridge. “The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox 
of Supererogation.” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1575–1592.  
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999. 
 265 
Augustine. Adulterous Marriages, in Marriage and Virginity. Translated by 
Ray Kearney and edited by John E. Rotelle. Hyde Park, NY: New City 
Press, 1999.  
–––––––––. De sancta virginitate. In De bono coniugali and De sancta 
virginitate. Translated and edited by P.G. Walsh, 66–147. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Austin, Robert D. and Lee Devin. “Knowledge Work, Craft Work, and 
Calling.” In Global Neighbors: Christian Faith and Moral Obligation in 
Today’s Economy, edited by Douglas A. Hicks & Mark Valeri, 167–
195. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2008.  
Badhar, Neera K. “Justice and Supererogation.” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 22 (1985): 123–131. 
Balthasar, Hans Urs von. In the Fullness of Faith: On the Centrality of the 
Distinctively Catholic. Translated by Graham Harrison. San Francisco, 
CA: Ignatius Press, 1988.  
–––––––––. “A Theology of the Evangelical Counsels.” CrossCurrents 16, 
no. 2 (1966): 213–236.  
Barnbaum, Deborah R. “Supererogation in Clinical Research.” Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 11 (2008): 343–349. 
Baron, Marcia. “A Kantian Take on the Supererogatory.” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 33 (2016): 347–362.  
Bash, Anthony. Forgiveness and Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.  
Beale, G.K. and D.A. Carson, ed. Commentary on the New Testament Use 
of the Old Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007.  
Benjabi, Hagit and David Heyd. “The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness 
and Toleration as Supererogatory.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
31, no. 4 (2001): 567–586.  
Benn, Claire. “The Enemy of the Good: Supererogation and Requiring 
Perfection.” Utilitas 30 (2018): 333–354. 
–––––––––. “Supererogation, Optionality, and Cost.” Philosophical Studies 
(2017): 1–19.  
–––––––––. “What is Wrong with Promising to Supererogate,” Philosophia 42 
(2014): 55–61. 
Bennett, Jana M. Singleness and the Church: A New Theology of the Single 
Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
 266 
Blackburn, Simon. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
Blomberg, Craig. “Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, and Celibacy: An 
Exegesis of Matthew 19:3-12.” Trinity Journal 11 (1990): 161-196.  
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Ethics. Vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. Translated by 
Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Stott. Edited by 
Clifford J. Green. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005. 
Brendlinger, Irv and Eric E. Mueller. “Psychological Implications of the 
Doctrine of Christian Perfection with Special Reference to John 
Wesley’s View.” The Journal of Pastoral Care & Counseling 60, no. 3 
(2006): 275–286.  
Brenner, Abigail. “6 Signs That Your Spouse Is Having an Emotional Affair.” 
Psychology Today, March 17, 2019. 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/in-flux/201903/6-signs-
your-spouse-is-having-emotional-affair.  
Brosend II, William F. James & Jude. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
Bunnin, Nicholas and Jiyuan Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Philosophy. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.  
Calhoun, Cheshire. “Changing One’s Heart.” Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992): 76–96. 
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Ford Lewis 
Battles. London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1975.  
Cannon, William. “John Wesley’s Doctrine of Sanctification and Perfection.” 
Mennonite Quarterly Review 35, no. 2 (1961): 91–95. 
Chambers, Talbot W. “Divorce in the New Testament.” The Reformed 
Quarterly Review 42, no. 1 (Jan. 1895): 39–46. 
Chisholm, Roderick and Ernest Sosa. “Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem 
of Supererogation.” Synthese 16 (1966): 321–331.  
Ciubotarasu-Pricop, Laura. “Supererogatory Actions and Their Moral Value.” 
Cultural and Linguistic Communication 3, no. 2 (2013): 161–165. 
Clark, Michael. “The Meritorious and the Mandatory.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 79 (1978–1979): 23–33.  




Cohen, Shlomo. “Forced Supererogation.” European Journal of Philosophy 
23 (2013): 1006–1024.  
Corlett, J. Angelo. “Forgiveness, Apology, and Retributive Punishment.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2006): 25–42. 
Cowley, Christopher. “The Agents, Acts and Attitudes of Supererogation.” 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 1–23.  
Cunningham, David. Christian Ethics: The End of the Law. London: 
Routledge, 2008.  
Curtis, Barry. “The Supererogatory, the Foolish and the Morally Required.” 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (1981): 311–318. 
Dancy, Jonathan. “Mill’s Puzzling Footnote.” Utilitas 12, no. 2 (2000): 219–
222.  
Daniel, David M. Briefly: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
London: SCM Press, 2006. 
Davies, W.D. and Dale C. Allison Jr. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary 
on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew. 3 vol. Edited by J.A. 
Emerton, C.E.B. Cranfield, and G.N. Stanton. London: T&T Clark, 
2000. 
Davis, John J. Evangelical Ethics: Issues Facing the Church Today. 2nd. ed. 
Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 
1993.  
Dombrowski, Daniel A. “Back to Sainthood.” Philosophy Today 33, no. 1 
(1989): 56–62.  
Dorsey, Dale. “The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It.” Utilitas 
25, no. 3 (2013): 355–382.  
Dreier, James. “Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational 
Satisficing Doesn’t.” In Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on 
Practical Reason, edited by Michael Byron, 131–154. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Dunn, James D.G and John W. Rogerson, ed. Eerdmans Commentary on 
the Bible. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2003.  
Evans, C. Stephen. God and Moral Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
Feinberg, Joel. “Supererogation and Rules.” Ethics 71 (1961): 276–288.  
 268 
Feinberg, John S. and Paul D. Feinberg. Ethics for a Brave New World. 2nd 
ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010.  
Ferry, Michael. “Beyond Obligation: Reasons and Supererogation.” Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 49–65. 
Fesko, John V. Beyond Calvin: Union With Christ and Justification in Early 
Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700). Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2012. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. Translated by George Eliot. 
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989. 
Fletcher, Joseph. Situational Ethics. London: SCM Press, 1966. 
Forrest, Peter. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Winter 2016 edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta. 
Stanford University Metaphysics Research Lab, 2016. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/.  
France, R.T. The Gospel of Matthew. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007.  
Froehlich, Karlfried. “Luther on Vocation.” Lutheran Quarterly 8 (1999): 195–
207.  
Gamlund, Espen. “Supererogatory Forgiveness.” Inquiry 53, no. 6 (2010): 
540–564. 
Gingrich, F. Wilbur and Frederick W. Danker. Shorter Lexicon of the Greek 
New Testament. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1983.  
Glaser, John. “Commands-Counsels: A Pauline Teaching?” Theological 
Studies 31, no. 2 (1970): 275–287. 
Gregory, Eric. “Agape and Special Relations in a Global Economy: 
Theological Sources.” In Global Neighbors: Christian Faith and Moral 
Obligation in Today’s Economy, edited by Douglas A. Hicks & Mark 
Valeri, 16–42. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008.  
Grenz, Stanley. The Moral Quest. Leicester: Apollos, 1997. 
–––––––––. Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective. Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1990. 
Grudem, Wayne. Christian Ethics: An Introduction to Biblical Moral 
Reasoning. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2018. 
–––––––––. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994.  
 269 
Gundry, Robert H. Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological 
Act. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1982. 
Hale, Susan. “Against Supererogation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 28 
(1991): 273–285.  
Hansson, Sven O. “Representing Supererogation.” Journal of Logic and 
Computation 25, no.2 (2015): 443–451.  
Hare, John. God’s Command. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.  
Harvey, Van A. Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Hauerwas, Stanley. Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological 
Ethics. San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1985.  
–––––––––. The Peaceable Kingdom. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983. 
Hays, Richard B. The Moral Vision of the New Testament. London: T&T 
Clark, 1996. 
Heyd, David. “Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation.” Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 25–47. 
–––––––––. Supererogation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
–––––––––. “Supererogation.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford University Metaphysics Research 
Lab, 2016. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/supererogation/. 
Heyd, David and Franklin G. Miller. “Life Plans: Do They Give Meaning to 
Our Lives?” The Monist 93, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 17–37. 
Hill, David. The Gospel of Matthew. Edited by Matthew Black. Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972. 
Hollinger, David P. The Meaning of Sex. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2009. 
Horgan, Terry and Mark Timmons. “Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: 
Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of Supererogation.” Social Philosophy 
and Policy 27, no. 2 (2010): 29–63.  
Horton, Michael. Pilgrim Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011.  
Hruschka, Joachim. “Supererogation and Meritorious Duties.” Annual Review 
of Law and Ethics 6 (1998): 93–108. 
 270 
Hughes, George. “Motive and Duty.” Mind 53, no. 212 (Oct. 1944): 314–331.  
Instone-Brewer, David. Divorce & Remarriage in the Church: Biblical 
Solutions for Pastoral Realities. Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003. 
–––––––––. Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary 
Context. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2002.  
Isaksson, Abel. Marriage and Ministry in the New Temple. Translated by Neil 
Tomkinson and Jean Gray. Copenhagen: C.W.K. Gleerup Lund, 1965. 
Jackson, M.W. “The Nature of Supererogation.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 
20 (1986): 289–296. 
Jacobs, Russell. “Obligation, Supererogation, and Self-Sacrifice.” Philosophy 
62, no. 239 (1987): 96–101. 
Janzen, David. “The Meaning of Porneia in Matthew 5.32 and 19.9: An 
Approach From the Study of Ancient Near Eastern Culture.” Journal 
for the Study of the New Testament 80 (2000): 66-80.  
 
Jones, Ivor H. The Gospel of Matthew. London: Epworth Press, 1994.  
Juel, Donald H. Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament: Mark. 
Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1990. 
Kamm, Frances M. “Supererogation and Obligation.” The Journal of 
Philosophy 82 (1985): 118–138. 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by 
Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
–––––––––. Metaphysics of Morals, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works 
of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by 
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
Keener, Craig S. A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999. 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Sylvia Walsh and 
edited by C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
Kolb, Robert. “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness.” In Harvesting 
Martin Luther’s Reflections on Theology, Ethics, and the Church. 
Edited by Timothy J. Wengert, 38–55. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2004. 
 271 
Korsgaard, Christine M. Introduction to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, ix–xxxvi. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Kotva, Joseph. The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics. Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1996. 
Kusukawa, Sachiko. The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of 
Philip Melanchthon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Leibniz, Gottfried W. Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays. 
Translated and edited by Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991.  
Lewis, C.S. Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich: 1963. 
–––––––––. Mere Christianity. In The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 1–177. 
New York: HarperOne, 2017. 
–––––––––. The Problem of Pain. In The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 
543–646. New York: HarperOne, 2017. 
Lovin, Robin W. Christian Ethics: An Essential Guide. Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 2000. 
Luther, Martin. “A Brief Introduction on What to Look For and Expect in the 
Gospels.” In Word and Sacrament I of Luther’s Works, vol. 35. 
Translated and edited by E. Theodore Bachmann. Philadelphia, PA: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1960.  
–––––––––. “The Estate of Marriage.” In Luther’s Works, vol. 45. Translated 
and edited by Walther I. Brandt, 11–49. Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg 
Press, 1962. 
–––––––––. “An Exhortation to the Clergy Assembled at the Diet at Augsburg 
1530.” In Works of Martin Luther, vol. IV. Translated by C.M. Jacobs, 
327–382. Philadelphia, PA: A.J. Holman Company, 1931.  
–––––––––. “Exposition of Psalms 127.” In Luther’s Works, vol. 45. 
Translated and edited by Walther I. Brandt, 311–338. Philadelphia, 
PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1962.  
–––––––––. “Our Christian Duties. An Exhortation to the New Christian Life.” 
In Sermons of Martin Luther, vol. 7. Translated and edited by John 
Nicholas Lenker, 272–284. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1988. 
–––––––––. A Treatise on Good Works. In Luther’s Works, vol. 44. 
Translated by W.A. Lambert and edited by James Atkinson, 15–114. 
Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1966.  
 272 
–––––––––. “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” in Career of the Reformer: I of 
Luther’s Works, vol. 31. Translated by Lowell J. Satre and edited by 
Harold J. Grimm. Philadelphia, PA: Muhlenberg Press, 1957. 
–––––––––. “Small Catechism.” In The Book of Concord. Translated and 
edited by Theodore G. Tappert. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 
1959.  
–––––––––. “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved.” In Luther’s Works, vol. 
46. Translated by Charles M. Jacobs and edited by Robert C. Schultz, 
87–138. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1967.  
McCartney, Dan G. James. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009. 
McCarty, Richard. Kant’s Theory of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009.  
McGary, Howard. “Forgiveness.” American Philosophical Quarterly 26, no. 4 
(1989): 343–351. 
McGoldrick, Patricia. “Saints and Heroes: A Plea for the Supererogatory.” 
Philosophy 59 (1984): 523–528.  
McKay, A.C. “Supererogation and the Profession of Medicine.” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 28 (2002): 70–73. 
McNamara, Paul. “Making Room for Going Beyond the Call." Mind 105, no. 
419 (1996): 415–450.  
McKnight, Scot. The Letter of James. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2011.  
Manschreck, Clyde L. Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer. Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1958.  
Massoud, Amy. “Moral Worth and Supererogation.” Ethics 126 (2016): 690–
710. 
Meijering, E.P. Melanchthon and Patristic Thought. Leiden, The Netherlands: 
E.J. Brill, 1983. 
Meilaender, Gilbert. Faith and Faithfulness: Basic Themes in Christian 
Ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. 
Melanchthon, Philip. “Apology of the Augsburg Confession.” In The Book of 
Concord. Translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert and Jaroslav 
Pelikan. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1959. 
–––––––––. “Augsburg Confession.” In A Melanchthon Reader, translated by 
Ralph Keen, 97-125. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1988. 
 
 273 
–––––––––. Loci Communes 1521. Translated by Christian Preus. St. Louis, 
MO: Concordia Publishing House, 2014. 
–––––––––. Loci Communes 1555, in Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: 
Loci Communes 1955. Translated and edited by Clyde L. Manschreck. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1965.  
Mellema, Gregory. “Alternative Acts and the Demands of Morality.” The 
Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2004): 451–456. 
–––––––––. Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and 
Offence. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991. Mill, 
John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Edited by George Sher. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 2001.  
–––––––––. “Moral Ideals and Virtue Ethics.” The Journal of Ethics 14, no. 2 
(2010): 173–180.  
–––––––––. “Quasi-Supererogation.” Philosophical Studies 52 (1987): 141–
150. 
–––––––––. “Supererogation and Business Ethics,” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 8, no. 2 (1991): 191–199.  
–––––––––. “Supererogation and the Fulfillment of Duty.” The Journal of 
Value Inquiry 25 (1991): 167–175. 
Montague, Phillip. “Acts, Agents, and Supererogation.” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989): 101–111.  
Moo, Douglas J. The Letter of James. Leicester: Apollos, 2000. 
Morris, Leon. The Gospel According to Matthew. Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992.  
Mortimer, Sarah. “Counsels of Perfections and Reformation Political 
Thought.” The Historical Journal (2018): 1–20.  
Mounce, William D. The Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1993.  
Mouw, Richard. The God Who Commands. Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990.  
Myers, David G. and C. Nathan DeWall. Psychology. 12th ed. New York, NY; 
Worth Publishers, 2018. 
Murray, John. Divorce. Philadelphia, PA: The Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1972.  
 274 
Nardo, Massimo N. and Ronald D. Francis. “Morality and the Prevention of 
Corruption: Action or Intent—a New Look at an Old Problem. Journal 
of Financial Crime 19, no. 2 (2012): 128–139.  
New, Christopher. “Saints, Heroes and Utilitarians.” Philosophy 49, no. 188 
(1974): 179–189. 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. “Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism.” The 
Journal of Religious Thought 9, no. 2 (1952): 95–111. 
Nowell-Smith, P.H. Ethics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954. 
Osborn, Andrew R. Christian Ethics. London: Oxford University Press, 1940.  
Packer, Mark. “Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 50, no. 3 (1989): 429–442. 
Perschbacher, Wesley J. The New Analytical Greek Lexicon. Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1990. 
Peterfreund, Sheldon. “On the Relationship Between Supererogation and 
Basic Duty.” The Personalist 59, no. 1 (1978): 53–57.  
Pilsner, Joseph. The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Pybus, Elizabeth. “Saints and Heroes.” Philosophy 57 (1982): 193–199.  
Rachels, James. “Active and Passive Euthanasia.” The New England Journal 
of Medicine 292, no. 2 (1975): 78–80. 
Ramsey, Paul. The Essential Paul Ramsey. Edited by William Werpehowski 
and Stephen D. Crocco. London: Yale University Press, 1994. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971.  
–––––––––. “Two Concepts of Rules.” The Philosophical Review 64, no. 1 
(Jan. 1955): 3–32. 
Rayner, Karl. “The Theology of the Religious Life.” In Religious Orders in the 
Modern World, translated by Walter Mitchell, 41–75. Westminster, 
MD: The Newman Press, 1966.  
Raz, Joseph. “Permissions and Supererogation.” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 12 (1975): 161–168. 
Richard, James W. Heroes of the Reformation: Philip Melanchthon. London: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898.   
Richardson, Kurt. James. Vol. 36, The New American Commentary. 
Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1997. 
 275 
Ridge, Michael. “Mill’s Intentions and Motives.” Utilitas 14, no. 1 (2002): 54–
70. 
Rogness, Michael. Philip Melanchthon: Reformer Without Honor. 
Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Humanism. Translated by Philip Mairet. 
London: Methuen & Co., 1966.  
Schaeffer, Francis A. He is There and He is Not Silent. In The Francis A. 
Schaeffer Trilogy. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1990. 
Schmidt-Petri, Christoph. “Mill and the Footnote on Davies.” Journal of Value 
Inquiry 47 (2013): 337–350.  
Schultz, Robert C. Introduction to “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved.” In 
Luther’s Works, vol. 46. Translated by Charles M. Jacobs and edited 
by Robert C. Schultz, 89–91. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1967.  
Schumaker, Millard. “Deontic Morality and the Problem of Supererogation.” 
Philosophical Studies 23 (1972): 427–428.. 
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1 (1972): 229–243.  
–––––––––. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Smedes, Lewis B. Sex for Christians. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Williams B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994. 
Smith, Robert H. Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament: Matthew. 
Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1989. 
Stackhouse, Max L. “Vocation.” In The Oxford Handbook of Theological 
Ethics, edited by Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski, 190–
205. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
Stein, Robert. Mark: Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008.  
Stepler, Renee. “Led by Baby Boomers, divorce rates climb for America’s 
50+ population.” Pew Research Center, accessed February 7th, 2020. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/09/led-by-baby-
boomers-divorce-rates-climb-for-americas-50-population/. 
Stump, Eleonore. “God’s Obligations.” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 
475–491.  
Stupperich, Robert. Melanchthon. Translated by Robert H. Fischer. London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1966.  
 276 
Sullivan, Roger J. An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  
Sverdlik, Steven. Motive and Rightness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
Thielicke, Helmut. Theological Ethics—Foundations. Edited by William H. 
Lazareth. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1968.  
Timmons, Mark. Significance and System: Essays on Kant’s Ethics. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
Trenchard, Warren C. A Concise Dictionary of New Testament Greek. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Trianosky, Gregory. “Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the Autonomy of the Ethics 
of Virtue.” The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1996): 26–40. 
Turner, David L. Matthew: Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New 
Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008.  
UNICEF. “Under-five morality.” Accessed February 5th, 2020. 
https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-five-mortality/.  
Urmson, James. “Saints and Heroes.” In Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited 
by A.I. Melden, 198–216. Seattle, WA: University of Washington 
Press, 1958.  
Vine, W.E. An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words. London: 
Oliphants, 1975. 
Walker, Thomas W. “Who is My Neighbor? An Invitation to See the World 
with Different Eyes.” In Global Neighbors: Christian Faith and Moral 
Obligation in Today’s Economy, edited by Douglas A. Hicks & Mark 
Valeri, 3–15. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008.  
Ward, Jule DeJaeger. Review of Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The 
Social and Literary Context, by David Instone-Brewer. Theological 
Studies 65 (2004): 178-179.  
Worthington Jr., Everett. Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Wesley, John. Plain Account of Christian Perfection. In Entire Sanctification 
Attainable In This Life, 3–141. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1898.  
Wessels, Ulla. “Beyond the Call of Duty: The Structure of a Moral Region.” 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 87–104. 
 277 
Wingren, Gustaf. Luther on Vocation. Translated by Carl C. Rasmussen. 
Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2004. 
Wilson, George. Philip Melanchthon: 1497–1560. London: The Religious 
Tract Society, 1897. 
Wilson, Walter T. “Seen in Secret: Inconspicuous Piety and Alternative 
Subjectivity in Matthew 6:1-6, 16-18.” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 
72, no. 3 (July 2010): 475–497.  
Witherington III, Ben. The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary. 
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2001. 
Wogaman, J. Philip. Christian Ethics: A Historical Introduction. London: 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1994. 
Wolf, Susan. The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, and Love. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.  
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the 
Claim that God Speaks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
Wood, Allen W. The Free Development of Each: Studies on Freedom, Right, 
and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014.  
–––––––––. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Wynn, Mark. “Supererogation and the Relationship Between Religious and 
Secular Ethics: Some Perspectives Drawn from Thomas Aquinas and 
John of the Cross.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 
(2015): 163–183.  
Young, Elizabeth D. “God’s Moral Goodness and Supererogation.” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2013): 83–95.  
–––––––––. “Is Supererogation More Than Just Costly Sacrifice?” Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 77 (2015): 125–140. 
Zimmerman, Michael. “Supererogation and Doing the Best One Can.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 373–380. 
Zly, Liezl van. “Motive and Right Action.” Philosophia 38 (2010): 405–415. 
  
 278 
 
 
 
